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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Introduction:
This thesis plays a part in the recent debate on the fragmentation of 
international law and the relationship between international tribunals. While much 
focus has been given to substantive rules of law, this research introduces a new angle 
through the study of procedural law. Its aim is the examination of evidential rules, 
bringing novelty by addressing three important questions: a) is there a common set of 
rules on evidence from the practice of international tribunals?, b) what are the factors 
influencing international tribunals in the formation of evidential rules?, c) should 
there be a common set of evidential rules for international tribunals? The answer to 
these questions will give an insight on what can be said about procedural rules from 
the perspective of the proliferation of international tribunals and vice versa.
After the examination of how international tribunals treat aspects of evidential 
rules and identifying the factors that affect their approach, the thesis will propose that 
a level of commonality in the evidential rules is desired. This conclusion will be 
backed up by the balancing of the advantages and disadvantages of commonality.
1.2 Background and the research:
The research was carried out in the changing landscape of international 
litigation. In recent years, there has been a proliferation of international tribunals, the 
phenomenon of the significant increase in their number1 and the tendency for them to 
be more specialized . Further, there has also been an increase in the use of 
international tribunals by States, e.g. before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
and newly created tribunals such as the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 
Body (WTO DSB) and the International Tribunal for the law of the Sea (ITLOS). 
This change in the landscape of international tribunals has raised many questions. 
Many scholars argue that it could lead to the fragmentation of international law. In
1 See: Chapter 2, Section 3.2, 27-29
2 See: Chapter 2, Section 2,14-23
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contrast, others think that the proliferation will not have such a direct or substantial 
impact3.
The recent debate has focused on the fragmentation of substantive law and its 
effects on international law. However, there have been few studies focusing on 
procedural rules of international tribunals and most of the existing literature is 
outdated4. To answer questions on procedural rules in the context of the proliferation 
of international tribunals, a fully comprehensive study of all aspects of procedural 
rules in every international tribunal would be ideal. However, this thesis will only 
focus on a very important aspect of procedural rules: the evidential rules.
The production of this thesis is timely as part of the general debate on the 
proliferation of international tribunals and the fragmentation of international law 
because of two recent developments: a) the Conclusions of the work of the Study 
Group on the Fragmentation of International Law5, b) the recent judgment of the ICJ 
on the Genocide Case6. They are significant because, as a simplification, they 
indicated that international law is becoming a system where norms relate to one 
another, and where tribunals refer to one another’s decision.
1.3 The scope of the research:
In order to make the research manageable, it has been narrowed down in two
ways.
First, the study will examine three aspects of evidential rules: the standard of 
proof, expert evidence and amicus curiae briefs. They have been chosen because they 
give a good range of the types of rules, and can be a good indication of the general 
approach of the tribunals. Rules on the standard of proof are only applied and used by 
the tribunals. Those on expert evidence involve the parties to a higher degree. 
Finally, rules on amicus curiae submissions also concern entities not part of the 
proceedings.
Second, the study is limited to three tribunals: the ICJ, ITLOS and the WTO 
DSB. The practice and the relationship between these tribunals give a good example 
of how tribunals generally treat the issue of evidential rules. The ICJ was specifically
3 See: Chapter 2, Section 3.2, 27-29
4 The major works in this area are: Sandifer, (1975), Kazazi, (1996), Sands, Mackenzie and Shany, (1999), Rosenne, (1965), 
Brown, (2004), White, (1965)
5 International Law Commission, (2006). See: Chapter 2, Section 3.2, 27-29
6 The Genocide Case, ICJ, 2007. See: Chapter 4, Section 3.3.2.3, 79
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chosen because it is the only tribunal with universal jurisdiction covering all types of 
disputes and the only tribunal that is a principal organ of the United Nations. The 
other two tribunals have been selected because they also have global jurisdiction over 
civil cases. Further, the three tribunals are active and can be used extensively in the 
future. Criminal tribunals have not been selected because their treatment of evidential 
rules is very different to civil cases tribunals. To establish whether there is an 
emerging commonality, similar tribunals must be compared.
Third, the study, unless otherwise stated, will only examine the practice of 
tribunals in contentious cases and not advisory opinions. This is because not all the 
tribunals have jurisdiction to give advisory opinions, and a comparative study has to 
be done on common aspects.
1.4 The questions of the research:
This investigation of evidential rules of the tribunals will answer three main 
questions:
1.4.1 Is there a common set of rules on evidence emerging from the practice of
n
international tribunals?
The research examined the provisions and the practice of international 
tribunals to see whether there is, within this new landscape of international litigation, 
an emerging commonality on evidential rules. This emerging commonality is the 
increase in the level of cross-fertilization of evidential rules established and applied 
by different tribunals. This investigation is significant in many respects.
Detailed examination of the evidential rules of international tribunals has been 
rare, and most of the existing literature is outdated. This research has brought fresh 
information to the question of what is the practice of international tribunals on 
evidence.
Further, an emerging common set of rules would have other implications. 
First, a dialogue between tribunals resulting in common rules could indicate that they 
regard themselves as part of a more integrated legal system. This is significant
7 See: Chapter 7, Section 2, 248-250
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because it would not concur with the “traditional” view of international litigation 
where tribunals are independent and fragmented. Second, States created tribunals as 
individual entities. A common approach suggesting tribunals evolving towards an 
integrated system begs the questions of what has caused this change. Third, from a 
practical point of view, common evidential rules would mean uniformity. From the 
perspective of States, this will make international litigation easier. Fourth, there are 
also implications for the tribunals. If there are common rules on evidence developing 
from an emerging integrated system, tribunals can arguably formally refer to rules of 
other tribunals to fill in gaps in their own provisions.
1.4.2 What are the factors influencing the tribunals in the formation of evidential 
rules?8
The second question of the thesis is what factors have a role in influencing the 
tribunals in their approach to evidential rules. For example, this could comprise a 
range of factors: a) the awareness and the policies of the tribunals towards 
commonality, b) the background and the training of the judges, c) the nature of the 
cases before the tribunals. These are explored throughout the thesis and summarized 
in the conclusion.
1.4.3 Should there be a common set of evidential rules for international tribunals?9
If there is no emerging commonality in the evidential rules of international 
tribunals, the next question is whether there should be such commonality. This 
section brings together the answers to the first and the second question of the thesis by 
reaching a conclusion whether a common set of rules is desirable.
After addressing the advantages and the disadvantages, the thesis proposes 
that a level of commonality is desired, taking into account the relevant considerations. 
This conclusion is significant in the new era of the proliferation of international 
tribunals, indicating that the way in which they are seen has to be reconsidered. 
Further, the thesis puts forward, mainly from the input of judges, ways in which a 
level of commonality can be achieved.
8 See: Chapter 7, Section 3, 257-265
9 See: Chapter 7, Section 4, 265-316
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1.5 The methodology of the thesis:
The methodology of the thesis involved the gathering of information on the 
practice of international tribunals through three major channels. First, the provisions 
of the tribunals, including any constituent instruments, are examined. This gives an 
insight on the explicit powers and limitations of the tribunals on evidential rules. 
Where relevant, the research also examined other documents concerning the 
provisions, such as any preparatory work. Second, the study examined the 
jurisprudence of the tribunals to see how these rules have been applied, and whether 
the actual practice reflects the provisions. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the 
research includes interviews with 13 judges of the three selected tribunals on their 
views on evidential rules10. These three sources of information collectively give an 
insight to the approach of the three tribunals and answer the three questions of the 
thesis.
1.6 The layout of the thesis:
The thesis has been divided into the following seven chapters:
- Chapter one - Introduction: This chapter introduces the thesis by setting out the 
context within which it is set and lays out the three main questions.
- Chapter two - The development and historical aspects of international litigation: 
After a short account of how the three chosen tribunals work, this chapter investigates 
how international litigation has developed and its different phases.
- Chapter three - Understanding international rules from the municipal rules: The third 
chapter gives a brief introduction into different legal traditions in the municipal 
context to see whether there has been an influence on the international level.
- Chapter four to six - Standard of Proof, Expert Evidence, Amicus Curiae briefs: 
These three are the substantive chapters and examine the way in which the three 
chosen tribunals approach the issues. The examination will include looking at the
10 The details of the methodology and the results can be found in Appendix A,B, and E.
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constituent instruments of the tribunals, the jurisprudence, and information gathered 
from the interviews.
- Chapter seven - Conclusion: The concluding Chapter brings together the other 
chapters to answer the three main questions of the thesis. In addition to concluding 
that a level of commonality of evidential rules is desirable, it will address as to how 
this can be achieved.
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Chapter Two: The development and historical aspects of international litigation:
Section 1: Introduction:
1.1 Introduction:
One purpose of this chapter is to introduce the selected tribunals. 
Understanding of the background of the tribunals is crucial for a fruitful study of their 
evidential rules. In addition, this chapter continues with a study of the history of 
international tribunals, particularly on the issue of evidential rules1. This is done 
through studying a cross-section of international tribunals on selected issues of 
evidential rules. The chapter attempts to answer the question of what have been the 
policy considerations of the tribunals in the earlier part of the history of international 
litigation. Further, have the policy considerations of the earlier tribunals been carried 
through to the tribunals today? Alternatively, how has the approach of the earlier 
international tribunals affected the approach of the tribunals today? And finally, what 
can we learn from the approach of the earlier tribunals in relation to the existing 
tribunals?
Section 2: Introduction to the three selected tribunals
2.1 The International Court of Justice2:
2.1.1 The role of the Court:
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was created in 1945 after the end of 
the Second World War to replace its predecessor, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice3. The ICJ was based closely on the PCIJ and it is one of the 
principal organs of the United Nations4. The UN Charter further states that the Court
1 The historical account in this chapter is largely drawn from: Sandifer, (1975).
2 There has been much literature written on the International Court. See generally: Bowett and others, (1997), Rosenne, (1995), 
Sands, Mackenzie and Shany, (1999), Thirlway, (1996), Rosenne, (2006), Merrills, (1998), Chapter 6-7, Rosenne, (1965), Abi- 
Saab, (1996) , Fitzmaurice, (1986), Jennings, (1997) , Muller, Raic and Thuransky, (1997), Oda, (1996) , Oda, (1993) , Plender, 
(1991), Rosenne, (1983), Sameh M Amr, (2003), Shaw, (1998)
3 See further: Fachiri, (1932), Hudson, (1943), Hudson, (1946), Lauterpacht, (1934)
4 UN Charter, 1945 Article 7
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shall function according to its Statute of the Court which is an integral part of the 
Charter5.
The ICJ was created to achieve two main goals. The first goal of the Court is 
to decide legal disputes between States, in other words, make judgments in 
contentious cases between States. Because of the fact that the ICJ statute is part of the 
UN Charter, all members of the UN, and other States which are members of the 
Statute of the Court and not members of the UN, may bring disputes before the Court.
For the Court to be able to make a ruling on a dispute between States, those 
States need to give their consent to be under the jurisdiction of the Court. This 
consent can be established by three methods6: (a) upon Special Agreement, (b) 
through international treaties or conventions, (c) through Article 36(2) of the Statute, 
otherwise known as “the optional clause”. The parties may refer a dispute of any 
legal nature to the Court. The only limitation is one which might have been laid down 
by treaties granting the jurisdiction of the dispute to the Court. The decisions of the
n
ICJ for contentious cases are binding .
The second function of the Court is to give advisory opinions8. These are 
requests from the General Assembly, the Security Council or other authorized United 
Nations agencies for the opinion of the Court on legal questions that may arise in their 
activities9. The procedures used in advisory opinions are generally very similar to 
those in contentious cases. Advisory opinions are not legally binding.
States can also request the Court to grant provisional measures to preserve 
their rights in disputes. These tend to be disputes of a rapidly changing nature, hence 
urgent need to preserve the rights of the parties. Parties can request provisional 
measures at any time during the proceedings. Such requests are treated with utmost 
urgency and will get priority over other cases.
2.1.2 The functioning of the Court:
The Court’s primary instrument is the Statue of the Court. It sets out the way 
in which the Court will function including issues of its composition, organization and 
jurisdiction. In addition, the Court is also governed by other provisions: a) the Rules
5 UN Charter, 1945 Article 92
6 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 36
7 UN Charter, 1945 Article 94
8 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 65
9 ICJ Statute, 1945 Chapter IV
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of the Court, and, b) the Practice Directions. These two instruments provide for 
procedures of the Court in more detail.
The Statute stipulates that the Court is to decide its cases according to 
international law which includes treaties, customary international law and general 
principles of law. In addition, the Court may also use judicial decisions and the 
teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as subsidiary 
means for the determination of international law10.
2.1.3 The judges of the Court:
The Court is composed of 15 judges who must be persons of high moral 
character and should possess qualifications for appointment to the highest judicial 
office in their own countries or be jurists of recognized competence in international 
law11. They are elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council on 
renewable nine year terms. The composition of the bench should represent the main 
forms of civilisations and the principal legal systems. No two judges can have the
1 9same nationality . However, in practice, the five permanent members of the Security 
Council always have one judge on the bench each. The rest are judges representing 
different regions of the world. The Court elects a President and a Vice-president for a 
renewable three year term13. In cases where a party in a dispute does not have a judge 
of its nationality on the bench, an ad hoc judge can be appointed. They must meet the 
same requirements as the permanent judges and work on an equality basis14. If both 
parties have the right to appoint ad hoc judges, then one party may ask the other for 
them to both abstain from doing so15.
The Court can hear its cases in plenary or in chambers. The plenary has a 
quorum of nine judges16. The Statute of the Court provides for both ad hoc and 
permanent chambers. A permanent chamber may be established by the Court to look
17at a particular type of dispute . The Court has formed one such Chamber, the 
Chamber for Environmental Matters. However, it has not been used so far in the
10 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 38
" ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 2, Other articles on the judges of the Court: Article 3(1), 4(1), 7(2), 9, 13(1), 21(1), 31(2),(3),(6), 
35(1),(2)
12 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 3(1)
13 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 21(1)
14 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 31(6)
15 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 35(2)
16 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 29
17 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 16(1)
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history of the Court. Ad hoc chambers are formed for particular disputes. According 
to the Statute, the parties must approve of the number of judges for the ad hoc 
chamber18. In its history, the Court has sat in plenary more than in chambers. The 
procedural rules for the chambers are generally very similar to those when the Court 
is sitting in plenary.
The Court has a registry with a Registrar and a Deputy-Registrar who are 
elected on renewable seven year terms. The Registry is responsible for many 
functions of the Court including important administrative functions, acting as its 
channel of communications, and publishing and translating the decisions of the Court.
2.1.4 Some basic procedures:
The Court has two official languages: French and English19. The parties can 
decide which language will be used in the proceedings or both languages can be used
0C\simultaneously . If the latter is the case, there will be translation into the other 
official language.
The proceedings of the Court are divided into two stages: the written
proceedings and the oral proceedings. At the written proceedings, a Memorial is filed
21by the applicant and then a Counter-Memorial by the respondent. If the jurisdiction 
was established through a Special Agreement, the parties may determine the order and 
number of written submissions. Where the Court considers it necessary, the applicant 
may then submit a Reply and the respondent a Rejoinder. " The ICJ Statute and the
Rules of the Court stipulate the detail of the procedures regarding the written
proceedings, covering issues of what is to be included and its time frame. Evidence 
can be introduced to the Court as part of the written submissions. The parties can 
make arguments referring to relevant evidence which is normally annexed.
The oral arguments take place after the written proceedings. The oral 
statements are to be as succinct as possible and they must focus on issues which still
7^divide the parties . Evidence can again be introduced at this stage. This is usually 
done through the oral testimony of witnesses and experts who are called by the
18 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 26(2)
19 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 39(1)
20 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 39(1), (2)
21 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 43(2); Rules o f Court, 1978 Article 45(1)
22 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 43(2); Rules o f Court, 1978 Article 45(2), 46(2)
23 Rules o f Court, 1978 Article 60(1)
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parties. The Court can also put questions to these experts. If the Court decides to 
appoint independent experts, they can also be questioned at the oral proceedings.
A third state may request to intervene in proceedings if it has an interest of a 
legal nature which may be affected by the decision24. In disputes concerning the 
interpretation of an international convention which has as parties States other than 
those in dispute, the third party States have the right to intervene in the proceedings.25 
The requirements for third party intervention are set out in the Rules26. Multiple 
proceedings are also possible. The Court can direct proceedings in two or more cases 
to be formally joined and litigated together27.
2.2 ITLOS28:
2.2.1 The functioning of the Tribunal:
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was created by the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS), and it is an 
important part of the dispute settlement regime set up by the Convention. The 
Tribunal is governed by Part XV of UNCLOS, the Statute, and other provisions such 
as the Rules of the Tribunal, the Guidelines concerning the Presentation of Cases 
before the Tribunal, and the Resolution on the Internal Judicial Practice of the 
Tribunal. The Tribunal’s scope covers issues concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Convention, or other agreements related to its purposes.
The Tribunal can be used by State parties to the Convention, and in specific 
circumstances, other States, non-State entities including private individuals and 
corporations, and international organizations29.
Disputes which arise under UNCLOS are subject to compulsory settlement 
according the Part XV of the Convention, with some exceptions. The Tribunal is one 
of the fora which a State can chose according to Article 287 of the Convention. 
ITLOS has mandatory jurisdiction over some areas of UNCLOS such as the prompt
24 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 62
25 ICJ Statute, 1945 Article 63
26 Rules o f Court, 1978 Article 81, 82
27 Rules o f Court, 1978 Article 47
28 On ITLOS, see generally: Adede, (1987), Eiriksson, (1997), Mensah, (1997) , Nelson, (1997), Sands, Mackenzie and Shany, 
(1999), Treves, (1999)., Treves, (2000), Anderson, (1998), Churchill, (1998), Lowe, (2001)
29 Statute o f ITLOS, 1982 Article 20
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release of vessels, the request for provisional measures, and issues concerning the sea­
bed area.
2.2.2 The judges of the Tribunal:
ITLOS has 21 judges who are elected by the State parties to UNCLOS. They 
must be persons enjoying the highest reputation for fairness and integrity and of
TOrecognized competence in the field of the law of the sea . Like the ICJ, the selection 
of the judges must represent the principal legal systems of the world and ensure 
equitable distribution. No two judges can have the same nationality. The terms of the 
judges are 9 years and renewable. Parties to a dispute are entitled to have a judge of 
their nationality on the bench, and if there is no permanent judge of their nationality, 
an ad hoc judge may be appointed with equal footing to the permanent judges.
The Tribunal normally hears its cases in plenary, with a quorum of 11
T1judges . It can also hear cases in chambers, which are composed of three or more 
judges. So far, the Tribunal has established two chambers: the Chamber for Fisheries 
Dispute and the Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes. According to Part XI of 
UNCLOS, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the tribunal has exclusive and 
compulsory jurisdiction over disputes on activities in the sea-bed area. If the parties 
agree, a special ad hoc chamber can also be formed to deal with a particular dispute32. 
The Tribunal is to determine the composition of such a chamber with the approval of 
the parties.
ITLOS has a registry. It serves as the secretariat to the Tribunal, performing 
many functions including acting as the channel of communication between the parties 
and the Tribunal, handling documents and providing translation and interpretation 
services. The Registrar and Deputy Registrar are elected on renewable seven year 
terms.
2.2.3 Some basic procedures:
30 Statute o f ITLOS, 1982 Article 2(1)
31 Statute o f ITLOS, 1982 Article 13
32 Statute o f ITLOS, 1982 Article 15(2)
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Disputes before ITLOS are decided according to the substantive rules of 
UNCLOS and general international law not incompatible with the Convention33. The 
Tribunal can also decide cases ex aequo et bono should the parties agree.
The two official languages of ITLOS are French and English34. The pleadings 
are to be in one or both of the official languages, but in cases where a party wants to 
submit its pleadings in another language, a certified translation into an official 
language must be produced.
The proceedings before ITLOS consist of two parts: the written and the oral 
proceedings. Where there was an application to commence the case, a Memorial is 
submitted by the applicant and a Counter-Memorial by the respondent . If needed, 
the Tribunal may authorize the applicant to file a Reply and the respondent a 
Rejoinder. The number, order and time limits for the submissions are determined by 
the Tribunal. In cases where the dispute is submitted by special agreement, the 
procedures are to be determined by that agreement unless the Tribunal, after 
consulting the parties, decides otherwise . Similar to the ICJ, the evidence can be 
submitted to the Tribunal at both the written and oral stages. It can be annexed to the 
written submissions.
The oral arguments start once the written proceedings are finished and the
T7judges have exchanged views . The Tribunal determines the procedure of the oral 
arguments. The statements should be as succinct as possible and should focus on the 
issues that still divide the parties after the written proceedings38. The Tribunal can 
ask any questions and seek clarification from the parties39. During the oral stage, the 
parties may call on witnesses and experts if a list is submitted to the Registrar in 
sufficient time40. The parties as well as the Tribunal can put forward questions to the 
witnesses and experts41. If the Tribunal decides to appoint its own experts, then they 
can also be questioned at the oral stage of the proceedings.
Should a third party consider that its interest of a legal nature can be affected 
by the decision of the Tribunal in the dispute, it may request to intervene42. In
33 UNCLOS, 1982 Article 293(1)
34 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 Article 43
35 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 Article 60(1)
36 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 Article 61(1)
37 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 Article 68
38 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 Article 75 (1)
39 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 Article 76(2)
40 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 Article 72, 78
41 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 Article 80
42 Statute o f ITLOS, 1982 Article 31
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addition, Article 32 of the Statute allows for third parties to intervene in cases which 
concern an interpretation of a treaty to which that State is a party (e.g. UNCLOS or 
one conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal). If the request for the intervention is 
granted by the Tribunal, the intervening party will receive copies of the pleadings and 
other documents. They will be entitled to participate in both the written and oral 
pleadings. The Tribunal can also hear cases which involve more than two parties: 
multiple proceedings. In cases where they are filed separately, the Tribunal may 
order the proceedings to be joined43.
International organizations which are not party to a dispute can submit a 
memorial with relevant information before the end of the written pleadings44. The 
Tribunal can also request information from international organizations on its on 
initiative. In cases where an organization’s instrument or international convention 
adopted under an organization is in question, the Tribunal will invite observations on 
those particular issues from the relevant organization.
Regarding scientific experts, the Tribunal may select two or more scientific or 
technical experts on its own initiative or at the request of a party45. It is preferred that 
the experts are chosen from lists maintained by international organizations according 
to Annex VIII of UNCLOS. Experts should be independent and enjoy the highest 
reputation for fairness, competence and integrity46. If necessary, the Tribunal can 
arrange for an inquiry or an expert opinion on a particular issue after hearing the 
parties. Under such circumstances, ITLOS is to determine the details of such an 
inquiry including the subject matter, the number of experts and the procedures47.
ITLOS can also render advisory opinions where another agreement related to 
the purpose of UNCLOS provides for it. In the context of UNCLOS, the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber is authorized to give advisory opinions at the request of the 
Assembly or Council of the International Seabed Authority on questions that arise in 
their activities.
2.3 The World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body (WTO DSB)48
43 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 Article 47
44 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 Article 84
45 UNCLOS, 1982 Article 289
46 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 Article 15(3)
47 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 Article 82(2)
48 General literature include: Cameron and Campbell, (1998); Jackson, (1997); Petersmann, (1997b); Petersmann, (1997a); 
Sands, Mackenzie and Shany, (1999), GATT, (1994), Marceau, (2001) , McRae, (2004) , Palmeter and Mavroidis, (2004), 
Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Macvroidis, (2003), Petersmann, (1995) , Steger and Hainsworth, (1998) , Stewart and Dwyer, 
(2003), Waincymer, (2002), Watts, (2000)
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2.3.1 The functioning of the DSB:
The WTO DSB was established by the Marrakesh Agreement (1994) that also 
created the new World Trade Organization to regulate international trade and 
replacing the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement, the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU)’s purpose is to resolve disputes under the WTO Agreement and its related 
agreements. The DSU established the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) comprising ad 
hoc panels and a permanent Appellate Body (AB).
The WTO dispute settlement system is governed by various instruments 
including: (a) the Agreement Establishing the WTO, (b) the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement), (c) Working Procedures (“Panel 
Working Procedures”) (Appendix 3 to the DSU), (d) Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review (“Appellate Body Working Procedures”), (e) Rules of Conduct for 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(“Rules of Conduct”).
Appendix 1 of the DSU provides a list of the agreements covered by the 
Understanding. It includes the WTO agreement, Multilateral Trade Agreements and 
Plurilateral Trade Agreements. The contents of these agreements are the substantive 
rules to be applied by the DSB. The provisions of the WTO DSB do not refer to 
general public international law as the applied substantive law. However, in US -  
Standards fo r  Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, the first case before the AB, 
it was stated that trade rules are not to be read in clinical isolation from public 
international law49.
The body of first instance of the WTO DSB is the panel. There are normally 
three panelists in a panel, but parties can request an increase to five50. The panelists 
are proposed by the WTO Secretariat usually from a list of prospective panel 
members, put forward by members of the WTO and approved by the DSB. The 
Parties are expected to agree unless they have compelling reasons not to51. Citizens
49 USA - Gasoline Case , WTO DSB, 1996, 18
50 Dispute Settlement Understanding, 1994 Article 8(5)
51 Dispute Settlement Understanding, 1994 Article 8(6)
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of Members parties to a dispute are not to serve as panelists, unless the parties agree 
otherwise.52
The WTO DSB has an appeal system limited to legal issues already addressed 
by the panels. In practice, however, the AB does look into issues that the panel had 
not previously considered . The AB has seven members elected by the DSB on a 
four year term which is renewable once. The AB members rotate to sit in divisions of 
three for a particular case. They are independent experts recognized in international 
trade law54. The AB is headed by a Chairman elected for a one year term and each 
three member division is headed by a Presiding Member. The Working Procedures 
for Appellate Review have provisions to ensure consistency in the rulings by 
requiring members of the AB to meet on a regular basis to discuss matters of policy, 
practice and procedure. Consistency in the rulings is further ensured by the 
requirement that the division considering a particular appeal must exchange views 
with other AB members before finalizing the report55.
The administrative tasks of the panels are handled by the WTO Secretariat. 
The Legal Affairs Division normally provides the panels with help on legal and 
procedural aspects of the dispute. The AB has its own Secretariat with similar 
supportive roles to the panel’s.
The WTO DSB has compulsory jurisdiction over all disputes arising under the 
WTO. Non-Members do not have standing. The jurisdiction of the WTO DSB only 
covers contentious cases and not advisory opinions. The panel reports are not ipso 
facto  binding upon the litigant parties, but only recommendations until they have been 
adopted by the DSB. However, the DSB must adopt the reports unless there is a 
consensus not to. In practice, the reports are always adopted and become binding on 
the parties.
2.3.2 Some basic procedures:
The conditions for initiating proceedings before the WTO DSB are governed 
by Article XXIII of GATT 1994, or corresponding provisions of other Agreements.
52 Dispute Settlement Understanding, 1994 Article 8(6)
53 E.g. AB report o f Canada - Periodicals Case, WTO DSB, 1997, 449
54 Dispute Settlement Understanding, 1994 Article 17
55 Appellate Body Working Procedure, 2005 Rule 4
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But the jurisdiction only extends to cases initiated after the WTO Agreement has 
come into force.
The WTO system encourages parties to resolve their dispute through 
consultation, good offices, conciliation and mediation. The establishment of a panel 
may only be done by a party after 60 days counting from when it submitted a request 
for consultation to the other party, and if the consultation fails (20 days for urgent 
cases)56. However, the parties may agree to submit the dispute to a panel before the 
expiration of the 60 days or extend the period to encourage other means of settling the 
dispute. The DSB must take its decision to adopt the report within 60 days from 
when the panel report is circulated to the WTO members but not before 20 days. The 
submission for the appeal process must be before the DSB adopts the report.
The WTO panel may seek information from any individual or body as it 
considers appropriate, given that the Member State with the jurisdiction over that 
individual or body has been notified. The panel may also appoint an expert review 
group, composed of leading experts in the field, to prepare an advisory report. The 
rules which govern this procedure are contained in Appendix 4 of the DSU.
The official languages of the WTO are French, Spanish and English. The 
parties may use anyone of these in the proceedings. The proceedings before the WTO 
DSB also have two stages: written and oral.
The rules on written submissions are regulated by the panel with some 
limitations such as the time limits57. In principle, the complaining party submits their 
submissions first but the panel can decide that the parties should do so 
simultaneously58. The parties should submit written rebuttals within two or three 
weeks of the first session59. The panel can request the parties to explain any specific 
questions60. Evidence can be incorporated as part of the written submissions.
As for the oral stage, the complainant is to present arguments first followed by 
the respondent. This takes place at the first meeting. At the second meeting, the 
respondent makes its oral rebuttal first, and the complainant is called to make their 
case. The panel can ask any questions to both parties during the oral stage. Evidence
56 Dispute Settlement Understanding, 1994 Article 4(3), 4(7), (8), (9) 5(4). The panel and the AB cannot issue provisional 
measures but urgent cases can be accelerated, e.g. cases involving perishable goods.
57 Appendix 3 o f Dispute Settlement Understanding, 1994
58 Dispute Settlement Understanding, 1994 Article 12(6)
59 Dispute Settlement Understanding, 1994 Article 12(6)
60 Dispute Settlement Understanding, 1994 Appendix 3, Panel Working Procedures, Rule 8
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can be presented by the parties at the oral stage. Any experts appointed by the panel 
could also be asked questions at this stage.
A third party with a substantial interest in a case pending before the panel can 
join the proceedings as an intervener61. The panel can arrange a special meeting to 
hear the third parties’ views and they can also make written submissions to the panel.
In addition, in cases where another WTO Member meets the jurisdictional
62requirements, it can also initiate proceedings regarding the same dispute . If it is 
possible, the DSB will refer the case to the same panel.
There is no provision in the DSU allowing non-governmental amicus curiae 
submissions. However, according to Article 13 of the DSU, panels have the right to
ATask for information from any individual or body they deem appropriate .
61 Dispute Settlement Understanding, 1994 Article 10(2)
62 Dispute Settlement Understanding, 1994 Article 10(4)
63 See Chapter 5, Section 5.2, 161
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Section 3: The International Legal Order
3.1 The Nature of the International Legal Order:
International law is different to municipal law. A distinctive feature of the 
international legal order is that there is no legislating body. International law is 
generally agreed as deriving from a number of sources including treaties and
64custom .
In addition, and more relevant to this thesis, there is no centralized body for 
dispute settlement, to be distinguished from the municipal context where cases are 
dealt with in a hierarchical and centralized system65. The international arena consists 
of many different tribunals established by treaties between States66. Each tribunal is 
autonomous, independent and segregated from one another .
The De Merode Case before the World Bank Administrative Tribunal 
illustrates the independent nature of international tribunals. The case concerns a 
dispute between the Bank and its employees about actions taken by the Bank 
concerning the remuneration of its employees to the effect that the money received by 
them was not as high as expected. Significantly for the purposes of this study, the 
Tribunal stated that it “does not overlook the fact...that the differences between one 
organization and another are so obvious that the notion of a common law of 
international organization must be subject to numerous and sometimes significant 
qualifications. But the fact that these differences exist does not exclude the possibility 
that similar conditions may affect the solution of comparable problems. While the 
various international administrative tribunals do not consider themselves bound by 
each other’s decision...it is...true that on certain points the solutions reached are not 
significantly different. It even happens that the judgment of one tribunal may refer to
z: q
the jurisprudence of another.” Throughout the judgment, the tribunal refers to 
practice of the United Nations regarding particular issues it was discussing69.
Even though the De Merode Case concerned tribunals within the context of 
international organizations, it underlined that international tribunals are independent
64 ICJ Statute, 1945 article 38
65 Examples the highest court include: a) the House of Lords in England, b) the Supreme Court in the United States and, c) the 
Cour de Cassation or the Conseil d’Etat in France.
66 See generally on the law of treaties: Aust, (2000)
67 See further: Shany, (2003) 94-99, Conmbacau, (1986) 90
68 Louis de Merode, World Bank Administrative Tribunal, 1981, 13
69 See further: Louis de Merode, Tribunal, 1981, 19, 26, 33, 42-43
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of one another and that their jurisprudence is not binding upon one another in any 
way. However, tribunals may look at another’s jurisprudence in an attempt to adopt 
its own.
3.2 The “proliferation” of international courts and tribunals:
The “traditional view” of international law has to be re-examined in light of 
the proliferation of international tribunals70. This proliferation describes phenomenon 
of the growing number of international tribunals, and their increasing specialization. 
The recent work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law under 
the auspices of the ILC is of note. Although it mainly addressed substantive law, it 
also has bearing on the debate on international litigation.
3.2.1 The recognition of the fragmentation of international law and specialization:
The conclusions of the study recognized the fragmentation of international 
law, possible conflict of laws, and the overlapping jurisdiction of international 
tribunals71. Further, it noted the emergence of rules and legal institutions which are
72specialized and autonomous . For the purpose of this study, what must be noted is 
the increase in the number of specialized tribunals.
New tribunals have been created to focus on an aspect of international law or 
disputes arising in a geographical region. An example of a regional tribunal is the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). Other specialized tribunals include:
- Human rights law: European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
- International criminal law: International Criminal Court, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR)
- International trade law: World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body 
(WTO DSB)
- Investment: International Centre for the Settlement of International Dispute 
(ICSID)
70 This has been the subject of much debate, the details of which will not be dwelled upon here. See: G Guillaume, (2000), 
Kingsbury, (1999) , Romano, (1999) , Chamey, (1999) , Treves, (1999) , Abi-Saab, (1999) , Guillaume, (2004) , Buergenthal, 
(2001), Treves, (20 0 0 ), Shany, (2003) Chamey, (1998), Boyle, (1997), Hafner, (1998), Dupuy, (1999), Schwebel, (2000)
71 Study Group: Analytical study, (2006) para 5-8.
72 Study Group: Analytical study, (2006) para 8
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- The Law of the Sea: International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
In addition, litigants before these new tribunals include other stakeholders in 
international law: individuals, corporations, and NGOs. This is different from the 
“classical” view of international law where States are the sole litigants.
3.2.2 The debate on proliferation:
Many scholars have suggested that the simultaneous use of international
7Ttribunals has always been the norm , but it has been on the increase. There have 
been further suggestions that the proliferation of tribunals has been partly a result of 
the demand for more specialization of tribunals74. Shany has suggested that States 
have been more willing to submit disputes to third party litigation. Further, the 
proliferation has been a result of globalization where there has been more interaction 
between States and the creation of international treaties75.
The debate on the fragmentation of international law and the proliferation of 
international tribunals has been substantial. “Some commentators have been highly 
critical of what they have seen as the erosion of general international law, emergence 
of conflicting jurisprudence, forum-shopping and loss of legal security. Others have 
seen here a merely technical problem that has emerged naturally with the increase of 
international activity may be controlled by the use of technical streamlining and 
coordination.”76
More specifically to international tribunals, the proliferation has underlined
77the fact that they exist as individual and separate entities . There are scholars, 
notably former President Guillaume of the ICJ, who argue that the proliferation could
78lead to the fragmentation of international law . Some have pointed out that it could 
also lead to conflicting decisions from different tribunals79, and forum shopping80. 
However, there are other scholars, notably President Higgins of the ICJ, who consider
that the proliferation could have an effect on the integrity of international law but that
81it is not as big a threat as some has made it out to be . The proliferation also raises
73 Lauterpacht, (1991) 10
74 Lauterpacht, (1991) 14-22
75 See further: Shany, (2003) 3-4
76 Study Group: Analytical study, (2006) para 9. See also the literature therein.
77 See further: Shany, (2003) 94-99
78 For example: Guillaume, (2004), Guillaume, (2000), Guillaume, (1995)
79 See, for example: Chamey, (1999) 704-708, Brown, (2002) 460-464
80 Treves, (1997) 418, see also: Shany, (2003) 133-134
81 Higgins, (2006) and Higgins, (2003)
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questions of the relationship between the international tribunals, and whether 
deference should be granted to the ICJ because it is the only international tribunal that
is a principal organ of the United Nations. Further, there are also questions as to the
82relationship between general international law and lex specialis .
3.3 The development of international tribunals:
From the outset, it is important to note that States also have other means to
09
settle their disputes as alternatives to binding third party settlement : e.g. a) 
negotiation, a way in which disputes can be settled without a third party, b) mediation,
o4
c) conciliation . This section will give an outline of the development of international 
tribunals to show their progress and how they have changed.
3.3.1 The five main eras of international litigation:
For the purposes of this study, the history of international litigation has been 
divided into five main eras. The beginning of each era is determined by the initiation 
of a new method of dispute settlement or a particular dispute settlement body which 
brought about some change in the way in which international litigation was carried 
out.
However, what must be made clear from the outset is that, even though a 
particular period was marked by new or a change in settlement bodies, States were not 
limited to those fora. For example, during the period which the ICJ was the
or
significant player in international litigation, many States still opted for arbitrations .
3.3.1.1 The Early Years, pre-1899:
The Early Years is the earliest period of international dispute settlement, 
defined here as pre-1899. It is the beginning of international dispute settlement in the 
formal context where third parties are involved. Ad hoc arbitration and mixed 
commissions emerged in this period. Arbitrations would be set up on agreement of
82 See further: Pauwelyn, (2001) 535, Higgins, (2003) in particular 17-20 , Higgins, (1997), Oxman, (2001) 309-312 , 
International Law Commission, (2006) 30-114
83 See generally: Aldrich and Chinkin, (2000a), Institute, (1987)
84 On the various types o f dispute settlement mechanisms, see: Merrills, (1998) 91-237
85 On the relationship between the ICJ and other tribunals, see: Lauterpacht, (1991) 11
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the States in dispute, and usually designed to be specific to it. Mixed commissions 
tended to include equal numbers of representatives from the two States in dispute.
However, these dispute settlement processes were still very much in control of 
the States. They were able to decide on the details and had the freedom to appoint the 
arbitrators and commissioners of their choice. Subject to agreement of the other 
party, they were able to control all aspects of the proceedings, including the
Qz:
procedural rules .
3.3.1.2 The Two Hague Conventions, 1899-1920:
The first Hague Convention was created in 1899. The modified version, or the 
second Hague Convention, was agreed upon in 1907. The Permanent Court of 
Arbitration was also created at the time of the two Hague Conventions . This period 
is significant because there was a set of rules laid down to be applied to more than one 
international dispute. The Conventions also introduced a set of procedural rules for 
arbitrations. This meant that, for the first time, States were willing to accept that there 
should be an international standard of procedural rules indicating that they would not
oo
have complete freedom over the rules of the proceedings .
The Hague Conventions had provisions for a list of arbitrators to be compiled, 
from which States could chose their arbitrators. The procedural rules and the power 
of the tribunals were defined more clearly. However, States were not obliged to adopt
OQ
these rules but they were only guidelines . States were able to adopt their own 
approach to litigation as before.
In the two eras just mentioned, States used arbitrations and mixed 
commissions as the third party dispute settlement process of choice. However, their 
use was not limited to these two eras, but extended to modem times. These first two 
periods saw their creation and their initial use90.
3.3.1.3 The Years of the Permanent Court, 1920-1942:
86 See: Sandifer, (1975)4-22
87 See: Merrills, (1999) 3-31
88 See for a general and historical discussion on the Peace Conference: Aldrich and Chinkin, (2000b) in particular 90-92 , Caron, 
(2000)
89 On the nature o f arbitrations in general, see: Merrills, (1998), Chapter 5
90 See further: Gray and Kingsbury, (1992)
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The introduction of Central American Court of Justice (CACJ) and the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) can be considered a crucial landmark. 
As well as the option of going to arbitration, from this point onwards, States could go 
before these permanent tribunals.
The rules of the proceedings already existed in these courts and were fixed. It 
was no longer up to the States to decide the specific details of the dispute settlement 
process. The question for the States was whether they would litigate before the 
existing bodies. States no longer had the freedom to choose their own rules before 
these permanent tribunals, and consequently less power to control the proceedings.
A novelty that was introduced by the PCIJ was the “optional clause” which, 
for the first time in the history of international litigation, brought States under the 
compulsory and general jurisdiction of the Court91. In other words, the Permanent 
Court was a “court” similar to courts in the municipal context. Even though the 
CACJ and the PCIJ did not function for very long, they were a novel concept in 
international litigation92.
3.3.1.4 The Introduction of the International Court of Justice, from 1945:
Recognizing problems that existed with the PCIJ, the signatories of the United 
Nations Charter created the International Court of Justice93. The ICJ replaced the 
PCIJ, carrying on the notion of the World Court, taking on many of its characteristics, 
but simultaneously incorporating many new elements.
The most significant contribution of the ICJ to international litigation is 
perhaps that, because it is working under the ambit of the United Nations, it is the first 
court that truly has global jurisdiction covering every type of inter-State dispute. 
Compared to the courts that existed before it, the ICJ has been operating for a much 
longer period of time. There were many cases before the Court during the few 
decades following its creation.
3.3.1.5 The Proliferation, a few decades ago -  present time:
91 See: http://www.worldcourts.eom/pcii/eng/conventions/l942.12.31 optional.htm. for States signed up to the “optional clause”
92 See further on the PCU: Rosenne, (1995) 15-21
93 Refer to the general literature cited Chapter 2, Section 2.1, 14
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The proliferation of international tribunals has intensified during the past 
decade. There has been a substantial increase in the number of tribunals, in particular 
those which are specialized94. The ICJ arguably has had to play a less significant role 
in light of the many tribunals created to deal with specific types of disputes. States 
have more choice on how to settle their disputes. The range of tribunals has raised the 
question of forum shopping; States basing their choice on the benefits that might be 
derived from the different approaches in various aspects of tribunals95.
Section 4: Evidential rules before international tribunals
4.1 Introduction:
This section will give a brief introduction on some how different tribunals deal 
with evidentiary issue in the different eras of international law as defined in the 
previous section96. A thorough examination of all the jurisprudence stretches beyond 
the scope of this thesis.
4.1.1 The Early Years:
International litigation in the Early Years generally comprised ad hoc 
arbitrations and mixed commissions. Evidential rules of these two types of bodies 
mainly derived from the agreement drafted with the consent of the litigant States 
(often in the form of treaties), incorporating what rules the States saw fit. Most 
arbitrations of this period involved European States and the United States.
The arbitral tribunals and the mixed commissions in this period adopted a very 
liberal approach to evidential rules, with the emphasis on the needs of the litigant 
States. Some agreements virtually grant unlimited powers to the tribunal97, and some 
have restrictions98. In cases where there is an absence of a rule from the agreement, 
the tribunals may create their own. Tribunals may also be inclined to look at the 
practice of other tribunals, but this is not obligatory.
94 See: Chapter 2, Section 3.2, 27-29
95 See the list o f literature in footnote 70
96 See generally: Brower, (1994), Sandifer, (1975), Kazazi, (1996), Amerasinghe, (2005), Mani, (1980), Moore, (1929)
97 Agreement in the Delogoa Bay Railway Arbitration Case, Moore, (1898) 1877, Volume 2
98 For a list of common restrictions, see Sandifer, (1975) 37
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Lauterpacht noted that there is much flexibility in the evidential rules of 
international arbitrations. In his words: “There has been a general tendency, 
sanctioned by a long series of arbitral pronouncements, to disregard elaborate 
restrictions upon the admissibility of evidence and to accept the principle that no 
evidence should be excluded a limine and that it should be left to the judge to 
appreciate the weight and persuasiveness of the evidence put before him”99.
During this era of litigation, tribunals adopted an inquisitorial approach to 
litigation (i.e. seeking information), rather than imposing restrictive rules of evidence. 
For example, the Joint Commission for the United States and Panama said in its 
report: “With reference to the admissibility of evidence, the Commission will follow 
the procedure of a commission of inquiry rather than the technical rules of 
evidence”100.
The approach of having few restrictive rules can be seen in the jurisprudence 
of the period. The Dowman Case showed that the admission of evidence was open 
with few restrictive rules. In the case, there was a question regarding the testimony of 
certain slaves. It was held by the Board of Commissioners that the testimony might 
“with entire safety be heard by the board; examined, weighed and cautiously 
considered, received or rejected according to the circumstances.” 101
In the Fur Seal Arbitration Case, Sir Charles Russell, arguing before the 
tribunal, said that the practice of admitting all types of evidence without regard to “the 
character, the antecedents, the trustworthiness” of the witnesses is due to the
1 09exigencies of the situations presented and the character of the tribunals
On this issue, Sandifer elaborated on the particularities of claims commissions, 
those set up between two States to deal with claims of individuals of one State against 
the other. He stated: “The same practice of liberal admission obtains generally in 
claims commissions, although the application of stricter rules might be expected there 
because of the fact that the real parties in interest in the prosecution of the claims are 
private persons, although the defendant is the State, and the questions involved more 
nearly assimilable to those arising in municipal litigation. This practice is due no 
doubt to ...the extreme difficulties...in obtaining adequate evidence.” 103 However, it
99 Lauterpacht, (1931)31
100 Joint Commission, (1920), 22
101 The Dowman Case, Domestic Claims Commission(United States), 1827
102 The Fur Seal Arbitration Case, Arbitral Tribunal, 1895, 59, Volume 11
103 Sandifer, (1975) 181-182. For discussion on judges’ hesitation to exclude evidence because the difficulties in obtaining it: see 
Sandifer, (1975) 54, 81 Section 5
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cannot be generally said that the evidential rules of mixed claims commissions are 
stricter than arbitral tribunals. Neither can it be said that the rules of the claim 
commissions became stricter with time104.
The practice of international tribunals of this period has shown an open and 
flexible approach towards evidence. The procedure was up to the tribunals to 
determine.
4.1.2 The Two Hague Conventions:
This era was marked by the creation of the 1899 Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes. The Convention was arguably not as complex 
or detailed as modem treaties. However, it does give an indication of the nature of 
evidential mles at the time.
The Convention established the Permanent Court of Arbitration which was 
essentially a list of arbitrators chosen by the member States, anyone of whom could 
be called in case of a dispute. However, the Convention did not go into detail on the 
mles of evidence, but granted wide powers to the arbitrators. “The Tribunal has the 
right to issue Rules of Procedure...and to arrange all the formalities required for 
dealing with the evidence”105.
The 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was 
an improvement of the 1899 Convention. It was more extensive and detailed. 
However, the 1907 Convention did not add much regarding evidential mles. It was 
left to the Tribunal to decide the mles of procedure106. As a confirmation of the 
Convention’s liberal approach, the International Commission of Inquiry, a new body 
set up by the Convention, was left to “ ...arrange all the formalities required for 
dealing with the evidence”107.
The cases of this period also reflected the flexible approach mentioned in the 
two Hague Conventions, illustrated by the examples below.
In an arbitral award made by the Swiss Federal Council in a boundary dispute 
between French Guiana and Brazil, it was declared, referring to the French objection
104 See further: Sandifer, (1975) 38
105 The 1899 Hague Convention, 1899, Art. 49
106 The 1907 Hague Convention, 1907, Art. 74.
107 The 1907 Hague Convention, 1907, Art. 18. Very few rules of evidence were introduced. However, some rules were 
introduced, such as in Article 23, where if the witnesses or experts are unable to appear before the Commission, then the Parties 
will arrange for their testimonies to be taken in their own country. See also: Art. 26, 27, 28, 32.
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to the introduction of new evidence by Brazil with its second memoir: “L ’arbitre 
estime qu’il n ’est pas reduit a s’en tenir aux allegations des parties et aux moyens de 
preuve qu’elles invoquent. II ne s’agit pas, pour lui, de trancher un differend de droit 
civil, selon les voies de la procedure civile mais d’etablir un fait historique ; il doit 
rechercher la verite par tous les moyens qui sont a sa disposition. II ne tiendra compte 
des allegations des parties et des documents produits, sur lesquels la partie adverse 
n ’aura pas pu s’expliquer, que si leur exactitude de leur authenticity lui paraissent hors 
de doute.” 108 In other words, the arbitral tribunal was adopting an open and flexible 
approach toward evidence.
This approach was again reflected in the Whaling and Sealing Claims. In this 
case between the United States and Russia, when Counsel for the United States was 
protesting against the introduction of a deposition by an expert who was not present, 
the Arbitrator said: “In an arbitration between States it is of far greater interest than in 
purely juridical proceedings to draw forth all evidence, whether direct or indirect, 
which may serve to give full light”109.
Another clear example of the liberal approach international tribunals took 
towards rules of evidence can be seen in the Franqui Case before the Spanish- 
Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission of 1903. In this case, Umpire Gutierrez- 
Otero said, “The Arbitral tribunal remains free to employ, for enlightening itself, all 
the kinds of evidence that it deems necessary; and it will not be bound, in this regard, 
by any restrictions that are encountered in municipal law .. .”110
Further, the War Claims Arbiter, appointed by the President of the United 
States under the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928, in discussing the value of 
patents in one country when issued in another, said: “The Arbiter’s rules governing 
the admissibility of evidence are not technical but are most liberal in the interest of 
arriving at the truth whatsoever form it may take, and where the claimant proffers 
evidence tending to establish the value in foreign countries of the patented invention, 
together with evidence of the conditions existing there as compared with those 
existing in the United States at the pertinent time, such evidence will be admitted for 
what it may be worth, and the weight to which it may entitle will be determined by the 
Arbiter.” " 1
108 French Guiana-Brazil Boundary Arbitration, Arbitral Tribunal (Swiss Federal Council), 1900
109 Whaling and Sealing Claims, Arbitral Tribunal, 1900, 428 [1902]
110 Merignhac, (1895)269
111 War Claims Arbiter, War Claims Arbiter, 1928, 61-62. See further: Sandifer, (1975) 6-7
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Another example of the open approach was in the Venezuela Preferential 
Case. In this case between Germany and Venezuela, the Arbitral agreement accorded 
broad discretion to the tribunal. In Article 2 of the Agreement, it was provided: “The
facts on which shall depend the decision of the questions stated in Article 1 shall be
112ascertained in such a manner as the tribunal may determine.”
From the few provisions and the examples of the cases of this period, it can be 
seen that international tribunals, like those in the period before it, adopted a flexible 
and open approach towards evidential rules. In this era, there were attempts to 
formalize to an extent this procedure but much discretion was still left to the tribunals.
4.1.3 The Years of the Permanent Court:
During this period, permanent courts such as the CACJ and the PCIJ began to 
play a bigger role. In contrast to the arbitral tribunals before them, their rules, even 
though few, were not ad hoc but fixed and set out in the relevant provisions of the 
tribunals. This new characteristic of evidential rules was duly noted by Lauterpacht: 
“Apart from the rules of permanent tribunals like the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
or the Permanent Court of International Justice, no specific rules as to evidence and
1 1 o
proof have so far evolved in international arbitration.” The rules in these 
permanent tribunals tend to be more specific and detailed. However, much flexibility 
was still left to them.
4.1.3.1 The Central American Court of Justice:
The CACJ established an approach leaving evidential rules to the parties to 
decide. There was very little said on evidential rules in the provisions114. In the 
Convention establishing the Court, the provisions relating to evidence were those 
regarding the rules regulating the pleadings115. In its Regulations, very little was 
mentioned with regard to evidential rules. “The extent of the powers of the court, as
112 Venezuela Preferential Case, Arbitral Tribunal, 1903, 63. See further: Sandifer, (1975) 37
113 Lauterpacht, (1931)42
114 There were a few general rules. For example, in these two cases regarding the submission of complaints (Article XIV of the 
Convention), it was ruled that they have to be Filed with the relevant documents to be accepted by the Court. See: Honduras and 
Nicaragua v. Guatemala and El Salvador, CACJ, 1908, 8-9, 177; Felipe Molina Larios v. Honduras, CACJ, 1913, 60-61. See 
further : Sandifer, (1975) 185-187
115 See the text o f Articles XIV, XV, XVI in Convention fo r  the Establishment o f a Central American Court o f Justice, 1907, Vol. 
2. See further: Sandifer, (1975) 39
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well as the judicial procedure applicable, shall be those expressed by the agreement or 
compromis of the parties...”116 The ability of the parties to decide on the evidential 
rules indicates that, among attempts to formalise them117, tribunals granted much 
flexibility to States on this issue.
4.1.3.2 The Permanent Court of International Justice:
In the Statute of the Permanent Court, little is said regarding rules of evidence, 
leaving much discretion to the Court. This section will give a few examples of 
provisions and cases from the history of the Court.
Article 30 of the Statute stipulates that “the Court shall frame rules for 
carrying out its functions. In particular it shall lay down rules of procedure.” In the 
Rules of the Court, there were also rules to which the parties had to adhere, but they 
were by no means complete. They were not very restrictive, very basic, and mostly 
concern the way in which the Parties must prepare and present the evidence, and not
1 1 o
what evidence could be admitted . For example, some rules of the Court concerning 
evidence included: a) the Court had the power to “determine whether the parties shall 
address the Court before or after the production of evidence” 119, b) after the Court has 
received the evidence within the time specified, it may refuse to accept any further 
oral or written evidence that one party may desire to present unless the other side
190 191consents , c) the power of the Court to procure evidence .
The open approach to the admissions of evidence has been confirmed by 
judges of the Court. Judge Anzilotti has stated, during the drafting of the Rules in
1922, that “the Court had accepted the principle that any evidence produced by the
122parties should be admitted automatically” . In a memorandum about the revision of 
the Rules of the Court, M. Huber said that since the Statute of the Court did “not 
contain a trace of a formal and rigid system of evidence, it would be inadmissible for 
the Court to create such a regime through its rules”. He continued: “The attitude 
taken by the Court in the Mavrommatis Case seems thus absolutely to conform to the
116 Regulations o f the Central American Court o f Justice, 1911
117 The Convention of the CACJ can be distinguished from the Hague Conventions because, unlike the latter two, it was not an
attempt to formalize procedural rules, including those on evidence. The Hague Conventions were more elaborate.
118 E.g Article 32, 49, 50, 53, 54, 58, 60, 62, 72(3).
119 Article 50 o f 1936 Rules of the Court.
120 Article 52 o f the 1936 Rules o f the Court
121 Article 4 4 ,4 8  of the 1936 Rules o f the Court
122 [1922] PCU., ser. D, No. 2, at 210.
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exigencies of the jurisdiction exercised by it: the Parties may present any proof that 
they judge useful, and the Court is entirely free to take the evidence into account to
123the extent that it deems it pertinent.”
Judge Van Eysinga in the Oscar Chinn Case stated “the Court [PCIJ] is not 
tied to any system of taking of evidence...its task is to cooperate in the objective 
ascertainment of the truth”124. The PCIJ further reaffirmed this in a session on June 
28, 1926 when M. Huber, the President, commented that “it would be somewhat 
dangerous to adopt too rigid a rule” to the Registrar’s proposal to add the words “and 
no more documents may be filed by the parties except at the request of the Court” to 
Article 41 l25.
In the Free Zones o f Upper Savoy and the District o f Gex Case, overruling the 
demand of the Swiss Government that the Court reject the late submissions of the 
French Government in the oral proceedings, the Court said that “the decision of an 
international dispute of the present order should not mainly depend on a point of 
procedure” 126. This further confirmed the open approach of the Court, admitting as 
much evidence as possible.
However, in contrast to what was stated above, there were also few instances 
where evidence was refused by the PCIJ. The Free Zones Case and the Mavrommatis 
Jerusalem Concessions Case are particularly of note127. The basis of the refusals was 
on the due form in which the evidence had to be submitted.
4.1.4 The Introduction of the International Court of Justice:
This section, through a selection of examples of the ICJ’s cases, shows that the 
open approach to evidence has been carried through to this period of international 
litigation. A similar rationale to that of the PCIJ was shown in the South-West Africa 
Cases. In this case, the Court, in rejecting a request of the Applicant that the 
Respondent submit dispositions or statements in lieu of personal testimony by 
witnesses, stated: “in the view of the Court, the Statute and Rules contemplated a right
123 [1926] PCU, ser. D, No. 2 (add), at 249, 250. It has been suggested that the standard that was mentioned by Huber has similar 
characteristics as what is called “preuve libre” in French law. Under such a notion, the “judge shall be charged with determining 
the value of the means invoked by the parties, but all the means which they consider effective for establishing the correctness of 
their allegations may be presented to him. In other words the parties fmd themselves under the regime of preuve libre (free 
proof)”, Colin and Capitant, (1947) 97
124 Alford, (1958) 80-81
125 [1936] PCU, serD , No. 1
126 [1932] PCU ser. A/B, No. 46, at 155-56.
127 See further : Sandifer, (1975) 189
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of the party in contentious proceedings to produce all evidence before the Court by
the calling of witnesses and experts, and a party must be left to exercise that right, as
128it thought fit, subject, of course, to the provisions of the Court’s Statute and Rules” . 
This shows that the Court had as its priority the right of the parties to present evidence 
the way they wanted. In the same case, Judge Jessup said that “it would seem to be a 
truism that in an international court which is not bound by technical rules of 
procedure or evidence, the meaning of submissions should be sought in the intention 
of the party submitting them”.129
The open approach of the Court on evidential rules was reiterated in the 
Interhandel Case by Switzerland. It argued in its Memorial that it is a “principle 
already developed in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice...that the 
Court is free to appreciate the evidence and the allegations of the Parties. The Parties 
are thus in a large measure free to present any evidence that they consider necessary 
and opportune.”130
In addition, in the Barcelona Traction Case, Judge Fitzmaurice pointed out 
that international tribunals are not firmly tied down by rules: “Of course the Trust 
Deeds would, if produced, constitute what is known in Common Law parlance as the 
“best” evidence, and unless they could be shown to have been lost or destroyed, it is 
unlikely that a municipal court would admit secondary evidence of their contents. 
International tribunals are not tied by such firm rules, however, many of which are not
1 T 1
appropriate to litigation between the governments.”
The approach of the Court has been addressed and summarized by Rosenne: 
“The Court’s function in establishing the facts consists in its assessing the weight of 
the evidence produced insofar as necessary for the determination of the concrete issue 
which it finds to be the one on which it has to decide. For this reason, there is little to 
be found in the way of rules of evidence, and a striking feature of the jurisprudence is 
the ability of the Court frequently to base its decision on undisputed facts, and in 
reducing voluminous evidence to manageable proportions.”132
4.1.5 Proliferation Period:
128 South West Africa Cases (Merits), ICJ, 1966 32nd Public Hearing, May 14, 1965, 8 Pleadings 42; 9 id. 122-123
129 South West Africa Cases (Merits), ICJ, 1966, 430
130 Interhandel Case, ICJ, 1959 ICJ Pleadings 127-28
131 Barcelona Traction Case, ICJ, 1970, 98
132 Rosenne, (1965) 580, Vol 2
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A brief introduction to the approach of the many different tribunals that exist 
today would be difficult to achieve in this section. However, it is of note that, in this 
period, States have the choice to use any forum that has been previously created. 
These include the permanent tribunals suggested above, and also ad hoc arbitral 
tribunals. The evidential rules for these ad hoc tribunals are up to the parties to 
determine. There is currently no predominant model of evidential rules for States to 
use under such circumstances133.
The task of examining selected areas of evidential rules in selected tribunals 
will be carried out in detail in the following chapters. The proliferation of 
international tribunals raises questions regarding evidential rules.
133 The most established model o f rules for ad hoc arbitration is probably the UNCITRAL rules (1976), drafted for trade disputes. 
However, the rules concerning evidence are not detailed.
Charlie Gamjana-Goonchom
Page 41 of 321
Chapter Three: Understanding international rules from the municipal rules.
Section 1: Introduction
This chapter will examine evidential rules in the municipal context including 
different approaches of different legal traditions as well as their history, development, 
and jurisprudence. Studying municipal rules could help the understanding of 
international tribunals. The study will also show, if it is the case, why different 
approaches have been adopted by different jurisdictions. There are also questions as 
to whether international tribunals have incorporated municipal rules or used rationales 
of municipal rules in their own approach1. Due to limited resources, this chapter will 
only give an introduction to municipal rules on evidence and will not go into every 
detail2.
Section 2: What is the law of evidence?
First, the chapter will examine some jurisprudential thoughts on the law of
'i
evidence. The question has been much debated in the domestic context and written 
about,by many scholars4.
2.1 The approach of Jeremy Bentham, the freedom of proof:
Bentham has argued that the ultimate goal for evidential rules is to achieve 
“rectitude in the dispute” between the two parties. He suggested that this can be 
achieved through the Natural System of Procedure5, or the “Freedom of Proof’, which 
means the minimal use, and when possible, the absence of technical rules, in 
particular those rules which exclude evidence, and those which specify its probative 
value6. The rules that exist should be a guide, and not a restriction. “In other words,
1 See Chapter 7, Section 3.11,264, for the effects of municipal evidential rules at the international level.
2 The section will address the Common, Civil and Islamic Law tradition. A brief account of the Socialist Law tradition and 
examples o f evidential rules in the municipal context are included in Appendix C.
3 This section focuses on the Common law tradition and the Civil law tradition.
4 Some of these scholars include: a) Gilbert, who attempted to put all the rules o f evidence under one principle; b) Bentham who 
argued for the non-binding nature of rules in his Natural System of Procedure; c) Stephen, who tried to find coherence in the law 
of evidence with the notion of relevancy and; d) Thayer who treated the “rules of evidence as a mixed group of exceptions to a 
principle of freedom o f proof’. See further: Twining, (1990a), Chapter 6. See also: Thayer, (1898) 314.
5 Bentham, (1827), Vol 2, 425-434, Vol. 4, 5-12, 428 et seq. See further: Twining, (1985), Chapter 2; and Postema, (1986), 
Chapter 10 et seq.
6 Dennis, (2002) 25
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the law should not attempt to control fact-finding by having rules dictating what 
evidence can be received and how it should be evaluated. Instead the law should aim 
to improve the quality and accuracy of fact-finding by educating the fact-finder about 
the factors affecting the relevance and weight of evidence, and by giving guidance as
n
to appropriate reasoning in the evaluation of evidence.”
Nonetheless, Bentham recognized that there are limitations in every judicial 
system and allowed for modification to his Natural System approach by permitting 
exceptions to the general rule. Along the lines of his utilitarian approach, the process 
involves the balancing of costs. In other words, if the benefits gained from the receipt 
of the evidence were outweighed by other considerations (e.g. vexation, expense,
Q
delays), the omission of the evidence would be justified . Below are factors which the 
court may consider as restrictions to the Freedom of Proof:
2.1.1 Expense and Delay:
Most judicial systems recognize the goals of dealing with disputes: a) in a 
timely manner, b) in the most cost effective way. There is a balance to be made 
between admitting as much evidence as possible and dealing with the dispute in the 
most efficient way. The admission of evidence always requires time and money. For 
example, resources could be spent on the hearing of evidence in the proceedings. The 
admission of irrelevant evidence would be a waste of resources.
2.1.2 Procedural Fairness:
“There seems to be broad agreement that the law of evidence should aim to 
promote minimum standards of procedural fairness... [Procedural fairness] 
comprise[s] the ideas that parties to adjudication should have adequate notice of the 
allegations of their opponents, a reasonable opportunity to present their own case..., 
and that the adjudication should be conducted in public in an orderly and impartial 
manner.”9
7 Dennis, (2002) 25
8 Twining has pointed to the fact that the term “vexation, expense, delays” used by Bentham has never been defined by him, 
leaving the notion unclear. Twining, (1985) 91-94
9 Dennis, (2002) 26
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However, it has been argued that procedural fairness is not actually a 
constraint on the freedom of proof, but seems to be compatible with it10. Promoting 
procedural fairness does not necessarily mean the reduction of the amount of evidence 
admitted. In fact, promoting procedural fairness could help the maximization of the 
admission of evidence because participation of the parties is encouraged.
Procedural fairness also has a role in legitimizing the decision of any tribunal, 
both from the perspective of the participating parties and the public. When the 
decisions are seen to be fair, parties are more likely to conform to them. This is 
particularly important in international litigation where there are few enforcement 
mechanisms. A respected system will be used by States. Justice must not only be 
done but seen to be done.
2.1.3 Avoidance of Error:
The third factor which could be a constraint on the Freedom of Proof is the 
avoidance or error. The nature of judicial proceedings and imperfect evidence can 
lead to error and consequently a possible miscarriage of justice.
Scholars have put forward that “an important aim of the law of evidence is to 
allocate the risks of error in the adjudicative process so as to minimise the chance of a 
miscarriage of justice.”11 Examples of such rules include the burden of proof and the 
standard of proof. These aspects of evidential rules can be varied by placing the 
burden of proof on different parties or setting a higher or lower standard of proof. 
They can change depending on the relationship between the importance of the issue at 
stake and the gravity of a possible miscarriage of justice. For example, the standard 
of proof can be set higher in criminal cases to reduce the risk of a wrongful 
conviction12.
2.1.4 Other factors:
Judicial systems can also consider other factors as possible restraints on the 
application of the Freedom of Proof. The court can take into account what it
10 Dennis, (2002) 26-27
11 Dennis, (2002) 27. See further: Australian Law Reform Commission, (1987) paras 35 et seq; Stein, (1996) 279. Stein argues 
that allocation the risk of error is the prime principle of the law of evidence.
12 Dennis, (2002) 27
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considers as the ultimate goal of the rules of evidence gearing the rules towards 
achieving it. These will be addressed in the next section.
In addition, other factors which could play a role in determining the court’s
1 Tapproach on evidence include: a) considerations concerning the security of the State ,
b) the protection of family relationships and, c) the curbing of coercive methods of 
interrogation14.
2.2 The aim of the law of evidence
2.2.1 Search for the truth:
One of the roles of the law evidence is the search for the truth. “The ultimate 
purpose of the law of evidence today is to ensure that the facts found, to which the 
court is to apply the rules of substantive law, are more likely to be true than false”15.
However, it must be noted that evidence is imperfect as illustrated by a case 
before the UK House of Lords, Air Canada v. Secretary o f State fo r  Trade. In this 
case, Lord Wilberforce said: “It often happens, from the imperfection of evidence, or 
the withholding of it, sometimes by the party in whose favour it would tell if 
presented, that an adjudication has to be made which is not, and is known not to be, 
the whole truth of the matter; yet, if the decision has been in accordance with the 
available evidence and with the law, justice will have been fairly done.”16
2.2.2 The rights of individuals:
Some scholars have argued that the rights of individuals should be considered 
as an aim of the law of evidence. This right entails legal protection from the State, 
and not to be freely jeopardized for generalised social goals17. The determination of 
the right will depend on the legal tradition and social norm of each State. Examples 
of such rights under the domestic context are: a) the right of the accused not to be 
wrongly convicted, b) the right of an individual to a fair hearing and trial. Rawls
13 More clearly seen in the Socialist legal traditions, see Appendix C.
14 Twining, (1990b), 73
15 Stone and Wells, (1991)59
16 Air Canada v. Secretary o f State fo r  Trade, House of Lords, 1983, 438
17 See further: Dworkin, (1977)
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argues that judgments that affect the rights of individuals must be made according to
18procedures which respect their autonomy .
However, there are also limitations in discussing the rights of individuals as an 
aim for the law of evidence. It is more applicable to criminal law where the rights are 
better defined than in the civil law context. Further, in the case of international law, it 
must be noted that States and individuals are different. The rights they enjoy cannot 
be identical. Unlike the rights of individuals which might be laid out in a constitution 
or Bill of Rights, the rights of States are not clearly set out. States enjoy certain rights 
within the international community such as State sovereignty but the existing 
definition is not aimed at providing a safeguard against procedural uncertainly in 
international litigation. This begs the question of whether it is possible to apply the 
notion of rights of individuals mutatis mutandis to States.
Further, States have to claim their rights. States can have differing 
perspectives on what they regard as their right, and their views can shift depending on 
the government in power or their international lawyers at the time. There is no 
authority at the international level determining the rights of each State.
2.2.2 Legitimacy:
The last aim of evidential rules addressed by this chapter is the legitimacy of 
the judicial system. Adjudication must have, and be seen to have, legitimacy in order 
to gain recognition. Dennis notes: “Legitimacy of decision is not the same concept as 
(factual) rectitude of decision, although the two are closely related...The argument 
will be developed that the aims of the law of evidence are ultimately referable to an 
overall objective of promoting legitimacy of decision in adjudication, and that 
priorities as between competing rights and interests should be settled according to 
how best legitimacy of decision will be promoted.”19 Legitimacy includes the 
concept of integrity and acceptability of the courts. Courts may need to exclude some 
reliable evidence if there is a risk that the admission may impair the authority of the 
verdict.
Accordingly, the notion of legitimacy depends on the social context of the 
State and the type of dispute before the court. To gain legitimacy, litigation must be
18 Rawls, (1972) 238-239
19 Dennis, (2002) 41 see also 41-49
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carried out in public. This is particularly of note in international litigation where 
many cases are carried out in private20.
Taking examples from municipal law, and mainly criminal law, many 
evidential rules are geared towards establishing legitimacy:
(a) The burden of proof placed on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the 
accused illustrates that the freedom and the dignity of the accused is respected.
(b) The refusal to accept evidence obtained through torture because it is 
against the general moral standard.
Dennis suggests that the factual accuracy of the decision becomes secondary 
to establishing the legitimacy of the verdict21. A doubtful conviction can never be 
legitimate, but, an accurate conviction may be illegitimate if the method used in 
reaching that verdict is against minimum social values. But more than often, an 
accurate decision leads to legitimacy.
2.3 The application of the factors affecting evidential rules:
Having examined the constraints on the freedom of proof, the more difficult 
question is the determination of the extent and how they should be applied. Courts 
have to find a balance between many objectives, determining what priority it will give 
to each factor listed above.
One way is to weigh them against one another and calculate the gains and 
losses. The approach is valid, but there exists a problem that stems from the fact that 
the values to be weight up are difficult to gauge22. For example, how can a concept 
like State security be “weight in the same currency” as the accuracy of adjudicative
23process ? The term “balancing” should reflect a complex process of seeking the 
rights, interests and pertinent considerations. In addition, it should be “a properly 
researched, reasoned, and principled course of argument”24. However, Ashworth has 
argued that the act of balancing is no more than a device for reaching the desired 
conclusion of the court without any proper argument25.
20 Cases before ad  hoc tribunals are normally private, but cases before permanent tribunals are normally public.
21 Dennis, (2002) 45
22 Dennis, (2002) 29-30
23 Dennis, (2002) 29
24 Dennis, (2002) 29
25 Ashworth, (1998) 30-31
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2.4 Preliminary Conclusion:
This section has looked at the question of what is the law of evidence and 
what might the court take into consideration in deciding its approach. Although this 
section has segregated the different influencing factors, in practice, the court would 
probably take all of them into consideration resulting in a balance and a mixture of 
some if not all the factors. Further, courts in each jurisdiction will balance and 
prioritise each consideration differently depending on what their policies are.
Section 3: The Common Law Tradition:
3.1 Historical aspects and characteristics of the Common Law system:
The nature of evidential rules in the Common Law jurisdictions has been 
greatly influenced by the adversarial nature of the system. Twining, reformulating
9 f\Jacob’s words, summarises the key aspects of English civil procedure . They include 
principles of: a) party autonomy, b) the Court as umpire, c) orality, d) publicity, e) the 
protection of the accused against mistaken conviction. This adversarial process is 
unlikely to lead to an inquiry.
The study of the evidential rules of the Common Law tradition can be roughly 
divided into 4 periods: a) Pre-1800, b) 1800-50, dominated by thoughts of Bentham,
c) 1850-1900, when reforms took place in England, India and the United States, d) 
1900-1960, dominated by Wigmore27.
In the context of the English system, it must be noted at the outset that there 
were two judicial systems running parallel in its early stages of development:
28 29Common law and Equity . Early equity procedure resembled the jus commune on 
the Continent50. They included “the predominance of writing, the secret and 
segmented taking of evidence by examiners of commissioners, the numerical
“ Twining, (1990a) 182-184
27 See further: Stone and Wells, (1991) Part One, Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) Chapter 1
28 Not to be confused with the “common law” as distinguished from “civil law”, i.e. the two main legal traditions of the world.
29 See further: Holdsworth, (1972). Equity cases were brought before the Chancellor.
30 See Chapter 4, Section 4, 95-103
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evaluation of evidence, and extensive delay”31. In contrast to early equity procedures,
32the common law procedures focused on oral evidence .
When common law and equity merged, more characteristics of the former 
prevailed, but some of the latter also survived. The evaluation of the evidence by the 
jury was generally not restricted, but also not without any restrictions. Rules were 
developed to prevent types of evidence from being submitted to the jury, for example, 
the hearsay rule .
The English system was an “accusative system of trial by jury, and a 
qualitative system of evidence...in which, though many types of evidence were 
excluded, the weight attributed to that which was admitted was not mechanically 
fixed, but submitted.. .to the judgment of a group of lay men”34.
Scholars have also suggested that development of the Common Law could be 
distinguished into two parts, the first regarding written documents, and the second 
regarding oral testimony. This distinction exists because of the difference in the 
nature of the evidence. Written documents have played an important role from the 
start of the history of the legal tradition. This has meant that there was a need for the 
regulations of these rules. In contrast, it has been argued that the need for rules on 
oral evidence only arose “when it became established that the jury must give its
ac
verdict only on the evidence of witnesses duly sworn in the cause” . This is 
consequently the explanation for the two distinctive set of rules for written and oral 
evidence36.
3.2 Developments in England and the United States:
Important reforms started in England in 1830 and carried on into the middle of 
the 19th century, addressing similar problems as those in the Civil Law systems. 
Bentham’s school of thought was against the formalistic, restrictive and exclusionary 
nature of evidential rules. With his treatise published around 1820, Bentham greatly 
influenced the development of the law of evidence in the Common Law tradition.
31 Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 10, Chapter 1
32 Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 10, Chapter 1
33 Some rules were developed from the fear of an overreaching judiciary and the incompetence of juries.
34 Stone and Wells, (1991) 29. This is to be contrasted with the Civil Law tradition in the next section.
35 Stone and Wells, (1991) 23
36 See further: Stone and Wells, (1991) 23-36
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The reform in England started sooner than on the Continent, with acts such as 
Lord Denman’s Act of 1843 and the County Court Act of 1846. During the reform of 
the Judicial Acts of 1873-1875, the Benthamite lead movement brought an end to
37features of the Common Law resembling the Continental system . For example, in 
the Court of Chancery, a goal was set to achieve more orality and immediacy in the 
proceedings. A problem that existed was that the witnesses “instead of being 
examined in open court by hostile counsel and without time to prepare him self’, was 
questioned in writing and thus “he had leisure to exert his cunning on the fabrication 
of a false and fraudulent reply, which is eventually cast into due technical form by his 
counsel”38.
Reforms to reduce restrictions carry on today. For example, the Evidence Act 
of 1938 puts a limitation on the “best evidence” rule allowing more secondary 
evidence to be presented before the court. The Evidence Act of 1972 further 
eliminated rules restricting the submission of evidence to the court .
The evidentiary reforms in the US took place quickly after England with many 
states taking a similar approach. The aim was also to exclude as many restrictions as 
possible. There are few disqualifications and exclusionary rules left in the US today40. 
However, the existence of the jury prevents the system from moving towards the free 
evaluation of evidence41. There were also reforms in other areas of the US legal 
system. For example, there was the curtailment of power of the judges in many states. 
Some states went as far as forbidding the judge from commenting on the evidence or 
instructing the jury on the nature of the law except as requested by the parties. The 
judge’s powers were restricted even up to the late 19th century. A re-assessment of 
his powers began in the early part of the 20th century, and development continues 
even in the later part of the century42.
3.3 The Jury in the Common Law tradition:
The jury is one key factor that distinguishes the Common Law tradition from 
the Civil Law tradition. Having the jury meant that it was more difficult for the
37 See further: Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 39 and Pound and Pluncknett, (1927) 238
38 Johnes, (1834) 90
39 See further: Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 40
40 See further: Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 40-41
41 There were fears about the incompetent juries.
42 Developments also occurred in other aspects of the legal system but the details are beyond the scope of this chapter. See 
generally: Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 1
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system to be based on written evidence or the mechanical evaluation of evidence. 
Historically, because jurors were more than often illiterate, the system had to be 
primarily oral.
In its earlier forms, the jury was chosen for their knowledge to be brought into 
the case. In certain ways, they were witnesses. However, the jury has changed to the 
current form: twelve representatives deciding the case on the basis of sworn evidence. 
The jury may not use information independently obtained or that not presented to it. 
The jury has prevented a mechanical system of evidential rules from being 
introduced.
Further, it has been suggested that the use of the jury in civil cases in England 
is on a decline during the past century and has had effects on the rules of evidence43. 
“Working without a jury, judges feel free to admit evidence as to which the 
exclusionary rules might otherwise apply, reasoning that they will be able to give due 
weight to such evidence”44.
3.4 Common Law jurisdictions today:
In both England and the United States, proceedings currently include a 
preparatory period and the actual trial proceedings. The former is dominated with 
written procedure, the later with oral ones. The proof-taking during the trial phase 
includes oral examination and cross-examination. Some written documents must 
even be transformed into statements by the witnesses or the experts. The hearings are 
generally quite concentrated and held in a short period of time. This form of evidence 
is historically linked to the notion of oaths and cross-examination, to which the 
tradition attaches great importance45.
One aspect that both the courts in England and the United States share is that 
most of their procedural rules are now prepared and promulgated by the court 
themselves or by agencies in which the judge plays an important role. Designating 
these powers away from the legislature and to the judiciary means that the court is 
more efficient, flexible and sensitive to issues that might not have been foreseen by
43 “It has been said that the civil courts in England today work almost without rules of evidence.” Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 
40.
44 Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 40.
45 Dennis, (2002) 13
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the legislature46. Although having gained much support from Continental writers, this 
allocation of power to the courts is yet to be implemented in Europe47. No Common 
Law country has completely abolished all technical rules. However, as noted by
48Tapper, there has been a general trend to move towards that goal .
Section 4: The Civil Law tradition
4.1 Historical aspects and characteristics of the Civil Law system:
There has been integration of Roman law and canon law in both the Common 
Law and the Civil Law traditions49. There is consequently a possibility that the two 
legal traditions could adopt similar approaches on evidential rules. However, this has 
not been the case.
“In no respect is the divergence of the common law and the continental 
systems more extraordinary than in the law of evidence.”50 In Civil Law countries, 
rules of evidence, especially those on the admission and exclusion of evidence are not 
so technical. The judges are also more active in directing the proceedings and the 
examination of the witnesses. For example, German judges are involved in the 
formulation of issues on the basis of the statements of facts submitted by the parties51.
The law on the Continent is derived from Roman law which spread throughout 
Europe in the 12th century. The Roman system of investigation, known as the 
“inquisitorial procedure” , was used by the Church courts and then the lay courts, 
establishing its existence throughout the Continent in the Middle Ages. This new 
system differed from the pre-existing one because it arrived at the truth through 
rational investigation. An investigation would consist of two parts: the instruction 
and the trial. The instruction was a preliminary examination of the circumstances of 
the crime, and the evidence implicating the suspected person. The trial merely 
involved interrogation of the accused by the judge on the basis of the files. Although
46 In both England and the United States, the legislature has retained the ability to veto the court’s rules, but this is not often used. 
See further: Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 26-27
47 The exception is the Italian Constitutional Court which has to power to adopt procedural rules.
48 Tapper, (1985), Preface
49 For further details, see: Stone and Wells, (1991) 30-32
50 Stone and Wells, (1991) 29, Chapter 1
51 Lewinski, (1910) 198-201
52 For further details, see: Stone and Wells, (1991) 11-12, Chapter 1.
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an improvement on the pre-existing one, this newly introduced system was not 
without flaws53.
The system on the Continent “adopted the inquisitorial system of trial by 
public officials, and the quantitative system of evidence, that is, one in which 
everything was admitted, but was allowed only a fixed weight”54.
4.2 The jus commune:
Since the end of the Middle Ages, there has been a common approach of 
procedural law on the Continent, the jus commune, which still has influence on 
Continental jurisdictions today55. Historically, it has at least five important 
characteristics:
First, quod non est in actis non est in mundo (procedural acts not reduced to 
writing are null and void)56.
Second, direct contact and contact on a personal level was discouraged in 
judicial proceedings. The judge based his judgment on written records prepared in his 
absence. Witnesses were examined in camera and their testimonies were translated 
into the official language, often Latin.
Third, the evaluation of evidence was set in a formal framework. For 
example, the notion of testis unus testis nullus was applied, and concurring 
testimonies of two witnesses were binding upon the court. The value of statements 
made by female witnesses was less than those of men. Statements made by noblemen 
counted more than those of commoners. Evidence was counted and not weighed. 
This is understandable because the judges did not have personal contact with the 
witnesses, and consequently were not able evaluate their sincerity.
Fourth, legal proceedings were in segments. The law imposed compulsory 
stages as a controlling measure, but at the same time having a segmentation effect. 
The parties had control over the proceedings since intervention from the judge was 
minimal.
Fifth, civil cases lasted a long time. Proceedings spanning several decades
c7
were not unheard of .
53 See further: Stone and Wells, (1991) 13
54 Stone and Wells, (1991) 29. This is to be contrasted with the Common Law system.
55 Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 5
56 Further see: Cappelletti, (1971) 42-43; Engelmann, (1927) 457-458
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Any contact between the judge and the parties was considered to have 
impairing effects on the judge’s impartiality. The method of evaluation of evidence 
was also affected by the distrust of the judiciary. There were many restrictive rules 
and the judge was not able to assess the evidence freely. He was not able to weigh the 
proof, but just to count it. Proof was considered in arithmetical proportions. For 
example, the court would grant evidence full proof, half proof, one-fourth, etc. The 
lack of contact between the judge and the witnesses meant that the judge could not 
use his subjective view and experience in evaluating the evidence. He was unable to 
detect the hesitation, uncertainly or contradiction in the statements of the witnesses, a 
role performed by a judge in today’s system. The remoteness between the judge and 
the evidence was increased by the translation of the statements into Latin.
These evidential rules were based on Thomistic-Aristolelian philosophy, 
which was based on several a priori presumptions. Examples of these are: noblemen 
are more likely to tell the truth than commoners because they would take care to keep 
their family’s good name, or, a man was more capable of being relied on than a 
woman because he has a more certain and firmer character. Some rules were derived 
from theological texts. For example, the rule stating that the statement of one witness
CQ
does not have any probative value derived from a Biblical notion . Some of the 
presumptions of the jus commune have been eliminated by modem psychology but 
some remain. For example, courts today still consider testimonies of a number of 
witnesses to have more probative value than that of one witness.
In Europe generally, even up to the earlier parts of the 19th Century, litigation 
was more or less under the control of the parties. The judge was to consider the case 
according to the procedures decided by the parties. The parties even had the liberty to 
make arrangements on evidence so that the judge would have to base his decision on a 
set of facts that might be false.
4.3 Reforms:
Around the 18th century, legal scholars started to question the old procedures 
of the jus commune system. Changes occurred through various European code
57 For example, see: Kem, (1954) 31, 45-46
58 Deut. 19:15. See also e.g. the Gospel according to John 8:13
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reforms. For example, reform took place in Austria with the Code of 1895 and in 
France with Code of Civil Procedure in 1806.
The reform in the Civil Law tradition had several aims, including: a) direct 
contact between all the participants involved in the proceedings, b) the free evaluation 
of evidence without the influence of a priori rules of evaluation or exclusion59, c) the 
attempt to concentrate the hearings into a shorter period, and as a consequence 
achieving a more efficient judicial system60.
More specifically, in France, the revolution made a start on the reform of the 
jus commune system. There were many procedural reforms allowing an evaluation of 
evidence that was fuller and freer. For example, the taking of testimonials in private 
was abolished. The examination of witnesses was to be heard by judges in public and 
before the parties. The pre-existing formal system of proof, based on the mechanical 
and numerical system of evaluation, was also abolished and replaced with the free 
evaluation of evidence. The proceedings involved more immediacy and the judges 
were given certain powers of procedural initiative, especially regarding evidence61. 
Changes were incorporated into the Code of Civil Procedure in 1806.
Coinciding with the French impetus for reform, other States also sought 
similar changes in their legal systems. There were the German Code of Civil 
Procedure of 187762, and the more radical Austrian Code of 189563. Other States on 
the Continent soon established their own Code of Civil Procedure, the majority of 
them basing it on either the German or the Austrian model: the Norwegian Code of 
1915, the Danish codes of 1916 and 1979, the Swedish Code of 1942, and the Swiss 
Federal Law of Civil Procedure of 1947.
However, these reforms did not eliminate all aspects of the former system. 
For example, the French Code introduced an arrangement which did not promote 
immediacy between the evidentiary elements and the adjudicatory body. Although 
the parties were allowed to be present at the taking of the testimonies, the evidentiary 
hearings were conducted by a commissioned judge (juge commis) and not in public. 
Today, the person conducting the evidentiary hearing is the examining judge (juge de
59 The judge became an active participant in the proceedings and no longer a spectator. He was given much more power to 
control the trial.
60 Civil procedures in Europe generally became more public.
61 Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 24, Chapter 1. This trend is still very much alive today, the recent Code reforms in France being 
indicative of this fact, e.g. the reform of 30 October 1935 and 15 July 1944.
62 The German Code of Civil Procedure, in force 1 Oct 1879.
63 The Austrian Code of Civil Procedure, in force 1 January 1898. The Austrian Code was said to be more radical because it 
gave the judge a more active role in the judicial proceedings, notably his ability to be in contact with the litigants on a more 
personal level.
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la mise en etat). He is a member of the adjudicatory panel and is able to pass on his 
personal impressions of the evidence to his colleagues.
Developments to enhance the immediate contact between evidentiary elements 
and the adjudicatory body were also slow in other Civil Law countries. Evidence in 
Germany, until very recently, had been taken by a single delegated judge, and not the 
full adjudicating panel. In some Latin American States, the system still very much 
resembles the jus commune system. Witnesses still have to testify before the 
secretario who prepares a written report which is then presented to the court.
Another element of the former system that continued into the Napoleonic 
Code is the so-called reproches, rules regarding the disqualification of witnesses to 
testify. A party can challenge the witness, and if successful, the witness will be 
disqualified from giving evidence in the proceedings64. Similar disqualification rules 
existed in some other Civil Law countries65 while others take a different approach66.
4.4 Civil Law jurisdictions today:
Many Civil Law jurisdictions today share a few features worth noting. The 
first is the absence of a trial. A day in court is for the uninterrupted presentation of
fineverything that concerns the case . In some jurisdictions, such as in France, there is 
no taking of evidence during the oral pleadings (plaidoiries). However, in other 
jurisdictions, the oral pleadings do include the taking of evidence68. Second, the Civil 
Law tradition puts particular emphasis on the use of documentary evidence69. Third, 
there is a limit on the power of the parties and their lawyers to bring about 
investigations. Examples of jurisdictions with such limited powers include Spain and 
Italy. There is an emphasis towards granting such powers to the judges70.
States within the Civil Law tradition can be roughly divided into three groups, 
based on the extent to which the evidential rules still resemble the jus commune, and 
the stage where reform has reached71. The first group includes Spain, and various
64 For example, persons who had “drunk or eaten with the party”, or the party’s servants: Code of Civil Procedure (1806) art. 284 
para 2
65 For example, Code of Civil Procedure art. 246 of Italy stipulate that persons with interest in the case are forbidden to testify.
The Swiss Federal Law and the Codes of Austria of 1895, the German Code of 1877 contain nothing that would resemble the
French concept of reproches.
('7 Schlesinger, (1980) 298; Merryman, (1985) 120-121. See also: Homburger, (1970)
“  E.g. in Austria, Sweden and Germany. See further: Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 9, Chapter 1 
M See further: Merryman, (1985) 122-124
70 E.g. in Austria, Sweden, and France. See generally: Kaplan and Clermont, (1987)
71 The distinction as drawn up in Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 8, Chapter 1.
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Latin American countries. France and Italy are in the second group, and the third 
group comprises States from central Europe and Scandinavia, including Austria and 
Sweden72.
The first group of countries can be identified because of the close resemblance 
of its procedures to the jus commune. The pre-existing mechanical nature of the 
evaluation process still exists. The relationship between the adjudicatory body, the 
parties and witnesses lack immediacy. As a result, proceedings are still very long 
often spanning years.
The second group of States rely less on written evidence. Even though there 
are oral discussions of the issues, they do not include the taking of evidence (e.g. in 
France). The lack of importance given to oral aspects of proceedings is illustrated by 
the renouncing of this right by parties in Italy. If it is the case, the end result is an 
arrangement similar to the first group of States. Litigation in States in this second 
group is slow due to the lack of immediacy between the sources of evidence and the 
adjudicating body.
The third group of Civil Law countries have integrated oral aspects into the 
proceedings to a fuller extent. There is a preparatory oral stage (miindliche 
Verhandlung), where the judge can have direct contact with the parties, and the power
n ' i
to call them for questioning . The main hearing is oral, public and includes the 
taking of evidence, unlike the previous two groups mentioned above. The hearings 
are also very concentrated resulting in a much shorter duration of the proceedings.
Section 5: Islamic Law
5.1 Historical aspects and characteristics of the Islamic Law system:
Islamic law is a “phenomenon so different from all other forms of law...that 
its study is indispensable in order to appreciate adequately the full range of possible 
legal phenomena.”74 However, relatively little has been written in English on 
evidential rules in the Islamic Legal tradition for civil proceedings75.
72 See further: Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 8-9
73 This is particularly seen in Sweden, but to lesser degree in Austria and Germany. Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 9, Chapter 1.
74 Schacht, (1964) 102
75 There has been some literature on criminal proceedings but less on civil proceedings. See: Salama, (1981) 115-122 and 
Schacht, (1964) 104
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Islamic law, or Shari’a’, comprises many schools of thought, each establishing 
its own approach to evidential rules. As a result, evidential rules can vary in the 
different Islamic States, each approach based on the opinion of the heads of schools of
7Athought and discourse . Further, many Islamic countries today have moved away 
from the traditional Islamic approach, and have incorporated aspects of evidential 
rules Western in origin, especially from the Civil Law tradition. Legal systems in 
Islamic States are consequently a mixture of legal traditions.
5.2 Before the Westernization of law:
In the Islamic legal tradition, the notion of proof and evidence clearly holds an 
important place: “If people’s claims were accepted on their face value, some persons
77would claim other people’s blood and properties...”
While Western law generally arose from judicial and legislative institutions 
generally free from religious control, Islamic law has absorbed rules from the
78Koran . Evidential rules in the Islamic tradition are strict and specific but vary 
according to different areas of the law. During its history, it has been subject to 
influence from a number of sources: a) the Hellenistic administration, b) the two 
empires that dominated the Middle East: the Byzantine and the Persian empires and,
7Qc) the Arab culture .
Islamic law is derived from four main sources: the Koran, the Sunna (customs
sanctioned by tradition of the Prophet), ijma’ (consensus of the Muslim community)
8 0and qiyas (analogical reasoning) . Islamic Law can be distinguished from the 
Common Law and the Civil Law traditions by its religious and virtually unchangeable 
nature. “Islamic Law is a system based upon “God’s commands...having an 
existence independent of society imposed upon society from above.””81 Evidential 
rules in Islamic Law tradition are generally strict.
To illustrate some aspects of Islamic Law, three areas of evidential rules have 
been selected: (a) the use of written and oral evidence, (b) the range of evidence used 
by the judge, (c) the evaluation of evidence.
76 For an analysis o f different branches of Islamic Law, see: Schacht, (1950) 110-124
77 The words of the prophet, as quoted in: Mahmassani, (1961) 168
78 E.g. see the Islamic approach to witnesses in: Mahmassani, (1961) 169-176
79 Lippman and McConville, (1988) 23-24.
80 See further: Edge, (1996); Khadduri, (1954); and Lippman and McConville, (1988) 28-32
81 Lippman and McConville, (1988) 2
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5.2.1 The use of written and oral evidence:
According to the Muslim jurists, the principle means of taking proof was 
through witnesses. Testimonies were important because written documents were not 
widely used in the early history of Islamic law, and the majority of the population 
could not write. Consequently, not as much importance was attached to written
89evidence as to testimonies . “It was a fundamental principle in the Hanafi School 
that no reliance should be placed upon writing, because “handwritings resemble one 
another” and because writing “falls outside the recognized methods of proof in the 
shricah, namely testimony, admission and refusal to take the oath ...”83. However, as 
time progressed and more people relied on writing, jurists began accepting written 
evidence as part of the legal process.
In practice, however, documents did not only play a subsidiary role. 
Documentary evidence was used from the very early stages of the Muslim Arab 
world. Administrative authorities from the seventh-eight century AD wrote down 
their orders and decisions. Contracts between individuals were also written . 
However, the focus was still on witnesses. A written document was not considered to 
make proof by itself and jurists treated it as subsidiary evidence. The emphasis on 
witnesses was apparent for the fact that a legal act can be proven by two persons 
testifying that they have witnessed the act in question. “This is why all documents, be 
they under private seal or certified, are always signed by at least two witnesses...One 
can say that written proof developed only under the cover of proof established
or
through witnesses...” There were also criteria to determine the reliability of 
witnesses86.
5.2.2 The range of evidence used by the judge:
Islamic jurists are still divided on how the judge may reach his decision and 
what type of evidence he may use. In the criminal context, there is a view proposed 
by the Shafi’i, Hanafi, and Hanbali schools which suggests that evidence can only
82 Jurists thought that written evidence was recommended and not obligatory.
83 Mahmassani, (1961) 196
84 For a discussion on the history of written evidence, see: Liebesny, (1975) 244-246
85 Liebesny, (1975) 248
86 See further on this notion of a reliable witness: Liebesny, (1975) 248
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include the testimony of witnesses87, but other forms of evidence can be used in civil 
cases. The second view derives from ibn Taymuyya, ibn al-Qayyin and ibn al-Ghars 
schools which suggests that, for all cases, evidence comprises more than just the 
testimony of witnesses88. The claimant must submit whatever evidence is needed.
The question of whether the judge can render a decision based on his own 
knowledge is also discussed amongst Islamic jurists. The Common and the Civil Law 
traditions require the judge to base his decision only on the evidence presented before 
him. In certain circumstances, the judge is required to disqualify himself if there is a 
conflict of interest. However, this is not a universally accepted principle among 
Islamic jurists. There are three different views on the issue. First, the judge is 
prohibited from using his own knowledge in both criminal and civil cases. Second, 
the judge is allowed to rule using his own knowledge in both criminal and civil cases. 
Third, the judge is only restrained in making a decision according to prior knowledge
89only in the cases of Hudud, which are crimes prescribed by the right of God .
5.2.3 The evaluation of evidence:
In the Islamic Legal tradition, there are two views on the evaluation of 
evidence. First, the judge has no power to evaluate the evidence and must follow the 
witnesses’ testimonies. Second, the judge can use his discretion to weigh up the 
evidence90, the view of most modem codes91.
5.3 Islamic Law jurisdictions today:
With the increase of Western influence, supplementation and displacement of 
the traditional Islamic law increased. By the nineteenth century, European codes were 
adopted and adapted by various Islamic states.
For example, in Egyptian law, documentary evidence plays an important role 
in the taking of evidence by the court, in contrast with traditional Islamic law, but in 
line with the Civil Law tradition. Official documents, private agreements and signed
87 See further: Salama, (1981) 110
88 See further: Salama, (1981) 110-111
89 Many Islamic jurists allow special rules for Hudud. For example, delays of the witness in bringing forward his testimony 
could invalidate the evidence. See further: Salama, (1981) 111-114.
90 Mahmassani, (1961) 187-189
91 E.g. the Lebanese Code of Civil Procedures.
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letters are used, with varying degrees of probative value. “The testimony of witnesses
Q9is definitely sub-ordinate to proof through documentation” The emphasis on 
witnesses, as found in Islamic Law, has been replaced by documentary evidence, e.g. 
in Egypt and Turkey. In the current system, written evidence is considered “one of
QO
the most important and effective methods of proof’ . “Many modem codes, 
including, as we have seen, the Ottoman and the Lebanese, required the presentation 
of such [written] evidence in important civil cases, and excluded testimony except in 
restricted and exceptional circumstances”94. Most modem Islamic legal systems, 
while accepting testimony without reservation in penal matters, reject it in civil 
transactions except in special circumstances. In the Lebanese Code of Civil 
Procedure, for instance, testimony is not considered sufficient to disprove the contents 
of a written document. Moreover, it is not acceptable in cases involving more than 55 
Lebanese pounds95 except in very restricted and exceptional circumstances96.
Other influences, predominantly from the Civil Law tradition, are also 
apparent. Taking Egyptian law as an example, witnesses can be introduced by both 
parties. However, the witnesses cannot be directly questioned by the parties and any 
questions must be submitted through the court. The judges may also ask questions. 
In practice, the presiding judge asks most of the questions.
Section 6: Domestic rules influencing international tribunals
6.1 Introduction:
This section will briefly examine the question of to what extent do domestic 
evidential rules have an impact on international tribunals. The following chapters will 
address particular influences of domestic rules on international rules where 
appropriate.
Domestic law can influence international tribunals in many ways. First, the 
legal background of the delegates of the States during the drafting stages of the 
governing texts of the tribunals will no doubt be important. Second, if there is a lack
92 Liebesny, (1975)265
93 Mahmassani, (1961) 196-197
94 Mahmassani, (1961) 197
95 Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure, Articles 153 and 241.
96 Lebanese Code of Civil Procedure, Article 242
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of rules, the judges are able to determine the approach adopted, and their legal 
background will be important97.
6.2 The approach taken by tribunals:
Scholars have suggested that the evidential procedures before international 
tribunals resemble those of the Civil Law tradition. Sandifer has suggested that: 
“International practice in the admission of evidence has paralleled the Civil law in its 
freedom from technical and restrictive rules, it being considered as in that law, that 
the members of the tribunal were qualified to assign a proper weight to virtually any 
and all evidence submitted”98. He compares the arrangement before international 
tribunals to the German system where “rules of evidence, though not entirely lacking, 
are few and simple. For example, hearsay is not as such excluded. Evidential 
questions are approached from a non-technical point of view...The German Court is 
really quite free to investigate the cause before it and does exercise its power of 
ascertaining the truth without the regard to technical rules.”99
Writing on the rules of admission of international tribunals, and regarding 
influence of municipal law, Lauterpacht notes that, “there are therefore in this matter 
no longer two schools of thought in international law; there is one rule of international 
law on the subject, which as it happens, does not coincide with that which Common 
Law courts apply in actions brought before them”100.
The jurisprudence from the period before the existence of the three selected 
tribunals has generally shown that tribunals regard themselves as being free from the 
influence of domestic evidential rules. This was indicated in cases such as: a) the 
Thomas and Sarah Ward Case101, b) the Faber Case102, c) the Parker Case103, d) the 
Cameron Case104.
However, there have also been contrasting cases where it has been argued that 
the tribunal should use domestic evidential rules. First, there was a suggestion that 
the arbitral tribunal should adopt the evidential rules of one of the parties. The
97 See further: Twining, (1990b) 180, Chapter 6
98 Sandifer, (1975) 12
99 Shartel and Wolff, (1944) 884, 888
100 Lauterpacht, (1931)41
101 A case before the United States-British Mixed Claims Commission of 1871. See further: Sandifer, (1975) 29-30
102 A case before the German-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission of 1903. See further: Sandifer, (1975) 9-10, 32-33
103 A case before the United States-Mexican General Claims Commission of 1923. See further: Sandifer, (1975) 30-31
104 A case before the British-Mexican Claims Commission of 1926. See further: Sandifer, (1975) 31
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rationale was that international tribunals were “creatures of that States that have 
created it”, which meant that they were in a similar position to municipal courts of 
those States105. In some cases, this was rejected, e.g. in the Case o f the British- 
Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission106. In few cases, the domestic evidential rules 
were accepted as being applicable. For example, Rule XV of the Rules of Procedure 
of the United States-Chilean Mixed Claims Commission of 1892 provided that as to 
“the competency, relevancy, and effect,” of the evidence, the rules should “be 
determined by the Commission with reference to the Convention under which it is
1 1 107created, the laws of the two nations, the public law, and these [rules of procedure].”
Second, it has been suggested that the tribunal should adopt the evidential 
rules of the State where the evidence was found. However, this has never been 
accepted by a tribunal108.
To conclude, there is generally little influence of domestic evidential rules on 
tribunal tribunals in the period prior to the creation of the three selected tribunals. 
There were cases where tribunals have adopted the domestic rules of the litigating 
States, but these have been rare.
Section 7: Concluding remarks
This chapter has examined the question of what is the law of evidence. It has 
shown that the court has many factors to weigh up to establish its approach. First, the 
court considers the ultimate goals of the law of evidence, such as the legitimacy of the 
court and the rights of individuals. Second, the court has to take into account more 
pragmatic matters such as expense and delay.
Various legal traditions of the world have adopted differing approaches on 
evidential rules. The rules of each tradition depended on many factors which included 
the nature of the legal system and the aims and policies of the judiciary. For example, 
the rules in the Common Law tradition are influenced by the jury. The Islamic Legal 
tradition is influenced by the Koran.
105 Sandifer, (1975)28
106 This was proposed by the Venezuelan Commissioner but rejected by the Umpire of the Mixed Claims Commission in 1869. 
He said: “That is, international judges, acting within the limits of the compromis, according to the law of nations, ... are not 
bound by the unilateral prescriptions of one of the parties.” See further: Lapradelle and Politis, (1957) 537-538
107 Chile and United States, Convention, August 7, 1892. Minutes of Proceedings, 1894. See also: The French Spoliation 
Claims, Sandifer, (1975) 33 and The case of Queen, The Award of March 26, 1873, Sandifer, (1975) 33, Lapradelle and Politis, 
(1957) 708-709
108 This was argued by the Mexican Agent in cases before The Mexican Claims Commission. See further: Feller, (1935) 260
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The Common Law was greatly influenced by legal scholars of the 19th 
Century such as Bentham. Early procedures were relatively more restrictive. Reform 
took place in the 19th century to exclude as many restrictions as possible. However, 
the use of the jury prevented this reform from achieving the absolute Freedom of 
Proof. The procedures in the Common Law tradition are predominantly oral, with an 
emphasis on the parties presenting the evidence to the judge.
The Civil Law tradition developed from Roman law and the procedures took 
on characteristics of the jus commune system, meaning the evidence was usually in 
the written form. There was little interaction between the judges and the witness, and 
the evaluation was set in a formal framework. However, reform took place around the 
18th century emphasizing, inter alia, the immediacy between all participants in the 
proceedings. The problems of the jus commune system were addressed to an extent, 
but some of its aspects are still present in today’s systems. Compared to the Common 
Law tradition, the judge plays a much more active role.
The Islamic Legal tradition very much differs from the first two, being based 
on religion. There are many schools of Islam in the different Islamic States and 
consequently no one approach for Islamic Law. Further, in many Islamic States, the 
law has undergone reform incorporating aspects of the Civil Law tradition. Prior to 
this, Islamic Law put an emphasis on oral testimony. However, after the influence of 
the Civil Law tradition, many jurisdictions have taken on board characteristics such as 
an increase in the use of written evidence.
From the practice of international tribunals of the earlier period of 
international litigation, it seems that domestic evidential rules do not play a significant 
role in determining the approach of the tribunals. However, the following chapters, 
inter alia, will examine the extent to which domestic rules have an influence on the 
rules of the three selected tribunals.
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Chapter Four: The Standard of Proof
Section 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction:
This chapter investigates a more specific aspect of evidential rules: the
standard of proof. It will examine the definition of the standard of proof in 
international litigation and how it is used. It looks at the relevant tribunal’s governing 
instruments, the jurisprudence1 and presents information gathered from interviews of 
the judges of each tribunal.
The chapter takes the thesis forward by investigating whether there is an 
emerging commonality with regard to the standard of proof. Further, it will also try to 
understand why the tribunal has adopted its particular approach. The last question is 
whether there should be a common set of rules on the standard of proof, but the 
details will be left to the final chapter where all aspects of evidential rules will be 
looked at together.
1.2 What is the standard of proof?
The standard of proof is critical to the outcome of a case. As defined by 
Kazazi, it is the “measure or criterion, on the basis of which the adjudicating body 
ultimately determines whether or not the burden of proof in a given case has been
'y
m et...” Dennis has defined the standard of proof as “the degree of probability to 
which facts must be proved to be true”3.
The standard of proof can depend on the nature of the case, or the jurisdiction 
in which the trial is taking place. Standards which are used widely in the Common 
Law tradition, from the highest standard to the lowest are: (a) beyond reasonable 
doubt, (b) balance of probabilities or preponderance of probabilities, (c) prima facie 
evidence. The Civil Law tradition focuses more on requiring the conviction of the 
judge. These standards will be explored further in the section about municipal law.
1 The chapter will examine the jurisprudence of the three tribunals in different ways in an attempt to best suit the forum in 
question. In the case o f the ICJ, because of its long history, the cases will be looked at chronologically to understand its 
development. As for ITLOS and the WTO DSB, since they are relatively new, the issues will be examined by subject matter.
2 Kazazi, (1996) 323
3 Dennis, (2002) 370
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Dennis further explains the reason for the existence of the range of standards: 
“In adjudicative proceedings truth is generally conceived to be a matter of probability; 
since there can be degrees of probability a question arises of what is the appropriate 
degree for the proceedings in question. Because of the inherent limitations of human 
knowledge, no party is ever required to prove facts to a standard of absolute, 
mathematical, certainty.”4 A clear definition from international tribunals of the 
standard of proof required will enhance the predictability of the litigation process.
One important factor which this chapter must take into account is that, even 
though the standard of proof might be clearly stipulated by a tribunal, the question of 
whether the party has actually met the standard is still a subjective process. This very 
much depends on the judge, and each one could have a different opinion of what 
meets the standard. In some municipal jurisdictions, notably the Common Law 
Tradition, the standard of the “reasonable man” has been introduced as the benchmark 
which the parties have to satisfy. This is not the case with international tribunals. 
Different backgrounds and specializations of the judges will have effect on his 
judgment. This point has been illustrated by a prominent author with respect to 
international commercial arbitration: “experience shows that, even in arbitration 
cases, the solution of a dispute may differ depending on whether, for example, the 
case is tried by one single arbitrator with a common law background sitting in London 
or by three arbitrators of various legal backgrounds sitting in Paris”5.
Section 2: Municipal Law:
2.1 Introduction:
The aim of this section is to give an introduction to the standard of proof used 
in selected municipal legal traditions. Most of these rules are very complex and 
warrant much more time than can be given here. For the purposes of this chapter, 
these rules have been generalised, perhaps overly done so, for the sake of simplicity. 
The approach of Common Law jurisdictions has been grouped as one, and the Civil 
Law jurisdictions as another. However, in reality, the procedures in different 
jurisdictions of the same legal tradition do vary.
4 Dennis, (2002) 370
5 Hanotiau, (1994) 350-351
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2.2 The Common Law tradition:
Generally, the definition of the standard of proof is easier to find in the 
Common Law tradition than in the Civil Law tradition. In civil cases, the standard of 
proof that is applied by the courts is on “the balance of probabilities” or “the 
preponderance of probabilities”. Denning J explained this standard of proof as: 
“The...degree of cogency...required to discharge a burden in a civil case...is well 
settled. It must carry a reasonable degree or probability, but not so high as is required 
in a criminal case. If the evidence is such that the tribunal can say: “We think it more 
probable that not” the burden is discharged, but, if the probabilities are equal, it is 
not.”6 An alternative definition can be offered as: the party has to provide “superior 
evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all 
reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of
n
the issue rather than the other.”
In criminal cases, the standard used by the courts is “beyond reasonable
o
doubt” . This standard has been defined in the English court by Lord Denning in 
Miller v. Minister o f Pensions: “It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high 
degree of probability. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond 
the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted 
fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong 
against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be 
dismissed with the sentence “of course it is possible but not in the least probable” the 
case is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice.”9 
The standard can alternatively be expressed as whether the jury is completely satisfied 
or whether it is sure of the guilt10.
The ways in which different standards are applied are not absolute. There 
have been cases in English law where courts have used the criminal standard of proof 
in civil cases such as those involving the issue of contempt of court11.
6 Miller v. M inister o f Pensions, King's Bench Division, 1947, 374
7 Gamer, (1999) 1201
8 See further: Dennis, (2002) 392-394
9 Cross, (1979) 110
10 Hepworth, Queen’s Bench, 1955, 600
11 See further: Dennis, (2002) 395-399
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In the context of the Common Law tradition, it is also important to note that 
there are two types of burdens. The first type is what is commonly understood as the 
burden of proof, i.e. the burden of persuading the court. This is otherwise termed as 
the “legal burden”, the “persuasive burden”, the “probative” burden, and the “fixed
burden of proof’. The second type is the “evidential burden”. “It is the obligation to
12adduce sufficient evidence to raise an issue for the court to consider.” This
13distinction will be important in the context of the WTO as will be seen later .
2.3 The Civil Law tradition:
In the Civil Law tradition, the standard of proof is defined less clearly than in 
the Common Law tradition. Generally, the test used is the conviction of the judge.
In civil proceedings, an example of the standard applied is stipulated in the 
French Code du travail14: “le juge forme sa conviction au vu des elements qui lui sont 
foumis pas les parties et au besoin apres toutes mesure d’instruction qu’il estime 
utile”15. Equally, in the civil code, with regard to divorce: “ Le juge homologue la 
convention et prononce le divorce s'il a acquis la conviction que la volonte de chacun 
des epoux est reelle et que leur consentement est libre et eclaire.”16
It has been suggested by some scholars that this standard is theoretically 
higher than the Common Law standard. “Continental laws seem to establish a much 
higher standard. The laws and the legal doctrine refer to the “inner conviction of the
17 ” 18judge” . Austrian law even uses the term “full conviction” (voile Uberzeugung) . 
But in spite of the different wording the practical result seems to be the same in both 
systems...”19
However, there have also been suggestions that the standard applied in the 
Civil Law tradition resembles the Common Law notion of preponderance of evidence. 
It has been argued that because “judicial proof is administered in a conflictual 
context: the judge is faced with divergent or contradictory proofs. Therefore, to 
satisfy the burden of proof is to establish sufficient likelihood to convince the judge
12 See: Dennis, (2002) 371-374 and Witenberg, (1951) 324
13 See: Chapter 4, Section 5, 105
14 Article L 122-14-3
15 La loi du 13 juillet 1973
16 Code Civil, Article 232.
17 Faching, (1990) 33
18 Faching, (1990) 33
19 See further: Reiner, (1994) 335
Charlie Gamjana-Goonchom
Page 68 of 321
who will then turn to the other party and will give him the possibility to establish a
contrary likelihood. In a complex case, judges most often will try to determine what
20is the most probable or likely solution.”
With regard to the criminal procedures, the French Criminal Procedural Code 
states that the jury needs to follow their conscience, with their “intime conviction” as 
to the guilt of the defendant21.
2.4 Islamic Legal Tradition:
As previously mentioned, Islamic law, or Shari’a’, comprises many schools of 
thoughts which can establish many approaches to evidential rules in many different 
jurisdictions. In addition, many Islamic States have moved away from traditional 
Islamic law and incorporated many aspects of western legal traditions, especially the 
Civil Law tradition.
Traditional Islamic law puts emphasis on oral evidence and witnesses without 
much reliance on written evidence. In fact, “Islamic law...limits the evidence
admissible at trial to three types that are thought to possess a high degree of
22reliability: eyewitness testimony, confessions and religious oaths” . The reliance on 
oral evidence can also be seen in the rules regarding the standard of proof.
Failing a confession or admission by the defendant, an act can be proven by 
two persons who will testify that they have witnessed the act in question. This basis 
for the standard of proof is extended to the recently introduced use of written 
documents requiring all documents to be always signed by at least by two witnesses. 
Witnesses are usually male.
20 Hanotiau, (1994) 345-346
21 Code de Procedure Penale, Art 304.
22 Lippman and McConville, (1988) 68
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International tribunals: ICJ, ITLOS, and WTO DSB 
Section 3: ICJ:
3.1 Introduction:
The issue of the standard of proof of the Court is important and very much 
alive today. In this section, its jurisprudence will be examined. For the purposes of 
this study, the history of the Court has been divided into 3 periods: (a) 1945-1965, (b) 
1965-1985, (c) 1985-2005. In addition, a selection of the jurisprudence prior to the 
creation of the Court will also be looked at, putting the practice of the Court in 
context. The suggested time divisions do not reflect the conduct of the Court in any 
way, but so that the jurisprudence can be dealt with more easily.
This section will incorporate as much of the existing literature on the standard 
of proof as possible. However, it must be noted from the outset that this is limited, 
especially in the context of the ICJ and ITLOS.
3.2 The History of the Court:
3.2.1 Pre-1945:
The International Court of Justice was created in 1945, by no means at the 
beginning of the history of international litigation. To understand the context in 
which the Court was created, this section will examine jurisprudence prior to its 
creation. However, the jurisprudence of the period is vast and cannot be fully covered 
by this chapter alone. This section will consequently deal with relevant cases of the 
PCIJ and some of other fora, but both at a simplified level.
3.2.1.1 PCIJ:
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Although not a direct replacement of the PCIJ, the ICJ resembles the PCIJ in 
both its characteristics and the rules that govern it. The details of the relationship
23between the two Courts have been examined in a previous chapter .
The PCIJ was created in 1922 after the First World War. There has been a 
substantial amount of literature on the PCIJ, stretching to its procedural rules and 
evidential rules24. However, it has not addressed the issue of the standard of proof in 
great detail. During the period of the PCIJ, the issue of the standard of proof was not 
considered to be of great importance. This is indicated by Ralston. He has said that 
the insufficiency of evidence in international litigation that is due to the weighing of 
facts (i.e. not satisfying the standard of proof) “offer nothing of interest to the student
of international law”25. Further, Judge Hudson has added that the Permanent Court
26was “seldom called upon to pronounce on issues of fact” .
The PCIJ had two main instruments that governed it: the Statute of the Court 
and the Rules of the Court. Few rules exist in the Statute on the applicable standard of 
proof. Much flexibility was left to the Court. There was a wide provision which 
stated that the “Court shall frame rules for regulating its procedure.”27
The rule of the Statute which could explain to a certain degree the standard of 
proof of the Court was Article 53 which stated that in cases where one party refused 
to appear before the Court, it must satisfy itself that the claim was “well founded in 
fact and law”. The Court has provided little clarification on this article. As noted by 
Hudson, in the drafting of the Article 53, at the proposition of the Italian delegation, 
the sub-committee of the Third Committee of the First Assembly decided not to 
include the suggested requirement that the judgment be “supported by substantial 
evidence.” The Italian Council for Diplomatic Litigation described these words as 
“useless and dangerous”. This indicated that, from the outset, much flexibility was 
given to the Permanent Court in determining its own evidential rules. Unlike the ICJ, 
the PCIJ has never stated that Article 53 was equally applicable to cases where both 
parties were present.
23 See: Chapter 2, Section 2-3, 14-51
24 The works on the PCU include: Fachiri, (1932) which summarises the case law of the PCU and addresses the some aspects of 
the procedural law; Hudson, (1943) A detailed book on the case law of the PCU and the PCA, and the history of the drafting of 
articles of the Statute and rules; Ralston, (1926) covering some aspects of the law and procedures, including evidential rules, of 
the PCU;
25 Ralston, (1926)218
26 Hudson, (1934) 500
27 Article 30 of the Statute.
28 Ralston, (1926) 203-204;
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The PCIJ has never clearly stated the applicable standard of proof in its 
jurisprudence29. In its cases, the Permanent Court has not used the same terms as 
those found in municipal law in a way which would indicate the application of a 
similar standard30.
The lack of an explicit indication of the standard of proof can lead to the 
following conclusions: a) the issue of the standard of proof did not have priority for 
the Permanent Court, b) the Permanent Court did not want to be tied down by strict 
rules but emphasized flexibility. The lack of a fixed approach to procedural rules was 
illustrated in the Free Zones o f Upper Savoy and the District o f Gex Case. The Court 
declared that “the decision of an international dispute of the present order should not 
mainly depend on a point of procedure”31. In addition, Judge Huber said that the 
Court “must not run the risk of a case between two States being decided on the basis 
of a purely formal administration of Justice.”32
Although the jurisdiction phase falls outside the scope of this chapter, the 
practice of the Court is nonetheless worth noting for it might indicate as to the 
standard not expressed in the merits stage. In the jurisdiction phase of the Chorzow 
Factory Case, the Court seemed to be applying the “preponderant” test by saying that 
it will “affirm its jurisdiction provided that the force of the arguments militating in 
favour if it is preponderant"33. Further, the Court avoided the question of whether the 
standard applied was “beyond reasonable doubt” by saying that there was no need to 
answer the question because the evidence before it was convincing enough34. Having 
said this, it is not certain whether the Court was applying the same test during the 
merits phase.
3.2.1.2 Other Fora:
29 The study in this chapter is limited to contentious cases and not advisory opinions.
30 However, in a different context of considering the arguments of the parties as supposed to the facts, the PCU has used terms 
such as “well-founded” to describe whether the case presented was satisfactory to the Court. See further: The Meuse Case, PCU, 
1937, 19-20, The Lotus Case, PCU, 1927 Judge Loder: p. 34 Judge Weiss p. 49, Chorzow Factory Case (Indemnity), PCU, 1928, 
40, 44. Further, the Permanent Court has also used terms such as whether the evidence presented by the parties had “convinced” 
Court. See: The Wimbledon Case, PCU, 1923, 25. The Court has addressed various aspects o f evidential issues but has not 
clarified the applicable standard of proof. See further: Sandifer, (1975) see especially Chapter 3 on the production of evidence
31 Free Zones o f  Upper Savoy and the District o f Gex, PCU, 1932 ser. A/B, No. 46, at 155-56
32 During the discussion of a revision of the Rule of the Court in June 1926, ser. D, No. 2 (add), at 100-01
33 The Chorzow Case (Indemnity)(Jurisdiction), PCU, 1927, 32
34 The Chorzow Case (Indemnity)(Jurisdiction), PCU, 1927, 32
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Like the PCIJ, other fora that existed pre-1945 are also important to the 
understanding of the rules of the ICJ. This section will give a brief overview35.
International litigation of this period was often in the form of ad hoc 
arbitrations or mixed claim commissions. Similar to the PCIJ, few rules existed 
restricting the freedom of the judge to evaluate the evidence, particularly on the 
standard of proof36.
Municipal rules and technical rules were seldom incorporated, leaving the 
arbitrators/judges much discretion as to the procedures. They did not set a precise 
standard of proof. Judges/arbitrators decided the case on the basis of the strength of 
the evidence that was set out before them37. They have expressed the standard of 
proof in terms of the sufficiency of the evidence, but often omitting to state what the 
exact standard was38.
There have been some suggestions as to the possible applicable standard. For 
example, in the Feuilletan Case, the Umpire said that the “burden rests upon the 
respondent government to show by a fair balance of affirmative proof that 
recompense has been made”39. In the Parker Case before the United States-Mexican 
General Claims Commission, it was said that “when the claimant has established a 
prima facie case and the respondent has offered no evidence in rebuttal the latter may 
not insist that the former pile up evidence beyond reasonable doubt without pointing 
out some reason for doubting”40.
There was not a consistent or definite approach on the standard of proof of the 
tribunals of this period. As expressed by Judge Lauterpacht, “Apart from the rules of 
Permanent Tribunals...no specific rules as to evidence and proof have so far evolved 
in international arbitration.”41
3.3 The ICJ:
3.3.1 The provisions of the ICJ:
35 See generally: Sandifer, (1975) Chapter 3; Bishop, (1930); Carlston, (1946); Kazazi, (1996) in particular 323-352; Hudson, 
(1943) for cases under the rules o f the PCA;
36 See further: Sandifer, (1975)457-471
37 For example, the Commissioners concluded that: “it must decide on the strength of the evidence produced by both 
parties’’Archuleta Case, United States-Mexican General Claims Commission, 1929, 76
8 See cases that are cited: Ralston, (1926) 218-219
39 As cited by Ralston in Ralston, (1926) 220
40 Parker v Mexico, United States-Mexican General Claims Commission, 1926
41 See further: Lauterpacht, (1931) 42
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The ICJ is governed by several provisions, namely the Statute of the Court, 
the Rules of the Court, and the Practice Directions.
The Statute does not have a direct provision addressing the issue of the 
standard of proof. Similar to the PCIJ, the only helpful article is Article 53, even 
though it is primarily about the non-appearance of one of the parties. It provides that 
“whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, .. .the other party may 
call upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim”, but before doing so, the Court 
must “satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction in accordance with articles 36 and 
37, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law”42. The Statute does not 
offer any further explanation of the terms used.
However, the Court has stated in a later case that this standard is also 
applicable in cases where both parties are before the Court, but again, it did not go 
into detail of the precise definition of the article43. This universal applicability of 
Article 53 is also supported by authors such as Kazazi. He says that “although 
applicable to cases where one of the parties is absent, it implies that this is a kind of 
standard of proof which can be applied by the Court in other cases as well.”44 He 
went on further to suggest that “well founded in fact and law” is a standard unlike 
preponderance of proof, but resembles more proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
“Nevertheless, “well founded in fact and law” could be used for guidance in 
determining the standard of proof, as well as in combination with other standards.”45
The Rules of the Court and the Practice Directions do not address the issue of 
the standard of proof, but rather other aspects of procedural rules. They cover rules 
for the litigating parties such as the specifics of how the case should be presented 
before the Court and rules which regulate the functioning of the Court, such as the 
number of judges. There are not many rules which restrict the judges’ freedom in 
evaluating the facts of the case.
3.3.2 The jurisprudence of the ICJ:
3.3.2.1 1945-1965:
42 ICJ Statute, 1945 Art 53
43 The Nicaragua Case, ICJ, 1986, 24 para 24
44 Kazazi, (1996) 351
45 Kazazi, (1996) 351
Charlie Gamjana-Goonchom
Page 74 of 321
During the first 20 years of the Court, cases varied greatly in nature. They 
included boundary cases, cases involving State sovereignty, and the application of 
international conventions. During this period, the most notable case in terms of 
establishing the standard of proof of the Court was the Corfu Channel Case.
The Corfu Channel Case:
This case was between the United Kingdom and Albania on the question of 
the responsibility of Albania with regard to mines that two British destroyers struck in 
the Corfu Channel. In considering the merits of the case, the Court has made various 
statements which could be used to explain its approach to the standard of proof.
Most notably in this case, and not clearly seen in any other, the Court stated 
that the evidence presented by the parties must prove the case beyond reasonable 
doubt, a standard which is most commonly associated with criminal cases in the 
Common Law legal tradition. This standard was applied to the question of whether 
Albania knew about the mines in its own territorial waters. The Court stated that it 
“must examine...whether it has been established by means of indirect evidence that 
Albania has knowledge of minelaying in her territorial waters independently of any 
connivance on her part in this operation. The proof may be drawn from inferences of 
fact, provided that they leave no room for reasonable doubt.”46 This must be viewed 
in the light of what the Court later stated: the charge against Albania was of 
“exceptional gravity” which would “require a degree of certainty that has not been 
reached here”47. There seems to be a correlation between the gravity of the charge 
with the standard applied.
The rationale behind the Court’s applied standard was further explained by 
Dr. Ecer in his Dissenting Opinion48. He classified the laying of the mines in the 
Channel as one which was “in reality a criminal act”. Dr. Ecer quoted a Common 
Law tradition scholar enunciating that such a high standard was needed because of the 
stigma that was associated with the act49. The seriousness of the act in question
46 Corfu Channel Case , ICJ, 1949, 18
47 Corfu Channel Case , ICJ, 1949, 17
48 Dr. Ecer did not disagree with the Court on the standard of proof applied and offered an explanation as to why the Court was 
applying such a standard.
49 Corfu Channel Case, ICJ, 1949, 118-119
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corresponding to a higher standard will be discussed later, both in the context of the 
Oil Platforms Case50 and the interview with the various judges51.
However, in addition to standard of beyond reasonable doubt, there were also 
suggestions that the Court also applied other standards. This has been expressed by 
Dr. Ecer in his Dissenting Opinion in describing the way in which the Court dealt 
with indirect evidence. He seemed to be suggesting a standard which required a 
balancing act. Dr. Ecer said that, from the indirect evidence that was before the 
Court, it must balance out which conclusion is more likely and, in his opinion, there 
were factors that “tilt” the balance towards establishing that Albania was not 
cognizant of the existence of the minefield52. The standard applied here resembled 
the municipal concept of “balance of probabilities” because the Court had to decide 
which was the more likely conclusion based on the facts.
Another term used by the Court to describe whether it was satisfied with the 
evidence was the word “conclusive”. In relation to the statements attributed to third 
parties by the witnesses, the Court said that these allegations “were falling short of
CO
conclusive evidence” . However, the Court did not enunciate in anyway what it 
meant by “conclusive evidence”, or to what standard of proof in municipal law this 
corresponded to.
In the Corfu Channel Case, the applicable standard of proof seemed to be 
beyond reasonable doubt. There were also other standards mentioned but it is unclear 
whether the Court actually applied them or what the standard precisely meant.
Other cases in the period:
In addition to the Corfu Channel Case, the Court has also dealt with various 
other cases during this period covering a range of issues. The Court did not seem to 
be able to apply a consistent standard of proof throughout and did not utilise well- 
recognised municipal standards.
In 1951, the Court reaffirmed the test in its Statute in the Fisheries Cases 
(United Kingdom v. Norway) concerning a dispute on the fishing zone off the coast of 
Norway. It said that the “submissions of the applicant State are well-founded in fact
50 See: Chapter 4, Section 3.3.2.3, 79
51 See: Chapter 4, Section 3.3.2.4, 89
52 Corfu Channel Case, ICJ, 1949, 124
53 Corfu Channel Case, ICJ, 1949, 16-17
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and law ...”54 These words resemble Article 53 of the Statute as explained earlier. 
However, the Court failed to enunciate exactly what “well-founded in fact and law” 
entailed.
Furthermore, the Court also stated that the evidence needed to be 
“convincing”, expressing this twice. First, the Court said that, in the light of what has 
been presented to it, it was bound to hold that the Norwegian authorities applied their 
system of limitation consistently and uninterruptedly from 1869 until the time when 
the dispute arose unless there was “convincing evidence to the contrary”55. Second, 
the Court said that it “cannot readily find that the lines adopted in these 
circumstances...are not in accordance with the traditional system” “in absence of 
convincing evidence to the contrary.”56 The standard applied in these two scenarios 
seemed to be the requirement of “convincing” evidence. The Court once again did 
not enunciate what exactly this standard meant.
Two years later in 1953, the Court used what seemed to be the test of “balance 
of probabilities”. In the boundary case of Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v. 
United Kingdom), the Court said that it would decide the issue of whether the 
sovereignty over the islets and rocks of the Minquiers and Ecrehos group belonged to 
France or the United Kingdom by determining “which of the Parties has produced the 
more convincing proof of title to one or the other of these groups, or to both of
57them.” This act of comparing the evidence of the two parties and weighing them 
resemble the Common Law standard of the balance of probabilities. However, the 
Court never explicitly stated this or explained the relationship between this standard 
and those used in previous cases.
In the years that immediately follow, the Court did not pursue this “balance” 
approach and seemed to have moved back to the criterion where the evidence 
presented to it needed to be “convincing”. There was no explanation why the Court 
did this. The cases with this approach were the following.
The Nottebohm Case (1955) concerned a claim by Liechtenstein for restitution 
and compensation on the ground that the Government of Guatemala acted towards its 
citizen in a manner contrary to international law. Although the Court did not state 
what the standard of proof applied was, Judge Read said the fact that after his release
54 Fisheries Case, ICJ, 1951, 40
55 Fisheries Case, ICJ, 1951, 138
56 Fisheries Case, ICJ, 1951, 140
57 The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, ICJ, 1953, 52
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in North Dakota, Mr. Nottebohm returned to Liechtenstein, together with his 
admission into the country, was sufficient as “convincing” evidence of the real and
58effective character of his link with Liechstenstein .
In 1959, in a boundary dispute of the Case Concerning Sovereignty over 
Certain Frontier Land (Belgium v. Netherlands), the Court had to consider whether 
there was a mistake that would vitiate the Convention in question and granting the 
sovereignty over the disputed area to Belgium. The Court said that the “only question 
is whether a mistake...has been established by convincing evidence.”59 Here, the 
Court once more regarded “convincing” evidence as enough to discharge the burden 
of proof.
Preliminary Conclusion:
To summarise the first twenty years of the Court’s life, it saw many types of 
cases ranging from those involving State responsibility to boundary disputes. In its 
very first case, which involved issues of State responsibility, it applied inter alia the 
highest standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt. Dr. Ecer later clarified the 
application of the standard by saying that the case was one which was criminal in 
nature. In addition, there were boundary cases where the Court applied various 
standards of proof such as requiring evidence that was “convincing” or introduced an 
act of balancing the evidence. However, the Court has not been explicit on the 
standard of proof it applied, and on the exact correlation of the standard applied to the 
nature of the cases.
3.3.2.2 1965-1985:
The cases:
In the second period of the history of the Court, the lack of clarity on the 
standard of proof continued. There was a mixture of terms used. As well as the terms
58 Nottebohm Case, ICJ, 1955, 45. In his Dissenting Opinion, Judge Read quoted the case of Hatton v. United Mexican Slates 
where it was stated that “convincing proof of nationality is requisite not only from the standpoint of international law, but as 
jurisdictional requirement”. See further: Nottebohm Case, ICJ, 1955, 50-51
59 Belgium v. Netherlands, ICJ, 1959, 222
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used in the first period of its history, the Court also introduced the notions of 
“conclusiveness” and “sufficiency”.
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Germany v. Denmark; Germany v. 
Netherlands) in 1969, the Court simply held that the evidence produced was not 
sufficient. The Court stated that no “complete delimitation in this area has however 
yet been carried out” and that the evidence before the Court was “inconclusive” and 
“insufficient” to show that there was settled practice indicating that delimitation 
according to the principle of equidistance amounts to the mandatory rules of 
customary international law60. With regard to the attitude adopted by the Germany 
on the issue of it rights in the continental shelf, Judge Sorensen said that the state 
practice, and in particular its signing of the Geneva Convention was “conclusive” 
evidence of its attitude towards the Convention61. However, the Court did not 
enunciate what the standard of proof was, leaving open to interpretation the words 
“conclusive”, “inconclusive”, and “insufficient”.
A few years later in a case concerning the fishing zone off the coast of Iceland, 
the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Germany v. Iceland), the Court reverted back to the 
“well-founded” formula found in its Statute. In this case, with regard to the amount 
of damages that was to be determined, the Court said that the evidence did not always 
indicate the required or an estimation of the amount of the damages. The Court then 
went on to state that the evidence supporting such a claim must be “detailed”, and 
only after receiving such evidence can the Court establish that the claim is “well 
founded in fact and in law”62. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. 
Iceland), counsel for the United Kingdom suggested that the standard of proof needed 
was one which required the evidence to be “convincing” .
In 1982, in another boundary case, the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah), the Court used the “convincing” test once 
again. When discussing an objection that there was no express acceptance by the 
authorities of the Tunisian Protectorate of a perpendicular line for the delimitation, the 
Court held that this was not crucial. One of the decisive points was whether there was 
“conclusive” evidence that Italian authorities exercised effective surveillance of
60 North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ, 1969, 45
61 North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ, 1969, 248
62 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, ICJ, 1974, 204
63 In this dispute, the issues in question were whether international law recognised the right of a coastal State to make an 
exclusive claim, like that of Iceland which exceeded the 12-nautical miles from the baseline. Fisheries Jurisdiction, ICJ, 1974, 
78
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sponge fisheries off the Tripolitanian coasts, laterally, to the 22 degrees line and 
seawards, beyond the 34th parallel64.
Preliminary Conclusion:
As a summary, in the period of 1965-1985, the ICJ remained unclear as to the 
applicable standard of proof. It has indicated whether there was enough evidence 
provided but not a more precise standard. In some of the boundary cases, the Court 
has again expressed the standard of whether there was convincing evidence but this 
has not been consistently applied in all boundary cases. There were also other terms 
used such as whether the evidence was conclusive. Unlike the initial period of the 
Court’s life, there was no mention of the standard of proving a case beyond 
reasonable doubt even in cases involving State responsibility like the United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case65.
3.3.23  1985-2007:
In the past two decades, there has probably been more jurisprudence to aid the 
understanding of the approach of the Court on the standard of proof than ever before. 
However, that is not to say that the standard is well established. The Nicaragua Case 
was an important case, arguably marking the beginning of a period of the Court’s life 
where more attention is given to the issue of the standard of proof. This focus is also 
highlighted by the recent Oil Platforms Case which will be examined later.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua V. United 
States o f America):
The Nicaragua Case is crucial in trying to understand the standard of proof of 
the Court66. It concerned the allegation by Nicaragua that the United States had given 
support to a mercenary army, the contras, on attacks within the territory of Nicaragua 
with the aim of overthrowing the government. Nicaragua argued that the United
64 Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, ICJ, 1982, 131
65 The Tehran Hostages Case, ICJ, 1980, 3
66 See further on the practice of the Court in this case: Highet, (1987a)
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States was using armed force against it through its funding and assistance to the 
contras.
In the oral pleadings of Nicaragua, it was stated that “it is well known that 
charges of exceptional gravity against a sovereign State or its government require to 
be established by conclusive evidence involving a high degree of certainty”. This was 
taken from the Corfu Channel Case. However, Counsel for Nicaragua also insisted 
that “the standard of proof must depend upon the forensic geography of the particular 
case”. Counsel further added that, in this particular case, there are three factors that 
affect the standard of proof.
First, quoting the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
Case, Counsel argued that Article 53 has effect on the standard of proof in that the 
Court did not need to examine the accuracy of the submissions in all their details but 
it needed to convince itself they were well founded. Second, the standard of proof 
must reflect the fact that the Respondent has not appeared before the Court to deny 
the allegations that have been made against it. Third, there were indications in public 
records as to the United States’ illegal purpose and the responsibility for illegal 
actions. Counsel then concluded that the standard of proof that should be applied in
fnthis case was one of “reasonable certainty” .
What is important to note is the statement of the Court: “it is clear that general 
principles of judicial procedure necessarily govern the determination of what can be 
regarded as proved.”68 Yet, the Court did not define what these “general principles of 
judicial procedure” were. Are they municipal rules? Are they the rules of the 
Common Law tradition, the Civil Law tradition, or other legal traditions?
The most significant contribution of the Nicaragua Case on the issue of 
standard of proof was probably the statement of the Court addressing Article 53 of the 
Statute. The Court said that “the use of the term “satisfy itself’ in the English text of 
the Statute (and in the French text the term “s’assurer”) implies that the Court must 
attain the same degree of certainty as in any other case that the claim of the party 
appearing is sound in law, and, so far as the nature of the case permits, that the facts 
on which it is based are supported by convincing evidence.”69 In other words, the 
Court has confirmed that Article 53 equally applies to cases where both parties are 
present. Further, the Court seemed to be setting a standard consistent with many prior
67 This standard was also argued in: DRC v Uganda, ICJ, 2005 CR 2005/3, 12 April
68 The Nicaragua Case, ICJ, 1986, 40
69 The Nicaragua Case, ICJ, 1986, 24 para 24
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cases, namely that the evidence must be “convincing”. Once again, the Court omitted 
the precise definition of the word. In addition, what could be inferred from the 
statement that the evidence must be of this standard “so far as the nature of the case 
permits”? Could this imply that the standard of proof of the Court is variable 
contingent on the amount of evidence that is available? If this is the case, how does it 
determine which case deserves a change in the standard of proof, and in cases where it 
is necessary, how and by what margin does it regulate the change? Here, the Court 
seemed to have taken into account the proposal of the Nicaraguan counsel that the 
standard of proof must reflect the nature of the case. However, the Court did not state 
that the standard was “reasonable certainty”, but rather one which required 
“convincing evidence”.
The test of whether the evidence can “convince” the Court was used again in 
various places in the judgment. The clearest statement and one that addresses the 
interpretation of Article 53 most directly was probably by Judge Schwebel. He stated 
“ ...the real point is that, where objections are raised to the appearing party’s 
contentions, that party must convince the Court that those objections are unfounded if
70the Court is to meet the standard which article 53 imposes.”
In addition, the Court also arguably applied a test similar to the Common Law 
notion of the “balance of probabilities”. On determining that there was armed 
opposition in El Salvador from Nicaraguan territory, the Court stated that even though 
it did not have “full proof that there was aid, or as to its exact nature, its scale and its 
continuance until the early months of 1981, it cannot overlook a number of 
concordant indications, many of which were provided moreover by Nicaragua itself, 
from which it can reasonably infer the provision of a certain amount of aid from 
Nicaraguan territory” 71. Although not explicit, by allowing a degree of uncertainty, 
the Court seemed to be applying a standard resembling the “balance of probabilities” 
test.
More, the Nicaragua Case has also pointed out one crucial aspect of the way 
the Court evaluates evidence: deciding whether the evidence has satisfied the standard 
of proof can be a subjective process. Following the decision in the United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case, the Court deemed it sufficient to 
establish some facts as public knowledge through press information, raising questions
70 The Nicaragua Case, ICJ, 1986, 320
71 The Nicaragua Case, ICJ, 1986, 82
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whether this can satisfy the standard of proof and underlining the subjectivity of the
72procedure .
Cases after the Nicaragua Case:
After the Nicaragua Case, the Court again reverted to saying little about the 
standard of proof. Its approach was varied and inconsistent. In many cases, the Court 
merely stated that the evidence was not sufficient to uphold the claim.
In the ELSI Case (1989), the Chamber of the Court merely stated that “there is 
not sufficient evidence...to support the suggestion that there was a plan to favour IRI 
at the expense of ELSI, and the claim of "discriminatory measures" in the sense of 
Article I of the Supplementary Agreement must therefore be rejected.”73 Another 
indication as to the possible standard applied by the Court was mentioned by Judge 
Schwebel. After concluding that the arguments were unpersuasive, he suggested that 
the evidence or the demonstration of the claim needed to be “convincing” in order to 
discharge the burden of proof74.
In the Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute Case (1992), on the 
question of whether an uti possidetis juris position could be established by 
acquiescence or recognition, the Chamber of the Court stated the requirement to be 
“sufficient evidence”75. In addition, the judgment also suggested that the standard of 
proof was one that balances probabilities. The Chamber said “of the other two 
explanations put forward, the Chamber considers that advanced by Honduras, on 
balance, more likely; it considers that if what was contemplated was solely the risk of 
incursions by the inhabitants of the province of Comayagua, this would probably have 
been spelled out specifically in the document...”76 The Chamber used the “balance” 
notion in several other places in the judgment. The Chamber stated that “the fact that 
El Salvador has continued to present a consistent interpretation of the 1743 title does 
not prove that it is a correct one”, and that “on balance, it concludes that the Torola
72 The Nicaragua Case, ICJ, 1986, 41, See further on this issue: Highet, (1987a) 39-43, 49-51 Highet noted the high degree on 
which the Court was dependent on indirect evidence including press reports to establish the facts of the case. He commented that 
this could be a result o f the non-appearance of the United States leaving the Court very few options. ; See also Judge Schwebel’s 
Dissenting Opinion commenting that the Court’s finding of the facts was skewed in favour of Nicaragua in the way it selected 
and assessed news reports. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel The Nicaragua Case, ICJ, 1986, 271-273, 279-80, 295-296
73 The ELSI Case, ICJ, 1989, 73
74 ELSI, ICJ, 1989, 117-118
75 In cases where there was “sufficient evidence”, “there seems to be no reason in principle why these factors should not operate.” 
El Salvador V. Honduras, ICJ, 1992, 401
76 El Salvador V. Honduras, ICJ, 1992, 484
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title extended to the Yuquina or Las Canas river, and was not bounded by the 
Masire.”77 Further, the Chamber stated that “on balance, the Chamber accepts the 
contentions of El Salvador that the Colomoncagua lands did not at any point extend 
across the river Las Canas...78, but most significantly, the Chamber went on to say 
that “accordingly the Chamber considers, on a balance of probabilities, there being no 
great abundance of evidence either way, that the river Las Canas was the provincial 
boundary, and hence the uti possidetis line, downstream as far as the point where it
79turns southwards, to merge eventually with the river Torola.” The emphasis in this 
judgment has been on the “balance of probabilities” test, highlighted by the last 
statement.
However, in the same case, Judge Torres Bemadez suggested that the standard 
of proof was “beyond reasonable doubt” in his Separate Opinion. This was 
concerning the question of whether “the Alcaldia Mayor de Minas of 
Tegucigalpa...exercised the same range of territorial jurisdictional powers as had any
main administrative subdivision of the Captaincy-General of Guatemala before the
80introduction into Central America, in 1786, of the system of intendencias.” The 
Separate Opinion raises questions. What can be deduced from the mentioning of two 
standards of proof in the same judgment? Was Judge Torres Bemardez the only judge
o 1
who was applying the higher standard ? If so, what implications could this have?
After this case, the Court reverted to the lack of clarity on the standard of 
proof. In his Separate Opinion in the Case Concerning Land and Maritime Boundary 
between Cameroon and Nigeria, and although only at the preliminary stages of the 
case, Judge Ajibola said that there was “no conclusive or convincing evidence” to
o9
determine the issue at hand and that the issue must be left to the merits phase . This 
suggests that this standard would have been applied if the case had reached the merits 
stage.
More recently in 1997, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case, the Court 
once more expressed its standard of proof in terms of sufficiency of the evidence. It
77 El Salvador V. Honduras, ICJ, 1992, 497
78 El Salvador V. Honduras, ICJ, 1992, 502
79 El Salvador V. Honduras, ICJ, 1992, 506
80 El Salvador V. Honduras, ICJ, 1992, 683
81 In the more recent judgment of Qatar v Bahrain, Judge Torres Bemardez also applied the standard of “beyond reasonable 
doubt” in his Dissenting Opinion. He stated that “in any case, the Ottoman period of Qatar proves beyond any reasonable doubt 
the absence of a continuous exercise of State authority by Bahrain in the Qatar peninsula and the adjoining islands, namely of 
one of the essential elements required by international law for an alleged authority to become a possible source of title to 
territory.” Qatar v Bahrain, ICJ, 2001, 3001-301
82 Cameroon v. Nigeria, ICJ, 1996, 39
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said that it “has not found sufficient evidence to conclude that Czechoslovakia had 
consistently refused to consult with Hungary about the desirability or necessity of 
measures for the preservation of the environment.”83 The “sufficiency” test was also 
suggested by Judge Koroma. He stated that, although the Court took into 
consideration the scientific evidence presented by Hungary regarding the 
environmental effects of the project, this evidence “was not sufficient to allow 
Hungary unilaterally to suspend or terminate the Treaty.”84
Oil Platforms Case:
The recent Oil Platforms Case is one of the few cases in the jurisprudence of 
the Court that has addressed the issue of the standard of proof. It concerned a dispute 
between Iran and the United States. Iran instituted proceedings against the United 
States regarding attacks on three offshore oil complexes, owned by the National Iran 
Oil Company, by warships of the United States Navy. In turn, the United States filed 
a counter-claim concerning “Iran’s actions in the Gulf during 1987-88 which, among 
other things, involved mining and other attacks on US flag or US owned vessels”85.
On the standard of proof, the Oil Platforms Case shows that the debate is still 
alive. Judge Higgins addressed this issue in her Separate Opinion. She briefly went 
through the jurisprudence of the Court outlining the important cases and some of the 
problems the Court faces. Judge Higgins then reaffirmed the established notion that 
the party that seeks to establish a fact must prove it. However, she was critical of the 
method through which the Court arrived at its decision and in particular the question 
of what standard of proof the Court was using to establish sufficiency of the evidence. 
Judge Higgins highlighted the importance of establishing a clear standard of proof 
since so much of a case can turn on evidence. She further recognised that some 
international tribunals had addressed this issue and that the ICJ should do the same.
Judge Higgins observed that the primary objective of the Court seemed to be 
to grant itself as much freedom in evaluating the evidence as possible. She mentioned 
the Corfu Channel Case and the Nicaragua Case only to come to the conclusion that 
these cases did not establish a clearly defined set of rules86.
83 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case, ICJ, 1997, 66
84 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case, ICJ, 1997, 144 (Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma)
85 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 para 9
86 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 Judge Higgins’s separate opinion, para. 32
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In the judgment of the Court itself, the standard of proof applied was again far 
from clear. From the wording, it can be suggested that the Court was using the 
“balance of probabilities” test. Judge Higgins has stated that the Court “has satisfied 
itself with saying that it did not have to decide "on the basis of a balance of evidence" 
by whom the missile that struck the Sea Isle City was fired.”87 The Court later 
concluded that the evidence was insufficient.
The Court also indicated as to what was needed from the parties in terms of 
evidence. It concluded that there “was no direct evidence at all of the type of missile 
that struck the Sea Isle City; the evidence as to the nature of other missiles fired at
00
Kuwaiti territory at this period is suggestive, but no more" . This means that, to 
satisfy the Court, the evidence needed to be more than suggestive. On this point, 
Judge Higgins added that it was not clear “whether the Court is rejecting the indirect 
evidence per se (though it was clearly accepted by the Court in the Corfu Channel 
Case, Merits, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 18), or whether it was accepting indirect 
evidence but that in this particular case it did not meet the standard "no room for 
reasonable doubt" enunciated in the same case in 1949 (ibid., p. 18)”89. From the 
judgment, there was no further indication that the Court was using the high standard 
adopted in the Corfu Channel Case.
What is further worth noting is the mine that struck the USS Samuel B. 
Roberts. The Court recognised that there were comparable moored mines in the same 
area, and they had serial numbers matching other Iranian mines and those found on 
board the vessel Iran Ajr. As expressed by Judge Higgins, this evidence “is on any 
test rather weighty”, especially when compared with the issue of the missiles that 
struck the Sea Isle City. However, the Court only held that this evidence was “highly 
suggestive, but not conclusive"90. The way in which the Court reached this 
conclusion was not explicit. But it meant that evidence that was “highly suggestive” 
could not discharge the burden of proof while evidence that was “conclusive” could.
In addition to Judge Higgins, other judges also expressed concern and views 
about the standard of proof. In the context of the difficulty in ascertaining the facts of 
the case, Judge Owada pointed out that the rules of the Court on evidence were not
87 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 Judge Higgins’s separate opinion, para. 34
88 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 para 59
89 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003, Judge Higgin’s Separate Opinion, para 35
90 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 para 71
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well developed91. He further stated that the rules needed to be so to address the 
scenario where one party could find it hard to discharge the burden of proof placed 
upon them92.
Judge Buergenthal also expressed the view that the standard of proof set by 
the Court was unclear. He questioned the term “insufficient” used by the Court, 
pointing out that there was no precise definition. He made suggestions as to what 
could constitute “sufficiency” for the Court, covering a range of terms including
93“convincing”, “preponderant”, “overwhelming” and “beyond a reasonable doubt” . 
These were terms that the Court had used in its jurisprudence. Judge Buergenthal 
then underlined the problem of the lack of clarity regarding the standard of proof. 
Concerning the mines that struck USS Samuel B. Roberts, he noted the inconsistency 
of the Court in first setting the standard as requiring “sufficient” evidence and 
changing it to requiring “conclusive” evidence without an explanation. He agreed 
with Judge Higgins on why “highly suggestive” was not sufficient for the Court in 
this particular case94.
The Oil Platforms Case was significant in terms of the study on the standard 
of proof. It has shown that the Court still has not laid down a set of clear rules. 
However, it has used many terms in describing what evidence is required including 
that evidence needed to be: (a) “sufficient”95, (b) “convincing”96, and (c)
97“conclusive” . In the judgment of the Court, as already mentioned, the standard of
QO
the “balance of probabilities” was applied . Other standards were also expressed by
the judges of the Court. In his Separate Opinion, Judge Koojimans seemed to be
applying the standard of “beyond reasonable doubt” on the issue of the mines that 
caused damage to the USS Samuel B. Roberts99.
What is also clear from this case is the concern that some of the judges have 
for the lack of clarity on the standard of proof and the need for the Court to address 
the issue, as shown by the Opinions of Judge Higgins and Buergenthal. It is worth 
noting that both of these judges come from the Common Law background where the 
rules of evidence are clearly laid out when compared to the Civil Law tradition.
91 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 Judge Owada’s Separate Opinion, para 52
92 See further: Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 Judge Owada’s Separate Opinion, para 46-52
93 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 Judge Buergenthal’s Separate Opinion, para. 41
94 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 Judge Buergenthal’s Separate Opinion, para. 41 & 44
95 For example, see Judge Koojimans’s Opinion Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 para 56
96 For example, see Judge Koojimans’s Opinion Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 para 54
97 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 para 71
98 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 para 57
99 Judge Koojimans’s Opinion Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 para 56
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Perhaps they have had the advantage of having seen the benefits of a clear set of rules. 
The question then arises of what factors play a role in determining the approach of the 
Court, an issue which will be addressed later100.
Armed Activities in the Territory of Congo (DRC v Uganda):
The case of Armed Activities on the Territory o f Congo (DRC v Uganda) 
concerned a claim brought by Democratic Republic of Congo against Uganda with 
respect to armed aggression perpetrated by Uganda on its territory.
The Court once again did not clearly set the standard of proof to be met by the 
parties. This was despite the efforts of the parties to argue on the issue before the 
Court, maybe urging the Court to suggest the applicable standard. Counsel for the 
DRC suggested in their pleadings that the correct standard to apply was one of 
“reasonable certainty”, but also said that some issues could be established “without 
any shadow of doubt”, and that “there is no room for reasonable doubt in this regard”. 
The DRC argued that the Court is not fixed by firm rules on standard of proof, and 
pointed out the standard set by the Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute Case 
(El Salvador v. Honduras) of “balance of probabilities, and proving “beyond 
reasonable doubt” in the Corfu Channel Case101. Counsel for Uganda responded by 
referring to the Corfu Channel Case and stating that the standard of proof for the 
Court was one of “beyond reasonable doubt”.
The judgment itself indicated that the Court has no intention to directly 
address the applicable standard of proof. On the question of the support for anti-
Ugandan rebel groups by Congo, the Court merely said that the Uganda failed to
102provide “conclusive evidence” . The Court seemed to be addressing the question of 
the standard of proof in another way, by stating what sort of evidence would have 
probative value. For example, “The Court will treat with caution evidentiary 
materials specially prepared for this case and also materials emanating from a single 
source. It will prefer contemporaneous evidence from persons with direct knowledge. 
It will give particular attention to reliable evidence acknowledging facts or conduct 
unfavourable to the State represented by the person making them ...”103 The lack of
100 See: Chapter 4, Section 3.4,91 and Chapter 7, Section 3, 257
101 DRC v Uganda, ICJ, 2005 Verbatim Record 2005/3 - Public hearing held on Tuesday 12 April, p. 13-23
102 DRC v Uganda, ICJ, 2005 para 303
103 DRC v Uganda, ICJ, 2005 para 61
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enthusiasm on the part of the Court to specify the standard of proof, as illustrated by 
this case, was also apparent from the interviews of the judges of the Court as will 
shown in the following section.
The Genocide Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)
The latest development concerning the standard of proof applied by the Court 
is the recent Genocide Case. This case is significant because it is the first case that 
the Court has had to address the issue of the standard of proof directly. The case 
concerned Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Bosnia”) on one hand and Serbia and 
Montenegro (“Serbia”) on the other. Bosnia had claimed that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (later Serbia) had violated the Convention on the Prevention and the 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention).
Regarding the issue of the standard of proof, the Applicant argued that the 
standard applied should be the balance of evidence or the balance of probabilities 
because the case concerns a treaty obligation. In contrast, the Respondent suggested 
that the standard of proof should be proof beyond reasonable doubt because the 
proceedings concerned the most serious issues of State responsibility104.
However, the Court did not adopt either standard suggested by the parties but 
stated: “The Court has long recognized that claims against a State involving charges 
of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully conclusive (cf. Corfu 
Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 17). The 
Court requires that it be fully convinced that allegations made in the proceedings, that 
the crime of genocide or the other acts enumerated in Article III have been 
committed, have been clearly established. The same standard applies to the proof of 
attribution for such acts.. ..In respect of the Applicant’s claim that the Respondent has 
breached its undertakings to prevent genocide and to punish and extradite persons 
charged with genocide, the Court requires proof at a high level of certainty 
appropriate to the seriousness of the allegation.”105
What is of note from this case are the following. First, the Court did not 
define the standard of proof in terms as suggested by the parties which were those 
used in the Common Law Tradition. Second, the Court defined the standard as
104 The Genocide Case, ICJ, 2007 para 208
105 The Genocide Case, ICJ, 2007 para 209-210
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requiring evidence which is “fully conclusive” for “claims against a State involving 
charges of exceptional gravity”. Third, the Court has confirmed the applicable 
variable standard by saying that, regarding undertakings to prevent genocide and to 
punish and extradite persons charged with genocide, the Court requires proof at a high 
level of certainty appropriate to the seriousness of the allegation106. The Court did not 
go further to define standards of proof applicable to other types of cases in the 
Genocide Case.
Preliminary conclusion
The understanding of the standard of proof has increased significantly in the 
last twenty years of the Court’s life. The Court has given certain indications as to the 
applicable standard of proof. In the Nicaragua Case involving State responsibility, as 
well as stating that Article 53 of the Statute is also applicable where both parities are 
present, the Court also linked the term “satisfy itself’ in the article with the notion of 
producing “convincing” evidence. The Court in the Oil Platforms Case applied a 
high standard of proof on the question of the Iranian mines. However, it did apply the 
balance of probabilities test to the issue of who fired the missile on the Sea Isle City. 
In the boundary dispute of Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute Case, the
107Court used the standard of balancing the probabilities . Finally, in the Genocide 
Case, the Court further clarified the standard applicable to charges of exceptional 
gravity to be requiring “fully conclusive” proof, confirmed the variable nature of the 
standard of proof, but did not defined standards applicable to other types of cases. 
The Court has also expressed the standard of proof in other cases, including boundary 
cases, as needing “convincing” evidence. In other cases, the Court has merely stated 
whether the evidence was “sufficient”.
3.3.2.4 Interviews with the judges
Interviews with three judges of the Court have given this study an insight. 
When asked the question of what is the standard of proof applied by the Court, none 
of the three judges gave a straight-forward answer or a recognised municipal law
106 The Court merely stated that the standard required is high without defining it precisely.
107 Judge Bemardez applied the test of beyond reasonable doubt in the case.
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standard. There is no general policy on the standard of proof. Judges A and B noted
108that the current situation, where there is a lack of clarity is far from satisfactory . In 
contrast, Judge C said that there were both advantages and disadvantages to the 
current arrangement.
All three judges agreed on the principle that the more serious the act in 
question, the higher the standard would be. Judge C added that this shifting standard 
of proof could be compared to the Common Law tradition where, even in the trial of 
civil cases, the standard of proof could be increased if there are issues with criminal 
elements such as fraud. Judge A stated that the Court would use a standard similar to 
a criminal standard for cases of a criminal nature109. Judge C said that, for a case that 
was essentially criminal, the standard applied would almost be like the Common Law 
standard for criminal cases110.
When asked the question of how the judge determines what case is sufficiently 
serious to apply a higher standard, there was a mixture of responses. Judge A replied 
that this has to be taken on a case by case basis and that there are no fixed rules on 
determining what act would merit the application of a higher standard of proof. He 
further added that he would have to use his “gut-feeling”. In contrast, Judge B did 
give examples of what would constitute a serious act warranting a higher standard: (a) 
major uses of force, (b) breaches of humanitarian law. Judge C said the way to 
determine whether acts are serious is not a clear and mechanical process and he would 
have to look at the issue on a case by case basis.
Regarding the reason as to why the Court has not been more explicit as to the 
standard of proof, all three judges share the view that this has been caused by the lack 
of agreement among the members of the Court. There are some judges who: (a)
encourage a clear set of rules on the standard of proof111, (b) think that there is no
need to explicitly state the standard of proof112, (c) find themselves in the middle of 
the two extremes113. There is a divide between Common Law and the Civil Law 
judges. Judge A and C have suggested that this divide exists because rules on
108 Questions were also raised as to what can be done to solve the problem. This section of the interviews will be discussed in the 
concluding chapter of the thesis.
109 However, he refused to confirm that the standard applied was beyond reasonable doubt. Judge A underlined the fact that one 
must be careful in dealing with this issue and in trying to put with the debate of the rules of the Court into the context of 
municipal law.
110 Judges o f other tribunals have also expressed the view that the ICJ seem to be applying a standard higher than preponderance 
of evidence when faced with cases concerning a serious act, e.g. Judge E of ITLOS.
111 Judge B belongs to this group. He has made a comment that he has tried to
112 Judge A has expressed that many judge from the Civil Law tradition are in this group. Judge B suggests that the majority of 
the judges are in this group.
113 Judge A belongs to this group.
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evidence play a very important role in the Common Law tradition and much less so in 
the Civil Law tradition114. Judge A further suggested that, on the whole, judges from 
the Civil Law tradition tend to be less aware of the importance of setting out the 
evidential rules. Judge B has suggested that the majority of the judges from the Civil 
Law tradition, as far as he can tell, still apply the vague Civil Law notion of the 
conviction intime.
As for the question of the future direction of the Court on the standard of 
proof, Judge B pointed towards the DRC v Uganda Case. He added that, in this case, 
the Court was avoiding setting a standard of proof. Instead, the Court addressed the 
question by stating what evidence would be of high probative value. He further added 
that it is likely that this would be the way in which the Court would handle this issue 
in the future.
3.4 Concluding Remarks:
The aim of this section was to examine the practice of the Court and to 
understand its approach on the standard of proof. In its jurisprudence, the Court has 
not specified one standard of proof, but used a variety of terms to indicate whether the 
evidence supplied by the parties has been sufficient. The terms used varied from case 
to case and included: a) “beyond reasonable doubt”, b) “fully conclusive” evidence, c) 
“balance of probabilities”, d) convincing evidence, or where the evidence convinces 
the Court, e) conclusive evidence, f) the claim being well-founded, or merely g) 
sufficient evidence.
The Court did not use any of these terms consistently in a way that one could 
be singled out as the universally applied standard. Some terms were used more often 
by some judges, e.g. “beyond reasonable doubt” was often used by Judge Torres 
Bemardez. Some were used more in a particular period, e.g. “balance of 
probabilities” was used more from 1986-1996.
The priority of the Court seems to be to “retain a freedom in evaluating the 
evidence” 115. The uncertainty in the Court’s rules on standard of proof has also been 
expressed by Rosenne: “there is little to be found in the way of rules of evidence and 
a striking feature of the jurisprudence is the ability of the Court frequently to base its
114 Judge C commented that there are so many different cultures on the bench.
115 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 Judge Higgins’s separate opinion, para. 31
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decisions on undisputed facts, and in reducing voluminous evidence to manageable 
proportions.”116 From the jurisprudence and the interviews, it is shown that the Court 
applies a high standard of proof to cases of a serious nature. The standard would then 
shift according to the nature of the case.
However, it was not initially clear what precisely this high standard was. In 
the Corfu Channel Case, in relation to the argument of the United Kingdom that the 
minefield was laid with the connivance of the Albanian Government, the Court said: 
“A charge of such exceptional gravity against a State would require a high degree of 
certainty that has not been reached here.”117 In relation to inferences of fact, the 
Court added that “the proof may be drawn...provided that they leave no room for 
reasonable doubt.”118 Dr. Ecer explained the rationale of the Court for applying the 
highest standard by saying that the act in question was “in reality a criminal act”119. 
However, in the recent Genocide Case, the Court stated that the standard applied to 
cases with charges of exceptional gravity is the requirement of “fully conclusive” 
evidence.
The ability for the Court to shift the standard of proof was lately confirmed by: 
a) Judge Higgins in the Oil Platforms Case who said that the “graver the charge the
190more confidence must there be in the evidence relied on” , b) the Genocide Case. In 
addition, the Court has also suggested that the standard of proof can vary according to 
the circumstances of the case. For example, these could be factors such as the non- 
appearance of one of the parties and lack of evidence due to such circumstances. This 
is supported by the Court’s statement in the Nicaragua Case, where it said that there 
must be a degree of certainty, “as far as the nature of the case permits”121.
In principle, the variable standard of proof can function well for the Court, and 
it is arguably required because of the many types of cases that come before it. Cases 
that involve State responsibility, such as the Corfu Channel Case, should require a 
standard of proof that is higher than those involving maritime delimitation.
However, the problem is not the use of a variable standard of proof, but rather 
the way in which it is regulated, i.e. what standard is applicable to what sort of cases, 
and by how much should the standard change. For example, in the Corfu Channel
116 Rosenne, (1965) 2:580
117 Corfu Channel Case, ICJ, 1949, 16-17
118 Corfu Channel Case, ICJ, 1949, 18
119 Corfu Channel Case, ICJ, 1949, 118-119
120 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003 Judge Higgins’s Separate Opinion, para 33
121 The Nicaragua Case, ICJ, 1986, 24
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Case, the Court has never defined or explained the term “grave charge” and its 
relationship with standard of proof.
As pointed out by Judge C, this variable standard of proof is also used in the 
municipal context. For example, in the English jurisdiction, the standard of proof in 
civil proceedings can increase in cases where there are allegations of a criminal 
conduct, such as fraud122.
Another aim of this section is to examine what factors play a role in 
determining the approach of the Court on standard of proof. However, this will be 
left to the conclusion of the chapter and the thesis. The study will then have the 
benefit of a comparative analysis of the three tribunals and all three aspects of 
evidential rules.
3.4.1 Understanding the terms used by the Court:
This section will attempt to understand the different terms used by the Court 
as the standard of proof. In addition to the terms recognised from the municipal 
context such as the “balance of probabilities” and “beyond reasonable doubt”, there 
have also been other terms used which are worth examining.
First, the Court has often expressed its standard in terms of whether the 
evidence was sufficient, or whether the evidence has satisfied it. Prima facie, the 
words are not very indicative of the standard applied but only that the evidence has to 
meet the standard set. However, the definition of “satisfy” has been addressed by the 
Nicaragua Case. The Court said that it “must attain the same degree of certainty as in 
any other case that the claim of the party appearing is sound in law, and, so far as the 
nature of the case permits, that the facts on which it is based are supported by
19Tconvincing evidence.” Here, there seems to be a link between the satisfaction of 
the Court and “convincing” evidence.
The Court has also stated that the evidence needed to be “convincing” or that 
it needed to “convince” the Court without stating precisely what this meant. Although 
not expressed in exactly the same way, this standard resembles the Civil Law notion 
of requiring the conviction of the judge. However, the Court has made no such
122 But it does not reach the high level as found in criminal proceedings. For example in Bater v. Bater, Bater v. Bater, Court of  
Appeal, 1951, 35, 37, and H om al v. Neuberger Products Ltd, Homal v. Neuberger Products Ltd., Queen's Bench, 1957, 247,
266
123 The Nicaragua Case, ICJ, 1986, 24
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comparison leaving uncertainty of its intentions. Even if it had, the notion of the 
conviction of the judge is also far from being precise. In light of this, the plain 
meaning of the word will be examined. The word “convincing” is defined as: “able to 
cause to believe firmly in the truth of something; (of a victory or a winner) leaving no 
margin of doubt”124 or “making somebody feel certain; cause somebody to realise”125. 
From these definitions of “to cause to believe firmly” or “making somebody feel 
certain”, the standard required seems quite high, higher than that of “balance of 
probabilities”.
The Court has also used the word “conclusive” without a clear definition. The 
plain meaning of the word suggests that it is quite similar to that of “convincing”, 
being defined as “convincing; ending doubt”126. However, the latest use of the term 
“fully conclusive”, from the context of the Genocide Case, suggested the very high 
standard resembling the Common Law notion of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In addition, the Court has often stipulated that the claim needed to be “well- 
founded” in fact and law. This is the only standard mentioned in the Statute. But 
again, the Court has never gone into detail about its precise definition. The plain 
definition only indicates that the claim has to be based on good evidence, saying little 
about the standard.
124 The Oxford Concise Dictionary
125 The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary
126 The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary
Charlie Gamjana-Goonchom
Page 95 of 321
Section 4: ITLOS:
4.1 Introduction:
Compared to the ICJ, ITLOS is a relatively new forum, created through Part 
XV of UNCLOS. Regarding the study of the standard of proof, what must be noted is 
that, in its ten year history, the Tribunal still needs time for its jurisprudence to build 
up to the same level as other tribunals.
This section will examine the instruments and the jurisprudence of the 
Tribunal. However, cases under examination will be limited to full merits cases, 
excluding provisional measure cases. This is for consistency with the examination of 
the cases in the other tribunals where provisional measure cases are also excluded. 
Further, the standard of proof applied to provisional measure cases might differ to 
those heard on the merits because of their nature, seeking to prima facie protect the
1 97rights of the parties . However, in the context of ITLOS, prompt release cases will 
also be included. Although not exactly the same as full merits cases, these cases are 
“complete” in themselves where the entirety of the issue of prompt release is before
n o
the Tribunal . However, the nature of prompt release cases is not identical to full 
merits cases: speed is still very important in these cases, perhaps demanding a 
different standard of proof.
4.2 The provisions of ITLOS:
ITLOS is governed by Part XV of UNCLOS, the Statute of the Tribunal, the 
Rules of the Tribunal, the Guidelines concerning the Presentation of Cases before the 
Tribunal, and the Resolution on the Internal Judicial Practice of the Tribunal.
Part XV of UNCLOS is silent on the issue of the standard of proof. The 
Convention is more concerned with the setting up of the Tribunal itself.
As far as the Statute of the Tribunal and the Rules of the Tribunal are 
concerned, their drafting has been greatly influenced by the instruments of the ICJ129 
which means that there are no provisions directly expressing the standard of proof.
127 This could have an effect of lowering the standard.
128 Another reason why prompt release cases will be included is the lack of full merits cases in this forum.
129 Rao, (1998) 374
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What is first underlined is the power of the Tribunal to decide its own rules. 
Article 16 of the Statute states: “The Tribunal shall frame rules for carrying out its 
functions. In particular it shall lay down rules of procedure.” Similar to the ICJ, the 
only article relating to the standard of proof governs the situation where one party is 
absent, Article 28. In cases of default, it uses the same terminology as the ICJ Statute 
that “Before making its decision, the Tribunal must satisfy itself not only that it has 
jurisdiction over the dispute, but also that the claim is well founded in fact and law.” 
The Rules of the Tribunal do not address the general definition of the standard 
of proof. In the context of the prompt release of vessels, Article 113 of the Rules 
states that the Tribunal shall determine “whether or not the allegation.. .that the 
detaining State has not complied with a provision of the Convention for the prompt 
release of the vessel or the crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other 
financial security is well-founded”. This article sets a similar test to the Statute of the 
Tribunal as observed above. With regard to the preliminary proceedings, Article 294 
of the Rules states that the Tribunal must decide “whether the claim constitutes an 
abuse of legal process or whether prima facie it is well founded.”
Neither the Guidelines nor the Resolution on the Internal Judicial Practice 
provide any rules on the standard of proof. They are both concerned with other 
aspects of the Tribunal, namely how the parties should present the case to the 
Tribunal and what procedure the Tribunal will use in reaching the judgment in a case.
In sum, the instruments of the Tribunal have provided little in terms of stating 
the applicable standard of proof. They have been based on the provisions of the ICJ 
and share many characteristics. For example, the only article which really addresses 
the issue is Article 28, which introduces the “well-founded” test, applicable only to
1 TOscenarios where one party is not before the Tribunal .
4.3 The jurisprudence of ITLOS:
Regarding the standard of proof, the jurisprudence of the Tribunal has been 
limited and those that exist do not enunciate much on the definition.
In its very first case, the Saiga, the Tribunal adhered closely to the Statute 
saying that the allegation made by St. Vincent and the Grenadines were “well
130 Similar to Article 53 o f the Statute of the ICJ.
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founded” and that Guinea must release the M/V Saiga promptly131. The Tribunal 
failed to explain precisely what the term meant or what criteria it was using to judge 
the claim to be well founded. To add to the lack of clarity, although not explicit, 
Judge Wolfrum and Judge Yamamoto seemed to be expressing the standard of proof 
in terms of the “preponderance of probabilities”. They articulated the view that the 
claim that the Respondent acted on the basis of article 73 of the Convention was not 
“preponderant”132.
4.3.1 The Saiga (No. 2) (Merits Phase):
The Saiga (No. 2) (1999) was the continuation on the merits of the prompt 
release case that had previously been before the Tribunal. The case was a dispute 
between St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Guinea, submitted jointly to the 
Tribunal. The Saiga was an oil tanker flying the flag of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines which was arrested off the coast of West Africa by Guinea. The Guinean 
court found the Master of the Saiga guilty of illegally importing diesel oil, committing 
crimes of contraband, fraud and tax evasion. The Tribunal was asked to consider the 
full merits of all aspects of the case including damages and costs.
This case is the most important case regarding the issue of standard of proof to 
date, because it is the only case where the issue has been addressed directly. This was 
done by Judge Wolfrum in his Separate Opinion133 which could be summarised into 
the following points.
Judge Wolfrum underlined the discretion that international tribunals enjoy in 
determining the standard of proof in a dispute. However, he emphasised the need for 
rules to be established for “it is a matter of justice”134. He commented that the 
judgment did not pinpoint the standard applied, but drew attention to Article 28 of the 
Statute that a claim must be well founded in fact and law. For the first time in the 
history of ITLOS, the standard in Article 28 was declared, in this case by Judge
i i f
Wolfrum, to also be applicable to cases where both parties were present .
131 The Saiga Case , ITLOS, 1997 Prompt Release, para 79
132 The Saiga Case, ITLOS, 1997 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wolfrum and Judge Yamamoto, para 9-10. Article 73 of the 
Convention concerns the enforcement of laws and regulations of the coastal state.
133 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Merits, Separate Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, para 9-14
134 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Merits, Separate Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, para 10
135 The scope of Article 28 o f the Statute only covers cases where one party is absent from the proceedings. Judge Wolfrum’s 
statement extended the scope of Article 28 of the Statute in the same way that the Nicaragua Case did on the corresponding 
article for the ICJ.
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Later is his Opinion, Judge Wolfrum explained the different standards of 
proof: prima facie evidence, preponderance of evidence, and beyond reasonable 
doubt. He stated that “international courts or tribunals have not confined themselves 
strictly to these standards but have combined or modified them where justifiable 
under the circumstances of the respective case”136. He gave examples from this 
particular case where the Tribunal has applied the standard of proof in many ways. 
To conclude, Judge Wolfrum stated that “well-founded” in the sense of Article 28 of 
the Statute is “not a standard of proof in the sense of "preponderance of evidence", it 
is rather comparable to the standard of proof in the sense of "proof beyond reasonable 
doubt" as applied in many national legal systems”137. However, in saying this, he 
referred to the work of Kazazi. The question arises as to whether this is a view shared 
by other members of the Tribunal.
Judge Wolfrum was very critical of the low standard of proof that the 
Tribunal was applying in relation to establishing the nationality of the Saiga. “The 
judgment does not consider it necessary to be satisfied of the Vincentian nationality of 
the Saiga but rather accepts the lack of proof for the contrary to be sufficient. This is
138irreconcilable with the standard of proof to be applied according to the Statute.” 
The judge went on to say that if the standard of proof in the Statute were to be 
applied, then it has not been met by Guinea in its claims. This comment seems to 
suggest that, on this particular issue, the Tribunal was applying a particularly low 
standard.
Opinions of other judges have also given clues as to the applicable standard of 
proof. Judge Mensah seemed to be applying a standard of proof requiring convincing 
evidence. He stated that Guinea has provided this on the issue of the Registration of 
the Saiga and that Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has not contested to the evidence 
that has been produced139. In the oral pleadings, on the issue of the movements of the 
Guinean patrol boats and the Saiga, counsel for Guinea implied the same standard of 
proof. It argued that this had been “convincingly demonstrated before the 
Tribunal.”140
In addition, the standard of proof has also been merely expressed in terms of 
the sufficiency of the evidence. For example, Judge Anderson stated that the
136 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Merits, Separate Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, para 12
137 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Merits, Separate Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, para 12
138 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Merits, Separate Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, para 14
139 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Merits, Separate Opinion of Judge Mensah, para 15
140 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Merits, Oral Proceedings, 16-03-99 am, 13
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evidence needed to be “sufficient” and it is for the tribunal to decided whether the 
evidence has been so provided. He concluded in his Separate Opinion that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish that an order was given and received from the patrol 
vessels to the Saiga141. Regarding “overt signs of nationality” which were on the 
Saiga, the evidence on which Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had relied “do not 
constitute independent and sufficient evidence of registration”142. Again, the judge 
did not explain what he meant by “sufficient” evidence. The “sufficiency” standard 
was also mentioned by counsel of Guinea. It suggested that the evidence needed to be 
“sufficient” and challenged the claims of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on the 
grounds that this was not the case143.
The Opinion of Judge Anderson also suggests the applicable standard of proof 
to be the “balance of probabilities”. He stated: “In conclusion on these questions of 
nationality and conduct, St. Vincent was able in my view to establish, on the balance 
of probabilities and having regard to the predominant role of the registering State in 
the matter of nationality, that the Saiga possessed Vincentian nationality on the 
relevant dates.”144
Regarding the nationality of the Saiga, in the opinion of many judges145, the 
Tribunal applied an unsatisfactorily low standard of proof. The Tribunal seemed to be 
applying a standard resembling prima facie  evidence146. The Tribunal found that 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had discharged its initial burden of proof of the 
nationality of the Saiga, which was comparable to providing prima facie evidence. 
The burden of proof then shifted to Guinea to prove its case that the Saiga was not 
registered as such. Guinea was unable to prove this. The Tribunal hence concluded 
that the Saiga was of Vincentian nationality despite the fact that Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines only proved its case at a prima facie  level. Judge Warioba has expressed 
the view that the prima facie standard should not have been applicable.
If the Tribunal did actually apply the low prima facie standard in the way 
suggested by Judge Warioba, what could be reason for this? One explanation is that 
the Tribunal has mixed up two concepts: “burden of persuasion” and the “evidential 
burden”. Their distinction is to be found in the Common Law legal tradition.
141 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Merits, Separate Opinion of Judge Anderson, 6
142 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Merits, Separate Opinion of Judge Mensah, para 14
143 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Merits, Oral Proceedings 20-03-99 am, 30
144 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Merits, Separate Opinion of Judge Anderson, 5
145 See: The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Merits, Separate Opinion of Judge Mensah para 1-2, Dissenting Opinions of Judge 
Wolfrum para 1-45 and Warioba para 4-10.
146 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Merits, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Warioba, para 32-33
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However, the details will not be addressed here but in the section on the WTO DSB 
where a similar scenario has taken place. In brief, such confusion will shift the 
burden of proof to the respondent instead of only the evidential burden, and lowering 
the standard of proof as a result.
The Saiga (No. 2) has illustrated that the question of the standard of proof of 
ITLOS is far from clear. There has been concern expressed by a number of judges 
regarding the suitability of the standard applied and whether there should be a clearer 
standard set out.
4.3.2 After Saiga (No. 2):
After Saiga (No. 2), the Tribunal did not address the issue of standard of proof 
in much detail. There were only clues as to the possible applied standard. In the 
Monte Confurco Case, the French Agent made a statement which could be interpreted 
as him having the standard of “beyond reasonable doubt” in mind. He said: “Now I 
shall confine myself merely to noting that these facts speak for themselves and leave 
no doubt about the absence of reasonable doubt. In other words, there is no reasonable 
doubt relating to the reality of the violations committed and on the particular 
seriousness which they possess” 147. Does this statement mean that, to the parties, the 
Tribunal was applying this higher standard? Or was counsel uncertain and 
consequently having to argue to the higher standard?
In the prompt release case involving the Grand Prince, the Tribunal did not go 
into much detail about the standard of proof regarding the nationality of the vessel as 
it did with the Saiga. “Sufficient” evidence was the level of proof needed: “It is 
necessary that there is sufficient evidence to establish that a vessel is registered and, 
therefore, has the right to fly the flag of Belize at the relevant time.” 148 The question 
arises as to what is the relationship between this standard and the arguably low 
standard applied on a similar issue in Saiga (No.2).
In its latest prompt release case. The “Juno Trader” Case, the Tribunal 
determined that the application for the prompt release was “well founded” referring to 
Article 73(2) of the Convention and that Guinea-Bissau must release the ship
14 The Monte Confurco Case, ITLOS, 2000 Oral Proceedings. 07-12-00 pm., 13-14
14* The Grand Prince Case, ITLOS, 2001 Judgment, para 83
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promptly149. The use of this phrase says little about the standard of proof itself. 
Counsel for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines suggested that the required evidence 
was that “enough to convince the Tribunal” or “convincing” to discharge the burden 
of proof150. The judgm ent does not offer any clarification.
4.3.3 Preliminary Conclusions:
The jurisprudence of the tribunal to date has been limited on indicating the 
standard of proof applied. It has not shown that there is one standard. The most 
important case was the Saiga (No. 2) Case where the issue was debated. Judge 
W olfrum expressed his concern that the standard of proof has not been clearly stated. 
Further, there was the question of whether the standard applied by the Tribunal in this 
case regarding the nationality of the vessel was suitable or too low.
4.4 Interviews with the judges:
Regarding the question of what is the standard of proof applied by the 
Tribunal, the judges gave different answers. Most of the judges were hesitant to give 
a straight answer but had to take a few moments before arriving at the reply151. There 
was a mixture of responses. Some pointed to the fact that there is a lack of clarity and 
expressed the view that the Tribunal does not have general policy on the standard of 
proof, and that the issue has not been properly addressed by it152. Judge G and Judge 
H have said that the Tribunal does not apply a specific standard, and it very much 
depends on the case153. Some have expressed the view that the standard of the 
Tribunal has had most influence from the Civil Law tradition, and the standard 
applied would be one similar to the notion of the conviction of the judge. However, 
Judge E stated that the standard of proof applied most by the Tribunal was the 
preponderance of evidence154. Judge H said that, under normal circumstances, the 
Tribunal would apply the standard found in the provisions, the “well-founded” test.
149 The Juno Trader Case,  ITLOS. 2004 Judgment, p. 26, para 80
150 The Juno Trader Case, ITLOS, 2004 Oral Proceedings. 07-12-04 am, 20
151 This confirms the fact that the Tribunal’s standard o f proof is far from clear.
152 This is the view o f Judge D. He further suggested that, at the beginning o f the history o f the Tribunal, this issue was not a 
concern with the members o f  the Tribunal. This view is shared by judge H. Judge J referred to the practice o f the ICJ where the 
issue has not been addressed in its 60 year history. Judge I has said that the standard is not as strict as the domestic context.
153 Judge G added he will avoid classifying the standard o f the Tribunal in terms o f a municipal standard as this can be 
misleading.
154 However, he added that there were exceptions to this. Judge F also share this view.
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Judge G was of the view that, in practice, the parties will not consider what 
standard of proof is applicable but present all the evidence available to the Tribunal, 
and that there is limited procedural tactics in international litigation compared to the 
municipal context.
Further, members of the Tribunal have also stated that the standard of proof 
can change. For example, Judge E has stated that the standard of proof is different for 
the merits phase and the jurisdiction phase. The standard applied at the jurisdiction 
phase is higher than the merits phase. The former would require a standard that is 
higher than the “preponderance of evidence”, but not as high as “beyond reasonable 
doubt” 155. Judge I has also suggested that the urgency of the case can lower the 
standard of proof156. In addition, Judge E stated that the standard of proof can also 
shift with the seriousness of the case.
The question of whether the status quo is satisfactory also gave rise to a range 
of answers. Judge H was of the view that there is room for improvement. However, 
adopting too rigid a rule would not be feasible for international litigation which needs
1 S7a level of flexibility . Judge E expressed the opinion that the current rules, with a 
serious act demanding a higher standard, are satisfactory. Many judges said that the 
rules on the standard of proof need to be clearer158. This will introduce predictability 
and the parties would feel more comfortable before the Tribunal. There was also 
support for the flexible approach to the standard of proof159. The flexibility has not 
shown to be a hindrance to the work of the Tribunal so far160.
Judge F is a strong advocate for the Tribunal to address the problem of the 
lack of clarity of the standard of proof. He has stated that clear rules are needed both 
by the Tribunal and the parties. Further, the lack of clear rules could be one reason 
explaining the small number of cases before the Tribunal. States could be 
discouraged because of the unpredictability.
As for the factors that affect the approach on the standard of proof, as well as 
other areas of evidential rules, the judges have said that their own background and 
experience have played a role. Judge E has suggested that this is at the back of the 
minds of the judges. Other factors influencing the approach of the Tribunal include
in his opinion, the word “satisfy" used in the provisions establishing jurisdiction is more than the preponderance o f evidence.
156 The standard o f proof is not as strict as the domestic context.
15 He has suggested that Tribunal should establish guidelines which the judges could use.
IS* Judge H has stated that the rules as it currently stands have no fundamental floors. It does not hinder the decision making 
process. However, it would be beneficial to address the issue.
159 The problem o f  unpredictability which accompanies flexibility was also acknowledged, .e.g by Judge G, Judge J
160 Judge J
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its own past practice, and the practice of other international tribunals, especially the 
ICJ. One judge has commented that the lack of rules is a result of a clash of legal 
cultures, and it is difficult to formulate rules which will suit everyone161. Another has 
raised the question of whether the Tribunal is trying not to offend parties by avoiding 
the establishment of rules which could be an arrangement the parties are not used 
to 162.
A number of the judges also pointed out two problems which they have to face
in dealing with the issue of the standard of proof: the lack of time and the lack of 
1evidence . There has also been an observation made by some of the judges that, 
even if the rules on the standard of proof have been clearly stated, their application 
can still be a subjective process164. For example, what satisfies the applied standard to 
one judge might not to another.
What these interviews have shown are four important points. First, there is 
yet to be an agreed applied standard of proof for the Tribunal, even among the judges 
themselves. It does not seem to be an issue which has been addressed in detail. 
Second, some judges have expressed the opinion that the standard can shift. This can 
depend on: a) the nature of the case, b) the stage in the proceedings of the case, c) the 
urgency of the case. Third, there is substantial support by more than half of the 
judges interviewed for the adoption of clearer rules. Some are of the opinion that the 
rules must not be too rigid, others think that the flexible approach of the Tribunal has 
not so far been a hindrance. Fourth, many factors can influence the approach of the 
Tribunal. They include the background of the judges, the mix of legal cultures and 
the deference to States.
4.5 Concluding Remarks:
The jurisprudence and the interviews have shown that the Tribunal’s standard 
of proof is not clearly set out. Similar to the ICJ, the Tribunal and the judges use a
161 Judge H
162 Judge F
165 Judge D was concerned with both issues. Judge G expressed concern for the difficulty in applying a standard under time 
pressure.
164 Judge E and Judge H share this view .
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range of standards and one standard cannot be singled out. The standards vary from 
case to case165, and from judge to judge.
In terms of its jurisprudence, an important key to understanding ITLOS’s 
approach on the standard of proof is Judge W olfrum’s separate opinion. He draws 
attention to Article 28 of the Statute which requires that “the claim must be well 
founded in fact and law”. Although he did explore the different standards that are 
available, he never gave a more precise definition with regard to the standard of the 
Tribunal.
From the interviews, it can be seen that the issue of the standard of proof is 
still unclear for the judges of the Tribunal. Different judges have expressed different 
standards, from the Common Law notion of preponderance of evidence to the Civil 
Law notion of the conviction of the judge. Some of the judges had commented that 
the standard of proof can shift in relation to the circumstances of the case, which 
would be similar to the ICJ.
Factors influencing the approach of the Tribunal include the background of 
the judge and the difficulty in reconciling the many different legal cultures. These 
issues will be explored further in the overall conclusion with all the factors, including 
those in the other two tribunals.
As observed by many of the judges during the interviews, ITLOS is still a very 
young tribunal, its only full merits cases being Saiga (No. 2). With more cases to 
appear before the Tribunal, the new jurispmdence will certainly reveal more on the 
issue of the standard of proof.
165 Many judges have criticized the low standard o f proof applied in the Saiga (No. 2) Case. See: Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1, 97- 
100 and 4.4. 101-103
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Section 5: The WTO DSB:
5.1 Introduction:
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (WTO DSB) is relatively new. It was 
created by the Uruguay Round agreement as an improvement on the old GATT 
dispute settlement system which had many flaws. The new system introduces a well 
structured mechanism for dealing with disputes that could arise under the WTO 
agreement. W ithin the context of the WTO, the standard of proof will play an 
increasingly important role because of the importance of evidence and the very 
scientific nature o f the cases.
This section will examine the relevant instruments of the WTO DSB and its 
jurisprudence. Because the number of cases is vast, this section will focus on the 
most relevant cases and those which have reached the Appellate Body (AB).
5.2 The Provisions of the WTO DSB:
The W TO DSB is governed by several instruments: the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), the Rules of Conduct on rules and procedures for settling 
disputes166, and the W orking Procedures for Appellate Review.
The DSU lays down rules for both the panels and the AB but nothing 
addresses the issue of the standard of proof. The rules mostly concern the setting up 
of the dispute settlement system and its working time frame. The DSU includes the 
W orking Procedures (Annex 3) which contain mles on the panels but not the standard 
of proof.
The Rules of Conduct do not explain the DSB’s standard of proof, but 
concerns the possibility of a conflict of interest among its members: the panellists, 
the arbitrators, the experts, the secretariat, and the Appellate Body staff.
The W orking Procedures for Appellate Review do not address the standard of 
proof either. It concerns many aspects of the appeal system including the duties and 
responsibilities o f the Members of the AB, the procedure for submitting an appeal, the 
time frame of an appeal, and procedures for the proceedings. However, the Working
166 Adopted in December 1996
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Procedure for Appellate Review does provide for the Appellate Body to adopt rules 
for cases at hand and where a particular aspect of the proceedings has not been 
covered by the DSU and other provisions167. There is a possibility that the standard of 
proof can be adopted under this provision.
5.3 The Jurisprudence of the WTO DSB:
The jurisprudence of the WTO has addressed the issue of the standard of proof 
to an extent. However, the issue is very much intertwined with the rules on burden of 
proof, making the understanding of one crucial to the understanding the other. This 
situation is unique to the WTO because of the way in which the WTO DSB has 
interpreted the notion of burden of proof. It has confused the burden of proof with the 
evidential burden, two concepts found in the Common Law tradition. This will be 
explained more thoroughly later in the section.
5.3.1 Each party must prove its claim:
Since the early stages of the DSB, it was made clear that the burden of proof 
was on the complainant. For example, this was expressed in the Japan -  Alcohol 
Case, a dispute about the import of foreign alcohol into Japan and whether foreign 
alcohol had received treatment equal to local produce. In this case, on the claim 
according to Article 111:2 of G A T T ,//m  sentence, and on the question of whether the 
products are like, the panel ruled that the “complainants have the burden of proof to 
show first, that products are like and second, that foreign products are taxed in excess
1A8of domestic ones” . The panel also took similar views with the claim under Article 
111:2, second sentence, on the issue of whether the goods are directly competitive.
Similar to the requirement for the complainant to prove their claim, the 
respondent must also do the same for any exceptions that they intend to rely on. In 
the USA -  Shirts and Blouses Case, a case brought by India against the United States 
that the safeguard imposed on imports of woven wool shirts and blouses was not 
compatible with Articles 2, 6 and 8 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
(ATC), the AB stated that it is the “rules that the party who asserts a fact, whether the
167 Part 11, Article 16
16* Japan - A lcohol Case, WTO DSB, 1996 para 6.14
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claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof.” 169 In addition, 
the AB has confirmed that “the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether 
complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or
1 70
defence” . In the USA -  Underwear Case, the panel stated that “the party which 
invokes an exception in order to justify its action carries the burden of proof that it has 
fulfilled the conditions for invoking the exception” 171.
5.3.2 The two stage test, presenting a prima facie case and rebutting it:
At first, the rules on the burden of proof mentioned seem to be quite straight 
forward and not particularly relevant to the standard of proof. However, what was 
crucial was the introduction of the requirement for the complainant to present a prima
1 77facie  case to the DSB, which is the first stage of the two stage test .
Initially, it was the parties, especially the United States, who argued that the 
complainant needed to present a prima facie case. And once this was done, it was 
then for respondent to rebut this claim by providing sufficient evidence. In other 
words, the “burden of p ro o f’ would shift from the complainant to the respondent to 
rebut the prima facie  case. This is the second stage in the test.
In the Japan -  Alcohol Case, the USA argued that “it is up to the complainant 
to produce a prima facie  case that an origin-neutral measure has both the aim and the 
effect o f affording protection to domestic production [under GATT Article 111:2, first 
sentence].” 173 The United States also took this line of argument in the USA -  
Underwear Case, suggesting that the burden of proof was on Costa Rica to present 
the evidence showing a prima facie  case that the United States had not conformed to 
Article 6.2 and 6.3 of the A TC 174.
The mechanism requiring the complainant to present a prima facie case and 
then the burden shifting to the respondent to rebut that allegation was confirmed by 
the panel in the USA -  Shirts and Blouses Case. It said that “since India is the party 
that initiated the dispute settlement proceedings, we consider that it is for India to put
169 USA -  Shirts and Blouses C ase, WTO DSB, 1997. Appellate Body Report, para 4
P0 USA - Shirts and Blouses Case. WTO DSB, 1997, Appellate Body Report, para 4
171 USA -  U nderwear Case,  WTO DSB, 1997 Panel Report, para 7.16
172 For a fuller explanation o f why this prim a fa c ie  approach was established, see: Pauwelyn, (1998) 244-246
r }  Japan  -  Alcohol Case, WTO DSB, 19% Panel Report para 4.32
174 USA -  U nderwear Case, WTO DSB, 1997 Panel Report, para 5.41 and 5.67
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forward factual and legal argum ents...” 175 In addition, the panel went on to say that 
“it was for India to submit a prima facie  case of violation of the ATC, namely, that 
the restriction imposed by the United States did not respect the provisions of articles
2.4 and 6 of the ATC. It was then for the United States to convince the Panel that, at 
the time of its determination, it had respected the requirements of Article 6 of the 
ATC.” 176
During the appeal stage of this case, the AB also confirmed this two stage test. 
However, it expressed the notion of a prima facie  case in terms of creating a 
presumption. The AB said: “If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a 
presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who
177will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut that presumption.”
This two stage approach to presenting evidence has been used many times. In 
the India -  Patent Case, concerning the TRIPS agreement and the lack of patent 
protection for agricultural and pharmaceutical chemical products in India, the AB 
referred to the judgm ent in the USA -  Shirts and Blouses Case and said that “in this 
case, it is the United States that claims a violation by India of Article 70.8 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Therefore, it is up to the United States to put forward evidence 
and legal arguments sufficient to demonstrate that action by India is inconsistent with 
the obligations assumed by India under Article 70.8”178. The AB ruled that the United 
States had been successful in proving its case, and it is for India to rebut this claim.
The two stage test has not only been used during the earlier period of the life 
of the DSB but also recently. For example, this test was used in: (a) the USA -  Anti- 
Dumping Act of 1916 Case where the AB said that the Panel had correctly applied the 
burden of proof. The EC and Japan have satisfied their burden of proof by 
establishing a prima facie  case that the 1916 Act was inconsistent with Article VI of
179GATT 1994, and it was up to the United States to produce evidence to rebut this , 
(b) the EC -  Trade Descriptions of Sardines Case 180 (c) the Canada -  Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products Case, even 
though it concerned special circumstances where the burden of proof would be
15 USA - Shirts and Blouses Case, WTO DSB, 1997 Panel Report, para 7.12
P6 USA - Shins and Blouses Case, WTO DSB, 1997, Panel Report, para 6.7
USA - Shins and Blouses Case, WTO DSB, 1997, Appellate Body Report, para 4
178 India-Patent Case, WTO D SB, 1997 Appellate Body Report, para 73
1?v  USA - Anti-Dumping Act Case,  WTO DSB, 2000, Appellate Body Report, para 96-97
EC-Sardines Case, WTO D SB, 2002, Appellate Body Report, 75-82
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allocated differently181, the AB made an effort to reaffirm the two stage test which 
would apply normally.
There have also been cases where the allocation of the burden of proof, and in 
turn, the standard of proof has not been in accordance with the two stage test, such as 
the USA -  Subsidies on Upland Cotton Case, where article 10.3 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture changed the allocation of the burden of proof. Article 9 of the Agreement 
provides for the export subsidy commitments of the Member States. Article 10 
concerns the prevention of circumvention of the export subsidy commitments and 
article 10.3 requires that the “Member that claims that any quantity exported in excess 
of a reduction commitment level is not subsidized must establish that no export 
subsidy.. .has been granted in respect of the quantity of exports in question”. In other 
words, the burden o f proof was on the defendant to prove that there has been no 
subsidy to the export in question. However, in such cases where there were special 
circumstances that differed from the two stage test, this has been duly noted by the 
D SB 182.
5.3.3 The effects of the two stage test:
The two stage test has implications on the standard of proof of the WTO DSB. 
The definition o f a prima facie  case is crucial to understanding how the standard of 
proof is affected.
The requirement of a prima facie  case is explicit in the jurisprudence of the 
WTO, but its precise meaning is not as clear. The plain meaning of the term “prima 
facie” indicates that the complainant must provide enough proof so that, at first sight, 
their claim would be upheld. This is a low standard.
However, there is still a degree of uncertainty in the definition. The DSB has 
enunciated on the definition of “prima facie” in the USA -  Shirts and Blouses Case. 
The AB said “precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be 
required to establish such a presumption [or a prima facie case] will necessarily vary
183from measure to measure, provision to provision, and case to case” . Hence, the 
decision of whether enough evidence has been produced to constitute a prima facie 
case is at the discretion of the panellists or AB members.
181 Canada - M easures Affecting the Importation o f  M ilk and the Exportation o f  Dairy Products Case, WTO DSB, 2002, 16-22
182 USA - Subsidies on Upland Colton Case, WTO DSB, 2005, 241-249 Appellate Body Report
182 USA - Shirts and Blouses Case, WTO D SB, 1997, Appellate Body Report, para 4
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In addition, the panel has ruled in the EC- Hormones Case that if the prima 
facie  case of the complainant is unrebutted, then the case would go in favour of the 
complainant. The panel said “it is for the United States to present factual and legal 
arguments that, if unrebutted, would demonstrate a violation of the SPS Agreement. 
Once such a prima facie  case is m ade... the burden of proof shifts to the responding 
party’’184. This was also later confirmed by the A B 185.
As a result, in practice, the overall standard of proof for the complainant has 
been lowered to the same level as that required to establish a prima facie  case. If the 
responding party does not provide evidence to rebut the claim, the case can be 
concluded in favour of the complainant merely on that initial evidence alone. This 
view concurs with that of Pauwelyn: “Indeed, by adopting the presumption technique, 
the tribunal no longer requires conclusive evidence (or proof beyond reasonable doubt 
or whatever other standard of proof) of an alleged fact; it will be enough to create a
1 RAnon-rebutted presumption of truth.” The complainant has a low standard of proof 
to satisfy, much lower than what might be expected in cases before the WTO DSB.
This low standard of proof was confirmed in the Japan - Measures Affecting 
Agricultural Products Case. In the panel report, it stated: “In our view, the prima 
facie  case to be established in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding relates to the 
substantive issue of what a party invoking a fact or claim needs to prove for that fact 
or claim to be accepted be a panel; that is, evidence (1) which is sufficient to raise a 
presumption that the alleged fact or claim is correct and (2) that has not been 
sufficiently rebutted by the opposing party. ...w e consider that we are called upon to 
examine and weigh all the evidence validly submitted to u s ...” 187
In the recent United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Serv ices Case, the standard of a prima facie case was further 
explained by the AB. “The evidence and arguments underlying a prima facie case, 
therefore, must be sufficient to identify the challenged measure and its basic import,
identify the relevant WTO provision and obligation contained therein, and explain the
1 88basis for the claimed inconsistency of the measure with that provision.” These 
requirements imply a low standard of proof.
I M  EC - Hormones Case.  WTO DSB. 1997 Panel Report, para 8.54
185 EC - Hormones Case. WTO DSB, 1997 Appellate Body Report, para 98
186 Pauwelyn. (1998) 256
187 Japan - Agricultural Products Case, WTO DSB, 1999, Panel Report, para 7.10
188 USA - Gambling and Betting S en  ices Case, WTO DSB, 2005 Appellate Body Report, para 141
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In contrast to the low standard of proof that the complainant must satisfy, the 
respondent faces a higher standard. In the USA — Shirts and Blouses Case, the panel 
said that once the burden has shifted to the respondent, then they must provide enough 
evidence to “rebut” the presumption created by the complainant. But what does this 
mean? Not much guidance has been given by the DSB. Pauwelyn has suggested that 
the required standard is only one which casts a “reasonable doubt” on the evidence 
constituting the presumption since the respondent only needs to “rebut” it189.
However, the writer offers a different interpretation of the burden upon the 
respondent. The need for the respondent to rebut the presumption sets a relatively 
high standard of proof. To “rebut” is to claim or prove to be false. This cannot be 
done by merely casting “reasonable doubt” on the presumption, but requires a higher 
standard. In addition, the cases of the WTO DSB have not indicated a lower standard 
of just casting a reasonable doubt upon the presumption. For example, in the EC -  
Hormones Case, it was stated that the EC must “demonstrate that its measures in 
dispute meet the requirement imposed by the SPS Agreement.” 190 This seems to be a 
standard higher than casting reasonable doubt on the presumption.
The w riter’s view concurs with that of Christoforou. He has noted that the 
respondent bears a higher standard of proof than the complainant: “The burden of 
proof standard applied by WTO panels and the Appellate Body requires a very low 
degree of confidence, because it is sufficient for the complaining member to raise 
only a presumption that its products are “safe” or pose no risk.191 The defending 
member then must meet a much higher burden in order to eliminate the likelihood of
1Q?an erroneous judgm ent on the scientific aspects of the case. This standard is 
unsatisfactory.” 193 The writer agrees with Christoforou on the inappropriate standard 
applied. The standard of proof of the claimant should be the same as the 
respondent’s.
This double standard of proof has been noted by the parties in the
jurisprudence. In the Korea -  Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages Case, Korea indicated to
the AB that the complainant bore a standard much lower than the respondent: “The 
Panel was far more exacting when looking at evidence submitted by Korea than when 
considering evidence brought by the complainants. The Panel, in effect, applied a
lw Pauwelyn. (1 9 9 8 )2 5 7
190 EC - Hormones C ase, WTO DSB, 1997, Appellate Body Report, para 8.55 and 8.57
191 Japan - Agricultural Products Case, WTO DSB, 1999 See Appellate Body Report at para 137
l 9 :  Japan - Agricultural Products Case, WTO DSB, 1999 See Appellate Body Report at para 121-24
193 Christoforou, (2000) 644
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“double standard of p ro o f’” .194 In addition, concerning the price of the local goods in 
comparison to the foreign goods, Korea said that “The Panel...w rongly allocated the 
burden of proof and also applied a “double standard” since it was lenient with the 
complainants’ evidence, but strict with Korea’s rebuttal evidence.” 195 In response, the 
AB did not address the issue of the double standard. It concluded that the Panel had 
not erred on this procedural issue but had relied on the test that was established in the 
USA -  Shirts and Blouses Case, and that the Panel had understood the test therein. 
The Panel was correct to apply the “prima face case test” and to rule that it could only 
make findings under Article 111:2, second sentence, only with respect to products for 
which a prima facie  case has been made out on the basis of the evidence presented.
The two stage test has been used without much transparency and the WTO 
DSB has not guided the parties through the complex mechanisms of the proceedings. 
In the Thailand -  Anti-Dumping Case, Thailand argued that “the Panel failed to make, 
either expressly or implicitly, the required findings regarding whether Poland had 
indeed presented a prima facie case and whether Thailand had effectively refuted such
196case” . However, the AB referred to its ruling in the Korea -  Dairy Safeguards 
Case which stated that the Panel need not make an “explicit ruling on whether the 
complainant has established a prima facie case of violation before a panel may 
proceed to examine the respondent’s defence and evidence.” 197 The AB then referred 
to the India -  Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and 
Industrial Products Case, and added that the Panel is not “required to state expressly
1 QO
which party bears the burden of proof in respect of every claim made.”
The opinion of the writer is that the WTO dispute settlement system should 
encourage more transparency. This would in turn promote its own efficiency and the 
ultimate aim of Member States fulfilling their obligations. A transparent and fair 
dispute settlement system would earn the trust and confidence of the Member States 
in the WTO framework as a whole.
5.3.4 An alternative suggestion, the respondent presenting a prima facie case:
1W  Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages Case, WTO DSB, 1998 Appellate Body Report, para 19 
W5 Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages Case, WTO DSB, 1998 Appellate Body Report, para 33 
Thailand - Anti -Dumping Duties Case. WTO DSB, 2001 Appellate Body Report, para 131 
,v7 Korea - D airy Safeguards Case, WTO DSB, 2000 Appellate Body, para 145 
l y e  India - Quantitative Restrictions Case, WTO DSB, 1999 Appellate Body Report, para 137
Charlie Gamjana-Goonchom
Page 113 o f 321
The two stage test examined above requires the complainant to present a 
prima facie case and the respondent to rebut that presumption. However, in the 
Dominican Republic — Measures affecting the Importation and International Sale of 
Cigarettes Case, China, acting as a third party in this dispute suggested an alternative 
arrangement on the burden of proof. It was suggested that the respondent, when 
relying on an exception to a WTO obligation such as Article XX, must present a 
prima facie case. After this has been done, the burden of proof will then shift to the
1 9 9complainant to rebut it . This is the reverse of what has been seen in the 
jurisprudence and would also lower the standard of proof of the respondent to prima 
facie evidence. However, this suggested approach has not been endorsed by the WTO 
DSB.
5.4 An alternative view on the standard of proof:
Christoforou has suggested an alternative to the two stage test mentioned 
above, and that the standard of proof is not as low as previously indicated. This 
alternative view is based on the fact that the DSB has relied on both the evidence 
provided by the parties and that from scientific experts appointed under their 
authority. The DSB is free to pick and chose the scientific evidence before them. 
Christoforou has suggested that this procedure would lead to a standard that coincides 
with the Civil Law tradition of requiring enough facts to convince the judge. 
However, he notes that the standard applied by the DSB would relate more closely to 
the Common Law notion of the preponderance of the evidence because the DSB is
OQOessentially weighing up the evidence to decide which claim is the more convincing" .
Despite Christoforou’s view, the writer is still of the opinion that the two stage 
test is the one applied. This conclusion is supported by the numerous occasions 
where the two stage test has been confirmed by both the Panels and the AB, despite 
instances where parties have indicated otherwise.
In the Korea -  Dairy Products Case, the panel made a statement that 
suggested that standard of proof was one that resembled “preponderance of evidence”. 
After stating the two stage test, the Panel went on to say: “As a matter of law the 
burden of proof rests with the European Communities, as complainant, and does not
Dominican Replubic  -  C igarettes Case, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 5  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y ,  p a r a  4 9
2 0 0  C h r i s t o f o r o u ,  ( 2 0 0 0 )  6 4 2 - 6 4 3
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shift during the panel process. As a matter of process before the Panel, the European 
Communities will submit its arguments and evidence and Korea will respond to rebut 
the EC claims. At the end of this process, it is for the Panel to weigh and assess the 
evidence and arguments submitted by both parties in order to reach conclusions as to 
whether the EC claims are well-founded.”201 Korea argued that the Panel skipped a 
stage in the proceedings, not stating whether the prima facie test has been reached and 
instead balancing the evidence that was before them. The AB did not address the 
issue whether this balancing act was correct, but reaffirmed the two stage test and 
added that it was not necessary for the Panel to enunciate when a prima facie case has 
been established202.
5.5 Interviews with the panelists:
Compared to the other two previous tribunals, the issue of the standard of 
proof in the WTO DSB is relatively settled. The three panelists interviewed agree 
that the rule applied is the two stage test: the complainant presenting a prima facie 
case, and the respondent rebutting it. Panelist L underlined the fact that the panelists 
are not entitled to adopt policy on their own accord. The rules to be followed are 
already set out either in the DSU or jurisprudence. The panelists apply the existing 
rules and are careful not to exceed what has been stipulated by the AB.
Panelist M noted, however, that even though the two stage mechanism is 
applied, in his view, panelists do look at the overall case and apply the Civil Law 
notion of the conviction of the judge in determining the final outcome . Panelist K 
added that the standard, even though the two stage test is applied, is not as precise as 
such. It is up to the panelists to use his intuition to decide whether there is strong 
case. Further, in exceptional cases where issues resembling fraud have arisen, 
Panelist K has indicated that panelists would be inclined to impose a higher standard 
than usual.
Concerning the standard the claimants have to meet, all three panelists confirm 
that they must meet the prima facie standard. Panelist M added that it is rare for the 
standard not to be met. Although Panelist K agrees with this view for the most part,
101 Korea - Dairy Safeguards Case, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 0  p a r a  1 4 3 .  T h e  p r o c e s s  o f  w e i g h i n g  t h e  e v i d e n c e  f r o m  t h e  t w o  s i d e s  
s u g g e s t s  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  C o m m o n  L a w  s t a n d a r d  o f  t h e  “ p r e p o n d e r a n c e  o f  e v i d e n c e ” .
202  Korea - Dairy Safeguards Case, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 0  p a r a  1 4 5
2 02  H e  f u r t h e r  a d d e d  t h a t  t h e  C i v i l  L a w  s t a n d a r d  o f  t h e  c o n v i c t i o n  o f  t h e  j u d g e  i s  m o r e  s u b j e c t i v e  t h a n  t h e  C o m m o n  L a w  
s t a n d a r d s .
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he also indicated that in cases where the evidence involved is confidential, it could be 
very difficult for the claimants to satisfy this standard.
Another significant fact learnt from the interviews concerns the standard the 
respondent must meet in rebutting the complainant’s prima facie case. Panelist L has 
said that the standard applicable to the respondent was the criminal Common Law 
standard of beyond reasonable doubt. Panelist K added that the respondent has to 
meet a high standard in rebutting the claim of the complainant. However, he did not 
enunciate further what this standard was.
Regarding the question of whether the current arrangement on the standard of 
proof was satisfactory, Panelist L thinks that it functions well when applied 
consistently. However, Panelist M is of the view that the current rules still lack 
clarity. He would like this issue to be addressed in a formal way resulting in a clearer 
set of rules. Panelist K has also indicated that the WTO DSB would benefit from 
clearer rules granting more predictability to the parties and the panelists themselves.
Further, there are many factors that could have an influence on the approach 
on the standard of proof. First, in contrast to the other two tribunals examined, the 
panelists very often include non-lawyers. Panelist L has indicated that the non-lawyer 
panelists were not concerned about technical rules such as the standard of proof. 
Second, Panelist L has noted that the panelists rely on the Secretariat for help204. The 
Secretariat can hence have influence on the way in which the panelists interpret the 
existing rules on the standard of proof. Third, Panelist L gets an impression that the 
AB, in dealing with procedural rules, is facing a clash of the different legal cultures of 
the parties and trying to avoid any conflicts that might arise from it. This could be a 
reason why the rules have not been spelt out in the provisions. Another reason for the 
lack of rules in the provisions was suggested by Panelist M: the WTO’s focus is on 
the settlement of the trade dispute rather than the adjudication process. The WTO 
DSB is not yet a formalized “tribunal” like the other two.
The interviews of the three WTO Panelists have been revealing. The two 
stage test mentioned in the jurisprudence was confirmed. However, there were also 
suggestions that, when looking at the case as a whole, the panelists also applied the 
Civil Law standard of the conviction of the judge. Two panelists elaborated on the 
two stage test saying that the standard which the respondent must meet to rebut the
- 0 4  T h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  s e c r e t a r i a l  i n  t h e  W T O  i s  m u c h  m o r e  p r o m i n e n t  t h a n  t h o s e  a t  t h e  I C J  o r  I T L O S .
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prima facie claim of the complainant is a high one. Two of the three panelists 
interviewed called for a clearer set of rules. Factors which could have had an effect 
on the rules on the standard of proof include205: a) the help from the Secretariat, b) the 
reconciliation of the different legal cultures, c) the focus of the WTO on the 
settlement of the dispute rather than being an adjudicating body.
5.6 Concluding Remarks:
Compared to the other two tribunals, the WTO DSB has applied a consistent 
standard of proof: the two stage test. This requires the complainant of a WTO breach 
to present a prima facie case, and it is for the respondent to rebut it. This procedure 
sets up a double standard of proof where, in practice, the complainant only has to 
meet a low standard {prima facie) and the respondent has to meet a higher one. 
According to two panellists, this standard is high. One suggested that it is the 
Common Law standard of beyond reasonable doubt.
Two of the panelists interviewed had indicated for a need of clearer rules. 
There were also suggestions as to the factors that could have contributed to the WTO 
DSB’s approach on the standard of proof. One reason for the more consistent 
approach probably stems from the existence of the AB which can overlook all the 
cases to establish a degree of uniformity.
The reason why the WTO DSB has adopted the two stage test is not clear. 
There seems to be confusion on the distinction between the “burden of proof’ and the 
“evidential burden”, the two types of burden that exist in the Common Law tradition. 
In the municipal context, the complainant has to present a prima facie case before the 
“evidential burden”, not the burden of proof, shifts to the respondent. The burden of 
proof is the burden of persuasion that the party bears to prove the case to the Court 
and stays with that party, while the evidential burden is the burden to present the 
evidence to the Court which can shift between one party to another in a particular 
proceeding206. Indeed, the way of the Common Law tradition seemed to be what the 
panel in the Korea -  Dairy Products Case was suggesting, but the AB dismissed it,
205  U n l i k e  t h e  I C J  a n d  I T L O S ,  t h e  b a c k g r o u n d  o f  t h e  p a n e l i s t s  d o e s  n o t  s e e m  t o  h a v e  s u c h  a n  e f f e c t  o n  t h e  r u l e s  o n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  
o f  p r o o f .  T h i s  c o u l d  b e  b e c a u s e  t h e  W T O  p a n e l i s t s  a r e  n o t  p e r m a n e n t  a n d  t h e  l i m i t e d  r o l e  t h e  p a n e l i s t s  p l a y  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  
a p p r o a c h  o n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  o f  p r o o f .
D e n n i s ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  C h a p t e r  1 1
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and applied the two stage test that it had established before207. The WTO DSB has 
turned the Common Law notion of “evidential burden” into a burden of proof. As a 
result, the actual burden of proof shifts from one party to another, lowering the 
standard of proof for the complainant and applying different standards to different 
parties. Unfortunately, the WTO DSB has persisted to apply this standard of proof, 
therefore establishing consistency, but raising questions on the adequacy of the 
standard of proof.
207  Korea - Dairy Safeguards Case, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 0  p a r a  1 4 3 .
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Section 6: Overall conclusion:
After the examination of the three tribunals, the general thesis will be 
addressed here: a) whether there is a common approach to the standard of proof 
among the selected tribunals, b) what are the factors influencing the approach of the 
tribunals, c) whether there should be a common set rules on the standard of proof.
6.1 The existence of a common approach:
There is no general common approach on the standard of proof between the 
three selected tribunals. However, there are some similarities worth noting. The 
approach of the ICJ and ITLOS resemble one another while the WTO DSB has 
applied a consistent different standard. The standards of proof of the ICJ and ITLOS 
have been unclear and can vary from case to case. They both apply a standard which 
can shift according to the nature of the case, but have not been explicit in the way this 
is done. On the other hand, the WTO DSB has applied a relatively precise standard of 
the two stage test requiring the claimant to proof a prima facie case, and then the 
respondent to rebut it. There is yet to be an emerging common body of law on the 
issue of the standard of proof.
6.2 Factors influencing the approach on the standard of proof:
This section will begin to indicate the reasons behind the approach on the 
standard of proof. However, because different aspects of evidential rules can be 
influenced by similar factors, the detailed study will be left to the overall conclusion
'TORof the thesis where there will also be the benefit of a comparative analysis' .
The nature of the cases has an influence on the standard of proof. First, the 
judges of the ICJ and ITLOS have suggested that the standard of proof can shift 
according to the seriousness of the case. The more serious the nature of the case, the 
higher the standard applied. However, the judges have been unclear as to the 
definition of a serious case and precisely what standard is applicable. The seriousness
20,1 See: Chapter 7, Section 3, 257-265
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of State liability to the extent that could aid to clarify this question has not been 
addressed elsewhere either.
Second, the range of the cases can have an impact. Because the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction is universal covering all types of disputes, it would arguably need a range 
of standards of proof to suit the different types of cases. Although with a narrower 
jurisdiction, ITLOS still rule on a range of cases: full merits cases, provisional 
measures cases, and prompt release cases. On the other hand, the WTO only deals 
with cases on barriers to trade on their merits. This distinction could explain the 
different approaches of the tribunals.
Third, an influencing factor on the approach on the standard of proof is the 
deference to States. This has been expressed in the context of ITLOS and the WTO 
DSB, and could explain the lack of more explicit rules in all three tribunals. The 
tribunals have to deal with a clash of legal cultures. In response, this could have 
arguably resulted in a lack of more concrete rules in order not to offend States which 
might not be used to the adopted rules209. The ICJ and ITLOS arguably have more 
deference to States than the WTO DSB. They have few rules on the standard of 
proof. This is in contrast with the WTO DSB which has established rules and precise 
timetables on how disputes can be solved in a regulated manner. The difference in the 
level of deference might result from the context in which the tribunals were created
") i nand the nature of the tribunals themselves" .
The history of each tribunal is the fourth factor that can affect the approach on 
the standard of proof. For example, this explains the likeness of ITLOS’s rules to the 
ICJ’s rules, the former being based on the latter. Upon its creation, ITLOS, perhaps 
also because it was created under the UN framework, looked to the ICJ for its rules. 
As for the WTO DSB, it was created to have compulsory jurisdiction and even 
enforcement powers with the goal of achieving quick and efficient settlement. It is 
this context that can explain why its procedures are more rigid.
The fifth and important factor influencing the approach of the standard of 
proof is the judges: the number of judges, and the expertise and background of the 
judges211. Because there is a big difference between the number of judges on each 
tribunal, from 3 at the WTO AB to 21 at ITLOS, this can affect the outcome on the
20SI F r o m  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  t r i b u n a l s ,  m o r e  d e f e r e n c e  t o  S t a t e s  c o u l d  a l s o  e n c o u r a g e  S t a t e s  t o  u s e  t h e i r  f o r u m .
2 1 0  S e e :  C h a p t e r  7 ,  S e c t i o n  3 . 7 ,  2 6 2 ,  a n d  3 . 1 2 ,  2 6 4 .  M u c h  d e f e r e n c e  w a s  g r a n t e d  i n  t h e  e a r l i e r  p a r t  o f  t h i s  c e n t u r y  a n d  a r g u a b l y  
b e c o m i n g  l e s s  s o  a t  c u r r e n t  t i m e s .
211 S e e :  C h a p t e r  7 ,  S e c t i o n  3 . 1 ,  2 5 7 - 2 5 9
Charlie Gamjana-Goonchom
Page 120 o f 321
standard of proof. A larger body of judges will find it more difficult to arrive at an 
agreement especially one that is as technical as the standard of proof. This could help 
to explain why the ICJ and ITLOS have not been explicit on the standard of proof in 
contrast to the WTO. The difficulty in agreement is also shown in the various 
Dissenting Opinions in cases before the ICJ and ITLOS regarding this issue. The 
background of the judges can also play an important role. From the interviews, 
judges/panelists from all three tribunals have stated that their background do influence 
the standard of proof. There is the Civil/Common Law divide where the judges of the 
former tradition will apply the vaguer test of the conviction of the judge whereas their 
counterparts prefer clearer Common Law style rules.
The sixth reason which has had an effect on the approach on the standard of 
proof is the existence of the AB in the WTO system. The AB can ensure the thorough 
revision of the rules and their consistency. This is not possible in the ICJ or ITLOS, 
and raises questions of whether their rules would have been more explicit and 
consistent if there were a similar two-tier system.
6.3 Should there be a common approach on the standard of proof?:
Another underlying question of this chapter is whether there should be a 
common approach on the standard of proof. However, this issue will be better 
understood if all three aspects of evidential rules examined in this thesis are taken 
together. The ultimate question would be: should there be a common set of rules on 
evidence? Consequently, this section will only give a brief introduction to the debate, 
especially that concerning the standard of proof, and will leave the details to the 
conclusion of the thesis212.
The first point, albeit obvious, is that the standard of proof is important to the 
outcome of a dispute. For example, the party might possess only enough evidence to 
satisfy the standard of proof of “preponderance of evidence” but not “beyond 
reasonable doubt”. The dispute could turn on a technical matter such as this. As 
suggested by many of the judges interviewed, this calls for clarity in the rules. Clarity 
will in turn lead to predictability and transparency.
212 See: Chapter 7, Section 4, 265-213
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With the increasing number of international tribunals, there will be more 
overlapping jurisdictions. For example, the ICJ and ITLOS have overlapping 
competence over disputes arising from UNCLOS. There is potential for the same 
issues in the same dispute to appear before the two tribunals. The standard of proof 
applied should be the same in such cases to ensure that the same disputes result in the 
same outcome.
However, the differing nature of the tribunals must also be taken into 
consideration. A forum such as the ICJ with universal jurisdiction could demand a 
flexible standard of proof, and a specialised tribunal such as the WTO might function 
better with its own specific standard.
The overall conclusion of the thesis will address the tension between the desire 
to have a common set of evidential rules and the tribunal’s need for individuality. It 
will go into the details of the advantages and disadvantages of adopting a common 
approach to evidence. Further, it will address the question whether this is feasible in 
the context of the existing international tribunals213.
213 See: Chapter 7, Section 4, in particular 4.2.4, 273
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Chapter Five: Amicus curiae 
Section 1: Introduction:
1.1 Introduction:
This chapter concerns amicus curiae submissions. This topic is particularly 
relevant in recent times because of the increasing role of non-state actors in 
international litigation. The increase in the interaction between States, disputes before 
international tribunals, and international agreements means that non-States can more 
than ever be affected by the actions of States. One of the ways in which non-State 
actors can participate in international litigation is through amicus curiae submissions.
The general thesis still runs through this chapter. This chapter will examine 
whether there is a common approach on amicus curiae and then figure out the reasons 
behind the approach of the tribunals. Finally, the chapter will start to address whether 
there should be a common approach on amicus curiae but the details will be left to the 
final chapter where all three tribunals and aspects of evidential rules will be looked at 
together.
1.2 What is an amicus curiael What are its functions?
Literally translated from Latin, “amicus curiae” means “friend of the Court”. 
Other definitions have also been offered: (a) “One who calls the attention of the court 
to some point of law or fact which would appear to have been overlooked”214, (b) “a 
person who is not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by 
the court to file a brief in the action because that person has a strong interest in the 
subject matter”215.
Over time, there have been developments changing the traditional impartial 
role of the amicus curiae in different legal traditions216. However, the friend of the 
court is essentially still a bystander who is not a party to the proceedings but
? I 7intervenes in order to make submissions to the court' .
214  O s b o r n e ’ s  L a w  D i c t i o n a r y  ( 9 *  E d i t i o n ,  2 0 0 1 )
21 5  B l a c k ’ s  L a w  D i c t i o n a r y  ( 7 1*1 E d i t i o n , 1 9 9 9 )
21 6  S e e  f u r t h e r :  B e i l h o u s e ,  ( 2 0 0 4 )  1 8 7 - 1 8 8
2 ,7  S e e  g e n e r a l l y :  A n g e l l ,  ( 1 9 6 7 )  1 0 1 7 - 1 0 2 1 ;  K r i s l o v ,  ( 1 9 6 3 ) 6 9 4 - 6 9 7
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The amicus curiae brief derives from the Common Law tradition and was a 
solution to address the disadvantages of the adversarial system. The notion dates back 
as far as Roman law and the 14th Century218. In its early days, an amicus curiae 
would be a bystander who had no interest in the dispute and provided information 
omitted by the parties or otherwise unavailable219. However, in recent years, scholars 
have argued that the nature of the amicus curiae has changed. It has been turned into 
a tool by public interest organizations to promote a particular position220.
In addition to the supplying information to the court, amicus curiae 
submissions also have a variety of other functions221. First, they can provide
specialist or legal expertise to the court especially if the dispute falls outside their
' ) ? 2competence" . Second, they can provide factual information to the court. The 
information could come from specialized organizations with insights on certain 
issues. Third, amicus curiae briefs can also provide a measure of due process in 
terms of access to those who cannot directly participate but will be affected by the 
decision of the court223. Fourth, amicus curiae briefs can represent the public interest 
at large, a point argued by many NGOs224. Last, on questions with wider social and 
moral implications, they can provide further legitimacy to the court’s decision
Amicus curiae submissions can also fill in gaps where States have omitted 
certain issues from the pleadings to the Court. This may be for several reasons: a) the 
omitted issue is only peripheral to the main question, b) the omission is part of the 
litigation tactics, and most importantly, c) because the omitted facts will not be in the 
State’s interest. The information lacking from the Court would usually be supplied by 
the other party. However, there can be instances where an interest of a third party 
would be omitted by both parties and hence the need for amicus curiae briefs.
Amicus curiae have a limited role in the proceedings itself. “[They] cannot 
control the direction or management of the proceedings. They are not served with 
papers or other relevant documents. They cannot examine or cross-examine witnesses 
and cannot be heard without special leave of the court. They are not entitled to any
: I * L o w m a n ,  ( 1 9 9 2 )  1 2 4 3 - W a n d  1 2 4 8 - 5 0
2 l y  A s  c o n t r a s t e d  t o  t h e  i n t e r v e n e r  w h o  m u s t  n o r m a l l y  h a v e  a  d i r e c t  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e  c a s e .  I f  a l l o w e d ,  t h e  i n t e r v e n e r  
b e c o m e s  a  p a r t y  t o  t h e  p r o c e e d i n g s .
2 2 0  K n s l o v ,  ( 1 9 6 3 ) 6 9 7 - 7 0 4
2 :1  D i s c u s s e d  i n  B a r t h o l o m e u s z ,  ( 2 0 0 5 )  2 7 8 - 2 7 9
222 E . g .  USA - Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products C ase , W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 8 :  B r i e f s  f r o m  N G O s  w i t h  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  l a w  
e x p e r t i s e  w e r e  a c c e p t e d  b y  t h e  W T O  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y .
2 23  E . g .  Australia-Salmon. A rticle 21.5 Case, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 0  p a r a  7 . 8 :  T h e r e  w a s  a n  a m i c u s  b r i e f  f i l e d  f r o m  “ C o n c e r n e d  
F i s h e r m a n  a n d  P r o c e s s o r s ”  f r o m  S o u t h  A u s t r a l i a .
2 24  S e e  f u r t h e r :  B a r t h o l o m e u s z ,  ( 2 0 0 5 )  2 7 9
2 2 5  B r y d e n ,  ( 1 9 8 7 )  5 0 8 - 5 1 0 ;  S e e  f u r t h e r  o n  o t h e r  r o l e s  o f  amicus curiae: W i l l i a m s ,  ( 2 0 0 0 )  6 3 3 - 3 6 8
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9 9Acost or compensation” The acceptance of amicus curiae briefs generally increases 
the workload of courts. As will be seen in this chapter, there is a tension between, on 
one hand, the desire to admit information for all the advantages mentioned above, and 
on the other, to deal with dispute in the most efficient way possible.
In this chapter, only amicus curiae briefs submitted to tribunals independently 
of the Memorial of the parties will be examined. In all three of the selected tribunals, 
non-State entities can submit information to tribunals as an annex to the submission of 
the parties. This will mean, in the eye of the tribunal, that the submission will be 
supporting one side of the argument, and losing its neutrality. However, this might be 
a sacrifice that the non-State entity has to make in order for their voice to be heard.
2 2 6  R a z z a q u e .  ( 2 0 0 2 )  1 7 1
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Section 2: Municipal Law:
2.1 Introduction:
The ability for a domestic court to receive amicus curiae briefs differ from one 
jurisdiction to another. Historically, the amicus curiae brief has its roots in the 
Common Law. Imported from England where its use is not as extensive, the practice 
is used widely in North America.
In many jurisdictions, there has been an increase in recent years227 in the 
general awareness of the public on legal issues and the involvement of disputes with 
scientific matters have encouraged more use of amicus curiae. As a result, there are 
now many States in the Civil Law tradition which have incorporate rules on amicus 
curiae. Therefore, the distinction in the use of amicus curiae between the Common 
and Civil Law traditions will not be as apparent when compared to the issues in the 
other two chapters. Consequently, the practice of the municipal jurisdictions on 
amicus curiae will not be divided into their respective traditions as in other chapters.
2.2 The practice of municipal courts:
This section will give an overview of the approach of different municipal 
jurisdictions, and will address three in more detail: the United States, England and 
France. As a general overview of the worldwide practice, the following can be said 
about each region228:
a) There is an established practice of amicus curiae in North America. In both 
Canada and the United States, provisions on amicus curiae exist in the relevant Rules 
of the Court and are applied accordingly229.
b) In Latin America, amicus curiae are generally permitted apart from in a few 
States: El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama. Some States have adopted codified
D u e  t o  i m p r o v e d  t e c h n o l o g y ,  m e d i a  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
A s  s u m m a r i z e d  i n  t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t u d y  c a r r i e d  o u t  i n :  E w i n g  e t  a l . ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  . E v e n  t h o u g h  t h i s  a r t i c l e  w a s  w r i t t e n  i n  t h e  
c o n t e x t  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o p e r t y ,  i t  d o e s  g i v e  a  g o o d  c o m p a r a t i v e  o v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  o n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  amicus 
curiae.
22 v  E . g .  R u l e s  5 5  t o  5 7  o f  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  o f  C a n a d a .
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• . 230provisions , while others lack explicit provisions but allow the participation of non- 
State entities through its practice231.
c) In Europe, the use of amicus curiae briefs is very limited apart from in a 
few States. As a general rule, the evidence of non-parties would have to be annexed 
to the submission of the parties. However, there has been some use of amicus curiae 
briefs in the United Kingdom.
2.2.1 The United States:
Amicus curiae briefs are used extensively in the United States. The Supreme 
Court has allowed a range of amicus curiae submissions covering a wide variety of 
interests. Amicus curiae briefs have a basis in Rule 37 of the Rules of the Court. 
Rule 37(1) of the Court states that: “An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention 
of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be 
of considerable help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve this 
purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored.” The amicus curiae brief 
would normally be submitted as a written document.
The brief can be admitted if the Court grants leave or if it is agreed upon by 
the parties232. From recent practice before the Supreme Court, the parties would 
allow for the filing of an amicus curiae brief where the case concerns issues of a 
public nature233. Further, the practice of the Court has been to “grant nearly all 
motions for leave to file as amicus curiae when consent is denied by a party”234.
Various branches of the government can also submit amicus curiae briefs 
regardless of whether consent has been granted by the parties or the Court has granted 
leave. These include the Solicitor General, the Attorney-General of the State and the 
authorized law officer of a city, county, town, or similar entity235.
On occasion, the Supreme Court has gone as far as directly appointing an 
amicus curiae. This might include situations where the Court suspects collusion or
2 3 0  E . g  A r g e n t i n a ,  B r a z i l ,  C o s t a  R i c a
231 S e e  f u r t h e r :  E w i n g  e t  a l . ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )
2 32  R u l e  3 7 ( 3 )  o f  t h e  R u l e s  o f  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t .
2 33  W i l l i a m s ,  ( 2 0 0 0 )  3 7 5
2 34  K e a r n e y  a n d  M e r r i l l ,  ( 2 0 0 0 )  7 6 2
2 35  R u l e s  o f  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  R u l e  3 7 ( 4 )
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where there is no contradictor to a particular argument236. A large number of amicus 
curiae briefs are filed in the Supreme Court every year237.
The question then arises of the extent which the Court takes into account the 
amicus curiae briefs. It is not obliged to do so but there has been agreement among 
many American legal scholars that these briefs can have a profound effect on the 
decision of the Court238. In its jurisprudence, there have been cases where the Court: 
a) has cited as many as 29 briefs in its judgment, b) has accepted an argument which 
had only been suggested by an amicus curiae22*9.
2.2.2 England:
The use of amicus curiae in the English courts has been limited compared to 
the practice in the United States. The English courts play a big role in determining 
whether an amicus curiae brief is admitted. Such briefs have been used in various 
levels of courts240 and also in many areas of the law241. As summarized by Bellhouse: 
“It has been a practice, rather than an enshrined right, whereby arguments on points of 
law, or information, can be presented before the tribunal, with its permission and 
often by its active invitation, which would otherwise not be heard because they did 
not form part of the respective cases of the litigants represented.”242 Like the United 
States system, the amicus curiae briefs in the English system are used to fill in the 
lacunae left by the adversarial system and allow for issues of public interest to be 
presented to the court. “This power [to admit information from amicus curiae] was 
invariably used to appoint an official figure, usually the Attorney-General, Official 
Solicitor or Counsel from a list maintained by the Treasury Solicitor and has regularly 
been used in the Family Division.”^
In 2001, there was reform in the English system on this issue. The Attorney- 
General, in consultation with the Lord Chief Justice, produced a memorandum to 
Judges which stated more precisely the rules governing amicus curiae, or under its
2 3 6  E n n i s .  ( 1 9 8 4 )  6 0 5
23 F o r  e x a m p l e ,  K e a m e y  a n d  M e r r i l l  s t a t e d  t h a t  i n  Regents o f  the University o f  California v Bakke w h i c h  c o n c e r n e d  t h e  i s s u e  o f
a  r e v e r s e  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  i n  f a v o u r  o f  m i n o r i t y  g r o u p s ,  5 4  a m i c u s  b r i e f s  w e r e  f i l e d .  K e a m e y  a n d  M e r r i l l ,  ( 2 0 0 0 )  8 3 1
2 34 S e e  f u r t h e r  t h e  s t u d y  c a r r i e d  o u t  i n :  K e a m e y  a n d  M e r r i l l ,  ( 2 0 0 0 )  e s p e c i a l l y  p .  7 5 7 - 7 6 1 .  A l s o :  A n g e l l ,  ( 1 9 6 7 )  1 0 3 5 - 1 0 4 2 ;
B r y d e n ,  ( 1 9 8 7 )  5 0 7 - 5 0 8
2 3 y  S e e  f u r t h e r :  W i l l i a m s .  ( 2 0 0 0 )  3 7 6
2 4 0  I n c l u d i n g  t h e  C o u r t  o f  A p p e a l  a n d  H o u s e  o f  L o r d s
241 P r o p e r t y  L a w ,  L a w  o f  C o n t r a c t ,  F a m i l y  L a w ,  a n d  H u m a n  R i g h t s  L a w .  S e e  f u r t h e r :  B e l l h o u s e ,  ( 2 0 0 4 )  1 8 8 - 1 9 1
2 42  B e l l h o u s e ,  ( 2 0 0 4 )  1 9 0
2 43  H a r l o w ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  7
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new name, “the Advocate to the Court”244. Inter alia, the memorandum stated that “a 
court may properly seek the assistance of an Advocate to the Court when there is a 
danger of an important and difficult point of law being decided without the court 
hearing relevant argument.”
An example of how amicus curiae briefs have been used in the English courts 
included a case involving the question of whether a piece a land belonged to a foreign 
based company. The Court of Appeal invited the Attorney-General to attend the 
proceedings as amicus curiae because, if the foreign based company was not the 
owner, then the land would be vested in the Crown245. Another example of the use of 
an amicus curiae brief was in the Pinochet Case. “Because of the urgency and the 
important and difficult questions of international law which appeared to be raised, the 
Attorney General, at your [their] Lordships request, instructed Mr. David Lloyd Jones
,246as amicus curiae...
2.2.3 France:
The French jurisdiction is to be contrasted with the first two mentioned. In 
France, there are no explicit provisions for the use of amicus curiae briefs. However, 
studies have shown that, in some exceptional cases, the French court has also allowed 
them. Duncun has highlighted a case about surrogate motherhood in the Court of 
Cassation. The acceptance of amicus curiae briefs was an innovation and came from 
the Premier President of the Court of Cassation247. The Premier President stated that 
“The Court of Cassation, in order to enrich the debates which unroll before it and to 
raise them to the elevated level which should be theirs because of their technicality or 
specificity, should open the debates to the contribution of outsiders so long as the 
experts solicited by the court are beyond dispute, representative and of high moral and
IQ
human value.”- Duncun enunciates the debate of French academics on this issue: 
some say that the Court has an inherent right to “innovate their procedure to function 
more effectively”, while others think that the Court should not improvise procedure
- ) J Q
not authorized by Parliament" . In this particular case, the expert who was selected
2 44  S e e  f u r t h e r :  B e l l h o u s e ,  ( 2 0 0 4 )  1 9 1 - 1 9 2
2 45  M orelle Ltd  v  Wake ling, Q u e e n ' s  B e n c h ,  1 9 5 5
2 46  Pinochet Case. H o u s e  o f  L o r d s ,  1 9 9 8 ,  1 4 5 6
24 L a u r i n ,  ( 1 9 8 9 ) ,  3 4 1 - 3 4 2 ,  S e e  f u r t h e r :  D u n c u n ,  ( 1 9 9 4 )  4 5 0 - 4 5 1
248 L a u r i n .  ( 1 9 8 9 ) ,  3 4 2 ;  t r a n s l a t e d  i n  D u n c u n ,  ( 1 9 9 4 )  4 5 0
24V D u n c u n ,  ( 1 9 9 4 )  4 5 0
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was an oncologist and the president of the National Consultative Ethics Committee 
for Lifesciences and Healthsciences. Duncun further noted that, in the context of 
French courts, even though the practice of amicus curiae briefs “may have been 
inspired by British and American practice...[the] practice at the European Court of 
Human Rights.. .may have provided the true inspiration.”250
2.3 Preliminary Conclusion:
The practice of municipal jurisdictions on amicus curiae has varied. Even 
though the notion of the amicus curiae has its roots in the Common Law tradition, the 
practice has spread to other jurisdictions around the world. It has been used very 
widely in the United States, and to a lesser extent in England. Unlike some areas of 
evidential rules, the Common/Civil Law divide is not so apparent on this issue. For 
example, many Latin States which belong to the Civil Law tradition have introduced 
the use of the amicus curiae.
25 0  D u n c u n ,  ( 1 9 9 4 )  4 5 3
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International tribunals: ICJ, ITLOS and WTO DSB:
Section 3: ICJ:
3.1 Introduction:
The section will examine the rules and practice of the ICJ concerning amicus 
curiae briefs. As emphasized in the previous section, this issue is particularly 
pertinent at this time because of the increasing interests of non-State actors involved 
in cases before the Court, especially those which can have an effect on trans-border 
issues, such as the environment and human rights251.
In contrast to the other two chapters, this section will examine both the 
contentious cases and the advisory opinions because there has been some 
development regarding latter that are worth noting. These two types of cases are 
different and their distinction must be kept clearly in mind.
3.2 The PCU:
This section will examine the practice of the PCU in order to set the 
background for the examination of the ICJ’s rules on amicus curiae .
In the context of the PCU, the dispute settlement process was seen as 
exclusive to States and the extent to which non-State entities could participate was 
very limited. The view of jurists at the time was one which did not consider 
individuals as subjects of international law. States were the only entities which were 
subjects of the Law of Nations. There was an assumption that if the interests of 
individuals were at dispute, then the State would make the claim on their behalf
3.2.1 Provisions and practice:
251 A c c o r d i n g  t o  o n e  s t a t i s t i c ,  a s  a n  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  w h a t  a  w i d e  i m p a c t  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  C o u r t  h a v e ,  a s  m a n y  a s  1 , 2 0 0  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 5 ,  a n d  1 , 2 0 0  a p p l i c a t i o n s  i n  1 9 9 5 - 1 9 9 6  w e r e  p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  C o u r t  t o  s u b m i t  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  
R a z z a q u e ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  1 7 2 .
252  S e e  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  I C J  a n d  t h e  P C U ,  s e e :  C h a p t e r  2 ,  S e c t i o n  2 . 1 ,  1 4 - 1 8
2 53  D i s c u s s e d  i n  S h e l t o n ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  ; T h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  v i e w  w a s  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  e d i t i o n  o f  O p p e n h i e m ,  ( 1 9 1 2 )  3 6 2 - 3 6 9 ;  I n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  c l a i m s  b r o u g h t  b y  S t a t e s  o n  t h e i r  b e h a l f ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  c a n  o t h e r w i s e  b r i n g  t h e i r  o w n  c l a i m  i f  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  S t a t e s  
o r  p a r t i c u l a r  t r e a t i e s  p r o v i d e s  f o r  i t .  J u d g e  L a u t e r p a c h t  e x p l a i n e d :  “ W h e n  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  o f  J u r i s t s ,  w h i c h  i n  1 9 2 0  d r a f t e d  t h e  
S t a t u t e  o f  t h e  [ P C U ] ,  a d o p t e d  t h e  p r e s e n t  A r t i c l e  3 ,  o n e  o f  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  r e a s o n s  w h i c h  p r o m p t e d  i t s  d e c i s i o n  w a s  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  
i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  n o t  s u b j e c t s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l a w  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  t h e y  c a n  h a v e  n o  l o c u s  s t a n d i  b e f o r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r i b u n a l s . ”  
L a u t e r p a c h t ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  1 0 9 .  O n  t h i s  i s s u e ,  s e e  a l s o :  B r o w n l i e ,  ( 1 9 6 2 )  a n d  C h i n k i n ,  ( 1 9 9 3 )  2 3 0
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The only instrument of the PCU which addressed amicus curiae briefs was the 
Statute. There were two articles worth noting: article 26 and article 66. The ICJ 
would later base its provisions on these two articles.
Article 26 of the PCU Statute concerns the possibility of a non-State entity to 
submit information to the Court in contentious cases. It states, inter alia, “In Labour 
cases, the International Office shall be at liberty to furnish the Court with all relevant 
information, and for this purpose the Director of that Office shall receive copies of all 
the written proceedings.” As apparent from the text, this article only concerned 
labour cases and the submission of information from the ILO’s international office. 
This provision was the predecessor of Article 34 of the ICJ Statute.
However, there has been debate among scholars as to whether this article can 
be seen as the precedent for the interpretation of the term “public international 
organizations” in article 34 of the ICJ Statute254. This is an issue which will be 
addressed later in the context of the ICJ255. To the knowledge of the writer, Article 26 
of the Statute has never been used by the Permanent Court as a means of admitting 
information from the International Office of the ILO.
In contrast with Article 26, Article 66 of the Statute concerns the admission of 
information from non-State entities in advisory opinion proceedings. Where an 
advisory opinion has been requested, according to article 66 of the Statute, the 
Registrar must notify, inter alia, “international organization^] considered by the 
Court...as likely to be able to furnish information on the question, that the Court will 
be prepared to receive..., written statements, or to hear, at a public sitting to be held 
for the purpose, oral statements relating to the question.” A distinction can be 
drawn between article 26 and 66. The former only allowed submissions from the 
International Office of the ILO, but the latter adopted a much wider approach in 
allowing submission from “international organizations”.
The Permanent Court has allowed submissions from a wide range of entities 
including private international organizations on the basis of article 66257. The Court
2 54  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  t r i p a r t i t e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  I L O .  S e e  f u r t h e r :  S h e l t o n ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  9
2 5 5  S e e :  C h a p t e r  5 ,  S e c t i o n  3 . 3 . 2 ,  1 3 3 - 1 3 6
2 5 6  T h e  t e r r a  " i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ”  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  w a s  n e v e r  d e f i n e d .
2 57  S e e  f u r t h e r :  B a r t h o l o m e u s z ,  ( 2 0 0 5 )  2 1 7 - 2 2 5 ,  a n d  C l a r k ,  ( 1 9 8 1 )  1 1 6  el  r e < 7. ; S h e l t o n ,  ( 1 9 9 4 )  6 2 1 - 6 2 3  a n d  C h i n k i n ,  ( 1 9 9 3 )  2 2 9 -
2 3 0
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has also stated that it was prepared to receive information from individuals258. The 
number of amicus curiae submissions in advisory opinions has been significant. 
There were a number of cases which involved the ILO and organizations of workers 
or employers259. In the PCU’s Annual Report in 1927, a list of international 
organizations which had participated in advisory proceedings was compiled. 
Although a list early in the history of the Court, it was an illustration of the high level 
of participation. The list comprised a wide range of international organizations, many 
of which were union and trade representatives260.
To illustrate the willingness of the Permanent Court to allow participation of 
non-States in advisory opinions, in two cases, it went as far as admitting information 
from national organizations: a) a memorandum from the Netherlands General 
Confederation of Trade Unions , b) a letter from the Central Association of French 
Agriculturalists ". This is to be contrasted to the much more limited access which the 
ICJ has granted to non-governmental international organizations
In addition to these two articles, another article which could have been 
potentially used by the Court to admit amicus curiae briefs was Article 50 of the 
Statute. The Article permits the Court to “entrust any individual, body, bureau, 
commission or other organization that it may select, with the task of carrying out an 
enquiry or giving an expert opinion.” As background to the article, the PCU Drafting 
Committee of the Advisory Committee of Jurists had a proposal that the Permanent 
Court should be able to seek views apart from those submitted by the parties, which 
consequently resulted in Article 50 of the Statute Shelton has argued that the 
article was written for the purpose of seeking evidence not otherwise provided by the 
parties265. The PCU could use this article to gather information from entities other 
than States which would de facto resemble an amicus curiae brief.
: 5 *  I t  w a s  w i l l i n g  t o  r e c e i v e  e x p l a n a t o r y  n o t e s  i n  s u p p l e m e n t  t o  s t a t e m e n t s  m a d e  b y  p e t i t i o n e r s ,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  i t  w a s  f i l e d  w i t h  t h e  
R e g i s t r y  b e f o r e  t h e  d e a d l i n e .  Consistency' o f  Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution o f the Free City, P C U ,  
1 9 3 5 . 4 3
2 5 y  T h e  f i r s t  c a s e  w a s  Designation o f  the Workers' D elegate fo r  the Netherlands,  P C U ,  1 9 2 2  w h e r e  m a n y  t r a d e  u n i o n s  f i l e d  
s t a t e m e n t s  i n  t h e  p r o c e e d i n g s .  O t h e r  c a s e s  i n c l u d e :  Competence o f  the ILO to Regulate, Incidentally, the Personal Work o f  the 
Employer, P C U ,  1 9 2 6 ,  8 ,  Interpretation o f  the convention o f  1919 concerning employment o f  women during the night, P C U ,  
1 9 3 2 ,  3 6 7
2 6 0  E . g .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A g r i c u l t u r a l  C o m m i s s i o n ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a b o u r  O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  L a n d w o r k e r s ,  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  C h r i s t i a n  T r a d e  U n i o n  o f  L a n d w o r k e r s ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n f e d e r a t i o n  o f  C h r i s t i a n  T r a d e  U n i o n s .
261 Designation o f  the Workers' Delegate fo r  the Netherlands, P C U .  1 9 2 2 ,  1 1
262  Competence o f  the International Labour Organization (persons em ployed in agriculture),  P C U ,  1 9 2 2 ,  1 3 ;  Competence o f  the 
International Labour Organization (methods o f  agricultural production), P C U ,  1 9 2 2 ,  1 3
26 3  S e e :  C h a p t e r  5 .  S e c t i o n  3 . 3  2 . 2 ,  1 4 2 - 1 4 8
26 4  A d v i s o r y  C o m m i t e e  o f  J u r i s t s ,  ( 1 9 2 0 ) ,  5 6 1 .
26 5  D i s c u s s e d  i n :  S h e l t o n ,  ( 1 9 9 4 )  6 2 7  .
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3.2.2 Preliminary Conclusion:
The jurisprudence of the Permanent Court must be divided into two parts: the 
contentious proceedings and the advisory opinion. As far as contentious proceedings 
are concerned, the provisions are very limited only giving the ILO’s International 
Office the opportunity to submit information, and this provision has never been used. 
In contrast, in advisory opinions, the provisions of the Court allow “international 
organizations” to submit information. In practice, a wide range of international 
organizations have done so, many of which were trade and labour unions.
3.3 The ICJ
3.3.1 Introduction:
With the background of the PCU’s approach, this section will continue to 
examine the provisions and the practice of the ICJ. In the same way as the PCU, only 
States can be parties to disputes before the Court" . This again raises the question of 
how non-State entities can be represented, if the State does not bring the dispute to the 
Court on their behalf.
The scope of this section does not cover amicus curiae briefs attached to 
party’s submissions. However, it is of note that this channel is often used, as 
illustrated in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case where the Natural Heritage Institute 
prepared a brief that was eventually annexed to the Hungary Memorial. In the Armed 
activities on the territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda) Case, briefs prepared by Amnesty International and other NGOs were 
annexed to the Uganda Memorial" .
3.3.2 The provisions of the ICJ:
The provisions of the ICJ resemble those of the PCIJ in many respects. A 
mere look at the text will show that the former was based on the latter which means
2 6 6  ICJ Statute, 1 9 4 5  a i t  3 4 (  1 )
267  I t  h a s  b e e n  a r g u e d  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  a n n e x i n g  amicus curiae  b r i e f s  t o  m e m o r i a l  o f  S t a t e s  m i g h t  i n  r e a l i t y  h a v e  t h e  e f f e c t  o f
p l a c i n g  t h e  N G O  a s  b e i n g  o n  o n e  s i d e  o f  t h e  d i s p u t e ,  a t  l e a s t  t h e  m a t e r i a l  w i l l  b e  p a r t  o f  t h e  c a s e  f i l e  a n d  w i l l  b e  k e p t  o n  r e c o r d .  
S h e l t o n ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  1 8 - 1 9
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that there is a clear line drawn between the rules regarding contentious cases and 
advisory opinions.
3.3.2.1 Contentious Cases:
The first provision of note is Article 34 of the ICJ Statute, which was based on 
article 26 of the PCU Statute. At the U.N. Conference on International Organization, 
the United States proposed in the draft Article 34 the ability of the Court to request 
information from public international organizations and to receive information 
presented by the organizations voluntarily . This proposal was accepted and the 
increasing importance of international organizations was recognized. The Drafting 
Committee of the Washington Committee of Jurists stated that “The Committee has 
not wished to go so far as to admit...that public international organizations may 
become parties to a case before the Court. Admitting only that such organizations 
might, to the extent indicated, furnish information, it has laid down a rule which 
certain persons have considered as being one of procedure rather than of competence. 
The Committee, by placing it nevertheless in Article 34, has intended to emphasize its 
importance.’’269 The chairman of the legal committee, Gerald Fitzmaurice, said that 
the United States proposal concerning the ability of submission of information by 
international organizations without a previous request from the Court “was probably 
meant to embrace that provision relating to the ILO” in article 26 of the PCU 
Statute270.
Article 34(2) and 34(3) of the Statute allow for the submission of information 
from public international organizations in contentious cases. Article 34(2) provides 
that “The Court...may request of public international organizations information 
relevant to cases before it, and shall receive such information presented by such 
organizations on their own initiative.” However, the interpretation of this article has 
been subject to debate.
26* S e e  f u r t h e r  o n  t h e  d r a f t i n g  o f  t h e  a r t i c l e :  R o s e n n e ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  6 2 0 - 6 2 6  
26 v  R o s e n n e ,  ( 2 0 0 6 ) 6 2 1
2 7 0  D o c .  J u r i s t  3 0 ,  G / 2 2 ,  1 4  U . N . C . l . O .  D o c s  1 3 1 ,  1 3 3 ;  F i t z m a u r i c e  n o t e d  t h a t  i f  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  C o u r t  w a s  t o  b e  e x t e n d e d  
t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  t h i s  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  b e  a d d r e s s e d  s e p a r a t e l y ,  i b i d  1 3 6 - 1 3 7 .  H e  a l s o  e x p r e s s e d  h i s  o p i n i o n  s t a t i n g  
t h a t  " t h e  t e r m  i n c l u d e d  o n l y  t h o s e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  h a v i n g  S t a t e s  a s  m e m b e r s ,  i b i d  1 3 7 ;  S e e  f u r t h e r :  S h e l t o n ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  7 - 8 .
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First, some argue for the more restrictive interpretation of the word 
“information” in that it excludes policy submissions and legal arguments. However, 
there has not been enough practice to support view271.
Second, there are questions as to the scope of the term “public international
277organizations” . There have been suggestions that article 34(2) should also include
2 7 3NGOs . Despite the debate, the Rules of the Court have been quite explicit as the 
definition of the term. Under Article 69(4) of the Rules of the Court, the term 
“denotes an international organization of States”.
Article 34(2) also stipulates some requirements that submissions must meet. 
The Memorial must be submitted before the closing of the written pleadings and is to 
include any information relevant to the case. The Court may ask the organization for 
further information, both written and oral. The parties are then given the opportunity 
to comment on submissions of the organization.
Article 34(3) provides that “whenever the construction of the constituent 
instrument of a public international organization or of an international convention 
adopted there-under is in question in a case before the Court, the Registrar shall so 
notify the public international organization concerned and shall communicate to it 
copies of all the written proceedings.” Even though this provision does not explicitly 
provide for the submission of evidence, informing international organizations of 
whether their constituent instrument is before the Court will further encourage 
submissions under Article 34(2).
In addition to these two articles, and similar to the PCU, another article which 
can potentially be used as a channel for the submission of amicus curiae briefs is 
Article 50 of the ICJ Statute. This article will also be discussed in the context of
' yni
experts- . The Article stipulates: “The Court may, at any time, entrust any 
individual, body, bureau, commission or other organization that it may select, with the 
task of carrying out an enquiry or giving expert opinion.” This article permits the 
Court to seek information should it be necessary. However, it does not provide the 
ability for non-parties to submit evidence on their own initiation. Nonetheless,
271 S e e :  C h i n k i n  a n d  M a c k e n z i e ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  1 3 9 - 1 4 0  a n d  B a r t h o l o m e u s z ,  ( 2 0 0 5 )  2 1 3
272 S h e l t o n  h a s  l o o k e d  a t  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  P C U .  S h e  q u e s t i o n e d  w h e t h e r  " p u b l i c  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ”  s h o u l d  b e  
i n t e r p r e t e d  b y  l o o k i n g  a t  t h e  P C U ’ s  p r o v i s i o n s .  S h e l t o n ,  ( 1 9 9 4 )  . W h a t  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  " p u b l i c ”  o r  " p r i v a t e ”  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  a l s o  
m u c h  d e b a t e d .  S e e  f u r t h e r :  B o w e t t ,  ( 1 9 7 5 )  5 ,  S h e l t o n ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  9 - 1 0
2 3 S h e l t o n  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  t e r m  " p u b l i c  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ”  s h o u l d  i n c l u d e  " i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ” . 
S h e l t o n ,  ( 1 9 9 4 )  6 2 5 .  T h e  w i d e r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  g a i n  f a v o u r  a m o n g  S t a t e s  o r  w i t h  t h e  C o u r t ,  s e e :  B a r t h o l o m e u s z ,  
( 2 0 0 5 ) 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 .
274  S e e  C h a p t e r  6 ,  S e c t i o n  3 ,  1 8 6 - 1 8 7
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organizations which cannot submit documents in any other way could use this 
channel, should the Court allow it.
3.3.2.2 Advisory Opinion:
Article 66 of the Statute concerns amicus curiae submissions, from both States 
and non-State entities, in advisory opinions. Article 66(2) states: “The Registrar 
shall...notify any State entitled to appear before the Court or International 
Organization considered by the Court...as likely to be able to furnish information on 
the question, that the Court will be prepared to receive, within a time-limit to be fixed 
by the President, written statements, or to hear, at a public sitting to be held for the 
purpose, oral statements relating to the question.” Article 66(3) states that if the Court 
fails to notify any State according to paragraph 2, then the State can communicate to 
the Court its desire to make a submission. However, the Court still has the discretion 
to admit such evidence. Article 66(4) permits States and organizations to make 
comments on statements by other States or organizations.
There are two more points worth noting in this section: a) Article 66 of the ICJ 
Statute was based on Article 66 of the PCU Statute as apparent from the wording of 
the two articles , b) in the exercise of its advisory opinion, the Court will also be
2 7 6guided by the provisions on contentious cases if it considers them to be applicable
3.3.3 The practice of the ICJ:
3.3.3.1 Contentious Cases:
In contentious cases, information has been submitted by a number of non- 
party sources. The following section will examine the Court’s jurisprudence but 
dividing it according to the sources of the information: a) non-party States, b) 
International Organizations, c) non-governmental organizations.
Information from non-party States:
2 75  S e e :  C h a p t e r  5 ,  S e c t i o n  3 . 3 . 2 ,  1 3 3 - 1 3 6
2 76  ICJ Statute, 1 9 4 5  a i t  6 8
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The submission of information by non-party States has not been provided for 
by the Court’s provisions. However, to the knowledge of the writer, the Court has 
allowed this on one occasion, in the Corfu Channel Case. The dispute between the 
United Kingdom and Albania concerned the question of whether latter was 
responsible for the mine-laying in the Corfu Channel which had damaged vessels of 
the British Navy.
Although not called as such by the Court or the parties, the amicus curiae brief 
came from Yugoslavia which was permitted to submit a communique to the Court. 
Previously, there were suggestions made by the United Kingdom that the mines in the 
Channel were laid by Yugloslav ships, based on evidence given by a Yugoslav 
Commander who had testified to that effect. The United Kingdom made it clear that 
their case was against Albania and that they were making no allegations against 
Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia’s communique denied this evidence.
The acceptance of the communique has meant the admission of information 
from a non-party State. The communique was not subject to any oral examination or 
cross-examination. In the words of the Court: ‘The Yugoslav Government, although 
not a party to the proceedings, authorized the Albanian Government to produce 
certain Yugoslav documents, for the purpose of refuting the United Kingdom 
contention... As the Court was anxious for full light to be thrown on the facts alleged, 
it did not refuse to receive these documents. But Yugoslavia’s absence from the 
proceedings meant that these documents could only be admitted as evidence subject to 
reserves, and the Court finds it unnecessary to express an opinion upon their probative 
value.”277 It has been suggested that, in admitting this evidence, the Court was 
relying on Article 50 of the Statute278.
Information from international organizations:
Despite being expressly provided for in the provisions, the practice of 
admitting information from international organizations has been limited. The Court 
has most often used this article in relation to the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO). An example of such use of an amicus curiae brief was in the 
Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 Case between Iran and the United States. The former
277  Corfu Channel Case ,  I C J ,  1 9 4 9 ,  1 7
2 78  C h i n k i n ,  ( 1 9 9 3 )  2 2 7
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had requested the Court to “determine on appeal from the decision rendered...by the 
Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization whether the United States 
had violated the [Convention]...through...actions with respect to the shooting down 
of an Iranian commercial airliner, and, if so, the amount of compensation due.”279
The Court invited the ICAO to provide information on the proceedings of its 
Council after the aerial incident280 as well as copies of decisions adopted by the
->8i
Council' . The Council submitted to the Court its observations which included 
factual descriptions of earlier proceedings in the Council and some conclusions 
regarding the procedure followed
Further, in the Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council Case 
between India and Pakistan, there were questions concerning the construction of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation and the International Air Services 
Agreement. Consequently, the Registrar communicated copies of the written 
proceedings to the Secretary General of the ICAO in accordance with Article 34(3) of 
the Statute283. The time-limit for the Organization to submit observations in writing 
was also later laid down. However, within the time-limit, the Secretary General stated 
that ICAO did not intend to submit observations.”284
Regarding submissions from the ICAO to the Court, there was further 
development at the time of and in relation to the Aerial Incident Case of 27 July 1955. 
During the 33rd session of the Council of the ICAO, it was agreed within the Council 
that the Secretariat could provide information to the Court upon its request without 
referring further to the Council. However, if it is a matter of requesting opinion or 
comments from the Organization then this would have to be submitted to the 
Council285. To an extent, this has made the submission of information to the Court 
easier.
In the Lockerbie Cases, the Court also notified the Secretary General of the 
ICAO for the Organization’s written comments on the case and sent copies of the 
pleadings. The Court further stated that the observations should be limited to 
questions of jurisdiction and admissibility. The Secretary-General of the ICAO 
“informed the Court that the Organization "ha[d] no observations to make for the
27 v  Aerial Incident o f  3 July 1988, I C J ,  1 9 8 9 ,  A p p l i c a t i o n  i n s t i t u t i n g  p r o c e e d i n g s  f i l e d  o n  1 7  M a y  1 9 8 9 ,  2
2 8 0  T h e  s h o o t i n g  d o w n  o f  I r a n  A i r  f l i g h t  I R 6 5 5
281 D i s c u s s e d  i n  C h i n k i n  a n d  M a c k e n z i e ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  1 4 1 ,  Aerial Incident o f  3 July 1988, I C J ,  1 9 8 9 ,  I C J  P l e a d i n g s ,  V o l .  I I ,  6 1 8
2 82  S e e  f u r t h e r :  R o s e n n e ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  6 2 9
283  Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction o f  the Icao Council, I C J ,  1 9 7 2  p a r a  5
28 4  Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction o f  the Icao Council, J C J ,  1 9 7 2  p a r a  5
28 5  R o s e n n e ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  6 2 5 - 6 2 6
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moment" but wished to remain informed about the progress of the case, in order to be 
able to determine whether it would be appropriate to submit observations later.”286 
However, there were no consequent comments submitted by the Organization.
As for cases not concerning the ICAO, in the Border and Transborder Armed 
Action Case between Nicaragua and Honduras, the Registrar “drew the attention of 
the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States to Article 34(3) of the 
Statute...” In the case, there were questions concerning the construction of the Pact of 
Bogota. The Registrar informed the Secretary-General that the Court had instructed 
him to communicate to the Organization copies of all the written proceedings . In 
response, the Secretary-General replied that, in his opinion, he did not have the 
authority to submit observations on behalf of the Organization. He added that each 
Member State would need to be supplied with a copy of the pleadings288. 
Consequently, no brief was submitted to the Court.
Chinkin and Mackenzie have noted that the submission of information from 
international organizations to the Court has been rare289. They argue that there have 
been many cases where participation from international organizations could have been 
expected. The cases involved questions within the scope of particular international 
organizations. For example, could there have been more participation by: a) the
7QOICAO in the various incident cases , b) environmental agencies on cases concerning 
trans-border environmental issues291, c) the UN security Council or NATO in the
707Legality of the Use of Force Cases between Yugoslavia and the NATO members- ,
d) the UN General Assembly Decolonisation Committee in the East Timor Case293, e) 
the UN Human Rights bodies in LaGrand and Breard294, and e) the North Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization or the European Union Community in the Case concerning 
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada)295! Chinkin and Mackenzie further suggests 
that the factors limiting the submissions of international organizations seem to be: (a)
2 86 Lockerbie C ase , I C J ,  1998, 12
287 P u r s u a n t  t o  A r t i c l e  69(3) o f  t h e  R u l e s .  Case Concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions, I C J ,  1988 p a r a  6
288  H e  r e c o r d e d  h i s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  h a d  n o t i f i e d  a l l  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  P a c t  o f  B o g o t a  t h a t  t h e  p r o c e e d i n g s  a p p e a r e d  t o  
r a i s e  q u e s t i o n s  o f  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t ,  s e e :  Case Concerning Border and Transborder Arm ed Actions, I C J ,  1988 
p a r a  7
C h i n k i n  a n d  M a c k e n z i e ,  (2002) 141-142
290  E . g .  Aerial Incident o f  10 August 1999, I C J ,  2000 a n d  Lockerbie Case, I C J ,  1998
291 E . g .  Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case, I C J ,  1997. S e e  f u r t h e r :  S h e l t o n ,  (1994) 625
292  e . g .  Legality o f  Use o f  Force, I C J ,  2004
293  East Timor Case, I C J ,  1995
2 9 4  LaGrand Case,  I C J ,  2001 a n d  The Breard Case, I C J ,  1998
2 95  Fisheries Jurisdiction, I C J ,  1998
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the internal issues within each international organization296, and (b) the time 
restrictions of the Court297. “The conclusion has to be that, even where it is possible, 
international organizations have generally not chosen to make submissions, nor has 
the Court generally considered it useful to seek them”298
Information from NGOs:
Similar to the case of non-party States, submissions by NGOs are not 
explicitly provided for in the provisions of the Court. The jurisprudence of the Court 
has shown that they have had a limited role.
In the Asylum Case, the International League for the Rights of Man requested 
to present relevant information to the Court, pursuant to article 34 of the Statute299. 
This request was submitted simultaneously to that in the South-West Africa Case 
(advisory opinion). The Court stated that it was prepared to accept information from
-1AA _
the League in the South-West Africa Case but not in the Asylum Case. The Court 
based the distinction on the difference between the wordings of the provisions on 
contentious cases (“public international organization”301) on one hand, and advisory 
opinions (“international organization”302) on the other. The League for the Rights of 
Man was deemed as an organization which “cannot be characterized as public 
international organization as envisaged by Statute.”303
Information from individuals:
The jurisprudence of the Court has shown that on no occasion has it allowed 
submissions from individuals. Rosenne has suggested that the Court ought to use its 
powers from the provisions to allow individuals concerned in a case to present his
**  T h e r e  c o u l d  b e  d i s a g r e e m e n t s  a m o n g  m e m b e r s  o f  a n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O r g a n i z a t i o n  o n :  ( a )  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o m p e t e n c e ,  ( b )  w h a t  
c o n s t i t u t e s  r e l e v a n t  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  a n d  ( c )  w h a t  c a n  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  o p i n i o n ,  o r  c o m m e n t . ”  C h i n k i n  a n d  M a c k e n z i e ,  
( 2 0 0 2 ) 1 4 2 - 1 4 3
R o s e n n e ,  ( 1 9 9 7 )  6 4 8 - 6 4 9  V o l  I I ,  S e e  f u r t h e r  o n  d e b a t e  a n d  d e v e l o p m e n t s  o f  t h e  a r t i c l e :  R o s e n n e ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  6 2 7 - 6 3 3
2y* C h i n k i n  a n d  M a c k e n z i e ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  1 4 3
2 W  R o b e r t  D e l s o n ,  L e t t e r  t o  t h e  R e g i s t r a r ,  Asylum Case , I C J ,  1 9 5 0 ,  1 9 5 0  I C J  P l e a d i n g s ,  V o l .  I I ,  2 2 7 ,  7  M a r c h  1 9 5 0
3 0 0  S e e :  C h a p t e r  5 ,  S e c t i o n  3 . 3 . 3 . 2
301 ICJ Statute, 1 9 4 5  a r t  3 4
302 ICJ Statute, 1 9 4 5  a r t  6 6
303  Asylum Case, I C J ,  1 9 5 0  I C J  P l e a d i n g s  1 9 5 0 ,  V o l .  I I ,  2 2 7 - 2 2 8 .  T h e  L e a g u e  d i d  n o t  r e q u e s t  t o  p r e s e n t  i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  a r t i c l e  5 0 .
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version of the facts to the Court. This would increase the Court’s general standing
• • 304and prestige .
Information from other sources:
The final way the Court could potentially admit information is through Article 
50 of the Statute. However, this article has never been used as a means to obtain 
information in a way which would resemble an amicus curiae brief.
Other observations:
In the context of the examination of the ICJ’s approach on amicus curiae, the 
Nicaragua Case is of note. This case has shown that the Court can take a very open 
approach to the admission of information. The Court stated that information in the 
public domain could potentially be used in its judgment. Information could play a 
role in the case “in ways and by means not contemplated by the Rules”305. The Court 
stated further that it is “not bound to confine its consideration to the material formally 
submitted to it by the parties” and it is also “not solely dependent on the arguments of 
the parties before it with respect to law”
The Court also said that it was aware of the existence of information not 
formally submitted by either party. Further, a document was presented to the Court 
without going through the formal channels. “Revolution Beyond Our Borders”, a 
publication of the United States Department of State was sent by the United States 
Information Office in The Hague to an official of the Court’s Registry so that it could
T07be made available to anyone at the Court interested in the subject The 
Government of Nicaragua argued that the document could not “probably be 
considered by the Court” . However, the Court noted the special circumstances of 
the case and ruled that “it may, within limits, make use of information in such a 
publication”309.
w  R o s e n n e .  ( 1 9 6 7 ) 2 5 0
305  The Nicaragua C ase, I C J ,  1 9 8 6 ,  2 5  p a r a  3 1
306  The Nicaragua Case, I C J ,  1 9 8 6 ,  2 5
307  The Nicaragua Case, I C J ,  1 9 8 6 ,  4 4  p a r a  7 3
308  The Nicaragua Case, I C J ,  1 9 8 6 ,  4 4  p a r a  7 3
3 09  The Nicaragua Case, I C J ,  1 9 8 6 ,  4 4  p a r a  7 3
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The Nicaragua Case has shown that the Court was willing to admit and make 
use of evidence not formally submitted by the parties. However, the extraordinary 
nature of the case where one party did not appear before the Court must be noted. 
Further, this very open approach to the admission of information has not been 
reflected in other contentious cases.
Preliminary conclusion on the approach of the Court in contentious cases:
The jurisprudence of the Court on contentious cases has shown that it has 
allowed amicus curiae submissions on very few occasions. It has adhered closely to 
its Statute and the Rules in limiting the submissions to public international 
organizations, with the exception of the Corfu Channel Case. The Court has 
consulted a limited number of international organizations but the ICAO has been the 
only one that has really played a role.
3.3.3.2 Advisory Opinions:
In addition to the contentious cases examined, this section will study the 
jurisprudence of the Court on advisory opinions. What must be noted is that 
according the Statute, States and international organizations can submit information to 
the Court. The debate in this section focuses on submissions from entities not 
explicitly mentioned in the Statute.
International Status o f  the South-West Africa Case:
The first advisory opinion in which the question of amicus curiae briefs arose, 
and perhaps the most known in this regard, was the International Status o f  South-West 
Africa Case. The case concerned the status of the Territory of South-West Africa. 
The Territory was German prior to World War I. After the War, the Territory was 
placed under a Mandate conferred upon the Union of South Africa which had full 
power of administration and legislation over the Territory as a part of the Union. The 
question before the Court was whether, after the Second World War, the Mandate had 
lapsed, and whether the Union of South Africa could integrate the Territory into the 
Union.
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In this case, the Court allowed an NGO, the International League for the 
Rights of Man, to submit information pursuant to Article 66(2) of the Statute310. The 
League had made a case for the submission of information to the Court referring to its 
history including: a) its long interest in the subject including its participation in the 
General Assembly’s Fourth Committee, b) its possession of legal material, resources 
and research background, c) its status as an international human rights organization 
with ECOSOC consultative status311. The Court stated that the League had to submit 
a written statement limited to legal questions, and excluding facts not before the
 ^1 o
Court, within 25 days However, the League did not meet this time limit but 
submitted the information one month later and was consequently excluded from the 
proceedings313. Following this delay of submission by the League, the Court later 
refused a request from the League for oral submissions314. The Court also refused 
submissions from other entities in this case, for example, those from Rev. Michael Sit 
who was involved with the League of the Rights of M an’s submission.
What this case shows is perhaps, prima facie, that the Court was willing to 
admit information from an international organization such as the League for the 
Rights of Man. However, after its late submission, could it be that the Court has 
changed its position and view amicus curiae briefs in a more unfavourable light?
Namibia Case:
There were also requests to submit information to the Court in the Namibia 
Case. The case concerned the question of the legal consequences for States of the 
continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council 
resolution 276 (1970) which had stated South Africa’s presence to be illegal.
In this case, there were requests from the League for the Rights of Man and 
the American Committee on Africa to submit a written and an oral statement, but both 
of them were not permitted by the Court. The statement of the League dealt directly 
with the question put by the Security Council Resolution 284 to the Court regarding 
the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in
310 The request was made by Delson, a League board member: International Status o f  South-West Africa, ICJ, 1950, 324
3,1 See further: Bartholomeusz, (2005) 220
312 International Status o f  South-West Africa, ICJ, 1950 ICJ Pleadings, 327
313 International Status o f  South-West Africa, ICJ, 1950 ICJ Pleadings, 346
314 International Status o f  South-West Africa, ICJ, 1950 ICJ Pleadings, 343-344, 346
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Namibia315. However, the Registrar stated that the Court had decided that the 
League’s request “should not be acceded to”316. The Registrar added his personal 
view that the Court would be “unwilling to open the floodgates to what might be a 
vast amount of proffered assistance”317.
In the same case, the Court also received an application to participate from 
four inhabitants of the international Territory of South West Africa. Their request to 
the Registrar stated: “It is imperative that we as a Namibia N ation.. .be heard by the 
International Court of Justice....the Court conferred a special legal interest upon the 
people of South West Africa (Namibia).”318 However, the Court refused the 
application.
Further, an international law professor from the United States, Prof. Riesman, 
also sought to submit an amicus curiae brief to the Court. The professor argued in 
support of his submission by referring to the practice of the Court of accepting a 
submission from the League for the Rights of Man in 1950 and also the practice in the
T i n
Common Law Tradition Prof. Riesman argued that there was no explicit 
prohibition in the Statute or the Rules against the Court accepting information from 
interest groups or individuals, having noted that they cannot initiate a case or plead 
orally “ . The Registrar refused to accept the brief from the professor because 
individuals did not fall within the definition of “international organization” in Article 
66 of the Statute The Registrar further enunciated that Court’s acceptance of 
information from the League for the Rights of Man in 1950 was on the basis of it 
being an international organization: “With reference to your suggestion that there 
seems to be no explicit bar...to  accepting a document from an interested group or 
individual...the Court’s view would seem to have been that the expression of its 
powers in Article 66.. .is limitative, and that expressio unius est exclusion alterius.”322 
The Namibia Case has shown the Court’s reluctance to admit amicus curiae 
briefs, even from the League for the Rights of Man which had previously been
Jl5 The statement dealt with legal questions. For full statement, see: Rovine and D'Amato, (1971)
316 On the League for the Rights o f Man: Namibia Case, ICJ, 1971 ICJ Pleadings, Vol II, 636-640; on the American Committee 
on Africa: ICJ Pleadings, Vol II, 643,639-640 .
317 Namibia Case, ICJ, 1971, ICJ Pleadings 1971, Vol. II, 639. However, Bartholomeusz has suggested that, at the time that the 
Court had stated this, the Court was not overwhelmed with cases. This begs more questions as what could be other factors that 
could be the Court’s refusal o f  amicus curiae from individuals.
3IS Namibia Case, ICJ, 1971 ICJ Pleadings 1971, Vol II, 677. Quote as noted by Bartholomeusz, (2005) 219
3IV Letter from Prof. Reisman to the Registrar, 10 September 1970, Namibia Case, ICJ, 1971 ICJ Pleadings 1971, Vol. II, 636-
637
320 Letter from Prof. Reisman to the Registrar, 10 September 1970, Namibia Case, ICJ, 1971 ICJ Pleadings 1971, Vol. II, 636- 
637
321 Letter from the Registrar to Prof. Reisman, 6 November 1970, Namibia Case, ICJ, 1971, ICJ Pleadings 1971, Vol. II, 638-639
322 Letter from the Registrar to Prof. Reisman, 6 November 1970, Namibia Case, ICJ, 1971, ICJ Pleadings 1971, Vol. II, 639
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allowed to submit. The Court has applied Article 66 of the Statute very narrowly. 
Could this be a result of the delayed submission in the International Status o f South- 
West Africa Case, causing the Court to look at such briefs in an unfavourable way?
Other cases:
There have been further attempts in the history of the Court by non-parties to 
submit briefs. In the Legality o f  the Use by a State o f Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict Case, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 
requested to submit information to the Court. In reply, the Registrar wrote a letter 
stating that the Court had considered the offer from the organization, remarking on its 
special relationship with the World Health Organization. However, the Court did not 
accept the submission from the organization having considered the circumstances of 
the case and the scope of the request from the WHO " . However, the Court had a 
chance to use their submissions in an informal manner. Ascensio, referring to a letter 
from the Registrar published in a newspaper, indicated that the submissions of the 
various NGOs were made available to the Court. This was done in an informal 
manner and there were no references made in the judgment324.
The narrow approach on the admissions of amicus curiae briefs was 
confirmed in two more cases.
First, in the Effects o f Awards o f Compensation made by the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal Case, the lawyers who had presented the case of the staff 
before the Administrative Tribunal requested to participate in the advisory opinion 
proceedings in the oral arguments. They argued that their clients were directly 
affected by the judgm ent of the Court. However, the Court did not permit the
325 r t .participation of the lawyers because they were considered to be individuals . The 
Court also did not allow the Federation of International Civil Servants to submit its 
views. The Registrar rejected the Federation’s application on the ground that the
' X ' l f sorganization was not an “international organization”
Second, the inability of individuals to submit amicus curiae was again 
confirmed in the Judgments o f the Administrative Tribunal o f ILO upon Complaints
323 Letter from the Registrar to Dr. Barry D. Levy, see: Shelton, (2006) 13.
324 Ascensio, (2001) 906
325 Effect o f  Aw ards o f  Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, ICJ, 1954, ICJ Pleadings, 394-395
326 The Federation did not have a consultative status in the Economic and Social Council, Razzaque, (2002) 174
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made against UNESCO Case. The issue referred to the ICJ involved the questioning 
of the validity of the Administrative Tribunal’s decision. In this case, there was a 
special arrangement made between the Court and UNESCO to transmit the views of 
the staff members’ Counsel through UNESCO to the Court. This was to ensure 
equality of the Parties and to prevent only one party (the international organization) 
being able to present submissions before the Court . The Court commented on the 
inequality between the parties: “The individual will have to be dependent on the 
Organization (i.e. UNESCO) who was their opponent in the disputes before the 
administrative tribunal for the presentation of their views in the court. In order to 
provide some equality, the court dispensed with oral proceedings in the present 
advisory case.”328
From the jurisprudence up to this point, Bartholomeusz has noted that the 
approach of the Court has changed from lenient to strict329. He has provided some 
explanation for this. The Court has to take into consideration the following: a) the 
question of whether the organization was likely to furnish accurate information, b) the 
worry of opening floodgates for NGOs, c) the question of whether “international 
organization” should be limited to public international organizations according to the 
meaning in Article 34 of the Statute .
Recent developments:
Recent developments have shown that the Court could be leaving its narrow 
approach and going towards a more open approach on the admission of amicus curiae 
briefs. The Palestinian Wall Case is important in this regard. The question before the 
Court concerned the construction of a wall by Israel in Palestinian occupied territory. 
Regarding amicus curiae briefs, the debate surrounded the ability of Palestine to 
submit information to the Court because it is neither a State nor an international 
organization. Despite the controversy, the ICJ, understandably in the circumstances, 
requested Palestine to make submissions. However, the legal basis for the submission 
raises questions.
327 See further: Bartholomeusz, (2005) 225 and Chinkin, (1993) 325
328 Razzaque, (2002) 174; Allowing the oral proceedings would have meant that only UNESCO could have appeared before the 
Court.
32s The writer shares the same views as Bartholomeusz. A balance must be struck between these considerations.
330 Compare the definition of international organization in Article 34 o f the Statute o f the Court to Article 71 o f the UN Charter. 
See further: Bartholomeusz, (2005) 221
Charlie Gamjana-Goonchom
Page 147 of 321
The Court has not directly addressed this issue but said that what must be 
taken into account are: a) Resolution ES-10/14, b) the report of the Secretary-General 
transmitted with the request for the advisory opinion, c) the fact that the General 
Assembly has granted Palestine a special status of observer, d) Palestine was co­
sponsor of the draft resolution requesting the advisory opinion. The Court ruled that 
for these reasons, “Palestine might also submit a written statement on the question 
within the above time-limit”331.
Further, international organizations were also allowed to participate in 
advisory proceedings. In the Wall Case, two international organizations’ requests to 
intervene were accepted by the Court332, despite the fact this is not explicitly 
permitted by the Statute which only allows requests from States333. This again shows 
the increase in the willingness of the Court to admit amicus curiae briefs in advisory 
proceedings.
Other developments:
The recent Practice Direction XII of 2004 further supports the view that the 
Court is more willing to open its doors to amicus curiae briefs, or at least more aware 
of the issue. Even though the Practice Direction does not specifically allow NGO’s 
submissions to be part of the case file, it does set out the relationship between the
Court and NGOs. Practice Direction XII states:
1. Where an international non-govemmental organization submits a written 
statement and/or document in an advisory opinion case on its own initiative, such 
statement and/or document is not to be considered part of the case file.
2. Such statements and/or documents shall be treated as publications readily 
available and may accordingly be referred to by States and intergovernmental 
organizations presenting written and oral statements in the case in the same manner as 
publications in the public domain.
3. Written statements and/or documents submitted by international non- 
govemmental organizations will be placed in a designated location in the Peace 
Palace. All States as well as intergovernmental organizations presenting written or 
oral statements under Article 66 of the Statute will be informed as to the location
331 Wall C ase , ICJ. 2004 para 4. cf. Applicability o f  the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21, ICJ, 1988.
332 The League o f Arab States and the Organization o f the Islamic Conferences.
333 Article 66(2) and 66(3)
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where statements and/or documents submitted by international non-govemmental 
organizations may be consulted.
The Practice Direction has already raised questions and criticisms on many 
issues334: a) the definition of an “international nongovernmental organization”, b) 
whether the procedures in the Practice Direction are the exclusive way through which 
an NGO can participate before the Court, c) whether the Practice Direction could be 
extended to include contentious cases, d) the extent to which the Practice Direction 
could function effectively in practice335. These questions remain unanswered. 
Nonetheless, legal scholars have commented that despite its lack of clarity, the 
Practice Direction does show recognition that NGOs have an interest in advisory 
proceedings . The Court still retains the discretion whether to refer to the NGO 
submissions337, and even if the Court does make use of them, there is no requirement 
for the Court to stipulate this in the judgment.
Preliminary Conclusion on the Court’s approach in advisory opinions:
In contrast to contentious cases, the Court has been relatively more open to 
amicus curiae in advisory proceedings. In addition to submissions of States and 
international organizations which are provided for in the provisions, the Court has 
allowed a submission in the International Status o f South West Africa Case, but 
seemed to have changed its policy after this case. However, in recent times, the Court 
has opened up possibilities for amicus curiae submissions as shown in the Wall Case 
and Practice Direction XII. The Court has recognized that advisory opinion cases 
have a wider impact and affect the interests of many non-State entities.
3.3.4 Interviews with the judges:
Interviews with three judges of the ICJ have confirmed many observations 
from the jurisprudence. Judge A has indicated that the issue of amicus curiae 
submissions is not discussed in detail at the Court. In his time as a judge, this issue 
has only been discussed once or twice.
334 Shelton. (2006) 1
335 See further: Shelton, (2006) 18
336 See further: Bartholomeusz, (2005) 223
337 According to the Practice Direction, parties can consult the submissions. If this is the case and the information is included by 
the parties, then the Court would have to take this into consideration.
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Regarding contentious cases, all three judges stated that the position of the 
Court has been quite closed. Judge B noted that the Court’s approach to the 
admission of amicus curiae briefs has adhered closely to the Statute, and added that 
the Court is a long way off the admission of such briefs in contentious cases. 
However, he added that this is of no significance because non-States entities are 
generally not interested in contentious cases. The parties with a stake in such disputes 
are the States themselves. Judge C underlined the fact that, because of the closed 
position the Court, there could be a potential problem when the real parties to a 
dispute (i.e. when they are not States) cannot appear before it. This could be an 
inherent problem with the Statute.
However, regarding advisory opinions, Judge C has noted that the Court has 
generally refused amicus curiae briefs from entities not stipulated in the Statute. 
However, Judge B stated that the Court is generally opening up . According him, 
this has been going on even before the Wall Case. But in the opening up process, the 
Court must be consistent with the Statute. This policy of the Court has been driven by 
the desire to grant the opportunity to non-State actors to be represented, as supposed 
to the desire to have additional arguments from these entities. However, with regard 
to the Wall Case, Judge A noted that Palestine was nearly a State for the purpose of 
the submission, so it cannot be said this case opened the doors of the Court.
In the context of both contentious cases and advisory opinions, as a matter of 
policy, Judge C stated that there are occasions where the Court would benefit from 
amicus curiae briefs, and also occasions where amicus curiae briefs would burden the 
Court. Judge A expressed his view that the Court should open up for amicus curiae. 
However, there are other members of the bench who do not share this view. Judge A 
further added that, regarding amicus curiae briefs, the composition of the Court can 
have an impact on the approach of the Court. Further, with the current composition, 
Judge A thinks that the approach of the Court will probably open up.
3.4 Conclusion:
338 Judge B also thought that this is a phenomenon taking place with other tribunals.
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The provisions, jurisprudence and interviews have shown that, in both 
contentious and advisory opinions, the Court has generally been reluctant to admit 
amicus curiae briefs.
Regarding contentious cases, the provisions of the Court only allow 
submissions from “public international organizations”, defining the term as “an 
organization of States”. The practice of the Court has to a large extent reflected this. 
So far, there have only been requests to, and submissions from, public international 
organizations and none from NGOs.
As for advisory opinions, in addition to submissions from States and public 
international organizations, the Court was initially open to submissions from NGOs: 
the International League for the Rights of Man. However, following the failure of the 
League to submit the brief in time, the Court seemed to have closed its doors, refusing 
the League’s further requests for submissions, and many submissions by NGOs and 
individuals after this case.
However, recent developments have shown that the Court is beginning to be 
more open to amicus curiae submissions. This was supported by: (a) in many 
people’s opinions, the Wall Case, where information was submitted from Palestine, 
(b) Practice Direction XII submissions of NGOs, recognizing their interest in cases 
before the Court. The Court’s more open approach in advisory opinions raises 
questions of the possibility of it being extended to contentious cases.
One aim of this section is to explain the factors affecting the Court’s approach 
on amicus curiae briefs. One reason mentioned by Judge A is the composition of the 
bench. In his opinion, the current composition would probably lead to a more open 
approach on the issue. However, other reasons will be best understood in the overall 
conclusion when all the three tribunals and all three aspects of evidential rules will be 
examined together . There will then be benefits from a more complete picture and a 
comparative analysis.
The debate on the topic continues340. Some argue for the Court to admit as 
much information from amicus curiae as possible, showing the Court’s recognition 
that its decisions have a wide impact. This will also enhance the legitimacy of the 
Court, promote the Court’s image, and help the Court reach a decision which is more
33v See: Chapter 7, Section 2, 248-256
340 See further: Shelton, (2006) 19-23, Rosenne, (1997)654-655, Vol. II, Jurisdiction; Razzaque, (2002) 175
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“balanced”. In contrast, some argue that the Court is already overloaded with work 
and cannot cope with information.
For the writer, the Court has to find a balance between, on one hand, the desire 
to process the cases as rapidly and efficiently as possible, and on the other hand, the 
desire to have as much information as possible as well as granting the opportunity for 
non-State entities to be represented. In doing this, the Court has to consider the views 
of States whether they want non-State entities to participate.
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Section 4: ITLOS:
4.1 Introduction:
Similar to the ICJ, the drafting history of ITLOS has shown that it was created 
to serve the needs of States and not other entities. “Discussion about access by 
entities other than States under the prospective Rules never contemplated access by 
NGOs or individuals to Tribunal proceedings.”341
As noted previously, the provisions of ITLOS are modeled on those of the ICJ. 
The Preparatory Commission took into account “available precedents, such as those 
of the International Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the European 
Economic Community [and] any interpretations the Courts had given in the 
application of their Rules, as well as the need to ensure that the procedures should be 
expeditious, not unduly expensive to the parties and should encourage resort to the 
International Tribunal for the settlement of disputes.”342
4.2 The provisions of ITLOS:
4.2.1 Contentious Cases:
From the wording of ITLOS’s provisions, it is apparent that they were based 
on those of the ICJ. Article 84 of the ITLOS Rules was modeled on Article 34 of the 
ICJ Statute. Article 84(1) of the Rules stipulates that the Tribunal may request an 
appropriate intergovernmental organization to furnish relevant information. The 
Tribunal is to decide, after a consultation with the chief administrative officer of the 
organization, whether the information will be written or oral and any time limits will 
be set343. Similar to Article 34 of the ICJ Statute, an intergovernmental organization 
can also submit information on its own initiative. Further, if the construction of the
341 Bartholomeusz, (2005) 227. “In the case o f the Tribunal only States Parties have the right o f access in matters relating to 
application and interpretation o f [UNCLOS]. This would include international organizations referred to in Annex IX in cases 
within their spheres o f  competence. In enjoying that right, intergovernmental organizations do so on behalf o f and in the place of 
their Member States. Other entities only have the right o f access to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber. Their access is limited to 
certain kinds o f dispute.”. Statement by Chairman, Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the 
International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea, Special Commission 4, Second Session, Doc. No. LOS/PCN/SCN.4/1984/CRP.4, 4 
April 1984, para 3 in Platzoder, (1990) Vol. VII
34‘ Draft Rules o f the Tribunal (Prepared by the Secretariat): Explanatory Note, Preparatory Commission for the International 
Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Special Commission 4, Doc. No. 
LOS/PCN/SCN.4/W P.2, 27 July 1984, para 2
343 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 article 84(1)
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constituent instrument of an intergovernmental organization or of an international 
convention adopted hereunder is in question, then the Registrar must inform that 
particular organization so that it may submit any relevant information344.
One difference between the ICJ’s provisions and ITLOS’s is the change from 
the term “public international organization” to “intergovernmental organization”. 
“Intergovernmental organizations” restricts the types of organizations to only those 
between States, omitting any possibility of organizations with both State and non- 
State Members and NGOs submitting information to the Tribunal. The Rules also 
further define “intergovernmental organization” as an intergovernmental organization 
other than any organization which is a party or intervenes in the case concerned345.
In the writer’s opinion, the main purpose of the change to the term 
“intergovernmental organization” was to clarify the definition much debated in the 
context of the ICJ346.
4.2.2 Advisory Opinion:
ITLOS also contains provisions on the admission of amicus curiae briefs in 
advisory opinions. Rule 133 of the Rules addresses this issue and was modeled on 
Article 66 of the ICJ’s Statute, resembling it for the most part347. However, it must be 
noted that ITLOS has the jurisdiction for advisory opinions only in the context of the 
Seabed Disputes Chamber. Similar to the ICJ, the Chamber must identify the 
intergovernmental organizations that are likely to be able to furnish information and 
make a request to such organizations State Parties and intergovernmental 
organizations will also be “invited to present written statements on the question within 
the time-limit fixed by the Chamber”349. The Chamber must also “decide whether 
oral proceedings shall be held and, if so, fix the date for the opening of such 
proceedings”350.
344 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 article 84(3)
345 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 article 84(4)
346 This term was later defined as an "organization of States” by the Court’s Rules. See further on the drafting process o f Article 
84, see: Bartholomeusz, (2005) 229-230. The delegates did not intend for NGOs to be able to submit information to the 
Tribunal.
347 Chairman’s Summing up o f the Discussions on the Draft Rules o f the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law o f the Sea, 
Special Commission 4, Doc. No. LOS/PCN/SCN.4/L. 1, 10 July 1984, 6
348 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 article 133 (2)
349 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 art 133 (3)
350 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 art 133 (4)
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Among the many similarities, there are distinctions to be made between the 
provisions of ITLOS and those of the ICJ. First, under the Rules of ITLOS, all States 
can make submissions in advisory proceedings. This is to be contrasted with the 
ICJ’s provision where only States likely to be able to furnish information on the 
question are permitted351. The change has made it easier for non-party States to 
submit information. Second, like Article 84 of the Rules of ITLOS on contentious 
cases, Article 133 also refers to “intergovernmental organizations”352. Again, this 
term rules out the possibility of international organizations with non-State members 
and NGOs from submitting information.
The provisions of ITLOS on advisory opinions do not mention whether State 
Parties or intergovernmental organizations can submit information on their own 
initiative. Scholars have argued that ITLOS would probably look to the rules and the 
practice of the ICJ which indicate that State Parties and intergovernmental 
organizations would be able to do so . For example, in the Wall Case, the ICJ 
invited two international organizations to submit information in light of their earlier 
applications to the Court.
4.2.3 Other provisions:
Similar to the ICJ, ITLOS also has provisions allowing it to arrange for an 
enquiry or expert opinion354. This provision could potentially be used to admit 
information that would otherwise be amicus curiae submissions. However, any 
information admitted through this channel is solely at the discretion of the Tribunal 
because it has to initiate the enquiry or expert opinion. As a result, NGOs will not be 
able to submit information on their own initiation.
However, it has been suggested that the article will not be used in this fashion 
because of three reasons355. First, the Tribunal will look at the practice of the ICJ 
which has never used its equivalent article for this purpose. Second, the Tribunal will 
take into account the background of the negotiations of UNCLOS. The Tribunal will
351 “Initially som e delegations objected to this departure from the ICJ Statute, arguing that there would be “a danger that the
urgency required for dealing with advisory opinions under UNCLOS could not be assured””, Bartholomeusz, (2005) 230 
35: Draft article 141 in the Final Draft Rules o f the Tribunal, later to be article 133, still contained the term “international 
organization” but "intergovernmental organization” was chosen on the adoption of the Rules. Bartholomeusz, (2005) 231. This 
shows the restrictive view the delegates have taken towards submissions from such entities.
353 Bartholomeusz, (2005) 231
354 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 article 82; See also: Chapter 6, Section 4, 205-207
355 Bartholomeusz, (2005) 232
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be hesitant to permit entities not specifically provided for in the Convention to submit 
an amicus curiae brief. Third, in light of the urgent nature of the cases that have been 
before the Tribunal, admitting amicus curiae briefs could arguably be contradictory to 
Article 49 of the Rules which require the dispute settlement process to be conducted 
without unnecessary delay or expense.
Another provision that could arguably be used to admit amicus curiae briefs to 
the Tribunal is Article 289 of UNCLOS which provides for the appointment of
356experts . However, this is also unlikely to be used. First, the article was intended 
more specifically for the appointment of experts who can provide help on technical 
issues. Second, according to the Rules, experts appointed under article 289 will also 
take part in the Tribunal’s judicial deliberations. It is hard to imagine entities other 
than individual experts (e.g. NGOs) being able to participate.
4.2.4 Preliminary Conclusion:
The provisions of ITLOS on amicus curiae are based on those of the ICJ, both 
for contentious cases and advisory opinions. On contentious cases, ITLOS’s 
provisions resemble those of the ICJ apart from minor alterations. The Tribunal can 
request information from intergovernmental organizations, and they can also submit 
information on their own initiation. The notable difference between the provisions of 
the two tribunals is the term “public international organizations” used in the context 
of the ICJ, and “intergovernmental organizations” in the context of ITLOS.
With regard to advisory opinions, ITLOS’s procedures, limited to the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber, once again resemble those of the ICJ. The Chamber is to identify 
the intergovernmental organizations that are likely to be able to furnish information 
and make requests to such organizations States and intergovernmental 
organizations are to be invited to present written statements. All States can make 
submissions to the Chamber, to be contrasted with the ICJ where only “States likely 
to be able to furnish information on the question” are permitted to submit. There are 
other provisions with potential to be used to admit information from amicus curiae: 
Article 82 of the Rules and Article 289 of UNCLOS. However, it is unlikely that they 
will be used in this way.
356 This provision was based on Article 50 o f the ICJ Statute. See also: Chapter 6, Section 4, 205-207
357 The term used is the narrower “intergovernmental organizations”, and not “international organizations” as used by the ICJ.
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4.3 Practice of the Tribunal:
Unfortunately, the practice of ITLOS on amicus curiae briefs has been non­
existent, depriving this section of the benefit of seeing the application of the 
provisions by the Tribunal.
The lack of jurisprudence on this issue is due to many reasons. First, there 
have not been many cases before the Tribunal, limiting the opportunities for entities to 
submit briefs. Second, the nature of the cases which have been before the Tribunal 
does not give raise to amicus curiae briefs: the majority has been prompt release 
cases. These cases are specific to the particular circumstances without a wider 
impact. There are also provisional measures cases. Again, these do not incite amicus 
curiae briefs. Allowing submissions at this stage would substantially slow down the 
process which needs to be dealt with quickly. Amicus curiae briefs are normally 
submitted at the merits phase where the facts and legal arguments are examined in 
more detail.
There were no amicus curiae briefs submitted in the only full merits case in 
the Tribunal’s history, the Saiga Case (No. 2), which was a continuation of a prompt 
release case. If other cases with a potential wider impact, such as the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna Case or the Mox Plant Case, had appeared before the Tribunal on their 
full merits, then the submission of amicus curiae briefs would have been much more 
likely.
Equally, there have not been any advisory opinions requested from the 
Tribunal, limiting the study in this regard.
4.4 Interview with the judges:
The interview with the 7 judges of ITLOS has been revealing on the issue of 
amicus curiae. The judges agree that the Tribunal has discussed the admission of 
amicus curiae briefs, but there has not been clear agreement on the issue358. There
O C Q
were both judges who were for such submissions, and those who were against
3S* Judge J
35v Judge G said that the Tribunal would need more cases to determine whether the current rules are satisfactory.
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The majority of judges interviewed expressed the view that the Tribunal is 
cautious , and would be restrictive on the admission of amicus curiae briefs. Judge 
I stated that the Tribunal holds a conservative view that amicus curiae submissions 
have no place before it. They would be too much interference. Judge D stated that 
the general consensus has been that the Tribunal will follow the approach of the ICJ. 
Judge J added that, regarding NGOS, there is the legal hurdle that submissions from 
them are not provided in the instruments of the Tribunal. In contrast, Judge H had the 
general impression that the Tribunal concluded that amicus curiae briefs are desirable
o / r  i
within the constraints of the rules .
There were also mixed responses to the question of whether amicus curiae 
briefs would benefit the Tribunal. Judge H noted that amicus curiae briefs will be 
useful. Judge F has stated that this depended on the case. However, they can be very 
advantageous when used correctly. Judge E added that the probative value of the 
information from amicus curiae briefs is subject to the interpretation of the judge. 
Further, NGOs tend to have an ulterior motive, even those organizations that seem to 
be unbiased , and the judge will take this into account. For this reason, Judge E 
stated that amicus curiae briefs would not make a substantial difference to the 
outcome of the case. Judge G added that amicus curiae briefs are good when used in 
the municipal context. However, in the international arena, they can be misleading. 
Too much influence on the Tribunal is not a good thing. Further, the Tribunal should 
apply law, minimizing the need for friends
As for the approach of the Tribunal in the coming future, there are also 
contradicting views among the judges. Judge E noted that, so far in its history, the 
Tribunal has not had the opportunity to admit amicus curiae brief. However, should 
there be an opportunity in the future, the Tribunal will probably do so. In contrast, 
Judge D said that the Tribunal will probably follow the approach of the ICJ in that it 
will not accept briefs for contentious cases but will do so for advisory opinions364. 
Judge G stated that, if the Tribunal is busy, or if the Tribunal is sitting in plenary, then 
it is unlikely to admit any briefs. However, if it is split into chambers to deal with 
different issues, or on certain issues such as the environment, amicus curiae briefs
360 Judge D. G. J
361 Judge F shares this view.
362 Also the view o f Judge D
363 Judge G
364 The Tribunal tries as much as possible to avoid the fragmentation of international tribunals (Judge D)
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would play a role. Judge D said that the Tribunal could expect amicus curiae briefs in 
some areas. For example, there could be submissions from organizations such as 
Greenpeace in prompt release cases involving questions on fishing.
Judge H supports the idea of amicus curiae briefs. Entities should be free to 
submit them. If the numbers of submissions are too great, the Tribunal doesn’t have 
to read them because it must process cases efficiently. In his opinion, it is strange if 
the Tribunal is able to seek expert advice but cannot admit amicus curiae 
submissions. Seeking expert advice is asking people the Tribunal knows. What if 
there is information from people the Tribunal does not know? Judge H added that 
there should be some rules laid out to regulate amicus curiae submissions. According 
to him, NGOs should be encouraged to submit, and there is also potential for 
submissions from individuals.
Judge I also welcomes amicus curiae submissions and thinks that the Tribunal 
should open up. He stated that the views of non-States can be useful, but also noted 
that they can also come through the parties’ submissions.
Judge J stated that if there were submissions, the judges would read them. The 
submissions would have influence on the judges, albeit subconsciously, but there 
would be no visible proof of this.
Regarding the factors that influence its approach, the Tribunal looks at the 
approach of other tribunals especially the ICJ365. However, it does not have to follow 
that particular approach . Another constraint is the limited time
4.5 Conclusion:
Because of the absence of jurisprudence of the Tribunal on amicus curiae, this 
section was restricted to the examination of the provisions and the interviews of the 
judges.
The provisions of the Tribunal are based on those of the ICJ. This is apparent 
in the context of contentious cases where the provisions of the two tribunals are very 
similar apart from the difference that the term “public international organization” used 
in the context of the ICJ has been changed to “intergovernmental organization”. This
365 Judge J and D share this view.
366 Judge J
367 Judge G and J
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change was implemented to clarify the much debated definition in the provisions of 
the ICJ and excludes NGOs and individuals from submitting briefs.
ITLOS’s provisions on advisory opinions also resemble those of the ICJ. 
Again, the term “intergovernmental organization” is used in ITLOS’s context, 
distinguishing it from the ICJ’s “international organization”. This arguably limits the 
scope of entities able to submit to ITLOS when compared to the ICJ. However, the 
scope for States to submit information has been increased by allowing all States to 
submit information in the case of ITLOS, rather than limiting submissions to only 
States which are likely to furnish information on the question.
The future of the approach of ITLOS on amicus curiae is still uncertain. The 
judges still seem to be divided. Some view amicus curiae briefs with much 
skepticism. Others think that the Tribunal should admit more briefs.
There seem to be many factors influencing the approach of the Tribunal. First, 
the history of the Tribunal has played an important role. The drafting of the Rules has 
shown that ITLOS has been influenced to a large extent by the ICJ. Second, the 
judges have expressed the opinion that they look at the practice of other international 
tribunals, especially the ICJ. Third, during the negotiation process, the intention of 
States, not wanting to permit NGOs to submit information, is still reflected in the 
provisions. Fourth, the time restriction upon the Tribunal in the prompt release and 
provisional measures cases has also meant that it was difficult for amicus curiae to be 
submitted.
The details of other influencing factors, which are also common to other 
aspects of evidential rules, will be left to the concluding chapter where all three 
tribunals will be examined together.
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Section 5: The WTO DSB:
5.1 Introduction:
The approach of the WTO DSB on amicus curiae differs from those of the ICJ 
and ITLOS. The issue has been controversial and much debated over recent years, 
with those who strongly support it, and those who do not368. One reason why there 
has been more debate in the WTO is that the disputes in this forum often concern the 
public at large, many stakeholders such as multinational corporations, and involve 
health or the environment. Further, there is more interaction between States and non- 
State entities than ever before
5.2 The Provisions of the WTO DSB:
The provisions of the WTO do not explicitly provide for the submission of 
amicus curiae briefs. During the negotiations of the WTO Agreement, proposals for 
the use of amicus curiae had been made but rejected at the Uruguay Round. Further, 
according to the accounts of most of the Members of the WTO with the exception 
of the United States371, there was no consensus on the issue when it was suggested 
again at the DSU review372.
However, from the existing provisions, Article 13 of the DSU is the only 
provision that could arguably still be interpreted as allowing amicus curiae briefs. It 
provides: “each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice 
from any individual or body which it deems appropriate” and “panels may seek 
information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their opinion 
on certain aspects of the matter.” The way in which this article has been used will be 
examined in the next section.
368 President Bill Clinton is a supporter o f amicus curiae briefs, as expressed in his statement on the occasion of the 50th
Anniversary o f  GATT/WTO. He stated that stakeholders should be able to convey their views. WORLD TRADE 
WT/F1FTY/H/ST/8, 8 May 1998. See further: Bartholomeusz, (2005) 254-255, Umbricht, (2001), Marceau and Stilwell, (2001), 
Boisson de Chazoumes and Mbengue, (2003) 213-231
m  On the relationship between the sovereign States and the interest o f non-State actors, see generally: Hollis, (2002).
3 0 WT/GC/M/60, General Council, Minutes o f Meeting held on 22 November 2000, 23 January 2001, Similar accounts o f the 
history of the negotiations were given by India, M exico and Singapore, see: para 38, 50, and 60 accordingly.
31 WT/GC/M/60, General Council, Minutes o f Meeting held on 22 November 2000, 23 January 2001. “It was a mistake to claim 
that the negotiations history o f the DSU showed any intent to ban amicus curiae submissions. In fact, the United States had at 
one point sought the language to clarify the DSU and made it explicit that such submissions would be permitted, but had become 
convinced that this was not necessary.” para 77
373 As noted in Bartholomeusz, (2005); See WT/GC/M/60, General Council, Minutes o f Meeting held on 22 November 2000, 23 
January 2001, para 23 (Statement o f Hong Kong, China).
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5.3 The Practice of the WTO DSB:
At the outset, the WTO DSB did not admit any amicus curiae briefs, but 
followed the practice of its predecessor, the GATT373. However, this was to change 
only three years after its creation. In the Shrimp/Turtle Case, the question of how 
Article 13 of the DSU should be interpreted arose for the first time.
5.3.1 The Shrimp/Turtle Case:
The Shrimp/Turtle Case was a dispute between a group of developing States 
on one hand374, and the United States on the other. It concerned the question of 
whether a law passed by the United States requiring importers of shrimps to fit turtle 
excluder devices on their shrimp trawlers was compatible with WTO obligations.
At the panel stage, three environmental NGOS submitted amicus curiae briefs 
on their own initiation: the Center for Marine Conservation ("CMC"), the Center for 
International Environmental Law ("CBEL"), and World Wide Fund for Nature375.
The Panel refused to admit the amicus curiae briefs, giving the following 
explanation: “We had not requested such information...W e note that, pursuant to 
Article 13 of the DSU, the initiative to seek information and to select the source of 
information rests with the Panel. In any other situations, only parties and third parties 
are allowed to submit information directly to the Panel. Accepting non-requested 
information from non-govemmental sources would be, in our opinion, incompatible 
with the provisions of the DSU as currently applied. We therefore informed the 
parties that we did not intend to take these documents into consideration. We 
observed, moreover, that it was usual practice for parties to put forward whatever 
documents they considered relevant to support their case and that, if any party in the 
present dispute wanted to put forward these documents, or parts of them, as part of 
their own submissions to the Panel, they were free to do so.”376 The United States did 
annex the NGO briefs to its submission.
373 Stem, (2003) 260
0 4 India, Malaysia. Pakistan and Thailand
375 USA - Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case, WTO DSB, 1998 Report o f the Appellate Body, para 99; Concerning briefs 
from the first two NGOs, the Panel acknowledged receiving them. The complaining parties requested the Panel not to consider 
them. In contrast, the United States urged the Panel to avail itself o f any relevant information in the two briefs.
376 USA - Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case, WTO DSB, 1998, Panel Report, para 7.8
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However, the Appellate Body overturned the ruling of the Panel on the 
interpretation of Article 13. In its own words: “Authority to seek information is not 
properly equated with a prohibition on accepting information which has been 
submitted without having been requested by a panel. A panel has the discretionary 
authority either to accept and consider or to reject information and advice submitted 
to it, whether requested by a panel or not...The...authority vested in panels to shape 
the processes of fact finding...makes clear that a panel will not be deluged,...with
T77non-requested material, unless that panel allows itself to be so deluged.”
The AB further stated that the Panel was entitled to take into consideration the
070
information provided by the NGO annexed to the submissions of the United States 
The AB considered that, by attaching the material to the submission, it became an 
integral part of the participant’s submission379.
The AB highlighted that the DSU must be interpreted flexibly: “It is pertinent 
to note that Article 12.1 of the DSU authorizes panels to depart from, or to add to, the 
Working Procedures set forth in Appendix 3 of the DSU, and in effect to develop their 
own Working Procedures, after consultation with the parties to the dispute. Article
12.2 goes on to direct that “[p]anel procedures should provide sufficient flexibility so 
as to ensure high-quality panel reports while not unduly delaying the panel 
process
It is note worthy that the AB decided to accept for consideration the legal
arguments made in the NGO’s briefs attached to the submission of the United States.
1
These were submitted by three groups of NGOs . In addition, the AB also accepted 
the revised version of the brief by the Center for International Environmental et al. 
which was not appended to a party’s submission. However, the AB did not state the
O O')
reason for doing so “. In the Report, it did not refer directly to any of the amicus 
curiae briefs but did reach some conclusions which were suggested by them
■ USA - Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case, WTO DSB, 1998, Report o f the AB, para 108
3,8 USA - Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case, WTO DSB, 1998, Report o f the AB, para 109, 110
' v USA - Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case, WTO DSB, 1998, Report o f the AB, para 89
380 USA - Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case, WTO DSB, 1998 Report o f the AB, para 105, also para 106
381 The three groups include among them: a) first group: the Earth Institute, the Humane Society o f the United States, and the 
Sierra Club, b) second group: Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) the Centre for Marine Conservation, the 
Mangrove Action project, the Philippine Ecological Network and Sobrevivencia, c) third group: the Worldwide Fund for Nature 
and the International Environmental Law and Development. Based on arguments on teleological interpretation, one of the NGO 
groups argued that the panel erred in deciding that Article 13 o f the DSU prohibits WTO panels from accepting non-requested 
information from NGOS. Malaysia argued that the appended briefs should be inadmissible in the appeal. The US argued that the 
views appended to the submission reflected their independent view.
382 USA - Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case, WTO DSB, 1998, Report o f the AB, para 83, The admission of the non­
annexed amicus curiae  brief was criticized by Thailand: Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes o f Meeting Held on 6 November 
1998, W T/DSB/M /50, 14 December 1998, 2-3
383 See further: USA - Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case, WTO DSB, 1998, Report o f the AB, para 17, 131, 152-154
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Despite the open approach of admitting amicus curiae briefs, the AB still 
underlined the fact that the dispute settlement mechanism was for the Members: 
“Access to the dispute settlement process of the WTO is limited to Members of the 
WTO” and not to individuals or international organizations, whether governmental or 
non-govemmental. “Only Members who are parties to a dispute, or who have notified 
their interest in becoming third parties...have a legal right to make submissions to, 
and have a legal right to have those submissions considered by, a panel.”384
5.3.1.1 Reactions to the Shrimp/Turtle Case:
The overall reaction of the Members to the Shrimp/Turtle Case, as recorded in 
the minutes of the meeting of the DSB in November 1998, was negative towards the 
permission granted to allow the submission of uninvited amicus curiae briefs at the 
panel level. However, there was a minority of Members who supported the AB’s 
decision: the United States, Hong Kong, China385.
This meeting has also explained to an extent why the majority of the Members 
did not concur to the views of the AB386. First, many of the Members did not hold the 
view that the ability of the panel to “seek” information pursuant to Article 13 of the 
DSU extended to the acceptance of uninvited information, this being an interpretation 
that is arguably contrary to the ordinary meaning of “seek” as read in the context of
0  0 - 7
the WTO Agreement . Second, for some Members, accepting uninvited amicus 
curiae briefs, due to the promotion of the rights of NGO and non-Members, could
ooo
lead to the diminishing of the M embers’ rights, contrary to Article 19.2 of the DSU 
Third, too many amicus curiae briefs could overburden both the panels and the 
parties389. Fourth, the Members thought that it was for them to decide whether the 
panel could admit uninvited amicus curiae briefs, and not the Appellate Body390. 
India and Mexico also stated that they were against NGO participation in WTO
191proceedings in principle
384 USA - Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case , WTO DSB, 1998, Report o f the AB, para 101
385 Dispute Settlement Body, (1998), 11 and 16
386 Discussed in: Bartholomeusz, (2005) 257
387 This view was argued by many Members: Dispute Settlement Body, (1998), 2-3,5,7,12,17
388 Dispute Settlement Body, (1998), 3, 5, 10, 13, 17
389 Dispute Settlement Body, (1998), 12, 16-17
390 Dispute Settlement Body, (1998), 2, 13
391 Dispute Settlement Body, (1998), 10 and 14
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5.3.2 US -  Lead Bars Case:
In the US-Lead Bars Case, the AB confirmed its ability to admit uninvited 
amicus curiae briefs and explained further the rational behind its decision. The case 
concerned the imposition of countervailing duties by the United States on certain hot- 
rolled lead and bismuth carbon steel products originating from the United Kingdom.
The AB accepted that nothing in the DSU or Working Procedures specifically 
provides “that the Appellate Body may accept and consider submissions or briefs 
from sources other than the participants and third participants in an appeal.”392 
However, the provisions do not explicitly prohibit it either. The AB added that 
Article 17.9 of the DSU grants it the authority “to adopt procedural rules which do not 
conflict with any rules and procedures in the DSU or the covered agreements” and 
continued, “we [the AB] are of the opinion that as long as we act consistently with the 
provisions of the DSU and the covered agreements, we have the legal authority to 
decide whether or not to accept and consider any information that we believe is 
pertinent and useful in an appeal.”394
Like in the Shrimp/Turtle Case, the AB re-enunciated the rights of Members 
and non-Members, and underlined that only Members have the legal right to 
participate as parties or third parties. “Non-Members have no legal right to make 
submissions to or to be heard by the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body has no 
legal duty to accept or consider unsolicited amicus curiae briefs submitted by 
individuals or organizations, not Members of the W TO.” In this case, the AB did 
not find it necessary to take into account the two amicus curiae briefs received in
oqz:
rendering its decision
5.3.2.1 Reactions after the US-Lead Bars Case:
In the DSB meeting after the US-Lead Bars Case, there were mixed reactions 
from the Members to the AB’s decision. The United States once again supported and
397“welcomed the Appellate Body’s findings on amicus curiae submissions” .
392 USA - Lead Bars C ase , WTO DSB, 1999, Report o f the Appellate Body, para 39
3 93 USA - Lead Bars C ase , WTO DSB, 1999, Report o f the Appellate Body, para 39
3 94 USA - Lead Bars C ase ,  WTO DSB, 1999, Report o f the Appellate Body, para 39
395 USA - Lead Bars C ase , WTO DSB, 1999, Report o f the Appellate Body, para 41
396 USA - Lead Bars C ase , WTO DSB, 1999, Report o f the Appellate Body, para 42
397 Dispute Settlement Body, (2000) 3
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However, there were concerns by other Members. Some Members queried 
whether the authority of Article 17.9, which provides for the AB’s ability to draw up 
working procedures, is enough as a legal basis for the acceptance and consideration of
O Q O
amicus curiae briefs . Members also questioned whether and under what 
circumstances amicus curiae briefs are to be admitted to the WTO DSB399 and 
commented that this issue should be left to the Members to decide400. There were 
further concerns about the position of developing States and stretching their already 
limited resources to make comments on amicus curiae briefs considered by the AB as 
relevant to the appeal401.
5.3.3 European Community-Asbestos Case:
The door to submit amicus curiae briefs remained open in the EU-Asbestos 
Case, perhaps the most controversial case on this issue in the history of the WTO. 
This dispute was between Canada and France involving a measure introduced by the 
latter to ban the importation of chrysotile asbestos on grounds of the protection of 
public health.
The AB went further than the previous two cases and, in addition to admitting 
amicus curiae briefs, provided guidelines for their submission402. The AB decided to 
consult the parties and the third parties regarding the possibility of establishing an ad  
hoc procedure to manage non-party submissions on appeal. In its own words: “we 
[the AB] recognized the possibility that we might receive submissions in this appeal 
from persons other than the parties and the third parties to this dispute, and stated that 
we were of the view that the fair and orderly conduct of this appeal could be 
facilitated by the adoption of appropriate procedures, for the purposes of this appeal 
only, pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures, to deal with any possible 
submissions received from such persons.”403
The AB put questions to the parties and third parties including: a) whether the 
AB should adopt a “request for leave” procedure, b) “what procedures would be 
needed to ensure that the parties and third parties would have a full and adequate
m  Dispute Settlement Body, (2000) 4-8 
m  Dispute Settlement Body, (2000) 4-6
400 Dispute Settlement Body, (2000) 4-6
401 Dispute Settlement Body, (2000) 8
402 The Panel received 5 written submissions from NGOs. It took two of these into account. EC - Asbestos Case, WTO DSB, 
2001, Report o f the Appellate Body, para 50
403 EC - Asbestos Case, WTO DSB, 2001, Report o f the Appellate Body, para 50
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opportunity to respond to submissions that might be received.” 404, c) whether there 
are any other points that were worth the AB’s consideration.
As response to these questions, “Canada, the European Communities and 
Brazil considered that issues pertaining to any such procedure should be dealt with by 
the WTO Members themselves. The United States welcomed adoption of a request for 
leave procedure, and Zimbabwe indicated that it had no specific reasons to oppose 
adoption of a request for leave procedure.”405 After consultation involving all seven 
members of the AB, pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures, an additional 
procedure406 was adopted, for the purposes of this appeal only, to deal with written 
submissions received from persons other than the parties and third parties407.
The Additional Procedure was communicated to the parties and third parties. 
The Chairman of the AB informed the Chairman of the DSU of the adoption of the 
Addition Procedures and this communication was also circulated to the Members of 
the WTO408. This communication stated that the Additional Procedures were for the 
purposes of this appeal only pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review. It was not a new working procedure drawn up pursuant to Article 
17(9) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes409.
An outline of the Additional Procedure is as follows. First, it states that any 
person, whether natural or legal, other than parties or third parties to the dispute, 
wishing to file an amicus curiae brief must apply for leave from the AB. The 
application must be made in writing and contain, inter alia : a) details on the applicant 
and its interest in the case, b) the identification of the issues that are subject to appeal, 
c) an indication of “what way the applicant will make a contribution to the resolution 
of this dispute that is not likely to be repetitive of what has been already submitted by 
a party or third party to this dispute”, d) a statement indicating whether the applicants 
have any relationship with the party or third party to the dispute. The AB has made it 
clear that the granting of leave to file a brief does not mean that the arguments of the 
applicants will be addressed. The Additional Procedure also sets out details the briefs
404 EC  - Asbestos C ase , WTO DSB, 2001, Report o f the Appellate Body, para 50
405 EC - Asbestos Case, WTO DSB, 2001, Report o f the Appellate Body, para 50
406 Later called the “Additional Procedure”
407 EC  - Asbestos Case, WTO DSB, 2001 para 51
408 EC - Asbestos Case, WTO DSB, 2001 W T/DS135/9
409 EC - Asbestos Case, WTO DSB, 2001 para 51
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must satisfy, and guarantees the right of the parties and third parties to comment and 
respond to any briefs submitted.
The Additional Procedures has attracted some criticism410. First, not much 
time was given to the applicants, both for the request for leave and for preparing the 
written briefs. Second, the maximum length for the requests for leave and the briefs 
is too short, three pages and twenty pages being allowed respectively. Third, the 
threshold for granting leave is very high: the requirement of the applicants to indicate 
how their submissions would not be repetitive to those of the parties or third parties. 
This can be difficult unless the applicants had access to submissions of the parties and 
the third parties411. Fourth, the determination of who had the right to submit amicus 
curiae briefs could be subject to external pressures412. Fifth, the AB does not have to 
address the legal arguments in the applicants’ brief. Sixth, because it is the appeal 
stage, the amicus curiae briefs are limited to the legal arguments. Finally, even 
though parties and third-parties have the right to make observations and comments on 
the amicus curiae submissions, this can be a difficult task for some Members413. The 
first five points mentioned have a result of making the position of the applicant NGO 
much weaker than that of the parties or third parties.
5.3.3.1 Reaction to the Additional Procedures:
Even before the final decision of the AB, the Additional Procedures had 
already caused much controversy. A special meeting of the WTO General Council 
was held to address this issue. The summary of the meeting by the Chairman is of 
note. The Chairman said that “almost all delegations had made comments on the 
question of whether the Appellate Body or panels should receive or solicit amicus 
briefs.”414 Further, “there was a broad agreement that the rights and obligations under 
the DSU belongs to WTO members...[M]ost delegations had concluded that since 
there was no specific provision regarding amicus briefs, such briefs should not be 
accepted. Some delegations were of the view that amicus briefs could be used in 
some cases and there was at least one delegation who believed that there was both a 
legal and a substantive reason to use amicus curiae briefs. There was no agreement
410 Bartholomeusz, (2005) 261-262
411 As noted by India: General Council, (2001) para 36; See further: Bartholomeusz, (2005) 261
412 A comment made by Brazil: General Council, (2001) para 46
413 Uruguay: General Council, (2001) para 7
414 General Council, (2001) para 114
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on this point.”415 The Chairman continued to draw some conclusions: “First,...there 
had been a large sentiment expressed by almost all delegations that there was a need 
to consider whether it would be possible to put in place clear rules for amicus briefs. 
There might not be absolute unanimity on that point, but the majority of delegations 
had stated that the Appellate Body and the system would benefit from clearer 
rules...Second, in light of the views expressed and in the absence of clear rules,...the 
Appellate Body should exercise extreme caution in future cases until members had 
considered what rules were needed”416. Further, there was also concern that the 
Additional Procedure, allegedly specific to the Asbestos Case, would also set a 
precedent for future cases417.
5.3.3.2 The decision of the AB in the Asbestos Case:
The Report of the AB came after the mentioned General Meeting. It rejected 
all of the received seventeen requests for leave: six were late and the other eleven did
418not comply with the criterion set out in paragraph 3 of the Additional Procedure 
Even though the doors for the submission of amicus curiae briefs seem open, this
419Report indicates that, in reality, it may not be the case
5.3.4 The European Communities-Sardines Case:
For the purposes of this chapter, this case addressed the question of the 
possibility of a State acting as an amicus curiae as supposed to a party or third party. 
The case concerned a dispute between the EC and Peru on a measure adopted by the 
former on the labeling of tinned Sardines and the question of what species of fish 
could be labeled as such. The adopted EC measure only allowed one species of fish 
to be labeled as “sardines” whereas the international standard had also permitted other 
species to come under the same label.
The submission in question was an amicus curiae brief from the Kingdom of 
Morocco. The EC argued that the AB should treat submissions from Member States 
and those from private persons in the same way. However, Peru argued that the AB
415 General Council, (2001) para 114
416 General Council, (2001) para 119
417 General Council, (2001) para 20
41S EC - Asbestos C ase , WTO DSB, 2001 para 56
41y Bartholomeusz, (2005) 263; Stem, (2003) 271
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should not accept the brief of the Kingdom of Morocco because this would be 
bending the DSU’s rules on the participation of Members in disputes420.
The AB decided that the Kingdom of Morocco could submit a brief. 
However, its rights will be the same as other amicus curiae and not the same as those 
Members who participate as third parties421.
Further, the AB confirmed its right to admit amicus curiae and referred to the 
US-Lead Bars Case that even though there was no provision which allowed the AB to 
admit submissions from sources other than the parties and the third-parties, there was 
no provision prohibiting it either . According to the AB, there is to be no distinction 
between submissions from WTO Members not parties or third parties to the dispute 
on one hand, and those from non-WTO Members on the other423. In addition, the AB 
confirmed that there is no legal right for amicus curiae to submit information, and that 
it has no duty to accept any amicus curiae briefs424. Regarding the brief of Morocco, 
the AB considered that its submission principally concerned questions of fact which 
did not come within its mandate. However, some of the legal arguments concerning 
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and the GATT were taken into account425.
5.3.5 Other Cases:
In the history of the WTO, there have also been occasions where amicus 
curiae briefs have been rejected. In some cases, the panel has simply ruled that it did 
not find it necessary to take the submission into account, but did not go into detail 
how it decided so426. In other cases, the panel gave specific reasons. For example, in 
the EC-Sugar Subsidies Case, the Panel decided “not to consider further the amicus 
curiae from WVZ because, inter alia , it is based on confidential information and is 
thus evidence of a breach of confidentiality which disqualifies the credibility of the 
authors.”427 At the Panel stage of the EC-Asbestos Case, one submission was rejected 
for being untimely428.
420 See further: Boisson de Chazoumes and Mbengue, (2003) 236-238
421 DSU, 1994 art 10.2 and 17.4
4:2 EC-Sardines Case, WTO DSB, 2002, Report o f the Appellate Body, para 162
423 EC-Sardines Case, WTO DSB, 2002, Report o f the Appellate Body, para 166
424 EC-Sardines Case, WTO DSB, 2002, Report o f the Appellate Body, para 166-167
425 EC-Sardines Case, WTO DSB, 2002, Report o f the Appellate Body, para 170
426 E.g. EC-Bed Linen, WTO DSB, 2000, Panel Report, EC - Asbestos Case, WTO DSB, 2001, Panel Report, b) USA - Copyright 
A ct Case, WTO DSB, 2000, Panel Report
4r EC - Sugars Case, WTO DSB, 2005, Panel Report, para 2.20 and 7.76-85 of the report in complaint by Australia.
428 EC - Asbestos Case, WTO DSB, 2001, Panel Report, para 8.12-14
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There have also been amicus curiae submissions since the controversial EC- 
Asbestos Case. However, there has not been much development to clarify the legal 
standing of the WTO DSB on amicus curiae briefs. WTiere there have been 
submissions at the appeal level, in the majority of cases, the AB has admitted amicus 
curiae briefs but only to find that it was not necessary to take the briefs into 
account429. The Panels have taken a more cautious approach stating that it would only 
consider the arguments of an amicus curiae brief only to the extent that they were 
incorporated into the submissions of the parties430.
5.3.6 Preliminary Conclusion:
The practice of the WTO on the submission of amicus curiae briefs has been 
much debated. Starting with the US-Shrimp/Turtle Case, the AB allowed non-parties 
to submit amicus curiae briefs, stirring up reaction among the Members. The open 
approach taken by the AB continued in subsequent cases and the furthest the AB went 
was to set up the Additional Procedures regulating the way in which amicus curiae 
briefs were to be submitted in the EC-Asbestos Case. The Additional Procedure was 
again a much debated issue among the Members, with most of them questioning the 
authority of the AB to issue such procedures.
Consequently after the EC-Asbestos Case, there seems to be a deadlock in the 
WTO on this issue. Most of the Members consider the admission of amicus curiae 
submissions to be outside the scope of the AB and are against it. However, a few 
Members are in support. A consensus has not been reached. The AB is still admitting 
amicus curiae briefs but has been cautious in not using the submissions in its 
decisions431.
5.4 Interviews with the Panelists:
43v The cases where the AB has taken this approach include: a) USA - Lumber CVDs Final Case, WTO DSB, 2004, Report o f the 
Appellate Body, para 9, b) EC - Sugars Case, WTO DSB, 2005, Report o f the Appellate Body, para 9, c) EC-Chicken 
Classification Case, WTO DSB, 2005. Report o f the Appellate Body, para 12, d) Mexico-Soft Drinks Case, WTO DSB, 2006, 
Report o f the Appellate Body, para 8
430 E.g.: a) USA - Lumber CVDs Final Case, WTO DSB, 2004, Panel Report, para 7.1, fn 75, b) USA - Lumber LTC Investigation 
Case, WTO DSB, 2004, Panel Report, para 7.10, fh 75. c) USA - "Zeroing" Case, WTO DSB, 2006, Panel Report, para 1.7
431 With the exception of the EC-Sardines Case where the AB admitted and used to a limited extent the submissions from 
Morocco.
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The interviews with the three panelists have been revealing. To the first 
question of what rules are applied by the panels, Panelist L noted that there is nothing 
precise in the DSU on this topic. So far, the rules have been created by the AB in 
their decisions and the panels follow the approach of the AB. When he was a 
panelist, the approach was to consider the amicus curiae submitted for a possible use 
in the case, but the panels were very careful in treating the amicus curiae brief. There 
can be biased motives behind a submission. In one case, it turned out that an NGO 
submission was linked to a lawyer for one of the parties who a key player in that 
particular NGO. Panelist L adds that, with the panels that he has been involved in, he 
tried to adopt as much of a consistent approach as possible.
Panelist K said that, when he was a panelist, amicus curiae briefs were widely 
accepted. However, they are generally ignored unless they are very compelling. 
There is a small chance that briefs would bring additional information to the panel 
because the arguments and the information provided are generally already covered by 
the submissions of the parties.
Panelist M stated that, during his time as a panelist, no amicus curiae briefs 
were submitted. However, he indicated that amicus curiae briefs are often used to 
promote the aims of NGOS. Nonetheless, he added that, in his opinion, amicus curiae 
briefs have an important role to play in the context of the WTO, referring to the 
information provided by Greenpeace in the Shrimp/Turtle Case.
On the treatment of amicus curiae briefs, Panelist L stated that the criteria 
determining which brief would be read changes from panel to panel, and very much 
depends on the individual panelists. For his panels, the neutrality of the submission is 
the determining factor. Once the panel agrees to read a submission, all three panelists 
would read it and discuss it. Some submissions are just thrown away because they 
were considered to be biased. There is of course the risk of missing out on 
information from not reading everything but doing so would take too much time. 
Further, Panelist L added that if a particular brief is read, then it would be very hard 
not to take it into account. In contrast, Panelist M said that he would read, to the 
extent possible, all the amicus curiae submissions. But the information provided 
therein will be subordinate to the submissions of the parties. He added that different 
amicus curiae would be granted different weight. For example, in a case concerning 
nuclear power, the panel would take seriously a submission from Greenpeace and 
even more so a submission from the atomic energy authorities.
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Regarding what factors play a role in influencing the approach of the WTO 
DSB, the panelists stated that they must follow the approach established by the AB. 
Panelist L added that the debate on the amicus curiae has been a result of a clash of 
legal cultures. There is the Civil/Common law divide. From his experience, as a civil 
lawyer, Panelist L had a difficult time grasping the notion of an amicus curiae. At 
first, he could not distinguish between an amicus curiae brief and technical or expert 
advice, but soon became accustomed to it. Further, non-lawyers are also less aware of 
these technical issues432.
The panelists also gave a range of opinions as to the future of the amicus 
curiae brief in the WTO context. Panelist L expressed the view that the debate on 
amicus curiae, as a result of the clash of legal cultures, is not altogether a bad thing 
because it encourages an exchange of ideas and could further enhance the rules of the 
WTO DSB. However, the WTO DSB must find a balance in admitting the briefs 
because it does not want to be over-flooded with irrelevant material.
Panelist M noted that even though amicus curiae briefs can provide important 
information, there is also the risk of over-flooding the panels. This problem must be 
dealt with on a case by case basis. The WTO DSB should set the submission of 
amicus curiae briefs in a more formal context, establishing rules where necessary. 
Again, in doing so, a balance must be found.
Panelist K supports the use of amicus curiae. He noted that there have been 
arguments that amicus curiae briefs often support developed countries, and not 
developing countries. However, in his opinion, this is not necessary the case. He 
further added that if NGOs provide information that has not been provided by the 
parties, then the panel should take that into account. Panelist K stated that the 
approach of the WTO on amicus curiae briefs is good: the channels are open for 
entities to submit but there is still the absolute discretion whether or not to use the 
information. However, he noted that, from his experience, the evidence submitted by 
the parties is of higher quality from those from NGOs. Evidence from NGOs can be 
irrelevant. One reason is that the submissions of the parties are sometimes 
confidential, granting no access to the NGO, and making it difficult for the NGO to 
address the right issues.
432  P a n e l i s t  M  a g r e e s  w i t h  t h i s  v i e w .
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5.4 Conclusion:
The debate on the admission of amicus curiae submissions is still very alive 
today433. However, the scope of this section only concerns the practice of the WTO 
DSB and only the outline of the debate will be examined here. The issues much 
debated include: a) whether the AB was within its authority to make rulings on the 
issue and who should decide its future434, b) whether amicus curiae briefs would 
benefit the WTO system435, c) how should amicus curiae briefs be handled and 
developed436.
Little is said in the provisions of the WTO on amicus curiae. However, the 
development of the WTO DSB’s approach can be followed from its jurisprudence. 
Upon its creation, the WTO DSB did not admit any amicus curiae briefs, following 
the practice of the GATT. But this is to change in the Shrimp/Turtle Case where, 
although first rejected by the panel, the AB allowed amicus curiae briefs for the first 
time. The briefs concerned the marine environment. This decision was controversial 
and sparked off mixed reactions among the Members. The AB confirmed this 
decision in the US-Lead Bars Case where it stated that there is nothing explicit in the 
provisions of the WTO to prevent it from admitting amicus curiae briefs. The AB 
went furthest in the EC-Asbestos Case where, as well as allowing amicus curiae briefs 
to be submitted, it established the Additional Procedure to deal with how amicus 
curiae submissions are to be submitted. This caused much controversy in the WTO 
granting a special meeting on the issue. However, a consensus could not be 
established. The current situation seems to be in stalemate but the AB has taken a 
cautious approach in that, although admitting amicus curiae briefs, it has ruled that it 
was not necessary to take them into account.
As for the factors that has had an influence on the WTO DSB, as in the other 
sections, the details will be left to the overall conclusion where there can be a 
comparative analysis of all three tribunals across three different aspects of evidence. 
This section will make a preliminary remark. From the jurisprudence and the
4 ”  S e e :  U m b r i c h t ,  ( 2 0 0 1 )  7 8 3 - 7 9 0 ;  M a r c e a u  a n d  S t i l w e l l ,  ( 2 0 0 1 ) ;  B o i s s o n  d e  C h a z o u m e s  a n d  M b e n g u e ,  ( 2 0 0 3 )  2 1 3 - 2 3 1
4 ,4  U m b r i c h t ,  ( 2 0 0 1 ) 7 8 2
4 3 5  F o r  a r g u m e n t s ,  b o t h  f o r  a n d  a g a i n s t :  U m b r i c h t ,  ( 2 0 0 1 )  7 8 3 - 7 8 7 .  F o r  o n l y  a l l o w i n g  amicus curiae  a t  t h e  p a n e l  o n l y ,  s e e :  
U m b r i c h t ,  ( 2 0 0 1 )  7 8 7 - 7 9 0 .  P a u w e l y n  a r g u e s  f o r  m a k i n g  c a s e s  p u b l i c .  T h i s  w o u l d  a l s o  e n h a n c e  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  t h e  W T O  
D S B :  P a u w e l y n ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3 2 9 - 3 3 0 ,  a n d  B a r t h o l o m e u s z ,  ( 2 0 0 5 )  2 8 5 .  H o w s e  a r g u e s  t h a t  a d m i t t i n g  amicus curiae  b r i e f s  i s  a  j u d i c i a l  
r i g h t :  H o w s e ,  ( 2 0 0 0 )  4 9
4 36  U m b r i c h t ,  ( 2 0 0 1 )  7 7 5 ,  a n d  U m b r i c h t ,  ( 2 0 0 1 )  7 9 1 - 7 9 4 .  S e e  f u r t h e r :  A l a ' i ,  ( 2 0 0 1 ) ,  a n  a r t i c l e  e x a m i n i n g  t h e  U S  e x p e r i e n c e  o n  
amicus curiae  a p p l y i n g  i t  t o  t h e  W T O .
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interviews, it is clear that the AB Members/Panelists play an important role. This is 
apparent from the lead which the AB has taken in allowing amicus curiae 
submissions and adopting the Additional Procedures. Second, an interviewed panelist 
has also suggested that there is a Civil/Common law divide. It can be difficult for 
civil lawyers to understand common law notions and vice versa. There are also non­
lawyers as panelists who are not aware of technical legal issues such as evidential 
rules. Further, the Member States also have an influence on the approach of the WTO 
DSB. After the reaction from the Members to the EC-Asbestos Case, it is clear that 
their opinion does bear weight because of the much more cautious approach that both 
the panels and the AB took.
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Section 6: Overall Conclusion:
6.1 The existence of a common approach:
This chapter has shown that there is no common approach that the three 
tribunals take on the issue of amicus curiae submissions. In contentious cases, the 
ICJ stuck closely to the provisions and has not allowed any submissions from entities 
not therein provided. Even though provided for, the ICJ has also taken a restricted 
approach to submissions from international organizations. The Court has been more 
open regarding advisory opinions. The Court allowed an NGO to submit a brief in the 
International Status o f the South-West Africa Case but it did not meet the time limit 
set. Thereafter, the Court seems to have taken a much more restrictive approach, but 
have arguably opened up in the recent the Wall Case. Interviews with judges also 
indicated that the ICJ will try to open up to amicus curiae submissions.
Regarding ITLOS, apart from a few differences in the terms used, its 
provisions are very similar to those of the ICJ. There are provisions for submission of 
briefs from intergovernmental organizations in contentious cases, and 
intergovernmental organizations and States in advisory opinions. However, there has 
not been any practice in its jurisprudence to indicate the way in which the Tribunal 
will apply these provisions. The interviews of the judges have indicated uncertainty. 
The majority of the judges stated that the Tribunal will take a cautious approach. 
However, there are also some who also think that the Tribunal will be willing to admit 
amicus curiae briefs. The future of the Tribunal’s approach on amicus curiae is 
hence still uncertain.
As for the WTO DSB, in contrast to the ICJ and ITLOS, there are no clear 
provisions granting the use of amicus curiae briefs from any entity, not even 
international organizations. However, the jurisprudence has shown that the AB has 
been willing to admit amicus curiae briefs starting from the Shrimp/Turtle Case and 
carrying on to the EC-Asbestos Case where the Additional Procedure was created to 
regulate the way in which amicus curiae briefs were to be submitted. This caused 
much debate and controversy among the Members of the WTO. The current situation 
seems to be one of stalemate. The AB still admits amicus curiae briefs but has been 
careful in ruling that they are not necessary for reaching the decision. Unlike the ICJ
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or ITLOS, the WTO DSB does not have the mandate to give advisory opinions and 
depriving this research of a comparison.
All three tribunals have to balance the efficiency of the tribunal with the 
benefits of gaining more information and having non-States represented. The 
tribunals have to take into account that the nature of international litigation is 
evolving. There has been a considerable increase in the number of non-State entities 
with interest in disputes at the international level. Consequently, there is arguably 
increasing pressure for the tribunals to admit amicus curiae.
6.2 Factors influencing the approach on amicus curiae briefs:
This section will begin to address the issue of what factors can influence the 
tribunals’ approach on amicus curiae briefs. Because there could be factors which 
influence many aspects of evidential rules, the detailed study will be left to the overall 
conclusion of the thesis where there will be a comparative study of all the issues. 
This section will focus on the factors that have had an influence on rules on amicus 
curiae briefs.
The first influencing factor, apparent from the provisions of the tribunals, is 
the history and background of each tribunal. The provisions of the ICJ were based on 
those of the PCU. At the time of the PCU, non-States entities had a very limited role 
on the international plane. Any interests of non-States had to be represented by States 
on their behalf. Therefore, it is not surprising that the ICJ has adopted an approach 
restricting the participation of non-States. Further, from the provisions, it is apparent 
that those of ITLOS were based on those of the ICJ. The ICJ was used as a model, 
and consequently, ITLOS has acquired of its characteristics. As for the WTO DSB, 
the lack of provisions in the DSU was no doubt partly the result of the practice under 
the GATT which did not allow any amicus curiae. Should they have been allowed 
under the GATT, then the approach taken today could have been very different.
The second issue the tribunals had to consider was the administrative burden 
amicus curiae briefs could cause. This concern was apparent from the interviews. 
The tribunals have limited resources in terms of time and money437. They have to 
deal with the cases as efficiently as possible. Amicus curiae briefs can also be a
437  I n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  I C J ,  i t  h a s  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  w o u l d  s t i l l  b e  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  t o  d e n y  a n y  s u b m i s s i o n  i f  t h e  w o r k l o a d  
i s  b e c o m i n g  o v e r w h e l m i n g .  S e e :  S h e l t o n ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  1 4
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burden on the litigating States438 because they could need to submit comments on the 
briefs. This could deter States from using international tribunals if they do not have 
the resources to meet this task439.
The third influencing factor is the judges. This was indicated by the 
judges/panelists from all three tribunals in one way or another. For example, because 
of the current composition of judges, the ICJ is opening up to amicus curiae briefs. 
Further the judges can determine how ITLOS applies its provisions in the future. 
Each judge will bring with him his background and expertise.
The fourth influencing factor is the influence of States. This is very apparent 
in the context on the WTO. The debate whether the AB should have admitted amicus 
curiae briefs relates to the question of whether the decision should have been taken by 
the Members instead. The majority of Members hold the opinion that the question 
was one for the Members. As a result, the AB has taken notice and has been cautious 
on this issue.
6.3 Should there be a common approach on amicus curiae briefs?
One aspect of this thesis is to answer the question of whether there should be a 
common set of evidential rules for international tribunals. The detailed answer to this 
question will be left to the overall conclusion where all aspects of evidential rules in 
all three tribunals will be examined. However, this section will touch on the debate 
giving the reader the issues that are particularly pertinent to amicus curiae briefs.
The first point to note is that the issue of amicus curiae briefs is a policy to be 
determined by the tribunals. With the increasing role of non-State entities on the 
international plane, the question arises whether international tribunals should adopt a 
common approach to address this phenomenon.
The second point of note is that amicus curiae briefs can potentially affect the 
outcome of a case. They could supply the tribunal with crucial information or legal 
arguments otherwise not provided by the parties. Further, with the increasing number 
of tribunals and the potential for them to have overlapping jurisdiction over the same 
dispute, amicus curiae briefs could be a determining factor of the result of the case. 
In other words, if different tribunals adopt different rules on amicus curiae briefs as
4 j 8  S e e :  R a z z a q u e ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  1 7 1
4 M  C f .  S h e l t o n ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  1 5
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shown above, there is room for inconsistent results from the same case before two 
different tribunals. The difference most easily identifiable is the distinction in the 
provisions of the ICJ and ITLOS on one hand, and the WTO DSB on the other. The 
ICJ and ITLOS allow for submissions in contentious cases from international 
organizations or intergovernmental organizations whereas the WTO DSB does not. 
There is also a distinction to be drawn on the approach to NGO submissions. From its 
history, the ICJ has not been willing to admit such briefs in contentious cases. This 
would equally apply to ITLOS should it decide to follow this approach. In contrast, 
among much controversy, the recent practice of the WTO has shown it has allowed 
the submission of information from NGOs, even if it has ruled that it was not 
necessary to take them into account. Consequently, there is potential for the WTO 
DSB to look at the submissions in an informal manner. Information could be taken 
into account through this informal channel even if it is not mentioned in the Report. 
This is in contrast with the ICJ where no information would be submitted at all.
The overall conclusion will address these issues in much more detail. It will 
examine whether, taking into account the nature of the tribunals and their history, it 
would be feasible to adopt a common approach on amicus curiae submissions as well 
as evidential rules as a whole. The conclusion will also go into the details of the 
advantages and disadvantages of commonality. Further, the question of how this can 
be implemented will also be addressed.
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Chapter Six: Expert Evidence
Section 1: Introduction:
1.1 Introduction:
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the way in which international 
tribunals obtain expert evidence, which is often needed in increasingly technical 
disputes with issues that stretch beyond the ability of the legally trained judges.
This chapter will examine the tribunals’ instruments, jurisprudence and 
interviews with the judges. The general thesis of this research runs through this 
chapter, keeping three questions in mind: a) is there an emerging common approach 
on the use of expert evidence between the tribunals, b) what are the factors affecting 
the approach of the tribunals on expert evidence, c) should there be a common 
approach on expert evidence.
This section will be limited to the examination of contentious cases because all 
three tribunals have jurisdiction over them. The WTO DSB cannot be requested to 
give an advisory opinion. However, because of the lack of cases in ITLOS, 
provisional measures cases and prompt release cases will also be included.
1.2 What are the functions of experts?
Experts are used to clarify technical issues beyond the expertise of the judge. 
They have an important role because the understanding of the issue could be 
fundamental to the outcome of the case. According to White, experts have a 
straightforward task to perform, “namely to assist the tribunal in the establishment or 
the elucidation of matters of fact, within the terms of the instructions given...by the 
tribunal” 1.
Expert evidence can be communicated to international tribunals through 
various channels: a) incorporated as part of the written submission, b) experts can 
plead before the tribunal as counsel, c) experts can be called by the parties to testify, a
1 W h i t e ,  ( 1 9 6 5 )  1 6 3 - 1 6 4 .  W h i t e  n o t e s  t h a t ,  i n  c e r t a i n  c o n t e x t s ,  e x p e r t s  c a n  a l s o  p e r f o r m  a  j u d i c i a l  r o l e  w i t h  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  r e n d e r  
b i n d i n g  d e c i s i o n s  o n  t h e  p a r t i e s .
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process which would normally involve cross-examination, d) if provided for, tribunals 
can also appoint their own experts.
Section 2: Municipal Courts
2.1 Introduction:
The aim of this section is to give an introduction to the way in which selected 
municipal jurisdictions admit expert evidence . Because of limitations of resources, 
for the purposes of this chapter, legal systems in the same tradition have been grouped 
together. The approach of the Common Law jurisdictions has been grouped as one, 
and the Civil Law tradition as another. In reality, there will of course be variations 
within each legal tradition on their approach to expert evidence.
The difference often said to exist between the Civil Law and the Common 
Law traditions is that the former is an inquisitorial system and the latter an 
accusatorial system. The Civil Law system would normally leave the gathering of 
evidence, including the examination of experts to the judges while, in the Common 
Law system, the judge is seen as a referee for the parties and does not take an active 
role, but enforces the law objectively.
2.2 Civil Law Tradition:
In this tradition, the judge is crucial in the seeking of expert opinion. They 
“possess the widest powers to appoint experts and order inquiries of their own motion, 
irrespective of the consent of the parties” .
In France, the Judge Delegate historically takes an active role in the
procurement of evidence4. He has four techniques at his discretion, one being the
request for expert assistance.5 The use of expertise is limited to technical questions6 
and does not cover the establishment of facts. Experts are not allowed to enunciate 
the law or the legal effects of their findings7. The judge may commission any person
2 S e e  g e n e r a l l y  o n  t h i s  i s s u e :  W h i t e ,  (1965)
3 W h i t e ,  (1965) 14
4 F o r  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  F r e n c h  a p p r o a c h ,  s e e :  T a y l o r ,  (1996) 186
5 S e e n  f u r t h e r :  T a y l o r ,  (19% ) 189
6 French "Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile", art 232
7 French "Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile", art 238
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to provide technical guidance by way of observations, consultation, or on a question
8 _r_of fact . The Court usually appoints one single expert but can appoint more if 
necessary9. The expert is given a mandate to answer questions on a particular subject 
matter, and he is limited, with some exceptions, to giving his opinion on these 
questions. The parties may object to the appointment of an expert in some 
circumstances10.
In the context of France, Taylor suggests that it would be difficult for the
judge to contradict an expert without relying on another11. The Court of Cassation
has ruled that judges do not have to explain why they have accepted an expert’s
opinion. The appointment of experts is not a right of the parties but subject to judicial 
12discretion . However, a request for expert assistance can be from either of the 
parties, or initiated by the Court.13
The expert report is left with the Court when completed. Under normal 
circumstances, this would be the end of the expert’s duties. However, the judges may 
require the experts to explain the findings more fully. They are questioned by the 
judges but there is no cross-examination from counsel. The report is given to both 
parties, at which point they can question its probative value, which is normally written 
with no oral argument14. Further, the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation 
hold a list from which experts can potentially be selected from.
In Germany, the trial judge is very much in control of the process concerning 
experts. The judge can call experts when he considers it to be appropriate. A party 
may propose a name of an expert but the judge is not obliged to call him. However, if 
both parties agree upon one expert, the Court must hear him but it can also appoint 
others. The role of experts in Germany is two-fold. First, he provides opinions and 
facts to the Court. However, in contrast to the Common Law Tradition, experts can 
also help the Court to draw conclusions. An oral examination also normally takes 
place.15
2.3 Common Law Tradition:
8 French "Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile", a r t  2 3 2
y French "Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile", a r t  2 6 4
10 S e e  f u r t h e r :  W h i t e ,  ( 1 9 6 5 )  1 8
11 T a y l o r ,  ( 1 9 9 6 )  2 0 9
12 French "Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile", a r t  2 3 2
13 French "Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile", a r t  1 4 3
14 F o r  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n i n g  s t a t u t e ,  s e e :  T a y l o r ,  ( 1 9 % )
15 F o r  p r o c e d u r e s  o f  o t h e r  C i v i l  L a w  j u r i s d i c t i o n s ,  s e e :  W h i t e ,  ( 1 9 6 5 )  1 9 - 2 0
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In this tradition, it is generally up to the parties to present evidence to the 
judge who remains neutral, and acts more as a referee. According to English 
Common Law, opinion evidence is only admissible under two exceptions16, one of 
which is expert opinion proving “matters of specialized knowledge, on which the 
court would be unable properly to reach a conclusion unaided” 17. “An expert’s 
opinion is admissible to furnish the court with scientific information which is likely to 
be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury. If on the proven facts a
judge or jury can form their own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an
1 8expert is unnecessary”
In England, an expert is called by the parties. “The expert is primarily seen as 
an aide to the party who has organized that he or she should come to court”19 They 
are generally “selected on the basis of a reasonable expectation that they will support
90the case of the party calling them.” Because of the adversarial nature of the system, 
the experts are neither a random selection from a particular scientific community nor
91do they generally represent views of the majority . An expert can present his opinion 
in many ways: expert reports, glossaries or oral testimonies22.
In addition to party appointed experts, the English Court can also appoint its 
own experts in civil proceedings but this power has hardly been used. This is still an 
issue much debated today23.
In the United States, the use of experts is provided for in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence24. A person may qualify as an expert “by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training or education” and they may be called “if scientific, technical or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue.”25 McCormick noted that two elements are required for the 
use of expert testimony: a) the subject of the inference must be related to some 
science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average
16 S e e  f u r t h e r :  K e a n e ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  5 5 2
1 M u r p h y ,  ( 1 9 8 0 )  3 0 2
18 D e n n i s ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  7 0 2  c i t i n g  Turner [ 1 9 7 5 ]  Q . B .  8 3 4  a t  8 4 1 ,  C A .
19 N i j b o e r .  ( 1 9 9 5 ) 5 5 8
20  D e n n i s ,  ( 2 0 0 2 ) 7 1 2
21 R e d m a y n e ,  ( 1 9 9 7 )  1 0 6 7
22 B r o w n e ,  W i l l i a m s o n ,  a n d  B a r k a c s ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  8 0 ;  O n  h o w  t h e  E n g l i s h  s y s t e m  t r e a t s  e x p e r t  e v i d e n c e ,  a n d  a  c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  s e e :  B r o w n e ,  W i l l i a m s o n ,  a n d  B a r k a c s ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  7 5 - 9 1 ;  G e n e r a l l y :  D e n n i s ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  C h a p t e r  2 0 ,  K e a n e ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  
C h a p t e r  1 8
23  S e e  f u r t h e r :  D e n n i s ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  7 1 2
2 4 A r t i c l e  7 0 2 - 7 0 6 ;  M u e l l e r  a n d  K i r k p a t r i c k ,  ( 1 9 9 5 )  C h a p t e r  7 ;  L e m p e r t  a n d  S a l t z b u r g ,  ( 1 9 8 4 )  C h a p t e r  1 0 ;  L e t w i n ,  ( 1 9 8 6 )
C h a p t e r  9
25  A r t i c l e  7 0 2
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layman, b) the witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge or experience in that 
field26.
Like the English system, experts are normally called by the parties. However,
01the Court does have power to appoint its own experts . Expert opinion does not bind 
the judge or the jury28.
International tribunals: The ICJ, WTO DSB, and ITLOS 
Section 3: The ICJ
3.1 Introduction
The aim of this section is to examine the approach of the ICJ on expert 
evidence. However, at the outset, there will be an introduction to the use of expert 
evidence prior to the creation of the ICJ, especially the practice of the PCU, to 
understand the context in which the ICJ was created.
3.2 The Early Development of the Use of Experts:
Expert evidence has been used since the earlier period of international
9 0litigation. From as early as 1907, in the Arbitration of Summary Procedure of the 
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Article 90 permitted each 
party to call experts. The tribunal would then be able to ask questions to both the 
parties and the experts as it considered useful. As revealed by the Report to the 
Conference of the First Commission of the Revision of the Convention of 1899, the 
purpose of this article was to address the settlement of technical difficulties . 
However, the Arbitration of Summary Procedure was subject to party consent which 
unfortunately meant that Article 90 has never been used in cases decided by members
26 M c C o r m i c k ,  ( 1 9 7 2 )  S e c t i o n  1 3 ,  a t  2 9 - 3 0
27 F e d e r a l  R u l e s  o n  E v i d e n c e ,  A r t i c l e  7 0 6
28  S e e  f u r t h e r :  L e m p e r t  a n d  S a l t z b u r g ,  ( 1 9 8 4 )  8 6 2
M  C h a p t e r  I I I  o f  P a r t  I V  o f  t h e  C o n v e n t i o n .  T h i s  a p p l i e d  i n  a b s e n c e  o f  o t h e r  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  a n d  s u b j e c t  t o  s o m e  r e s e r v a t i o n s .
30  W h i t e ,  ( 1 9 6 5 )  3 5 - 3 6 ;
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3 1of the PCA . However, it was used in Lighthouses Arbitration (Affaire des 
P h a resf1.
Experts have been also been used in ad hoc international arbitrations. In the 
Delagoa Bay Railroad Case, between the United States and the United Kingdom on 
one hand, and Portugal on the other, provisions were made by the arbitrators for 
experts in the valuation of the compensation for the cancellation of a concession 
granted to complainants’ citizens. The tribunal created a questionnaire for the 
experts. Three experts were used and their report was communicated to the parties for 
observations33.
In the Behring Sea Fur Arbitration in 1891 concerning the right of the 
nationals of the Parties to the seals in the Behring Sea, express provisions were made 
for a commission of experts in the compromis. Each government was to appoint two 
commissioners to investigate seal life in the area and suggest protecting measures. 
The commissioners visited the Behring Sea, and their report was presented to the 
arbitrators34.
In the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration of 1909, Great Britain and the 
United States submitted questions regarding an 1818 convention on fishing rights to 
an arbitral tribunal. The agreement provided for the use of experts by the tribunal in 
specific circumstances including, inter alia, if there were questions regarding the 
reasonableness of any regulation, or if expert information about the fisheries was 
required. According to the agreement, the tribunal was not bound by the findings of 
the experts35.
White noted that, in this early period, many agreements for the arbitration of 
boundary disputes, claims agreement, and general arbitration treaties contained
iz:
provisions for the use of experts . Two examples are: a) the Agreement of June 30, 
1921, between the United States and Norway for the Submission to Arbitration of 
Certain of Norwegian Subjects, b) the Arbitration Protocol between France and Haiti 
of September 10, 1913.
3.3 The PCIJ:
31 W h i t e ,  ( 1 9 6 5 )  3 5 - 3 6 ;
32 S e e  f u r t h e r :  W h i t e ,  ( 1 9 6 5 )  3 6
33 S e e  f u r t h e r :  W h i t e ,  ( 1 9 6 5 ) 4 9 ,  1 3 1 - 1 3 3
34  S e e  f u r t h e r :  W h i t e ,  ( 1 9 6 5 )  1 5 1 - 1 5 4
35  S e e  f u r t h e r :  W h i t e ,  ( 1 9 6 5 )  1 6 7 - 1 7 1
36  S e e  f u r t h e r :  W h i t e ,  ( 1 9 6 5 )  5 0  e t  s e q .  W h i t e  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  p r a c t i c e  h a s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a n  i m p l i e d  c o m p e t e n c e  f o r  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r i b u n a l s  t o  a p p o i n t  e x p e r t s ,  W h i t e ,  ( 1 9 6 5 )  C h a p t e r  4
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The PCU recognised the importance of experts37. Article 50 of the Statute 
stated: “the Court may, at any time, entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission 
or other organization that it may select, with the task of carrying out an enquiry or 
giving an expert opinion.” Article 51 further provided that questions may be put to 
the experts under conditions laid down by the Court. Article 57 of the Rules also 
provided for the Court to arrange for an expert enquiry or report, the results of which 
must be communicated to the parties.
During the lifetime of the PCU, the use of experts has not been frequent. The 
following are some examples. In the German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia 
Case39, both the German and the Polish Government used experts according to an 
order of the Court requesting further information on two of the proprietors of the 
agricultural estates in Polish Upper Silesia to be expropriated by the Polish 
government. The experts were questioned by the parties, the judges and the President.
In the Oscar Chinn Case40 between Belgium and the United Kingdom 
involving the reduction of freight charges in the River Congo by a transport company 
in which the Belgian Government was the majority shareholder. The questions before 
the Court were whether the reduction was contrary to international law and what 
compensation was due. The United Kingdom requested an expert enquiry on the 
question of compensation. However, after considering the evidence presented, the 
Court ruled that the lowering of the sea freight was not contrary to Belgium’s 
international obligation, and consequently, it was not necessary to carry out the expert 
inquiry as previously requested41.
In the Free Zones o f  Upper Savoy and the District o f Gex Case, a request was 
made by France for an expert enquiry. The Court rejected it on the basis that the 
judgment must be limited to questions of law42. However, experts were later used for 
a different purpose of drafting regulations on the relationship between France and 
Switzerland following the judgment.
37 S e e  g e n e r a l l y ,  W h i t e ,  ( 1 9 6 5 )  3 6 - 4 3
38  F o r  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  d r a f t i n g  t h e  S t a t u t e  o f  t h e  C o u r t ,  s e e :  W h i t e ,  ( 1 9 6 5 )  3 6 - 3 9
39 German Interests Case, P C U ,  1 9 2 5
40 The O scar Chinn Case, P C U ,  1 9 3 4
41 T h e r e  w e r e  d i s s e n t i n g  o p i n i o n s  o n  t h e  C o u r t ’ s  d e c i s i o n  n o t  t o  c a r r y  o u t  t h e  i n q u i r y ,  s t a t i n g  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  a  n e e d  t o  h a v e  r e g a r d
t o  a l l  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  o f  t h e  c a s e .  S e e :  W h i t e ,  ( 1 9 6 5 )  1 0 5 - 1 0 7 .
42 Free Zones o f  Upper Savoy and the District o f Gex, P C U ,  1 9 3 2 ,  1 6 2
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In the Chorzow Factory (Claim fo r  Indemnity) Case43, the Court requested an 
expert enquiry according to Article 50 of the Statute regarding the amount of the 
indemnity to be paid by the Polish Government to the German Government. The 
Court considered the data from Germany on the assessment of the indemnity to be 
unsatisfactory. A Committee of three experts was appointed which included: a 
Norwegian consulting Engineer, a Swiss chief Engineer, and the managing director of 
a Norwegian carbide factory. The parties each appointed an assessor to take part in 
the inquiry. However, the Committee did not have the opportunity to perform its task 
because the parties reached agreement through other means44. The use of experts in 
this case influenced the discussions for the preparation of the 1936 Rules. The 
Registrar noted that the nature of the Committee was very particular to this dispute. 
Consequently, Article 57 of the Rules was drafted to give freedom to the Court to 
decide the details of an inquiry45.
As a preliminary conclusion on the use of experts prior to the creation of the 
ICJ, it must be first noted that experts were used by many fora, both ad hoc and by the 
PCU. However, apart from the provisions of the PCU, there were no fixed rules and 
it was up to the parties and the tribunal to agree on the mandate of the experts. The 
expert evidence also covered many different issues.
3.4 The ICJ:
3.4.1 The provisions of the ICJ:
Like the PCU, the ICJ also recognises the importance of experts. The Statute 
of the ICJ is based on Statute of the PCU and also includes provisions for the use of 
experts. The Court has the power to seek information by inviting expert witnesses on 
its own initiative46, and can also request an enquiry or an expert opinion after hearing 
the parties.47 The details of an enquiry or a request for an expert opinion are for the
43 Chorzow Factory Case (Indemnity), P C U ,  1 9 2 8
44 Chorzow Factory Case (Indemnity), P C U ,  1 9 2 8  s e r .  C ,  N o .  1 6 - 1 1  a t  1 4 - 1 5 ;  O n  q u e s t i o n s  a s k e d  t o  t h e  e x p e r t s ,  s e e  W h i t e ,  
( 1 9 6 5 ) 1 2 9
45  S a n d i f e r ,  ( 1 9 7 5 ) 3 3 3
46 Rules o f Court, 1 9 7 8  a r t  6 2 ( 2 )
47 ICJ Statute, 1 9 4 5  a r t  5 0 ;  Rules o f  Court, 1 9 7 8  a r t  6 7 ( 1 )
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Court to determine. The parties are given opportunities to comment on the findings of 
the enquiry or the expert opinion48.
In addition, there are provisions for experts to be introduced by the parties49. 
The Statute provides for the hearing of the experts during the oral proceedings50. If 
they intend to call experts, the parties have to communicate their intention to the 
Court. This communication must contain details of the experts including the general 
points on which they will be questioned51. The parties may call any experts on the
52list . If at any time during the hearing, a party wishes to call an expert not included 
in that list, it must inform the Court and the other party, and must supply the 
information as required by Article 57 of the Rules. The expert may be called either if 
the other party makes no objection or if the Court is satisfied that his evidence seems 
likely to prove relevant . The selected experts are subject to questions from the other 
party and the judges54. The method of the examination is to be settled by the Court 
after the views of the parties have been ascertained55.
The Court can also appoint assessors to help on specialised issues. They sit on 
the bench and participate in the deliberations, without voting rights56. The need for 
the assessors is determined by the Court, either on its own initiative or upon a request 
made by one of the parties57. The assessors are elected by the Court but none have 
been used so far in the Court’s history.
Finally, Article 43 of the Statute permits parties to appoint experts as members 
of their delegation who can plead before the Court . As a result, and noted by 
Rosenne, the distinction between counsel and expert is not always easily drawn59. 
Experts who are members of the delegation do not have to make a solemn declaration 
and they are not subject to cross-examination. However, the judges may ask these 
experts questions as they see fit.
3.4.2 The jurisprudence of the Court:
48 Rules o f  Court, 1 9 7 8  art 6 7 ( 2 )
49 ICJ Statute, 1 9 4 5  art. 4 3 ( 5 ) ;  Rules o f Court, 1 9 7 8  art 6 3 ( 1 )
50 ICJ Statute, 1 9 4 5  art 4 3
51 Rules o f  Court, 1 9 7 8  art 5 7
52 Rules o f  Court, 1 9 7 8  a r t  5 7
53 Rules o f  Court, 1 9 7 8  art 6 3 ( 1 )
54 ICJ Statute, 1 9 4 5  art 5 1 ;  Rules o f Court, 1 9 7 8  art 6 5
55 Rules o f  Court, 1 9 7 8  art 5 8 ( 2 )
56 ICJ Statute, 1 9 4 5  art 3 0 ( 2 ) ;  Rules o f Court, 1 9 7 8  art 9 (  1) ,  ( 4 )
57 Rules o f Court. 1 9 7 8  art 9 (  1 )
58 R o s e n n e ,  ( 1 9 9 7 )  1 1 8 3
59  R o s e n n e ,  ( 1 9 9 7 )  1 1 8 2
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In the jurisprudence of the Court, experts have been used on many technical 
issues. The section includes a selection of the cases to give a cross-section of the 
jurisprudence. Because expert evidence can be used differently according to the 
subject matter of the dispute, the cases of the ICJ have been divided into those 
concerning: (a) Use of Force, (b) State Responsibility (excluding use of force), (c) 
Delimitation. Within these sections, the cases will be examined chronologically. At 
the outset, it is of note that the means through which expert evidence is most often 
submitted is the written submissions.
3.4.2.1 The normal procedures carried out by the Court:
Expert evidence can be presented to the Court at many stages. First, the 
parties can include expert evidence in the written submissions. This is usually 
included as an annex. After the written pleadings have been submitted, there would 
be two rounds of oral pleadings, where expert evidence can be presented.
The procedure for the examination of the experts generally resembles the 
Common Law tradition with an examination in chief, cross-examination, and a re­
examination. Rosenne has offered an explanation for the Court’s approach. In the 
first case of the ICJ, the Corfu Channel Case, the witnesses were examined by the 
British delegation in the Common Law style and the pattern has remained for the ICJ 
ever since60. But the ICJ’s rules are less strict than those of municipal courts. One 
member of each counsel would normally examine each expert but a different member 
can examine other experts if there is more than one. The judges can also put 
questions to the experts.
3.4.2.2 Cases Involving the Use of Force:
3.4.2.2.1 The Corfu Channel Case:
There was extensive use of experts in the Corfu Channel Case, but only in the 
last two stages: the merits and the determination of the damages owed by Albania to 
the United Kingdom, but not the preliminary objections.
6 0  R o s e n n e ,  ( 1 9 9 5 )  1 5 6
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During the merits stage, the question before the Court was whether Albania 
was responsible under international law for the explosions in the Channel and the 
damage caused to British ships, and whether Albania had a duty to pay compensation. 
The United Kingdom called two witness-experts and Albania called two experts, all 
of whom were naval officers. There was an examination and cross-examination of the 
experts and questions were put by members of the Court.
However, after several points had been contested by the Parties, an expert 
opinion was considered necessary by the Court but without enunciating what criteria 
were used in deciding this. There was an Order of the Court appointing the experts 
which was drafted in consultation with the parties. The three experts were naval 
officers from Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands (appointed chairman). They 
were given a mandate to investigate issues which included the way in which the mines 
in the channel were laid and whether it was possible to do so without Albania’s 
knowledge.61 However, despite having the opportunity, the Parties did not opt to ask 
specific questions to the experts “. The mandate of the enquiry limited the experts to 
the questions submitted to them: the “experts shall bear in mind that their task is not 
to prepare a scientific or technical statement of the problems involved, but to give to 
the Court a precise and concrete opinion upon the points submitted to them” 
However, they were encourage to go into the details of their findings: the experts 
“shall not limit themselves to stating their findings; they will also, as far as possible, 
give the reasons for these findings in order to make their true significance apparent to 
the Court. If need be, they will mention any doubts or differences of opinion amongst 
them.”64 There were eight questions to be addressed, including the types of mines 
that struck the British ships.
The Court decided that the expert report submitted was not conclusive and 
further requested the experts to proceed to Sibenik in Yugoslavia and Saranda in 
Albania to investigate the surrounding areas to verify and obtain answers on certain 
issues, and if necessary, modify their answers65. The Court allowed the parties to 
suggest points which the investigation should address. On this visit, experiments were 
carried out on site with the aim to answering, inter alia , whether the mine-laying 
would have been observed by the Albanian look-out posts. The experts concluded
61 O r d e r  o f  1 7  D e c e m b e r ,  1 9 4 8 .  Corfu Channel Case, I C J ,  1 9 4 9 ,  1 2 4 ,  1 2 6
62 Corfu Channel Case, I C J ,  1 9 4 9 ,  5  P l e a d i n g s  2 4 5
63 Corfu Channel Case, I C J ,  1 9 4 9 ,  1 2 6
64 Corfu Channel Case, I C J ,  1 9 4 9 ,  1 2 6
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that if a normal look-out was kept with binoculars, under normal conditions, the mine- 
laying operation must have been noticed by the coast-guards.66 The experts also gave 
opinions on other issues including when the mind was laid, where the ships were 
mined, and the type of mind the ship struck.
The Court relied on the information provided: “[it] cannot fail to give great 
weight to the opinion of Experts...From all the facts and observations mentioned 
above, the Court draws the conclusion that the laying of the minefield which caused
the explosions...could not have been accomplished without the knowledge of the
(\1Albanian Government. The Court also submitted further questions to the experts 
concerning the mines.
In the final stage of the case, the question before the Court was the amount of 
compensation owed. Albania argued that, according to the Special Agreement 
submitted by the two parties, the Court was only to decide whether Albania was 
obliged to pay compensation, and not to fix the exact amount. However, the Court 
ruled that it had jurisdiction to do so. Consequently, Albania did not attend the 
proceedings determining the damages.
On Albania’s refusal to present its views and to appear at a hearing, the Court 
appointed its own experts pursuant to Article 50 of the Statute to examine the figures 
of compensation submitted by the United Kingdom. Two Dutch experts in naval 
construction and warships were appointed. They submitted their report, and were 
subsequently questioned on their findings by various judges.
The Court separated the compensation claim into three categories: the 
replacement of the destroyer Saumarez, the damage sustained by the destroyer 
Volage, and damages in relation to the death and injuries of the naval personnel. 
The Court used the estimate of the United Kingdom because, as viewed by the Court 
appointed experts, it was an exact and reasonable estimate68. The Court also held that 
the United Kingdom had produced sufficient proof of the damage sustained by the 
naval personnel. The experts submitted to the Court the method of calculation of the 
estimate of the amount owed by Albania to the United Kingdom, which was annexed 
to the judgment of the Court together with the records of the questioning of the 
experts.
66  Corfu Channel Case, I C J ,  1 9 4 9 ,  2 1
67  Corfu Channel Case, I C J ,  1 9 4 9 ,  2 1 .  2 2 .  S e e  f u r t h e r :  L a l i v e ,  ( 1 9 5 0 )  1 0 1
68  Corfu Channel Case, I C J ,  1 9 4 9 ,  2 4 9 .  T h e  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  C o u r t ’ s  e x p e r t s  w a s  i n  f a c t  s i x t e e n  t h o u s a n d  p o u n d s  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h a t  
o f  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m .
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3.4.2.2.2 Oil Platforms Case:
The Oil Platforms Case concerned a dispute between Iran and the United 
States regarding an attack by several warships of the US Navy on three oil platforms 
owned by the National Iranian Oil Company. Iran claimed that the United States had 
breached provisions of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights 
between the two States. The United Stated filed a counter-claim regarding the actions 
of Iran in the Gulf during 1987-1988 which involved the mining and attacks on 
United States vessels.
This case is a good contrast to the Corfu Channel Case showing the range of 
ways which expert evidence can be introduced. The expert evidence in this case was 
solely submitted in the written form from both parties. The United States submitted 
expert reports describing the images of the four missile sites from which Iran 
allegedly fired missiles on the Sea Isle City, and reports on the ability of the missiles. 
Iran also produced differing views through its own expert reports regarding the 
satellite images that had been previously produced by the United States.
During the proceedings, the United States expressed the intention to file a new 
document containing the analysis and explanations by its own experts concerning the 
evidence that had already been submitted, pursuant to Article 56 of the Rules69. Iran 
did not object and wanted to submit its own expert document which commented on 
the expert document of the United States.
Because of the contradiction in the written expert evidence in this case, one 
issue is highlighted: the “independence” of parties’ expert evidence. The Court had 
the difficulty of facing two opposing expert views that both claimed to be 
“independent”70. This difficulty was also expressed by judges in the interviews which 
will be shown later.
3.4.2.3 State Responsibility Cases (excluding the use of force):
The first case to be examined is the Barcelona Traction Case between 
Belgium and Spain. Belgium was seeking for reparation for the damage allegedly
6 9  Oil Platforms C ase , I C J ,  2 0 0 3  p a r a  1 5
7 0  Oil Platforms Case, I C J ,  2 0 0 3  p a r a  5 9
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caused by Spain to Belgian nationals who were shareholders in the Barcelona 
Traction Company.
This case shows that the evidence introduced to the Court can include legal 
expertise, and that experts can be appointed as members of the delegation. The 
dispute involved questions of Spanish law. Belgium used as its “Expert-Counsel” 
three Professors from Spanish universities. Spain also appointed as members of its 
delegation various inspectors and experts from its ministry of finance71.
Again, the expert evidence in this case was only in the written format. 
Belgium submitted an expert report on the amount of compensation owed to it. 
However, there were conflicting expert views on the value of the Barcelona Traction 
Company. The Belgian government, inter alia, requested as an alternative to its 
suggested amount of compensation owed that the Court should carry out an expert 
enquiry, similar to the final stage of the Corfu Channel Case72. However, the Court 
did not carry it out, but without stating its reasons.
There was extensive use of expert evidence in the South West Africa Cases 
between South Africa on one hand, and Ethiopia and Liberia on the other. The 
dispute concerned the duties of South Africa as the Mandatory over the other two 
States under a regime set up under the League of Nations.
This case illustrates that the Court is willing to use experts through extensive 
oral examinations: thirteen witness-experts and one expert were called. The 
examination took place in thirty-eight hearings and roughly two months to complete. 
The process involved questions put in the examination, cross-examination and re­
examination on behalf of the Parties, and by Members of the Court. The experts 
included various professors in Social Philosophy, Social and Cultural Anthropology, 
Geography, Economics and the Chief Historian of the United States Army73.
A development worth noting in this case was the use of the voir dire for the 
first and only time in the Court’s history. The voir dire is an examination of the 
experts to determine his competence as an expert and his qualifications. It has its 
roots in the Common Law tradition and is not normally used in international tribunals 
where States are normally entitled to call any expert they chose. Not explicitly
71 Barcelona Traction Case , I C J ,  1 9 7 0 ,  4 - 6
72 Barcelona Traction Case , I C J ,  1 9 7 0 ,  1 4
73 South West Africa Cases (Merits), I C J ,  1 9 6 6 ,  9 - 1 0
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provided for in the provisions, allowing the voir dire indicates that the Court is 
willing to be flexible on the procedural rules on expert evidence74.
The issue to be addressed by the Union of South Africa was the cause of the 
large number of witness-experts and amount of time spent. Inter alia, the Union was 
trying to demonstrate that the principle of non-discrimination, as relied on by the 
Applicant, cannot always produce beneficial results and often are detrimental for all 
concerned. The Union also attempted to demonstrate that the circumstances which 
existed in South West Africa called for a policy of differentiation and not one of 
attempted integration.75 The experts were called from around the world to show an 
overwhelming weight of authority and the practice of States76.
However, after the large amount of time spent on examining the experts, the 
testimonies were not significant to the judgment because the Court ruled that the 
Applicant had no legal right or interest, and the claim was rejected as a result.
In this case, it was confirmed that the parties had a right to produce evidence 
by calling experts. The Court stated this in response to a proposal made by the 
Applicants, in an attempt to shorten the lengthy procedure, that the Court should 
decide that South Africa, in lieu of calling witnesses or experts to testify personally, 
should embody the evidence in depositions or written statements. The Court replied: 
“The Statute and Rules of Court contemplated a right in a party to produce evidence 
by calling witnesses and experts, and it must be left to exercise the right as it saw 
f it .. .”77
The Nicaragua Case is also worth mentioning in the examination of the 
Court’s approach on expert evidence. This is because of the extraordinary 
circumstances that the United States did not appear before the Court at the merits 
phase. The Court took note of the special circumstances, and said that it must ensure 
equal treatment of the parties. In relation to this, the Court underlined its power to 
launch an enquiry or request an expert opinion according to Article 50 of the Statute. 
However, it noted that this would neither be practical nor desirable in the case 
especially if the experts or the members of the enquiry needed to go to the applicant 
and neighbouring States, as might have been the case. The Court stated that it had a
74 E . g .  South West Africa Cases (Merits). I C J ,  1 9 6 6 ,  I C J  P l e a d i n g s  3 4 1 - 3 4 6 .  S e e  f u r t h e r :  S a n d i f e r ,  ( 1 9 7 5 )  3 4 2 - 3 4 3 .  C f .  s e c t i o n  
o n  I T L O S ,  s e e :  C h a p t e r  6 ,  S e c t i o n  4 ,  2 0 5 - 2 2 6
75 S e e  f u r t h e r :  S a n d i f e r ,  ( 1 9 7 5 )  3 4 0
76 South West Africa Cases (Merits), I C J ,  1 9 6 6 ,  9 - 1 0
77 South West Africa Cases (Merits), I C J ,  1 9 6 6 ,  9
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number of documents supplied by Nicaragua and the United States before it left the 
proceedings, and they could aid the Court in determining the facts of the case.
The ELSI Case, following the Nicaragua Case, has illustrated that expert 
evidence can also cover issues such as finance, as well as domestic law. The case 
concerned a dispute before a Chamber of the Court between the United States and 
Italy regarding a company (ELSI, a company running a plant producing electronic 
components) in Italy, and owned by US shareholders. The company was in financial 
trouble. The Italian government tried to keep the company running while the owning 
US corporation wanted to close it down and liquidate its assets. Following a series of 
events, which included a requisition of the plant by an order of the Mayor of Palermo, 
ELSI went into bankruptcy. The question before the Court was whether Italy had 
breached the existing Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the 
two States.
Expert opinion on whether the US company had exhausted all local remedies 
was annexed to the written submissions. Differing expert opinion was also given on 
the financial status of the company and the legal consequence. Various experts were 
also called before the Chamber. There was also the questioning of the Parties and the 
experts by the Chamber. The replies were given orally or in writing prior to the close 
of the proceedings. The experts of both parties gave their opinion regarding the state 
of insolvency of the company. Because of the complexity of the issue, the views of 
the experts of the two parties differed, and so were the views of the different experts 
called by Italy78.
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case has shown two things about expert 
evidence: a) experts can have a function even before the dispute is submitted to the 
Court, b) in some cases, the parties might prefer to have experts as members of their 
delegation and not call them before the Court. As for the facts of this case, it was 
between Hungary and Slovakia concerning a joint project of building water locks on 
the river Danube which also acted as a boundary between the two countries. This 
case was very technical and involved experts on many issues.
With regard to issues of the water locks on the Danube, prior to the case being 
before the Court, the parties had set up a tripartite group of experts on the measures 
that were to be taken at the time. The group of experts was composed of one person
78 The ELSI Case ,  I C J ,  1 9 8 9 ,  1 0 4
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designated by each party and three who were designated by the Commission of the 
European Communities, having offered to mediate. Experts were also used when the 
Treaty for the scheme was originally drafted. These expert reports were later used by 
the Court in understanding the dispute. For example, prior to the proceedings, experts 
became aware of the ecological effects of the system of locks on the river.
In addition, no experts were called by either party before the Court, but they
10were appointed as members of the delegation . For example, Hungary appointed as 
“Advocates” a number of experts: a professor of hydrology, a professor of biology, 
and a consulting engineer. Slovakia also appointed scientists as “Counsel and 
Experts”. The opinion of these experts would then be incorporated in the written 
submissions. This underlines the discretion that the parties have in the way in which 
expert evidence is presented to the Court. It also further begs the question of the 
extent to which expert evidence can avoid being scrutinized by the other party, 
because if not expert is called to give an oral testimony, then there would be no cross- 
examination.
3.4.2.4 Delimitation, boundary and fisheries area
The delimitation of boundaries is always a technical issue and need expert 
advice, at least from cartographers or, in cases of maritime delimitation, 
hydrographers. This section will examine how expert evidence has been presented in 
such cases.
3.4.2.4.1 The Temple Case:
The Temple Case was a dispute between Thailand and Cambodia concerning 
which State’s territory the Temple Preah Vihear lied. Both Parties used surveyor 
experts as part of their delegation. Cambodia appointed an Expert Advisor from the 
Royal Khmer Armed Forces while Thailand appointed members of the Royal Thai 
Survey Department.
Oral evidence was presented to the Court. Thailand called experts from Delft 
including: aerial surveyors and a geomorphologist. Cambodia only called a witness.
79 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case , I C J ,  1 9 9 7 ,  9 - 1 1
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The hearing of the experts and witness took five days, with examination and cross- 
examination from the parties, and questions from the Court.
It is o f note that various Members of the Court remarked on the quality of the 
expert evidence presented by Thailand. Judge Fitzmaurice noted that the evidence 
produced was “honest and reliable”80. Judge Quintana stated: “In general, the 
opinions of the experts...for Thailand impressed by their technical precision and the 
logical nature of their reasoning. Moreover, the official character of the Center, 
which is connected with the Netherlands Government, confers upon its opinion 
objectivity and an authority perhaps greater than could attach to the work of a private
Q 1
firm.” This suggests that the Court would give more weight to expert evidence from 
an “impartial” source. In addition, Judge Koo, referring to the practice in the Corfu 
Channel Case, made a point in his Dissenting Opinion that, considering the complex 
and technical issues in the case, the Court might have benefited from appointing its 
own experts under Article 44 and 50 of the Statute82. This again perhaps underlines 
the preference of the Court for “independent” expert evidence rather than that 
introduced by the parties.
Judge Quintana further highlighted the importance of expert evidence, 
especially that which had been obtained on location: “it was Mr. Ackermann’s special 
merit that he carried out the work of frontier reconnaissance...This Court has also, in 
its Judgment in the Corfu Channel Case, stressed the value of an expert 
investigation...The Judgment said: “The Court cannot fail to give great weight to the 
opinion of the Experts who examined the locality in a manner giving every guarantee
8 3of correct and impartial information' (I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 21).”
3.4.2.4.2 Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya):
This case also involved the use of many experts. It must be noted that there 
were two stages to this case. The Court reached its judgment on the initial application 
in 1982. However, Tunisia later applied for a revision and interpretation of the 1982 
judgment.
80  Temple Case, I C J ,  1 9 6 2 ,  6 0
81 Temple Case, I C J ,  1 9 6 2 ,  7 3
82 Temple Case, I C J ,  1 9 6 2 ,  1 0 0
83  Temple Case, I C J ,  1 9 6 2 ,  7 3
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In the first application to the Court, a range of experts were used by the two 
States including geologists, oceanographers, and engineers. Their expert opinion on 
the character of the sea-bed in question was incorporated in the submission of the 
Parties. In addition to the written submission, the Professor of Geology at the 
Technical University of Munich was also called by Libya to give an oral testimony 
pursuant to Articles 57 and 63 to 65 of the Rules of Court, and examined and cross- 
examined by both Parties.
What is further of note in this case is that experts were also used to implement 
the judgment of the Court. The Special Agreement only requested the Court to 
specify the way as to enable the experts of the two countries to delimit the area 
without difficulty84 and the precise delimitation line was for the experts to determine. 
Consequently, the Court left the exact coordinates of the A part of the most westerly 
point of the Tunisia coastline between Ras Kaboudia and Ras Ajdir to the experts. 
They were to use the cartographic evidence that were available and carry any ad hoc 
survey in loco if necessary.
The subsequent application for revision by Tunisia concerned, inter alia, the 
technical question of the determination of the latitude at which the bearing of the 
delimitation line is to change direction. The delimitation line had previously been 
divided into two segments with a point where the bearing of the line would change.
However, at this revision stage, the Court refused to appoint experts as 
submitted by Tunisia that “there is a cause to order an expert survey for the purpose of 
ascertaining the exact co-ordinates of the most westerly point o f the Gulf of Gabes”85. 
The Court reaffirmed its power under Article 50 of the Statute at any time to launch 
an enquiry or obtain an expert opinion. “However, this provision must be read in 
relation to the terms in which jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court in a specific 
case; the purpose of the expert opinion must be to assist the Court in giving judgment 
upon the issues submitted to it for decision. In the present case, therefore, it would be 
appropriate to accede to the request of Tunisia only if the determination of the exact 
co-ordinates of the most westerly point of the Gulf of Gabes were required to enable
o / r
the Court to give judgment on the matters submitted to it.” The Court noted that its 
previous judgment has left the precise co-ordinates of this most westerly point of the
84 Article 1 o f the Special Agreement, Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , ICJ, 1982, 21
85 Application fo r  Revision and Interpretation o f the Judgment o f  February 24, 1982, ICJ, 1985 para 64-65
86  Application fo r  Revision and Interpretation o f the Judgment o f  February 24, 1982, ICJ, 1985 para 65
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Gulf of Gabes for the experts to determine87. The Court further added that its decision 
was covered by the force of res judicata  and it would appoint a panel of experts only 
if there was a joint request from the parties. Unfortunately, the Court did not 
enunciate further in what circumstances it would in the future give effect to a request 
submitted by one party only. The Court stated that this question “does not fall to be 
considered at the present time.”88
3.4.2.4.3. Other cases:
The G ulf o f Maine Case of 1984, between the United States and Canada, 
concerning the maritime delimitation of the Gulf was before the Chamber of the 
Court. The Parties requested the Chamber to appoint a technical expert nominated 
jointly by the Parties to assist it in respect of technical matters and, in particular, in 
preparing the description of the maritime boundary and the charts. According to the 
Special Agreement, the expert is to be present at the oral proceedings and available to
OQ
the Chamber for any questions that might arise. The Special Agreement also set up 
a framework of technical provisions the expert was requested to utilize, such the types 
of maps and lines to be used90. The expert had to make a solemn declaration, and his 
explanatory Report was annexed to the judgment.91
Canada and the United States also appointed experts as members of their 
delegation including oceanographers and experts on fisheries. The Parties submitted 
expert opinion as part of their pleadings. For example, Canada had as part of its 
submission expert evidence on the nature of Georges Bank92, and the United States 
submitted expert evidence on the fish resource distribution and ecosystem of the 
region. Further, one expert from the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration was called by the United States, and he was subject to questions from 
both parties.
In addition to the written expert evidence, there was again the use of oral
Q O
testimony in the Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta) Case . Libya called three experts 
and Malta called two. In the usual manner, the experts were examined and cross­
87  Application fo r  Revision and Interpretation o f  the Judgment o f  February 24, 1982, ICJ, 1985 para 65
88 Application fo r  Revision and Interpretation o f the Judgment o f  February 24, 1982, ICJ, 1985 para 67
89 Special Agreement Article II, Gulf o f Maine Case, ICJ, 1984, 253
90 Article IV o f the Special Agreement, Gulf o f Maine Case, ICJ, 1984, 254
91 Gulf o f  Maine Case, ICJ, 1984, 344
92  Gulf o f  Maine Case, ICJ, 1984, 276
9 3  Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  V. Malta, ICJ, 1985 para 38
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examined. In addition, the Court also appointed its own expert cartographer who 
gave an opinion on the delimitation line that would divide the difference in area 
between the claims of the two parties into two equal halves. Again, similar to the 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya) Case, the Special Agreement only requested the 
Court to determine the applicable principles and rules of international law. The Court 
therefore did not draw the exact delimitation line but left open to the experts of the 
parties to determine the exact point at which the delimitation line will intersect 15° 
10’ E meridian. In other words, the final solution of the dispute was left to experts.
Following this case came a series of cases on delimitation. In all of them, 
experts would be appointed as members of the delegation. They included: 
engineers94, hydrographers95, cartographers96, and lawyers97. The inclusion of expert 
evidence in written submissions would be the norm. In the Frontier Dispute (Burkina 
Faso/Republic o f  Mali) Case, the parties requested the Court to appoint three experts 
for the purposes of aiding them in the demarcation process. The Court noted that such 
an appointment would not come within the meaning of Article 50 of the Statute. 
Consequently, instead of appointing the experts in the judgment, the Court did so in a
Q O
separate Order . In the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El 
Salvador/Honduras) Case, without an objection from Honduras, El Salvador 
suggested that the Chamber consider the possibility of obtaining evidence in situ 
according to Article 6 of the Rules, and requested an inquiry or expert opinion 
according to Article 67 of the Rules. However, the Chamber decided that neither was 
necessary but did not enunciate why or state under what circumstance it would be
99appropriate .
What must also be noted is that, in the Arbitral Award o f 31 July 1989 
(Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal) Case, Guinea-Bissau requested the Court to allow the 
calling as a witness or expert witness of a person already included as an adviser in the 
list of those representing the State. Senegal, on the basis of inter alia Article 57 of the 
Rules of Court, objected. The Court decided that it would not be appropriate to 
accede to the request of Guinea-Bissau. This shows that the Court draws a clear line
94  Burkina Faso V. Republic o f  Mali, ICJ, 1986
95 Greenland and Jan Mayen Case, ICJ, 1993
96 Libya  v. Chad, ICJ, 1994
97 Q atar  v Bahrain, ICJ, 2001
98 See further: Burkina Faso V. Republic o f Mali, ICJ, 1986 Order of 9 April 1987
99  El Salvador V. Honduras, ICJ, 1992, 400
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between experts who are members of the delegation, and the “independent” experts 
called to testify.
In the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and 
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain) Case, for the first time, expert evidence was submitted on 
the question of the authenticity of documents. Bahrain had challenged Qatar’s 
documents annexed to the pleadings. However, the Court at the end decided to 
disregard the disputed documents for the purposes of the case100. Expert reports were 
also used by the parties on other issues such as whether Qit'at Jaradah was an island 
or a low tide elevation. The Court ruled in Bahrain’s favour that it was an island for 
the purpose of drawing an equidistant line partly because the experts of Qatar did not 
prove that it was a low-tide elevation.
In the Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island, involving the question of the 
boundary between Botswana and Namibia around Kasikili/Sedudu Island and the 
legal status of the island, the Court highlighted the problem that the expert evidence 
submitted by the parties was often contradictory101. The evidence in this case 
concerned the Chobe River, used for the purposes of determining the boundary. With 
the limited knowledge of the Court on technical issues, it was very difficult for it to 
reconcile the difference in expert opinion. Judge Oda suggested that the Court should 
have appointed its own experts because the answer depended largely on scientific
109knowledge
3.5 Interviews with the Judges:
The interviews with the judges have been revealing on the approach of the 
Court on expert evidence. First, Judge A has stated that the Court has no general 
policy on the way in which expert evidence is admitted. Judge A and Judge B noted 
that written submissions are generally of high quality. They can cover a wide range
i
of issues , but not subject to cross-examination.
Judge A and B underlined the right of the parties to present oral evidence, 
which they have exercised on occasion. However, both judges added that in certain
100 Q atar v Bahrain, ICJ, 2001, 47
101 Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island, ICJ, 1999 para 28
102 Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island, ICJ, 1999 Separate Opinion of Judge Oda, para 32
103 Judge C
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cases, the quality of the oral evidence has not been high, and the process does not add 
much to the information already submitted through the written submissions.
Experts can also be appointed as members of the delegation. As explained by 
Judge B, these experts would take the Court through the technicalities of the dispute. 
They are not examined like the experts called before the Court. However, they must 
face the contrary arguments of the other party. The use of delegation experts is 
becoming a wide and growing practice. Judge B added that expert evidence presented 
in this format is very time-saving. The information is clear and there is much less 
courtroom tactics involved.
Regarding the use of independent experts by the Court, Judge C stated that this 
would normally be requested by the parties. Judge B noted that, because it is hard for 
an expert to be separated from his views, the Court has been cautious as it does not 
want to be seen as pre-judging the issues by selecting particular experts. For this 
reason, a commission of experts of 3-5 people would be more feasible if independent 
experts are appointed in the future. He further added that he is skeptical of the use of 
independent experts because, in his opinion, there are also many honest points of 
views from delegation experts. Judge C has added that the reason for refusals to 
parties’ requests for independent experts depends on the case at hand.
As for the future of the approach of the Court on expert evidence, Judge A has 
expressed his view that Court-appointed independent experts could be put to good 
use, but this still depends on the nature of the case. There will be a greater readiness 
to call on independent experts104. There were suggestions about using affidavits. 
However, this was not liked by many members of the Court because it was seen to be 
too Anglo-Saxon. Judge A said that he is a believer in the division of labour. 
Consequently, the Court should try to use independent experts as often as it can. 
Judge C underlined that independent experts can be used in future cases if there is a 
direct clash in the evidence presented by the parties. In such cases, an objective view 
would be beneficial. However, Judge C has indicated that the parties are left to 
conduct the proceedings. The Court will generally remain passive. It could be 
dangerous for the Court to start actively seeking information on its own accord. For 
example, Judge C asked the question whether France and Australia would have been 
happy if the Court started to seek information in the Nuclear Test Case.
104 There is the possibility o f using independent experts in the The Pulp Mills Case, ICJ, 2006
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3.6 Concluding Remarks:
Many forms of expert evidence have been used before the Court covering a 
very wide range of issues105. Expert evidence was often used in delimitation cases on 
technical issues such as cartography and hydrography. In State responsibility cases, 
expert evidence submitted covered, inter alia, questions of domestic law106 and 
environmental issues107. In use of force cases, expert evidence was used on issues 
such as military equipment and their capabilities108. Further, from the Corfu Channel 
Case, the Court has stated that the scope of the opinions of the experts is limited to the 
questions submitted. This is an indication that the Court wants to retain as much as 
possible its judicial function, and reduce the unnecessary effects that the expert 
evidence might have on it.
The expert evidence has also been presented to the Court through various 
channels, the most frequent way being the written submission of the Parties. The 
Parties would obtain the evidence from their own delegation experts or those who 
they have specifically commissioned. Although less frequently used than written 
submissions, Parties have also called experts before the Court. The experts would be 
subject to examination and cross-examination from Counsel of both Parties and also 
questions from the Court. Because of the nature of these submissions, the Court often 
found itself in the difficult situation facing contradicting evidence from the Parties. 
The channel least used by the Court to admit expert evidence was appointing its own 
experts according to Article 50 of the Statute. It would normally be up to the parties 
to request this. The Court has appointed such experts on several occasions: e.g. the 
Corfu Channel Case and the G ulf o f Maine Case. Apart from this being agreed upon 
by the parties, the Court has never enunciated as to the criteria applied on whether it 
would appoint its own experts. In some cases, the Court has given reason for the 
rejection109; other times, no reason was given110.
105 See further: Rosenne, (1997) 1164
106 Barcelona Traction Case, ICJ, 1970
107 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case, ICJ, 1997
10s Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003
109 As mentioned in this chapter, 192-193: The Nicaragua Case, ICJ, 1986
110 As mentioned in this chapter, 198: El Salvador V. Honduras, ICJ, 1992
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As well as experts used by the Court to reach its judgment, it is also worth 
noting that experts can also be used for the purposes of implementing the decision of 
the Court111.
This section will also begin to address the question of what factors play a role 
in determining the approach of the Court on expert evidence. The details of the study 
will be left to the thesis’s concluding chapter where all tribunals and all aspects of 
evidence will be looked at together.
The first factor that seems to have an influence over the Court’s rules on 
experts is domestic rules. Even though the practice of the Court does not indicate that 
it was following a particular jurisdiction’s approach on experts, there are some 
influences to be seen. The way in which the Court conducts its oral proceedings 
seems to have been inspired by the Common Law tradition.
The second factor is the deference granted by the Court to States. This was 
suggested by Judge C when he said that the parties are normally left to conduct the 
proceedings with the Court being passive and cautious about seeking its own 
information through its own experts. This perhaps reflects the level of autonomy the 
Court is willing to grant to the parties.
The third important influencing factor for the Court is the quality of the expert 
evidence through the different channels. The judges have said that, in some cases, the 
quality of the evidence during the oral proceedings have not been high. Despite the 
right of the parties to present oral evidence, the bench might discourage this in the 
future. In some cases where there is a direct clash between the evidence of the 
parties, the Court might seek a more objective view through its own appointed 
experts.
As indicated by Judge B, a fourth factor that could influence the approach of 
the Court is fact that it is trying to be seen to the largest extent possible as an impartial 
body. The judge suggested that independent experts are not appointed by the Court 
because it does not want to be seen as prejudging the dispute.
Other influencing factors could include: a) limited time especially in urgent 
cases or to avoid a backlog of cases, b) limited financial resources because the Court 
must provide funding if it appoints its own experts, c) the history and background of
111 E.g. As mentioned in this chapter, 198: Burkina Faso V. Republic o f M ali, ICJ, 1986
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the ICJ, and its relationship with the PCIJ. These issues will be further explored in 
the concluding chapter.
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Section 4: ITLOS:
4.1 Introduction:
At the outset, it is worth noting three things about ITLOS. First, the type of 
cases it handles includes prompt release cases, provisional measures cases, and merits 
cases. Second, compared to other tribunals, there have been a limited number of cases 
before ITLOS which restricts the study of the section. Third, there is not much 
existing literature on the Tribunal’s approach on evidential rules. This section will be 
breaking new ground.
4.2 Provisions of ITLOS:
The provisions of the Tribunal include five instruments: Part XV of
UNCLOS, the Statute of the Tribunal, the Rules of the Tribunal, the Guidelines 
concerning the Presentation of Cases before the Tribunal, and the Resolution on the 
Internal Judicial Practice of the Tribunal.
The comparable wording indicates that the provisions of ITLOS have been
117based on those of the ICJ . Similar to the ICJ, the emphasis has been on flexibility 
and the admission of as much expert evidence as possible. There are many channels 
through which expert evidence can be brought into the proceedings and also 
provisions to ensure the quality of the expert evidence.
First, the Tribunal may appoint its own experts. According to Article 289 of 
UNCLOS, the Tribunal may do this for disputes involving scientific or technical 
matters, at the request of a party or proprio motu, but no fewer than two experts may 
be selected113. Apart from exceptional cases, the party’s request for the appointment 
of experts must not be later than the closure of the written proceedings114. The 
Tribunal is to select the experts upon the proposal of the President who is to consult 
the parties beforehand115. Further, the experts are preferably to be chosen from a list 
maintained by international organizations according to Article 2, Annex VIII of
112 See: Chapter 6, Section 3.4.1, 186
113 UNCLOS, 1982 art 289; Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 art 15
114 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 art 15(1)
1,5 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 art 15(2)
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UNCLOS.116 The experts have to make a solemn declaration. Once chosen, they sit
117on the bench without votes and can take part in the deliberation of the Tribunal . So 
far, no expert has been appointed according to Article 289 of UNCLOS.
Further, according to the Rules, the Tribunal can arrange for an inquiry or
1 1 Q
expert opinion after hearing the parties , and it must determine the relevant details 
including the subject matter and the procedures to be followed. The parties have an 
opportunity to comment on the completed report119. In addition, the Tribunal may 
also arrange for the attendance of an expert to give evidence in the proceedings if 
necessary120. An expert can be examined otherwise than before the Tribunal at the 
request of a party or if the Tribunal considers it necessary. The President is 
responsible for taking the steps to implement such a decision121.
Second, the parties can introduce expert evidence to the Tribunal as part of the 
oral proceedings122 but they must communicate the information regarding the 
evidence to be produced to the Registrar in sufficient time before the opening of the 
oral proceedings. This communication must contain the details of the experts the 
party intends to call, with indications of the points to which their evidence will be 
directed. A copy of the communication must also be furnished for transmission to the 
other party123. The judges and the parties may question the experts. Further, the 
parties are free to determine who to call as experts. Similar to the ICJ, if a party 
wishes to call an expert not included in the communication list, it can make a request 
to the Tribunal and inform the other party, and supply the information required by 
Article 72 of the Rules. The expert may be called if the other party raises no objection 
or, in the event of an objection, the Tribunal can authorize it after hearing the 
objecting party124.
17SThe procedure for the examination of experts is similar to that of the ICJ .
1 0f\The details are for the Tribunal to determine “ . Experts are, under the control of the 
President, examined by the agents, counsel or advocates of the parties starting with 
the party calling the expert. Questions may be put to them by the judges. Before
116 UNCLOS, 1982 Annex VIII, art 2
1,7 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 art 15(4) and Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 art 42(2)
118 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 art 82(1)
119 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 art 82(2)
120 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 art 77(2)
121 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 art 78(2)
122 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 art 78 (1)
123 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 art 72
124 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 art 78(1)
125 See: Chapter 6, Section 3, 183-205
126 Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001 art 73(2)
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testifying, experts other than those appointed under article 289 of the Convention 
have to remain out of court.127
Third, the parties can appoint experts as members of their delegation. These 
experts can incorporate their expertise into their pleadings to the Tribunal, both 
written and oral. This channel of introducing expert evidence is arguably the most 
convenient for the parties, and is used in all cases.
4.3 The jurisprudence of the Tribunal:
This section will examine the jurisprudence of ITLOS, dividing it according to 
the types of cases: prompt release, provisional measures, and the merits.
4.3.1 Prompt Release Cases:
Prompt release cases, unique to ITLOS, concern the detention of a vessel 
flying the flag of one State by another, and often the question of the release of the 
vessel and whether a reasonable bond or financial security has been posted according 
to Article 292 of UNCLOS. Prompt release cases generally involve experts on two 
issues: a) the value of the vessel being held, and b) the appropriateness of the bond 
requested by the capturing State. Some prompt release cases have not involved the 
use of experts, but more witnesses " . This section will examine a selection of cases 
that have used expert evidence extensively.
4.3.1.1 The “Camouco” Case129\
The first prompt release case involving the use of experts was the Camouco 
Case in 1999. It concerned an application for the release of the Camouco, a 
Panamanian vessel, captured by France. It was allegedly unlawfully fishing in the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Crozet (French Southern and Antarctic 
Territories). Panama requested the Tribunal to order the prompt release of the vessel
127 Rules o f ITLOS, 2001 art 80
l2s E.g. The Saiga Case, ITLOS, 1997 (prompt release)
129 The Camouco Case, ITLOS, 2000
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and to find that France had violated the provisions of UNCLOS. Panama argued that
1 ^ 0the bond demanded, at $3,115,715, was disproportionate .
Panama called two experts at the oral proceedings, having submitted the
101
required information according to Article 72 of the Rules . The first was a 
representative of the ship-owners of the Camouco who testified on its ownership and 
registration, and the specifications of the vessel. He also gave an estimation that the
1 ^ 9detention of the vessel amounted to damage costing $250,000 . The second person
was a maritime expert. He assessed the value of the vessel and addressed the question 
of the bond. The expert estimated the vessel at $575,OOO133. Both experts thought 
that the bond demanded would correspond to the value of a new fishing vessel of this 
type, but not one that is ten years old134. These estimates were not challenged by the 
Respondent135.
The “Camouco” Case has prima facie  shown a straight forward use of 
experts. However, it underlines the importance given to expert evidence by the 
Tribunal and the parties. Experts were called even with the urgency of prompt release
1 TAcases . It is also evident that much weight was given to the expert evidence. From 
the French initial demand for a bond of $3,115,715, the Tribunal established that, 
taking into account the circumstances, a reasonable bond would be approximately 
$1,200,000. Although not exactly the estimate by the experts, it is much closer to it 
than to the original demand. There were no dissenting views on the value of the 
vessel.
It is worth noting that, in determining the reasonable value of the bond, the 
Tribunal cited the M /V Saiga Case that “reasonableness” encompasses the amount,
1 T7the nature and the form of the bond or financial security . Further, the Tribunal 
considered: a) the gravity of the alleged offences, b) the penalties imposed or 
imposable under the laws of the detaining State, c) the value of the vessel and of the 
cargo, d) the amount of the bond imposed by the detaining State and its form138.
130 The Camouco Case, ITLOS, 2000 Judgment, para 23
131 The Camouco C ase, ITLOS, 2000 Judgment, para 18
132 Although called an “expert”, his testimony could also be classified as that of a witness. However, he also addressed technical 
questions: e.g. the cost o f toothfish. See further: The Camouco Case, ITLOS, 2000 Oral Proceedings 27/01/00 am pp 13-18
133 The Camouco Case, ITLOS, 2000 Oral Proceedings 27/01/00 am, 18-20
134 The Camouco Case, ITLOS, 2000 Oral Proceedings, 27/01/00 am, 20
135 The Camouco Case, ITLOS, 2000 para 69
136 The representative o f the ship-owners was both examined and cross-examined. The Defendant did not use the opportunity to 
cross-examine the second expert. The Tribunal did not put its own questions to the experts. See generally: The Camouco Case, 
ITLOS, 2000 Oral Proceedings 27/01/00-am
137 The Camouco Case, ITLOS, 2000 para 66
138 The Camouco Case, ITLOS, 2000 para 67
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4.3.1.2 The “Monte Confurco” Case139:
The “Monte Confurco” Case, between France and the Seychelles, concerned 
the vessel Monte Confurco captured by a French surveillance frigate in the EEZ of the 
Kergeulen Islands for allegedly illegally fishing in its waters. After the Monte 
Confurco was intercepted, the district court of Saint-Denis requested a posting of a 
bond of 56,400,000 French Francs (around $9,700,000).
Both parties called experts to give an oral testimony according to Article 72 of 
the Rules and submitted information accordingly. Similar to the previous case, they 
were asked to evaluate the value of the vessel and also whether it was possible to fish 
in the area claimed by the Master of the vessel.
On the first question, the Applicant relied on reports of two experts who 
valued the vessel between $400,000 and $500,000. Oral expert testimony (from a 
merchant navy captain and marine surveyor) was then offered by the Applicant stating 
that that vessel had a value of around $345,000, a figure based on the amount the 
vessel was sold for in 1999140.
On the second question, France called an expert from the Museum of Natural 
History, Paris. He addressed the question of whether it was possible to fish in the area 
claimed by the Master of the Monte Confurco. The expert reached the conclusion that 
this was not possible for the variety of fish in question due to the depth of the water of 
the area which would mean that the Monte Confurco must have been illegally fishing 
in the shallower waters of the EEZ141. The Applicants argued that this conclusion was 
based on research conducted on board a scientific vessel or French fishing vessel 
which were principally trawlers with a fishing capacity limited to 1000 metres. 
Alternatively, a different type of long-line technology was used limiting the fishing 
capacity to 1500 metres. However, Spanish vessels (i.e. the Monte Confurco) are able 
to fish toothfish up to a depth of 2,500 to 2,700 metres142.
The Tribunal found that the bond set at 56,400,000 French Francs was 
unreasonable, and accepted as reasonable the estimate of the expert called by the 
Applicant. This shows that expert evidence does have an influence on the outcome of
139 The Monte Confurco Case, ITLOS, 2000
140 See generally: The Monte Confurco Case, ITLOS, 2000; more specifically on the testimony of the Mr. Perez The Monte 
Confurco Case, ITLOS, 2000 Oral Proceedings 08/12/00-am, 6-10
141 The expert was examined and cross-examined. See further: The Monte Confurco Case, ITLOS, 2000 Oral Proceedings 
07/10/00-pm, 7-11
142 The Monte Confurco Case, ITLOS, 2000 Judgment, para 54-55 and Oral Proceedings 8/12/00-am, 14-21
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the dispute. Further, the Tribunal ordered for the prompt release of the vessel on the 
furnishing of the security of 18,000,000 French Francs divided into: a) 9,000,000 for 
the value of the fish onboard the vessel, b) 9,000,000 for the value of the vessel 
itself143.
The Tribunal did not directly deal with the question of whether the vessel was 
illegally fishing in the EEZ of the Kergeulen Islands. This was not submitted by the 
parties for the Tribunal to address144. Questions of this nature are normally dealt with 
at the merits stage. However, because the value of the goods onboard a vessel is 
important in terms of estimating its value, the Tribunal did take the expert evidence 
on this issue into consideration. The Tribunal stated that the assumption made by the 
court at Saint-Paul that the catch onboard was entirely or principally caught in the 
EEZ of the Kergeulen Islands did not have adequate basis based upon the information 
before the Tribunal145. However, the use of expert evidence in this regard sparked off 
dissenting opinions that the Tribunal has to an extent ruled on the question whether 
the vessel was illegality fishing in the area146.
Apart from showing the way experts are used, what this case also illustrates is 
the limitation which prompt release cases have on the extent to which expert evidence 
can be used by the Tribunal. Consequently, this also means that this research could 
have benefited more from a deeper analysis if the cases were at their merits stage.
4.3.1.3 The ‘‘Grand Prince” Case147'.
The facts of the “Grand Prince” Case were very similar to the “Monte 
Confurco ” Case. The dispute concerned the alleged illegal fishing in the EEZ of the 
Kerguelen Islands. A vessel flying the flag of Belize was arrested by the French 
authorities. Proceedings were later brought against France by Belize for the prompt 
release of the vessel under Article 292 of UNCLOS. The Tribunal was requested to 
declare the bond demanded by France to be unreasonable.
However, the Tribunal ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over the dispute 
under Article 292 of UNCLOS because “documentary evidence submitted by the
143 The Monte Confurco Case, ITLOS, 2000 Judgment, para 92-95; There were no dissenting opinions on the issue o f the value of 
the vessel.
144 The Monte Confurco Case, ITLOS, 2000 Judgment, para 25-26.
145 The Monte Confurco Case, ITLOS, 2000 Judgment, para 88
146 See: (a) Anderson, Dissenting Opinion p 3, (b) Jesus, Dissenting Opinion, para 26, c) Mensah, Dissenting Opinion, 1
147 The Grand Prince Case, ITLOS, 2001
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Applicant fails to establish that Belize was the flag State of the vessel when the 
Application was made” 148. Although the Tribunal had no jurisdiction, expert 
evidence was still used.
After notifying the Registrar of the information required by Article 72 of the 
Rules, Belize called two experts: one naval engineer and marine surveyor, and one 
merchant navy captain and marine surveyor. The experts were examined and cross- 
examined on the value of the vessel, the way which they arrived at their conclusion, 
and also their background149. However, the experts were not questioned on the key 
issue in this case: the registration history of the vessel. Since this case turned on the 
registration of the vessel, the role of the expert evidence was limited in the outcome of 
the case.
4.3.1.4 Other Prompt Release cases:
Prior to the cases above, the case for the prompt release of the M/V Saiga did 
not involve the calling of any experts, not even for the valuation of the vessel. The 
respondent did not request for the deposition of any bond which meant that the 
question of its reasonableness did not arise. The question was left to the Tribunal and 
a bond was set at $400,000, in addition to the gasoil that had been discharged. The 
Tribunal emphasized that the bond must be “reasonable” and the figure was arrived 
through the evidence submitted to the Tribunal150.
There were other prompt release cases that also did not involve the calling of 
experts. The Chaisiri Reefer 2 Case151 was removed by the parties from the docket 
before the case was decided. In the Volga Case , there were no experts called in the 
proceedings but written reports submitted to the Tribunal on the value of the vessel. 
In the latest case before the Tribunal, the Juno Trader Case153, there were no experts 
called either. The parties left the Tribunal to determine the value of the vessel. In 
addition to the evidence submitted, the Tribunal used previous cases to establish what 
criteria were relevant in determining the reasonable bond154.
148 The G rand Prince Case, ITLOS, 2001 Judgment, para 93; Generally: para 62-94
149 The G rand Prince Case , ITLOS, 2001 Judgment, para 25 and Oral Proceedings 6/4/01-am, 7-12
150 The Saiga Case, ITLOS, 1997 Judgment, 17-18
151 The Chaisiri Reefer 2, ITLOS, 2001
152 The Volga Case, ITLOS, 2002
153 The Juno Trader Case, ITLOS, 2004
154 The Juno Trader Case, ITLOS, 2004 Judgment, para 81-102
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4.3.2 Provisional Measures Cases:
ITLOS has the authority to order provisional measures to “preserve the 
respective rights of the parties to a dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine 
environment” 155. These cases can involve a wide range of technical issues.
4.3.2.1 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case156:
This dispute, between Australia and New Zealand on one hand and Japan on 
the other, concerned the experimental fishing programme of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
carried out by Japan. The applicants argued that Japan, through its unilateral 
programme in 1998 and 1999, threatened to cause serious and irreversible damage to 
the Southern Bluefin Tuna population. Only the question of the provisional measure 
was before the Tribunal.
The parties appointed experts as members of their delegation. Australia had 
as their advisers: (a) two members of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry, (b) Principal Research Scientist from the Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Organization. Japan had as members of their delegation: (a) members of 
the Fisheries Agency, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan, (b) 
members of the National Research Institute of Far Seas Fisheries, (c) Prof 
Butterworth, Professor at the Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, 
University of Cape Town, (d) members of the Japan Tuna Fisheries Cooperative
157Associations.
There was only one expert called pursuant to Article 72 of the Rules which
ICO
was by the Applicants. He was an expert on population biology . Japan did not call 
an expert but relied on evidence included as part of its written submission, prepared 
by a delegation expert.
The Tribunal also used expert evidence which was prepared prior to the 
proceedings, a report prepared by the Commission for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna as set up by the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern
155 UNCLOS, 1982 art 290(1)
156 The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, ITLOS, 1999
157 See further, Straits o f  Johor Case, ITLOS, 2003 Oral Proceedings; New Zealand did not appoint experts o f its own but used 
those o f Australia.
158 The examination o f Prof. Beddington can be found at: The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, ITLOS, 1999 Oral Proceedings,
18/08/99-am, 36-45, and pm, 1-11
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Bluefin Tuna between the parties. This report, involving independent scientists, was 
done as a peer review in addition to the view of the permanent Scientific Committee 
to arrive at a consensus on the joint fishing programme. The parties used the report 
before the Tribunal, especially on the question of the depleting Southern Bluefin Tuna 
stock.159 Japan also annexed a document from an official of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization concerning the stock of the Southern Bluefin Tuna of different ages.
What is significant about the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case is the level of 
deference the Tribunal was willing to grant to the parties in allowing practices not 
explicitly provided for in its provisions if there is agreement between the parties.
For the first time in its history, the Tribunal allowed one of the parties to carry 
out a voir dire. The voir dire is a procedure associated with the Common Law 
tradition, particularly the United States jurisdiction. It is a preliminary examination to 
test the competence of a witness or expert through questions of a general nature. 
Proceedings in international tribunals do not usually include a voir dire. States are 
normally free to seek the advice of any expert.
The voir dire was requested by Japan and agreed upon by Australia and New 
Zealand but the specific reason for the request of the voir dire remain unclear. As 
speculation, it was Japan’s strategic attempt to discredit the expert of its opponents 
while the Applicants obliged to the request in order not to undermine the expert’s 
credibility. In this case, the voir dire concerned the employment history of Prof. 
Beddington, his area of work, his experience and his participation in the field160. The 
abnormality of the use of a voir dire was highlighted by the Agent of Australia and 
New Zealand: “this is an historical case and it has an historic event in the middle of it, 
because I understand that my learned friend and opponent wishes to put some 
questions to Professor Beddington on the voir dire. This is an unusual procedure in an 
international tribunal. States are normally entitled to seek independent advice from 
qualified persons.. .”161
What is of note is that the ICJ has also rarely allowed the voir dire, the only
/A?time, to the knowledge of the writer, being the South West Africa Cases . However, 
there was no reference to the practice of the ICJ. This could indicate several things: 
a) a minimal level of reference and dialogue between the tribunals, b) the lack of
159 The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, ITLOS, 1999 Oral Proceedings 19/08/99-am, 18-19; Oral Proceedings, 12-31
160 The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, ITLOS, 1999 Oral Proceedings 18/08/99-am, 31-45;
161 The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, ITLOS, 1999, 34-35
162 See further: Chapter 6, Section 3.4.2.3, 191-195
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awareness of the Tribunal and Agents of cases of other tribunals, c) the limited 
importance which one tribunal grants to the jurisprudence of another on evidential 
rules.
The Agents proceeded to the examination of the expert after the voir dire. The 
expert gave his opinion on the stock of the SBT, its decline, and the appropriate catch. 
He was also asked to comment on the report of the expert on the Japanese delegation, 
Prof. Butterworth. There was then a cross-examination by Japan on, inter alia, his 
views on the peer review of the Scientific Committee which had been conducted 
before the dispute.163
The Tribunal also diverged from its provisions in letting the expert called by 
the party enter the courtroom before, and stay after, his testimony164. The parties 
requested the Tribunal to suspend the application of this provision for the 
proceedings165. This was granted by the Tribunal, although the exact reason for it is 
unclear, and the expert accordingly remained in court before and after his testimony. 
This might have been because it would be more efficient.
The two instances of divergence from the provisions indicate that the Tribunal 
is willing to be flexible with the consent of both parties. This again points towards 
the level of deference which the Tribunal has towards the parties.
What is further underlined by the case is that the parties are free to submit 
expert evidence in anyway they wish. This was recognized even in a statement of the 
Applicants. While making an argument attacking the fact that Japan did not call an 
expert to give an oral testimony, the Applicants also made clear that the policy of the 
Tribunal was of flexibility, allowing variations in different legal systems166. The 
Applicants highlighted the quality of impartiality of their expert, having undergone a 
voir dire.
In light of the evidence, the Tribunal ordered provisional measures to the 
effect that, inter alia: (a) the parties are to prevent aggravation or extension of the 
dispute, (b) the catches are to be kept to the level last agreed, (c) the parties are to 
refrain from conducting an experimental fishing programme except with the 
agreement of the other parties or unless the experimental catch is counted against its 
annual national allocation. There were no dissenting opinions regarding the way
163 The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, ITLOS, 1999 Oral Proceedings, 18/9/99-am, 41-45, and 18/9/99-pm, 6-11
164 Contrary to Rules o f  ITLOS, 2001, article 80
165 The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, ITLOS, 1999 Oral Proceedings, 18/8/99-am, 9-10
166 For the argument o f the applicants, see: The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, ITLOS, 1999 Oral Proceedings, 20/8/99-am, 10-11
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expert evidence was used in this case. Further, from the interviews, Judge E has 
added that expert evidence was crucial to the outcome of this case.
4.3.2.2 Mox Plant Case167\
The Mox Plant Case, between the United Kingdom and the Republic of 
Ireland, concerned the authorization of the United Kingdom to open a new MOX 
(Mixed Oxide Fuel) facility in Sellafield. The Irish Government was concerned that 
the plant would contribute to pollution in the Irish Sea. There were also risks in the 
transportation of nuclear reactive material to and from the plant.
Pending the constitution of an Annex VII arbitral tribunal as provided by 
UNCLOS, Ireland submitted a request to ITLOS for a prescription of provisional 
measures according to Article 290 of UNLCOS. Ireland made a case that the UK, 
inter alia, (a) suspend the authorization of the plant (b) ensure that there is no 
movement of radioactive material on the waters over which Ireland has 
sovereignty168.
Both parties appointed experts as members of their delegation, and relied 
heavily on expert evidence as part of the written submissions. Experts were not called 
for oral testimony according to Article 72 of the Rules. Ireland’s delegation included 
three officers from the Department of Public Enterprise and two people from the 
Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland. The United Kingdom’s delegation 
included one person from the Department of Trade and Industry and two legal 
advisers from the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
In addition to their own expert evidence, Ireland also relied on a report 
prepared by the European Parliament’s Directory General for Research under the 
auspices of its Panel on Scientific and Technological Office Assessment on the 
“Possible Toxic Effects from the Nuclear Reprocessing Plants at Sellafield (UK) and 
Cap de la Hague (France)” 169. It was prepared by ten independent experts and 
submitted to the European Parliament. The report stated that the nuclear reprocessing 
at Sellafield generated large quantities of radioactive waste and there could be a risk 
of unplanned release of radioactive material which would pose a threat to the Irish
167 The MOX Plant C ase, ITLOS, 2001
168 The MOX Plant Case, ITLOS, 2001, Request for Provisional Measures and Statement of Case o f Ireland, 63
169 The MOX Plant Case, ITLOS, 2001, 50-59
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Sea. Ireland also cited a report done by the International Atomic Energy Agency on
i nr\
the danger of terrorists getting access to radioactive material .
The United Kingdom did not offer expert evidence to dispute the report by the 
European Parliament. However, it argued that the authorization process of the plant 
had been thorough at both the national and European level, relying on independent 
experts171. The consultation of experts by the European Commission is an obligation 
under the Euratom Treaty (Article 37) and the group of experts used in the process 
included public health experts. The United Kingdom argued that the dangers from the 
nuclear waste to the Irish Sea had been taken into account by the Commission. 
Further, the Opinion of the European Commission stated that the doses of radioactive 
waste received by the population in other Member States would not be significant
i nofrom the health point of view . Ireland argued that the United Kingdom has an 
enormous amount of expertise at its disposal but it did not dispute the findings of the 
European Parliament because its experts were not prepared to do so.173
The Tribunal took into account the assurance given by the United Kingdom 
that there would be no further transport by sea of radioactive material to/from 
Sellafield, and that there was no urgency for the need of provisional measures in the 
short period pending the constitution of the Annex VII tribunal. The Tribunal ruled 
the parties to cooperate on the following matters: (a) the exchange of information of 
the consequences for the Irish Sea as a result of the plant, (b) monitoring risks and 
effects on the Irish Sea, (c) the prevention of the pollution of the Irish Sea174.
4.3.2.3 Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits o f
175Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore) :
This dispute between Malaysia and Singapore concerned land reclamation 
activities conducted by Singapore in the Strait of Johor which separates the two 
States. Malaysia claimed that Singapore’s actions in engaging in land reclamation 
around Pulau Tekong and Tuas was: a) causing serious damage to the marine 
environment, b) prejudice to the rights of Malaysia, c) affecting the flow regime and
170 The MOX Plant Case, ITLOS, 2001, 89-94
171 See pleadings o f Lord Goldsmith The MOX Plant Case, ITLOS, 2001 Oral Proceedings 19/11/01-pm, 30
172 The MOX Plant Case, ITLOS, 2001 Oral Proceedings 19/11/01-pm, 35-37
173 The MOX Plant Case, ITLOS, 2001 Oral Proceedings 19/11/01-am, 18
174 The MOX Plant Case, ITLOS, 2001 Order 3/12/01, 12-14
175 Straits o f  Johor Case, ITLOS, 2003
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sedimentation and coastal erosion. Malaysia sought to preserve its rights relating to 
the marine environment and coastline, and that Singapore suspend the land 
reclamation activities in the area176.
Various forms of expert evidence were used. Both parties had as members of 
the delegation many experts in a range of fields. Malaysia included experts from its 
own government: (a) the Department of Survey and Mapping, (b) the Department of 
Environment, (c) the Royal Malaysian Navy, (d) the Department of Irrigation and 
Drainage, and (e) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There were also external experts 
from the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. Singapore’s experts included members 
from (a) the Ministry of National Development, (b) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
(c) Maritime Port Authority of Singapore, (d) the National Environment Agency. 
There were also experts from other Singapore based institutions: (a) members of the 
Department of Biological Sciences from Singaporean universities, (b) members of 
engineering and consultancy firms. One expert was from the Delft University of 
Technology, Netherlands177.
What is significant about this case is the way in which one delegation expert, 
Malaysia’s Professor in Geomorphology, was examined. In addition to presenting the 
applicant’s case to the Tribunal as a member of the delegation of Malaysia, she was 
also examined as an independent expert. The Professor first acted as counsel and 
expressed her views on the effect of Singapore’s land reclamation. However, she then 
was cross-examined like an independent expert on her work and study of the marine 
environment and coast in the area as well as her relationship with the government of
170
Malaysia . The practice of having a delegation expert examined by the other party 
is rare. In this case, the decision to do so was taken by the Tribunal in consultation
17 Q
with the parties . The reason for the examination of the delegation expert in this 
way was not apparent. As speculation, perhaps this was done at the request of 
Singapore to challenge the expert, and agreed by Malaysia so not to discredit its own 
expert. However, the examination of the delegation expert in this way goes to 
underline the flexible approach of the Tribunal.
In addition, there was one expert called according to Article 72 of the Rules, 
the Professor of Water Management at Cardiff University. He was an expert in
176 Straits o f Johor Case, ITLOS, 2003 Order 27/08/1999, 5-9
177 See further on details o f experts used: Straits o f  Johor Case, ITLOS, 2003 Provisional Measures 25/09/03-am, 3-6
178 Straits o f  Johor Case, ITLOS, 2003 Oral Proceedings, 25/09/03-am, 26-32
179 Straits o f Johor Case, ITLOS, 2003 Oral Proceedings, 25/09/03-am, 25
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environmental impact assessment, and examined by Malaysia and cross-examined by 
Singapore on the consequences of the land reclamation activities and measures that
i o/v
ought to be taken and the time frame of the implementation .
The Tribunal inter alia ruled that, with respect to the land reclamation in the 
sector of Tuas, Malaysia has not shown the urgency needed or that the damage would 
have been irreversible pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. With respect 
to the infilling work in Area D at Pulau Tekong, the Tribunal took note of Singapore’s 
commitment not to construct a stone revetment pending the completion of a study. It 
further ordered the cooperation of the two States, and the setting up of a group of 
experts181.
It is difficult to see the extent to which the Tribunal took into account the
expert evidence in this case. It was cautious in the way in which it reached its Order
so as to avoid directly addressing the question of adverse effects on the coastal area,
stating: “it cannot be excluded that, in the particular circumstances of this case, the
1 82land reclamation works may have adverse effects on the marine environment.”
In this particular case, experts were also used to promote the cooperation of 
the two parties after the Order. The Tribunal ruled that there were to be independent 
experts to investigate the effects of Singapore’s land reclamation, and to suggest 
measures to be taken183.
43 .2 .4  The M /V Saiga Case (No. 2),S4:
A continuation of the prompt release case examined earlier, the dispute 
concerned a shooting incident on the vessel, injury to its crew and the subsequent 
detention of the vessel at Conakry. According to the prompt release order, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines was to post $400,000 as security in addition to the 
$1,000,000 value cargo of gasoil that had been discharged from the vessel by the 
Guinean authorities. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines submitted that it had posted 
the bank guarantee. However, Guinea did not accept the terms of the guarantee and 
requested that changes be made. In the meantime, Guinea proceeded to file criminal 
charges against the Master of the vessel resulting in a $15,000,000 fine, to which
180 Straits o f  Johor Case, ITLOS, 2003 Oral Proceedings, 25/09/03-am, 32-38
181 Straits o f  Johor Case, ITLOS, 2003 See generally: Order, 08/10/03 and more specifically, 21-23
182 Straits o f  Johor Case, ITLOS, 2003 Order, 08/10/03 para 96
183 Straits o f Johor Case, ITLOS, 2003 Order, 08/10/03, 21-22
184 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999
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1 oc
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was made civilly liable The request for the 
provisional measure sought to prevent Guinea from taking or enforcing any judicial or 
administrative measure against the M/V Saiga. However, during this stage of the 
proceedings, there were no experts used because of the lack of technical or scientific 
issues.
4.3.3 Merits phase:
The Tribunal was also requested to deal with the merits of this case. However, 
there was not extensive use of expert evidence, but more from witnesses on the events 
surrounding the capture of the vessel by the Guinean authorities and the history of the 
vessel itself.
Regarding the use of experts, what is significant about this case is the 
application, for the first time, of a restriction on the expert evidence submitted. The 
communication submitted according to Article 72 of the Rules stated that Captain 
Bangoura was to be questioned as an expert on the laws and regulation of Guinea, the 
enforcement rules of Customs laws, the applicability of the laws to the Saiga, and the 
legal measures taken against fishing vessels. However, when examined, the subject 
matter was not those previously indicated in the communication. Captain Bangoura 
was questioned more as a witness about the facts surrounding the event rather than on 
the laws of Guinea. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines objected that the line of 
questioning had come as a “complete surprise” In response, the President of the 
Tribunal noted that this was a very pertinent matter, and it concerned both the 
Tribunal and other party. If the Tribunal knew that this would be the line of 
questioning, then it would have been interested to know the reaction of Saint Vincent
1 QO
and the Grenadines . Further, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines would have been 
able to prepare a response if it had known the intention of Guinea. Consequently, the 
evidence from Captain Bangoura was not permitted to be given because it would be 
contrary to the Rules of the Tribunal. What was already given on the subject 
uninformed to the Tribunal was struck off record. The President gave reasons for 
this: (a) there was insufficient notice given to the other party, and much more
185 For a detailed factual background to the case, see: The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 judgment (merits), para 31-39
186 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Oral Proceedings, 12/3/99-am, 11-14
187 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Oral Proceedings, 12/3/99-am, 11
188 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Oral Proceedings, 12/3/99-am, 11
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importantly, (b) it was entirely contrary to the information that was given to the 
Tribunal on the line of evidence to be provided by this witness189. The President 
emphasized that Guinea can still provide evidence on the subject that the Tribunal 
was originally informed.
In addition to the reasons given by the President, the exclusion of the 
information from Captain Bangoura was probably due to one more policy reason. 
The Tribunal was against the unpredictability that would have been brought into the 
proceedings if the testimony was allowed. In other words, because Guinea had not 
previously informed the Tribunal, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were not 
prepared and would be at a disadvantage if the practice was allowed. For the 
Tribunal, the lack of input from Saint Vincent and the Grenadines would also deprive 
it of a more complete picture of the issues. From this, it can be deduced that, even 
though the Tribunal has been flexible in terms of the rules applied to the expert 
evidence, it is not willing to put a party at an advantage at the expense of another or 
make a ruling without both sides of the argument.
The second point worth noting about this case is that the parties seem to 
recognize that delegation experts have a separate role to those called according to 
Article 72 of the Rules. In this case, the magistrate who dealt with the Saiga in the 
Guinean courts was included as an expert according to Article 72 of the Rules. 
However, he was also part of the Guinean delegation. Consequently, it was decided 
by Guinea that he only should act in the capacity of a member of the delegation190, 
and not an expert according to Article 72. Although not exactly the same 
circumstances, this must be compared to the Strait o f Johor Case191.
The Tribunal ruled that Guinea violated the right of Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines in arresting the MTV Saiga and, as compensation, awarded the sum of 
$2,123,357 with interest. The compensation was allotted for the detention of the 
Captain and the crew, for the gunshot injuries to the Second Officer and one other, the 
confiscated cargo and the damage to the vessel.192
4.3.4 Preliminary conclusion of jurisprudence of ITLOS:
189 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Oral Proceedings, 12/3/99-am, 13
190 The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Oral Proceedings, 12/3/99-am, 14-15
191 See: Chapter 6, Section 4.3.2.3, 217-219 Cf. the expert’s name in the Strait o f Johor Case was not included in the 
communication according to Article 72 of the Rules.
192 For further details, see: The Saiga Case (No. 2), ITLOS, 1999 Judgment, para 167-183
Charlie Gamjana-Goonchom
Page 221 of 321
The jurisprudence of the Tribunal has shown that expert evidence has been 
used in a variety of cases. In prompt release cases, the use of experts involved the 
valuation of the vessel in question, and issues such as the precise location where the 
dispute arose. Expert evidence has taken many forms: (a) written submissions, (b) 
evidence pleaded by experts who were members of the delegation, (c) evidence from 
experts called by the parties. It can also be seen from the cases that expert evidence 
seems to carry weight in influencing the outcome of the dispute. The values of the 
vessel in the different cases were close to the expert value, if not the same193. ITLOS 
has yet to appoint its own experts in prompt releases cases. The reasons why will be 
addressed by the interviews of the judges below.
In the provisional measures cases, similar to the prompt release cases, expert 
evidence was also presented in various forms. The Southern Bluefin Tuna Case has 
shown the Tribunal’s willingness to be flexible in allowing parties’ requests on the 
procedures of the proceedings that differ from the provisions. The Tribunal allowed a 
voir dire to be carried out, and the expert was also able to stay in the courtroom before 
and after his testimony. Further, because the Order went in favour of the applicants 
who called an expert to give an oral testimony, could this indicate that the Tribunal 
has a preference for evidence from experts who appear to be more “independent” and 
open to scrutiny through the cross-examination process?194
4.4 Interviews with the judges:
Interviews with 13 of ITLOS’s judges has been revealing on the issue of 
expert evidence. Judge F stated that the role of experts is crucial and Judge H added 
that it is clear to him that the drafters of the provisions recognized the need of the 
Tribunal for experts.
The judges have noted that expert evidence can come in many forms, as stated 
previously in this section. However, most noted that normally the evidence came 
from the parties. Judge E explained that this is due to the nature of international 
litigation which is adversarial in nature. The Court would be generally passive, not
193 See: The Camouco Case, ITLOS, 2000, The Monte Confurco Case, ITLOS, 2000
194 The applicants commissioned Prof. Beddington who appeared before the Tribunal. In contrast, Japan submitted a written 
submission by Prof. Burlington, see: The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, ITLOS, 1999 Oral Proceedings, 18/9/99-am, 41-45 and 
18/9/99-pm, 6-11
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seeking information on its own accord. He further added that the objectivity of the 
experts is ensured by the process of the cross-examination195.
In some cases before the Tribunal, Judge E said that Tribunal-appointed 
experts were not needed because there was already enough expertise brought by the 
parties. In others, there was already expertise on the bench. Alternatively, the 
Tribunal used experts in an informal manner196. Judge H added that the informal 
experts were needed because the evidence presented by the parties was often very 
technical. However, Judge I stated that, with the use of informal experts, from the 
perspective of the party, there is a danger that they do not know the extent of the 
influence that the experts might have on the Tribunal. There is a lack of transparency 
there. Finally, Judge E said that experts can also be used for a different purpose, such 
as after the judgment of the Tribunal in the Strait o f Johor Case.
Judge D observed that experts have so far been used in a satisfactory way 
before the Tribunal. However, the cases so far have not tested the provisions. In the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, few things are worth noting: a) the introduction of the 
voir dire, b) the issue of whether experts can play two roles, as counsel and an expert 
called before the Tribunal, c) the Tribunal originally sought independent expertise but 
this did not finally materialize.
Judge H added that the Tribunal is not bound by the opinion of the experts. 
However, they do often lead the Tribunal to a conclusion. The Tribunal has the 
discretion to use all or parts of the expert evidence. He added that the Tribunal has 
not discussed the rules on expert evidence as such. However, he does not think that 
the Tribunal has been hindered by the existing rules either.
Judge I noted that the current arrangement on expert evidence is satisfactory, 
being the only feasible arrangement when dealing with sovereign States. The 
international judge cannot be too active in seeking expert evidence. Judge I added 
that, in his opinion, sometimes the judges bow down too easily to expert evidence.
Regarding what factors have influence on the approach of the Tribunal, many 
judges noted that the lack of time played a very important role. This was a reason 
why the Tribunal did not appoint its own experts, especially because the cases that 
have been before the Tribunal mostly were prompt release and provisional measures 
cases. Judge H added that, if there had been cases on their merits, then the Tribunal
195 Judge G, Judge J, Judge I agree.
196 Judge H, Judge D agree.
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might have appointed its own experts. However, the priority of the Tribunal has been 
on the urgency of the cases. Judge G stated that the use of experts also depends on 
the subject of the dispute. If the issues are very technical, experts will be needed. 
Further, Judge I’s views that the Tribunal has to be cautious in actively seeking 
evidence because the parties are sovereign States suggest the Tribunal’s deference to 
them.
Regarding the future of the Tribunal on expert evidence, many judges were of 
the view that the Tribunal could, with the right opportunity, use independent experts. 
Some judges stated that they would personally give more weight to independent
197expert advice , but that is not to say that the evidence presented by the parties has 
been biased. However, Judge G noted that, even with Tribunal-appointed experts, 
their independence cannot be guaranteed, but they tend to give a more balanced and 
complete picture of the problem. Judge J has added that it can be sometimes difficult 
to find the right experts. Judge I expressed his opinion that the Tribunal should try to 
appoint experts in consultation with the parties. This would be a very legitimate way 
of using experts. However, he added that any experts should still be subject to a 
cross-examination.
Judge H also pointed towards Article 289 of UNCLOS. He stated that if the 
disputes get very technical, the Tribunal would be prepared to use this article to 
appoint experts who would also sit on the bench. However, the Tribunal has not 
needed this article so far. He further noted that the approach of the WTO on experts 
functions well. He liked the way in which the expert evidence submitted by the 
parties are again analysed by the experts appointed by the panel. With the experts’ 
help, the panel could ask the right questions. Consequently, in the context of ITLOS, 
if the evidence presented by the parties is completely contrary to one another, then it 
would be useful to have independent experts198. They will help the Tribunal focus the 
issues.
Judge F stated that, in order for the adequacy of the provisions to be tested, the 
Tribunal would need more cases on the merits.
4.5 Concluding Remarks:
197 Judge D, Judge G, Judge J
198 Judge F agrees.
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What must be first noted is that there have been a limited number of cases 
before the Tribunal, the majority of which have been prompt release and provisional 
measures cases. The amount of expert evidence used in these cases can be limited 
when compared to full merits cases, consequently putting a limitation on the study.
The provisions of the Tribunal are similar to those of the ICJ. As remarked on 
by Judge H, the drafters recognized the importance of experts and the need for the 
Tribunal to consult them. There are many provisions which provide for expert 
evidence. The Tribunal can appoint its own experts according to Article 289 of 
UNCLOS. In addition, the Tribunal can also arrange for an inquiry or expert opinion. 
The parties can also introduce expert evidence as part of their written submission or 
they can call experts to give oral testimony. Experts can also be appointed as 
members of the parties’ delegation.
The practice of ITLOS has shown that expert evidence has generally been 
submitted by the parties through the written and oral testimonies. The Tribunal has 
yet to appoint its own experts but have used independent experts in an informal 
manner, and sought formal independent expert advice on one occasion which did not 
materialize. The judges are not active in seeking their own expert evidence. Judge E 
has explained that this is a result of the adversarial nature of international litigation.
The jurisprudence has also shown several points worth noting. First, the 
Tribunal recognizes the importance of expert evidence by using it even in the urgent 
prompt release and provisional measures cases. The parties used their right to present 
oral evidence in many of the cases. Further, the importance of expert evidence was 
underlined by many of the judges. Second, the jurisprudence has shown that the 
expert evidence plays a crucial role in aiding the tribunal to reach its decision. In 
many of the prompt release cases, the value of the vessel arrived by the Tribunal was 
the same or very close the expert estimate. Third, the Tribunal has been willing to be 
flexible in its approach to expert evidence. For example, in the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Case, the Tribunal allowed a voir dire to be carried out. In addition, contrary to the 
provisions, it allowed the expert to stay in the courtroom before and after his 
testimony. Fourth, it can be argued that, even though the Tribunal is flexible on its 
approach, it is not willing to grant one party an unfair advantage over another. This 
was illustrated in the merits phase of the M /V Saiga Case.
This section has also given an insight as to the influencing factors on the 
approach of the Tribunal on expert evidence. Many judges noted that an important
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limitation on the Tribunal was the lack of time. Facing prompt release and 
provisional measures cases, the Tribunal did not have any time to appoint its own 
experts but had to rely on the expert evidence of the parties. Many of the judges also 
commented that, should the Tribunal have more cases on their merits in the future, 
then it could appoint its own experts. Further, as indicated by one of the judges, the 
Tribunal seems to be careful in not being too active in seeking the expert evidence. 
The parties are left to their own devices, which indicates the level of deference which 
the Tribunal has for States.
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Section 5: WTO DSB
5.1 Introduction:
This section will examine the approach of the WTO DSB on expert evidence. 
This issue is particularly pertinent in the WTO’s context because of the technical 
nature of the disputes. The experts generally address scientific questions of whether a 
Member’s measure has violated the WTO agreement. It is worth noting at the outset 
that, because facts can only be dealt with only at the panel level, there is a 
corresponding limitation on expert evidence. However, there can be legal expertise at 
the AB level. As with the other two tribunals, there are many ways in which expert 
evidence can be submitted. This section will accordingly be divided into: a) party 
appointed experts, b) tribunal appointed experts. For the purposes of a comparative 
study and to underline the distinction between the use of experts in the WTO DSB 
and the other two tribunals, this section will focus on the W TO’s use of tribunal 
appointed experts.
5.2 Party appointed experts:
Similar to the other two tribunals, party appointed experts can provide 
evidence in various ways. First, they can be appointed as members of the delegation. 
They can: a) conduct reports which the parties can submit to the panel and refer to, b) 
present the arguments of the parties to the panel themselves, c) give advice as part of 
the working progress before the proceedings itself. Alternatively, they can be called 
before the panel to testify, and asked questions by the parties, or the panelists. If 
called, the experts can be subject to cross-examination from the other party. 
However, in the context of the WTO, the expert evidence from the parties is normally 
submitted in the written form.
Parties have always been able to appoint experts as members of their 
delegation in both the old GATT and the new WTO regime. The right to appoint 
experts was confirmed by the AB in the EC-Regime fo r  the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution o f Bananas Case199. In the case, Saint Lucia argued that it should be
19y EC-Bananas, WTO DSB, 1997 Appellate Body Report, para 5-12
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allowed to rely on the use of two private legal advisers who were not full-time Saint 
Lucian government officers during the AB oral hearings. The AB ruled that Saint 
Lucia was permitted to do so. Further, the AB stated that it could find nothing in the 
WTO Agreement, the DSU, the AB Working Procedures, customary international law 
or the practice of international tribunals, that prevents a WTO Member from including 
whomever it chooses in its delegation during the oral hearings200. The expert advice
901can cover a range of issues, including: a) legal experts on WTO law , b) scientific 
experts, c) economic experts.
5.3 Panel appointed experts:
5.3.1 Provisions of the WTO DSB:
The WTO DSB is governed by three provisions: the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), the Rules of conduct on rules and procedures for the settling 
disputes, and the Working Procedures for Appellate Review.
What is of note in the context of the WTO DSB is that the panelists are not 
permanent. Consequently, expertise can be introduced into the proceedings by 
choosing the panelists with expertise to match the dispute. Hence, from the outset, 
there is arguably some level of expertise already in the proceedings202. According to 
the DSU, the list of individuals kept by the Secretariat for the selection of panelists 
will contain the area of experience and expertise of each individual to help in the
90Tselection process. In addition to the expertise of the panellists, the DSU provides 
other channels for the introduction of expert evidence:
5.3.1.1 The DSU 
Expert Review Group:
200 EC-Bananas, WTO DSB, 1997 Appellate Body Report, para 10-12. The AB also stated that this right was particularly 
important for developing countries, and to ensure that they are represented by qualified counsel.
201 E.g. EC-Bananas, WTO DSB, 1997
202 For example, panelists with expertise in agriculture would deal with disputes concerning this issue.
203 DSU, 1994 art 8(4)
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According to Article 13.2 of the DSU, a panel can appoint an expert review 
group of independent experts to prepare an advisory report204. The details of the rules 
governing the expert review group are set out in Appendix 4 of the DSU.
The terms of reference and working procedures of the expert review group are 
determined by the panel205. They must report to the panel, and only persons with 
professional and experience in the field in question may participate206. There are also
• • 9 0 7provisions ensuring the impartiality of the expert review group . Members of the 
group are also subject to the Rules of Conduct for the DSU which ensure impartiality 
of the experts by providing that they must declare any conflict of interest208.
For transparency, the information provided to an expert review group may be 
accessed by the parties unless confidential209. The expert review group must submit a 
draft report to the parties for comments, and take their comments into account as 
appropriate in the final report. The final report is only advisory for the panel210.
Further, the expert review group is able to “seek information and technical 
advice from any source they deem appropriate”211. This gives the expert review 
group the flexibility of seeking advice on issues not foreseen by the panel at the 
beginning of the advisory report.
Experts according to Article 13.1:
A WTO panel can also ask for information and technical advice from any 
individual or body as it considers appropriate, as long as they are within the 
jurisdiction of a member State and that State has been notified212. Further, the DSU 
states that “a Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by a panel for 
such information as the panel considers necessary and appropriate”213. There are no 
restrictions in the DSU on who the panel can chose as experts. The only limitation is 
the Rules of Conduct on the issue of the impartiality of experts. As will be addressed
™ DSU, 1994 art 13(2)
205 DS U, 1994 Appendix 4 art 1
206 DS U, 1994 Appendix art 2
207 DSU, 1994 Appendix art 3. The provisions ensure citizens o f parties to the dispute do not serve on the expert review group.
208 Rules o f  conduct, 1996 Rule II o f the Governing Principle
209 DSU, 1994 Appendix art 5
210 DSU, 1994 Appendix 4 art 9
211 DSU, 1994 Appendix 4 art 4
212 DSU, 1994 art 13(1)
213 DSU, 1994 art 13(1)
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below, the practice of the WTO has shown that this article has been used to obtain 
expert evidence from a range of sources.
The Secretariat:
According to the DSU, the Secretariat can also play a role in providing 
information to the panel that could be classified as expert evidence. The Secretariat 
has to assist panels “especially on the legal, historical and procedural aspects of the 
matters dealt with, and...providing secretarial and technical support”214. Normally, 
the panel would get help from a legal officer working for the legal affairs division or 
the rules division, and a secretary with input on technical matters of the WTO 
Agreement in question. For example, in cases involving the SPS Agreement, the 
secretary would come from the Agricultural Division215.
Other provisions under the general WTO Agreement:
The Rules of Conduct does not provide ways of introducing expert evidence. 
It addresses the issue of impartiality, the possibility of conflicting interests, and the
9 1 f\confidentiality of actors in the dispute settlement process, including experts . 
Experts must disclose any conflict of interests before participating in the dispute 
settlement process.
Finally, the WTO DSB is governed by the Working Procedures for Appellate 
Review, containing rules on the appeal process217. Since the AB only deals with 
questions of law and not questions of fact, there are no articles in the Working 
Procedures addressing expert evidence.
Other specific agreements:
214  DSU, 1 9 9 4  a r t  2 7 ( 1 )
215  P a u w e l y n ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3 3 3
216 Rules o f  conduct , 1 9 9 6  S e e  e s p e c i a l l y :  S e c t i o n  1 1 , I V ,  V I ,  V I I ,  a n d  A n n e x  l b  w h i c h  s t i p u l a t e  t h e  e x p e r t s  w h i c h  a r e  c o v e r e d  b y  
t h e  R u l e s .
217  Appellate Body Working Procedure , 2 0 0 5
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In addition to the general WTO Agreement, some of the W TO’s more specific 
agreements also have their own provisions regarding expert evidence218. These 
provisions generally confirm those of the DSU, but there are also some which 
supplement them, including those for permanent expert bodies. Some examples of the 
provisions of the specific agreements are given below.
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures provides for a 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and Subsidiary Bodies219. This 
is a body composed of representatives from each of the Members. The duties of this 
Committee include, inter alia, (a) giving Members the opportunity for consultation on 
matters relating to the operation of the Agreement220, (b) establishing a Permanent
99  1Group of Experts (PGE) composed of five persons .
The PGE can give advice in three ways: (a) the panel may request assistance 
“with regard to whether the measure in question is a prohibited subsidy”222. In such 
cases, the PGE has to submit a report which “shall be accepted by the panel without 
modification”., (b) Member States may consult the PGE and ask for opinion on the
99  9nature of any subsidy proposed , (c) the Committee may also seek an advisory
9 9 4opinion on the existence and the nature of any subsidy . However, so far in the 
history of the WTO, no panel has made use of the PGE225.
Other agreements also provide for permanent expert bodies. In the Agreement 
on Customs Valuation, there are provisions for the Technical Committee on Customs 
Valuation which is under the auspices of the Customs Co-operation Council. 
According to the Agreement, the panel is able to “request the Technical Committee to
99  f\carry out an examination of any question requiring technical consideration” . Every 
Member of the WTO has the right to be on the Committee. In contrast to the PGE, 
the report of the Technical Committee is not binding upon the panel. To date, 
Committee has not been used by the Members.
Another type of an expert body is set up by the Textiles Agreement: the 
Textile Monitoring Body. This body is different to the ones already mentioned
218  E . g .  A g r e e m e n t  o n  S u b s i d i e s  a n d  C o u n t e r v a i l i n g  M e a s u r e s ,  t h e  A g r e e m e n t  o n  t h e  A p p l i c a t i o n  o f  S a n i t a r y  a n d  P h y t o s a n i t a r y  
M e a s u r e s ,  a n d  t h e  A g r e e m e n t  o n  T e c h n i c a l  B a r r i e r s  t o  T r a d e .
219 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, 1 9 9 4  a r t  2 4 . 1
220 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, 1 9 9 4  a r t  2 4 . 1
221 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, 1 9 9 4  a r t  2 4 . 3
222 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, 1 9 9 4  a r t  4 . 5  T h e  e x p e r t s  g i v e  a d v i c e  o n  q u e s t i o n s  o f  w h e t h e r  t h e  m e a s u r e  
i s  a  p r o h i b i t e d  s u b s i d y ,  r a i s i n g  q u e s t i o n s  o f  a n  o v e r l a p  w i t h  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  p a n e l i s t s .
223 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, 1 9 9 4  a r t  2 4 . 4
224 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, 1 9 9 4  a r t  2 4 . 3
225 P a u w e l y n  h a s  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  w h y  n o  e x p e r t  r e v i e w  g r o u p  h a s  b e e n  u s e d .  P a u w e l y n ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3 3 6 - 3 3 7
226 Customs Valuation Agreement, 1 9 9 4  a r t  1 9 . 4 .  T h e  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  a r e  s e t  o u t  i n  A n n e x  I I  o f  t h e  A g r e e m e n t .
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because it does not give advice to panels. The Agreement stipulates that the body 
must “examine all measures taken under this Agreement and their conformity 
therewith, and to take the actions specifically required of it by this Agreement”227. 
Further, if a bilateral consultation fails, the Body’s role comes into play. Before 
requesting a panel, the parties must argue their dispute before the Body. It will then 
make recommendations. If the dispute cannot be resolved, then it would go to the 
panel where the findings of the Body are not binding228.
In addition to the agreements which provide for permanent expert bodies 
mentioned above, there are also others which provide for the use of experts. The 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement) provides that “In a dispute under this Agreement involving scientific or 
technical issues, a panel should seek advice from experts chosen by the panel in 
consultation with the parties to the dispute. To this end, the panel may, when it deems 
it appropriate, establish an advisory technical experts group, or consult the relevant 
international organizations, at the request of either party to the dispute or on its own 
initiative.”229
The last example is the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement). It provides that “At the request of a party to a dispute, or at its own 
initiative, a panel may establish a technical expert group to assist in questions of a 
technical nature, requiring detailed consideration by experts.”230 The Agreement 
continues to stipulate the way in which these experts groups are to be regulated . 
Again, the rules which regulate the expert groups are identical to those in the DSU232.
The similarity between the DSU and the specific agreements on the provisions 
on experts underlines the fact that the same policy is carried through the many 
agreements of the WTO.
5.3.2 The practice of the WTO DSB:
227 Textiles Agreement, 1 9 9 4  a r t  8 .  T h i s  a g r e e m e n t  w a s  t e r m i n a t e d  o n  1 J a n u a r y  2 0 0 5 .
228 H o w e v e r ,  t h e  f i n d i n g s  o f  t h e  B o d y  w i l l  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  p a n e l .
229  SPS Agreement, 1 9 9 4  a r t  1 1 . 2
2 3 °  jg jA g re e m e n t,  1 9 9 4  a r t  1 4 . 2
231 j g j Agreement, 1 9 9 4  a r t  1 4 . 3
232 TBT Agreement, 1 9 9 4  A n n e x  I I
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This section will address the question of how the WTO DSB has applied its 
provisions on expert evidence, highlighting the important cases233. From the outset, it 
is important to take note of the following: a) the use of experts is largely limited to the 
panel stage because the AB only has the competence to rule on questions of law, b) 
similar to the ICJ and ITLOS, and WTO DSB has not adopted a restrictive approach 
to the admission of evidence. The parties can submit evidence as they see fit but any 
evidence would be accordingly given different weights by the panel.
5.3.2.1 The change from the old GATT arrangement to the new WTO regime:
Under the GATT arrangement, the panel did not seek any expert advice except 
on one occasion: the Thailand-Cigarette Case where the World Health Organization 
was asked its opinion234. However, this has changed in the new WTO regime235. 
Because the practice of the WTO has been relatively much more consistent than the 
other two tribunals examined before, it will be clearer for this section to be divided 
according to the way expert evidence has been obtained.
5.3.2.2 Expert review group:
No panel has made use of an expert review group but rather opted to appoint 
individual experts, even when an expert review group was the preferred option of the 
parties. This was illustrated in the European Communities -  Asbestos Case.
In this case, the EC argued that the DSU “requires that, when consulting 
scientific experts, there should be an expert review group according to the terms of 
Appendix 4 to the Understanding”. In reply, the panel stated that “we also note that 
Article 13.2 provides that panels ‘m ay’ request in writing form an expert review 
group...”, hence indicating that expert review groups are only an option . Further, 
the option of the expert review group has been upheld by the AB in a number of
' j ' i n  9TRcases: (a) the EC-Beef Hormones Case , (b) the Argentina-Footwear Case . In the
233  D u e  t o  t h e  g r e a t  n u m b e r  o f  c a s e s  t h a t  h a v e  b e e n  b e f o r e  t h e  W T O ,  t h i s  s e c t i o n  c a n n o t  e x a m i n e  a l l  f o  t h e m .
234 Thailand - Cigarette Case, G A T T  P a n e l ,  1990, S e e  f u r t h e r :  C h r i s t o f o r o u ,  (2000) 623-627
235  F o r  t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  u s e  o f  e x p e r t  e v i d e n c e ,  s e e :  P a u w e l y n ,  (2002) 326
236 EC  - Asbestos Case, W T O  D S B ,  2001 P a n e l  R e p o r t  (2000), S e c t i o n  D .  S e e  f u r t h e r  a l s o :  P a u w e l y n ,  (2002) 327-328
237 EC  - Hormones Case, W T O  D S B ,  1997 A p p e l l a t e  B o d y  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  147. “.. . i n  d i s p u t e s  i n v o l v i n g  s c i e n t i f i c  o r  t e c h n i c a l  
i s s u e s ,  n e i t h e r  A r t i c l e  11.2 o f  t h e  S P S  A g r e e m e n t ,  n o r  A r t i c l e  13 o f  t h e  D S U  p r e v e n t s  p a n e l s  f r o m  c o n s u l t i n g  w i t h  i n d i v i d u a l  
e x p e r t s .  R a t h e r ,  b o t h  t h e  S P S  A g r e e m e n t  a n d  t h e  D S U  l e a v e  t o  t h e  s o u n d  d i s c r e t i o n  o f  a  p a n e l  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  w h e t h e r  t h e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a n  e x p e r t  r e v i e w  g r o u p  i s  n e c e s s a r y  o r  a p p r o p r i a t e . ”  T h e  p a n e l  d e c i d e d  t o  c o n s u l t  i n d i v i d u a l  e x p e r t s  d e s p i t e  t h e  
c o m m o n  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  t h a t  a n  e x p e r t  r e v i e w  g r o u p  w a s  t h e  p r e f e r r e d  c h o i c e .  S e e  f u r t h e r :  C h r i s t o f o r o u ,  (2000) 629-631
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EC-Asbestos Case, the AB reached this conclusion even for disputes under the TBT 
Agreement which had no reference to the use individual experts but only expert
239review groups .
There have been explanations for this preference, as summarised here240. 
First, the expert review group has to produce a report according to paragraph 6 of 
Appendix 4 of the DSU. There is understandably a fear that this report might restrict 
the panel in terms of the flexibility of the gathering of its own evidence and as to how 
it can reach the end result. Using individual experts gives more control to the panels 
over the proceedings to ask the questions as they see fit. In addition, although the 
capacity of the expert review group is only an advisory one, it would be difficult for 
the panel to ignore or not adopt any common position that the group has 
established241. Second, an expert review group will take a long time to finish its 
inquiry, possibly putting the panel under pressure in the already limited time 
available. The writer agrees with these views. Reasons of a practical nature can 
influence a tribunal’s approach.
It has also been suggested that the preference for individual experts may bring 
about disadvantages242. First, the panels could have to decide between contradictory 
scientific experts. Second, the panels might not be exposed to the more balanced 
view that an expert group review could offer243.
5.3.2.3 Experts according to Article 13.1 of the DSU:
Experts according to Article 13.1 have been used on many occasions in the 
jurisprudence of the WTO. The Article has been used by the panels to request 
“information and technical advice” from a range of sources: a) individual experts244,
238 Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports o f Foorwear, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 7 ,  P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a .  8 4  A r t i c l e  1 3  o f  t h e  D S U  
e n a b l e s  a  p a n e l  t o  s e e k  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  t e c h n i c a l  a d v i c e  a s  i t  d e e m s  a p p r o p r i a t e  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e ,  a n d  ( . . . )  t h e  D S U  l e a v e s  t o  
t h e  s o u n d  d i s c r e t i o n  o f  a  p a n e l  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  w h e t h e r  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a n  e x p e r t  r e v i e w  g r o u p  i s  n e c e s s a r y  o r  
a p p r o p r i a t e ”
239 EC - Asbestos Case , W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 1  P a n e l  r e p o r t ,  p a r a  8 . 1 0 .  T h e  p a n e l  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  D S U  a n d  t h e  T B T  A g r e e m e n t  a s  n o t  
c o n f l i c t i n g  a n d  a s  c o m p l e m e n t i n g  e a c h  o t h e r .  T h i s  m e a n t  t h a t  t h e  e x p e r t  r e v i e w  g r o u p  w a s  a n  o p t i o n  f o r  t h e  p a n e l .  T h e  p a n e l  
w e n t  o n  t o  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  c o n s u l t i n g  i n d i v i d u a l  e x p e r t s  w a s  t h e  m o s t  a p p r o p r i a t e  m e t h o d .
2 40  P a u w e l y n ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3 2 8
241 P a u w e l y n ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3 2 8
242 P a u w e l y n ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3 2 9
243 S e e  f u r t h e r :  P a u w e l y n ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3 2 9 .
244  T h e r e  h a v e  b e e n  7  c a s e s  w h e r e  t h e  W T O  D S B  h a s  r e q u e s t e d  o p i n i o n  f r o m  e x p e r t  i n d i v i d u a l s .  T h e y  h a v e  a l l  b e e n  a t  t h e  p a n e l  
s t a g e :  a )  EC  - Hormones Case , W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 7 ,  b )  USA - Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Case , W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 8 ,  c )  
Australia-Salmon, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 8 ,  d )  Japan - Agricultural Products Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 9 ,  e )  Australia-Salmon, Article 21.5  
Case, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 0 ,  f) EC - Asbestos Case, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 1 ,  g )  Japan-Apples, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 3
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b) institutions such as international organizations245, c) Members involved in the 
dispute246 and those which were not247.
Article 13.1 does not limit the field of expert evidence that the panel can seek. 
Regarding individual experts, the focus has been on questions of science . Panels’ 
requests to international organizations have involved questions on specialized areas, 
but not necessarily scientific. For example, questions have been put to: a) the IMF 
concerning balance-of-payments and national reserves249, b) WIPO on the 
interpretation of certain provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property250.
The panel also has the discretion to request advice from experts at its own 
initiation. This was confirmed in the US-Shrimp/Turtle Case25 ]. The parties may 
request the panel to seek expert opinion, but the panel has the discretion to do so or 
not, as confirmed in the Argentina-Footwear Case. Argentina requested the panel to 
seek advice from the IMF252. The panel ruled that this was not required, and the issue 
was contested before the AB. It was confirmed that the panel had the discretion to 
refuse such a request as long as the panel has made an “objective assessment of the 
matter before it” . However, the panel would normally appoint experts if there has 
been a request from the parties254.
The level of the discretion of the panel to appoint experts can differ between 
different agreements. The wording of the SPS Agreement suggests that there is a 
stronger obligation for the panel to appoint experts. The provisions state that the 
“panel should seek advice from experts chosen by the panel” should a dispute under
2 45  T h e r e  h a v e  b e e n  9  c a s e s  w h e r e  q u e s t i o n s  o f  c o n s u l t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  w e r e  b r o u g h t  b e f o r e  t h e  W T O  D S B .  T h e  
f o l l o w i n g  i s  a  l i s t  w i t h  t h e  r e l e v a n t  i n s t i t u t i o n  a n d  t h e  s t a g e  o f  t h e  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  p r o c e s s :  a )  Argentina - Measures Affecting 
Imports o f Foorwear, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 7 ,  A B - I M F ;  b )  India - Quantitative Restrictions Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 9 ,  P a n e l - I M F ;  c )  
USA - Copyright Act Case , W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 0 ,  P a n e l - W I P O ;  d )  USA - Section 211, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 1 ,  P a n e l - W I P O ;  e )  India- 
Autos, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 1 ,  P a n e l - I M F ;  f )  EC-Sardines Case, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 2 ,  P a n e l  a n d  A B - C O D E X ;  g )  EC-Trademarks/GIs, 
W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 5 ,  P a n e l - W I P O ;  h )  Dominican Replubic - Cigarettes Case, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 5 ,  P a n e l - I M F ;  g )  EC-Chicken 
Classification Case, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 5 ,  P a n e l - W o r l d  C u s t o m s  O r g a n i z a t i o n .
24 6  T h e  p a n e l ’ s  r e q u e s t  f r o m  M e m b e r s  t e n d s  t o  b e  i n f o r m a t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  t e c h n i c a l  a d v i c e .  T h e  c a s e s  i n c l u d e :  a )  Canada- 
Civilian Aircraft, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 9 ,  p a n e l  a n d  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y ;  b )  Australia-Leather, Article 21.5, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 0 ,  p a n e l ;  c )  
USA - Lead Bars Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 9 ,  p a n e l ;  d )  USA - Wheat Gluten Safeguards, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 0 ,  p a n e l  a n d  A p p e l l a t e  
B o d y ;  e )  Canada-Aircraft II, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 2 ,  p a n e l ;  f )  EC-Bed Linen, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 0 ,  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y ;  g )  EC - Pipe 
Fittings, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 3 ,  p a n e l ;  h )  USA - Subsidies on Upland Cotton Case, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 5 ,  p a n e l .  W T O  p a n e l s  m a y  d r a w  
a d v e r s e  i n f e r e n c e s  i f  t h e  p a r t i e s  f a i l  t o  p r o d u c e  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e q u e s t e d .  Canada-Civilian Aircraft, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 9 ,  A B  
R e p o r t
247 Turkey-Textiles, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 9
248 S e e  f u r t h e r :  P a u w e l y n ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3 3 1 - 3 3 2
249 India - Quantitative Restrictions Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 9
25 0  USA - Section 211, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 1
251 I t  h a s  b e e n  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  t h e  p a n e l  s h o u l d  a p p o i n t  e x p e r t s  o n  i t s  i n i t i a t i o n  m o r e .  S e e  f u r t h e r :  P a u w e l y n ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3 9 9
252 Argentina - Footwear, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 0
253  A s  s t a t e d  i n  A r t i c l e  1 1  o f  DSU, 1 9 9 4
2 54  P a u w e l y n  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  r e f u s i n g  t h e  r e q u e s t  c o u l d  u n d e r m i n e  t h e  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n .  P a u w e l y n ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3 3 9
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the Agreement involve scientific or technical issues255. In some SPS Agreement cases, 
such as the Japan-Agricultural Products Case or the Australia-Salmon Case, the
256panel appointed the experts even before the first submissions of the parties .
The experts are normally taken from a list provided by relevant international 
organizations257. The panels appoint the experts but the parties are given the 
opportunity to comment on the panel’s choice, ranking them in order of preference, 
and objecting to any with reasons for doing so. However, there has also been 
divergence from this norm. In the EC-Hormones Case, the panel allowed the parties 
to appoint one expert each. The panel then appointed four additional experts258.
The number of experts is for the panel to decide, and depends on the nature of 
the case. If the dispute involves a wide range of issues, then more experts will be 
needed. The jurisprudence has shown that the number of experts can vary, but tend to 
be odd rather than even, for example: (a) three experts in the Japan-Agricultural 
Products Case, (b) four in the EC-Asbestos Case, (c) five in the US-Shrimp/Turtle 
Case, and (d) six in the EC-Hormones Case. The two limiting factors on the number 
of experts seem to be time and the practical limitation for the panel to have to deal 
with too many experts.
From the jurisprudence, the procedure for obtaining expert opinion is normally 
the following. The panel would draft the questions and receive comments from the 
parties before sending the questions to the experts. The experts will then answer the 
questions in writing in the field of their expertise. The parties are then given the 
opportunity to comment on the expert’s views in writing. The experts can take part in 
the oral proceedings where they can: (a) be cross-examined by the parties, and (b) 
answer additional questions from the panel. Before finalizing the panel report, the 
relevant section will be sent to the experts to ensure that their views have been 
conveyed accurately. The verbatim record of the hearings with the experts and their 
answers to the questions of the panel are also published. Compared to the ICJ and 
ITLOS, the use of the cross-examination is much more limited in the context of the 
WTO259. To explain this, Pauwelyn has suggested several reasons: a) the parties’ fear 
to upset the experts who could heavily influence the decision of the panel, b) the
255  SPS Agreem ent , 1 9 9 4  a r t  1 1 . 2 .  T h e s e  p r o v i s i o n s  c o u l d  e x p l a i n  w h y  e x p e r t s  h a v e  b e e n  a p p o i n t e d  m o r e  f o r  d i s p u t e s  u n d e r  t h e  
S P S  A g r e e m e n t .
256  S e e  f u r t h e r :  P a u w e l y n ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3 4 0
257 F o r  e x a m p l e ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O f f i c e  o f  E p i z o o t i c s  o n  a n  i s s u e  o n  a n i m a l  h e a l t h .
258 EC  -  Hormones Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 7  p a r a  6 . 1 - 6 . 8 ,  e s p  6 . 7
259  S e e  f u r t h e r :  C h r i s t o f o r o u ,  ( 2 0 0 0 )  6 3 2
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WTO dispute settlement process is not so confrontational but carried out in a way
Of\C\similar to diplomatic meetings .
5.3.2.4 Examples of Cases:
Advice from individual experts:
Disputes with expert evidence requests from individuals according to Article
13.1 of the DSU have involved “scientific and technical” questions, often issues of 
health or the environment261.
EC-Beef Hormones:
This dispute was two cases running in parallel, between: a) the United States 
and the EC, b) Canada and the EC. It concerned European Council Directives which 
prohibited the importation and the placing on the market of meat and meat products 
which had been treated by any of the six growth hormones. Three of the hormones 
are naturally produced by animals, and the other three are artificially created to 
produce similar effects262.
Both Canada and the United States claimed that the EC measures were in 
violation of Article 2, 3, 5 of the SPS Agreement . In addition, Canada argued that 
the measures also violated Articles III and XI of GATT264. The United States also
' i / r c
claimed the measures violated GATT Articles I and III .
The question before the panel, inter alia, was whether the EC measure 
complied with international standards , and if not, whether the measure was
9A7justified*" . To rule whether the measure was justified under the SPS Agreement, the 
panel had to decide whether the measure was consistent with Article 5 of the SPS 
Agreement, which had two parts: a) the risk assessment or the “exercise of assessing
260  P a u w e l y n ,  (2002) 349; t h e r e  a r e  p r o p o s a l s  o n  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  p r o c e s s .
261 T h e r e  w e r e  q u e s t i o n s  i n v o l v i n g  h e a l t h  i n  f o u r  o u t  o f  t h e  s e v e n  c a s e s  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  S P S  A g r e e m e n t .
262 EC - Hormones Case, W T O  D S B ,  1997 P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  2
263 T h e  a r t i c l e s  c o n c e r n  b a s i c  r i g h t s  a n d  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  h a r m o n i z a t i o n  a n d  t h e  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  r i s k .
264  C o n c e r n i n g  n a t i o n a l  t r e a t m e n t  a n d  g e n e r a l  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s .
265  C o n c e r n i n g  t h e  M o s t - F a v o u r e d  N a t i o n  t r e a t m e n t  a n d  n a t i o n a l  t r e a t m e n t .
266  A c c o r d i n g  t o  a r t i c l e  3.1 o f  t h e  S P S  A g r e e m e n t ,  s e e  f u r t h e r :  EC - Hormones Case, W T O  D S B ,  1997 P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  8.74- 
81
267  A c c o r d i n g  t o  a r t i c l e  3.3 a n d  a r t i c l e  5 o f  t h e  S P S  A g r e e m e n t ,  s e e :  EC - Hormones Case, W T O  D S B ,  1997 P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  
8.85-8.86
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the risks against which a sanitary measure is intended to protect.”, b) the application 
of the “appropriate level of sanitary protection” .
Regarding the risk assessment, the report has shown that the panel put great 
weight on the expert evidence269. From the advice of its experts, the panel was
970satisfied that the EC has met the criteria of carrying out a risk assessment . 
However, the panel ruled that the risk assessment had not been taken into account by
97  1the competent EC institutions . The panel again relied on expert opinion to reach 
this conclusion, stating that the scientific studies, backed up by the opinion of the 
panel appointed experts, have shown that the hormones for growth promotion are safe 
assuming that good practice is followed272. However, the EC measure has shown a 
level of protection which indicated that any residue level of these hormones would be 
considered unsafe to human health273.
Experts were also used to address the question of whether the EC treated the 
three natural hormones differently when used as either: a) a growth promoter, b) for 
therapeutic and zootechnical purposes. The question arose because the EC allowed 
no hormone residue for the use of the hormones as a growth promoter but unlimited 
amounts for the other purposes274. The panel ruled that there were no qualitative 
differences in the hormones used and that the two situations were comparable.
The panel chose individual experts rather than expert review groups because 
of the possibility of the variety of opinions, and stated that nothing in the SPS 
Agreement or the DSU limits its powers to make this choice275. After consultation 
with the parties, the panel decided to use the same experts for the two parallel cases 
and had a joint meeting with the scientific experts. The Panel also decided to give 
access to all the information submitted in one proceeding to the parties in the other.
97  f \There were six experts involved in this case . They ranged in nationality, 
and work for international organizations, various technological institutions, and 
universities. Much different to the practice of the ICJ or ITLOS, the questions put
2&k Agreement, 1 9 9 4  a r t  5
269  A c c o r d i n g  t o :  SPS Agreement, 1 9 9 4  a r t  1 1 . 2 ,  a n d  DSU, 1 9 9 4  a r t  1 3
270 EC - Hormones Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 7  P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  8 . 1 1 1
271 EC - Hormones Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 7  P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  8 . 1 1 6 - 1 1 9
272 EC - Hormones Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 7  P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  8 . 1 2 0 - 1 2 7
273 EC - Hormones Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 7  P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  8 . 1 3 9
274 H a v i n g  c o n s i d e r e d  o t h e r  e l e m e n t s ,  t h e  p a n e l  r u l e d  t h a t  t h e  E C ’ s  m e a s u r e  w e r e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  A r t i c l e  5 . 5  o f  t h e  S P S  
A g r e e m e n t .  EC - Hormones Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 7  P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  8 . 2 0 4 - 2 0 9 .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y  r e v e r s e d  t h e  
p a n e l ’ s  d e c i s i o n  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h i s  p o i n t .
275 EC - Hormones Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 7  P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  8 . 7  T h i s  w a s  a l s o  c o n f i r m e d  b y  t h e  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y .
276  S e e  f u r t h e r :  EC - Hormones Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 7  P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  6 . 9
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9 7 7forward to the experts with their responses were laid out in the Panel Report and to 
a level of detail not seen in the other two tribunals. The panel, in consultation with 
the parties, prepared the questions which were submitted to the experts individually. 
The experts were requested to reply in writing to the questions which they felt 
qualified. They had available the written submissions and the written version of the 
oral submissions of the parties. The experts were then invited to meet with the panel 
and the parties to discuss their written responses.
This case has underlined the importance of expert evidence on the decision of 
the panel, being used at the various stages of the decision making process.
Advice from international organizations:
India -  Quantitative Restrictions Case:
This dispute was brought by the United States against India concerning import 
restrictions imposed by India with the justification of protecting its balance-of- 
payments situation under Article XVIII of GATT. India had been in talks with the 
Balance-of-payments (BOP) Committee, and established that its aim was to remove 
the restrictions by 1997. In 1997, India notified the BOP Committee of its
97Rquantitative restrictions which still existed to the effect that potential importers had 
to obtain a license. Various Members requested consultation with India where all but 
the United States reached agreement. The United States claimed that the restrictions 
violated Articles XI: 1 and XVIII: 11 of the GATT279.
During the course of the proceedings, the panel decided to consult the IMF on 
India’s balance-of-payment situation. The questions to the IMF were written, and the 
IMF wrote back the replies. The panel stated that the ability for it to consult the IMF 
arose from Article 13 of the DSU and it was able to request information on India’s 
monetary reserves and balance-of-payment situation to help it assess the claims. The 
IMF was a highly relevant source of information280.
The Report showed that the information requested aided the panel in reaching 
its decision. For example, the panel referred to the responses of the IMF on whether
277 3 5  q u e s t i o n s  a l t o g e t h e r ,  s e e  f u r t h e r :  EC - Hormones Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 7  P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  6 . 1 - 6 . 2 4 0
278 S e e  f u r t h e r  India - Quantitative Restrictions Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 9  P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  2 . 1 - 8
279  T h e  t w o  a r t i c l e s  c o n c e r n  t h e  g e n e r a l  e l i m i n a t i o n  a n d  t h e  n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  o f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s t r i c t i o n s .
280 India - Quantitative Restrictions Case, W T O  D S B ,  1 9 9 9  p a r a  5 . 1 1 - 5 . 1 2
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India’s measures were necessary under Article XVIII:9 of the GATT281. The IMF 
stated that “India's level of foreign currency reserves...was adequate.”282 
Subsequently, the panel ruled that India’s measures were not necessary283. Further, 
on the removal of the measures, the panel referred to the advice of the IMF that it 
should not be immediate but rather through a phasing out period284.
Information from Members:
Australia -  Leather, Article 21.5 Case:
This case concerned the implementation of an earlier panel report in the 
Australia -  Leather Case. In that case, the panel found that certain payments made by 
the Australian government to Howe, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Australian Leather 
Upholstery Pty. Ltd., which was owned by Australian Leather Holdings, Ltd., was a 
prohibited subsidy under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM Agreement). The panel recommended that Australia withdraw the subsidy 
within 90 days. Subsequently, Australia required that Howe repay A$8.065 million 
which was to cover any remaining inconsistent portion of grants made under the 
contract. However, the United States argued that the measure taken by Australia was 
not consistent with the SCM Agreement because Australia had only withdrawn 
A$8.065 million of the A$30 million grant and also given out a new loan.
The United States asked the panel to request Australia to produce a number of 
documents and information regarding the A$8.065 million repayment and the new 
loan made. The Unites States argued that the information could have direct bearing 
on the proceedings at hand. The Panel sought the view of Australia on this request 
and it was willing to present the information should the panel decide it necessary. 
The panel decided that this was the case and the relevant documents were 
submitted285.
5.3.2.5 Expert evidence before the AB:
281 R e s t r i c t i o n s  o f  i m p o r t  c o u l d  b e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  a d d r e s s  t h e  i s s u e  o f  m o n e y  r e s e r v e s .
282 India - Quantitative Restrictions Case, WTO DSB, 1999 P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  5.165
283 India - Quantitative Restrictions Case, WTO DSB, 1999 P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  5.184
284 India - Quantitative Restrictions Case, WTO DSB, 1999 P a n e l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  7.1-7
285 Australia-Leather, Article 21.5, WTO DSB, 2000 P e n a l  R e p o r t ,  p a r a  5.5-12
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The A B’s ability to acquire new expert evidence is limited to questions of law. 
However, there are still channels for this to be done. As observed by Pauwelyn, the 
AB has its own secretariat apart from that of the panels’. According to Article 17.7 of 
the DSU, the AB is to be provided with “appropriate administrative and legal support 
as it requires” . In practice, there are lawyers assigned, normally two, to each case 
before the AB286. Through this channel, the lawyers may give advice on questions 
regarding the Agreement in question. The parties can also introduce new legal expert 
evidence at the appeal stage. Further, in the EC-Asbestos Case, the AB has ruled that
987it is able to admit amicus curiae briefs , which could provide legal expert evidence, 
as long as the relevant procedures are adhered to.
5.4 Interviews with the panelists:
The interviews with the panelists have been revealing on the issue of expert 
evidence. First, Panelist L stated that the panel applies Article 13 of the DSU. All 
three panelists interviewed agreed that the panels were very open to the use of 
experts. Panelist M noted that the standard of the expert evidence has generally been 
high. The evidence gave the panel insights which it would not have had otherwise.
Panelist L noted that the experts in the WTO context are used differently to 
other international tribunals. The arrangement in the WTO is not Court-like. The 
panelist meetings resemble normal meetings. In his opinion, the informal nature of 
the proceedings is less intimidating for the experts. Consequently, more information 
could be gathered. In contrast, Panelist M does not like this informality. The experts 
are not interrogated as much as they could be. More interrogation could lead to more 
information. There needs to be a shift towards adjudication. Panelist K added that he 
would like more oral evidence in the future.
Panelist L and Panelist K also noted that the expert evidence can also come 
from the Secretariat. In most cases which only concerned trade, there was no need to 
appoint external experts. The Secretariat is very able to deal with trade issues and 
does provide help to the panels. However, there could be a need for experts in other 
areas such as the environment and health. Panelist K gave an example that, in cases
286 P a u w e l y n ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3 3 4
287 S e e  f u r t h e r :  C h a p t e r  5 ,  S e c t i o n  5 . 3 . 3 . 2 ,  1 6 8 .  S e e :  EC - Asbestos Case, W T O  D S B ,  2 0 0 1  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y ,  a m i c u s  c u r i a e  
p r o c e d u r e s ,  p a r a  3 ( 0
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which involved anti-dumping, the section of the Secretariat on anti-dumping can help. 
Further, one or two of the panelists would be experts in anti-dumping.
Panelist L and Panelist K added that the panel does look at the expert evidence 
in party submissions. However, the panel is very cautious in assessing this evidence 
because they tend to show the extreme views of the scientific community. The panel 
also takes note that they tend to support the party’s arguments. Further, Panelist K 
added that the panel takes into account factors such as: a) which expert wrote the 
submission, b) was the report written especially for this dispute. For this reason, 
Panelist M has stated that he personally prefers independent expert panels.
Panelist M stated that written and oral evidence have their advantages and 
disadvantages. Written evidence can provide more formality, and often more care is 
taken in drafting them. There can be more mistakes with oral evidence, but it does 
provide the spontaneity which written evidence does not provide.
Panelist L added that the current rules are satisfactory because it gives the 
panel the option to appoint experts when necessary.
As for the factors that could influence the approach of the WTO DSB, Panelist 
L has observed that the chairman of the panel is important. He can determine the 
direction of the panel. Panelist K noted that, because the panelists are not permanent, 
this could have an effect on the consistency in the way the provisions are applied. 
Further, both panelists added that the relaxed nature of the proceedings at the panel 
level could have an influence on the panel’s approach. This is to be contrasted to the 
AB where the proceedings are more aggressive and adversarial.
5.5 Concluding Remarks:
The practice of the WTO DSB on expert evidence has been consistent. Like 
the other two tribunals examined, expert evidence can be submitted through many 
channels. Expert evidence can be submitted at both the panel level and the AB level. 
However, the latter is restricted to questions of law only.
The parties have the right to submit expert evidence, usually in the written 
form. There has been a lack of the appointment of experts by the parties for the 
purposes of the oral testimony. However, what is of note for the purposes of this 
section is the way in which panels have appointed their own experts.
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The provisions of the WTO provide for the panels to appoint their own
experts. The DSU states that the panel can appoint expert review groups (Article
2 8 813.2) as well as appoint any individuals or body which it deems appropriate 
(Article 13.1). Further, the W TO’s special agreements also have provisions providing 
for expert advice. Some provide for permanent expert bodies, e.g. the PGE, the report 
of which can be binding upon the panel. However, they have not been used.
Pursuant to Article 13.1, the panels have been willing to: a) appoint its own 
individual experts to address technical and scientific issues, b) consult international 
organizations on their area of expertise, c) requested information from Members. The 
experts can be used to address a very wide range of issues, as the examples of the 
cases above have shown. The panels have the discretion whether to appoint experts 
and decide on the number of experts needed. The questions are drafted by the panel 
and, after receiving comments from the parties, sent to the experts who normally reply 
in writing. After this reply, the panel and the parties can consult the experts in a 
meeting. However, the oral proceedings normally have very little role within the 
WTO DSB. It has been argued that, because of the extent that the panel is in control 
of the proceedings, the nature of the WTO DSB resembles the Civil Law system more 
than the Common Law system289.
From the interviews, what was clear was that the panels welcome expert 
evidence. If the dispute mainly involved issues on trade, the expert evidence would 
normally come from within the panel or the Secretariat. However, if the dispute 
hinged on scientific questions, then external experts would be used.
It is worth noting that, at the panel stage, the proceedings are not adversarial. 
As indicated by the panelists interviewed, they resemble more diplomatic meetings 
than a court-room. The panel meetings even take place in the same rooms as the 
meetings between States.
In addition, the interviews have indicated that the chairman can have a crucial 
role in determining the direction of the panel on expert evidence. The non-permanent 
nature of the panelists might also have an effect on the way the provisions are applied.
288 T h i s  a r t i c l e  h a s  n e v e r  b e e n  u s e d .
289  S e e  f u r t h e r :  C h r i s t o f o r o u ,  ( 2 0 0 0 )  6 3 2
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Section 6: Overall Conclusion:
The purpose of this section is to underline the general theme of the thesis 
around the questions posed: a) is there commonality to the approach of the tribunals 
on expert evidence? b) what are the factors influencing the approach of the tribunals?
c) should there be a common set of rules on expert evidence?
6.1 The existence of a common approach:
From the examination of the practice of the three tribunals, it cannot be said 
that there is an emerging common set of rules to the extent that would suggest a 
developing community of tribunals. There are some similarities between the 
approaches of the tribunals and also some differences.
The similarity to be noted is that all three tribunals have adopted an open 
approach to the admission of expert evidence. The provisions of the tribunals allow 
for the submission of expert evidence from the parties, both written and oral. The 
parties before all three tribunals have all used this right to submit expert evidence, 
even if the form might differ before each tribunal. Further, each tribunal can launch a 
form of an inquiry or appoint its own experts on its own initiation.
There are also distinctions in the approaches of the three tribunals. The most 
evident one perhaps concerns the use of independent tribunal appointed experts. They 
have never been used before ITLOS and seldom used before the ICJ. However, 
before the WTO DSB, if the dispute concerns scientific issues such as health or the 
environment, the panels have not been hesitant to use its own experts.
Regarding the provisions, those of the ICJ and ITLOS resemble one another 
because the latter was based on the former when drafted. The provisions of these two 
tribunals do not go into much detail on how the experts are to be used. In contrast, the 
provisions of the WTO DSB go into much more detail. The role of the experts and 
the way they are to be regulated are spelled out. The rules have also been generally 
consistent throughout the various specialized agreements under the WTO framework.
Another distinction to be made between the ICJ and ITLOS on one hand, and 
the WTO DSB on the other, is the way in which expert evidence is presented. Before 
the ICJ and ITLOS, as well as written submissions from the parties, the expert 
evidence would often be presented through oral testimonies of experts called by the
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parties. The experts would then be examined and cross-examined by the parties 
resembling the Common Law tradition. In contrast, the party expert evidence before 
the WTO DSB would be submitted in the written form. Parties would seldom call 
experts to give oral testimonies. If the panel decides to appoint its own experts, it 
would draft the questions in written form. The replies would then be given in the 
written form with an option for the panel and the parties to ask further questions. The 
proceedings in the WTO context resemble more the Civil Law tradition where the 
panel is in control, instead of sitting back and letting the parties present the case 
through the examination process.
Further, another distinction to be made is that the WTO has set up permanent 
expert bodies to deal with questions arising from specialized agreements. There are 
no permanent expert bodies before the ICJ or ITLOS. In addition, none of the expert 
advice given before the ICJ or ITLOS is binding. In contrast, there are two 
circumstances where the expert evidence given in the context of the WTO is 
binding290.
What is also of note is the lack of communication between the tribunals. In 
addition, there is little reference made from one tribunal to another, e.g. regarding the 
use of the voir dire before ITLOS.
6.2 Factors influencing the approach on expert evidence:
This section will begin to address what factors have an influence on the 
approach of the tribunals on expert evidence. However, the details will be left to the 
overall conclusion of thesis where all the influencing factors affecting many aspects 
of evidential rules across all three tribunals will be examined together.
The first influencing factor for the tribunals seems to be their history and the 
context in which they were created. For example, the provisions of the ICJ derived 
from those of the PCIJ, unavoidably inheriting some characteristics. The provisions 
of ITLOS have similarly been based on those of the ICJ. In contrast, the WTO was 
created to replace the old and inefficient GATT system. Consequently, the aim was to 
have an efficient, informed, and enforceable dispute settlement system. This 
difference in background of the tribunals could explain: a) the detailed provisions on
290  ( a )  a d v i c e  f r o m  t h e  I M F  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  X V  : 2  o f  t h e  G A T T  w h i c h  a r e  b i n d i n g  u p o n  G A T T  c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t i e s  a n d  W T O  
m e m b e r s ,  ( b )  a d v i c e  f r o m  t h e  P e r m a n e n t  G r o u p  o f  E x p e r t s  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  4 . 5  o f  t h e  S u b s i d i e s  A g r e e m e n t .
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the use of experts of the WTO, b) the extent some of the provisions went to establish 
permanent expert bodies, c) the frequent use of panel appointed experts.
Second, the nature of the cases can also have an influence on the use of 
experts. For example, in the context of the WTO, the panelists have said that cases 
only involving trade would not normally require external experts because there is 
already expertise within the panel and the Secretariat. This would explain the lack of 
the use of experts in some cases. However, in comparison with the ICJ and ITLOS, 
WTO disputes can more often involve very technical issues on health and the 
environment. This could also contribute to explain why the WTO has used 
independent experts more often than the other two tribunals.
Third, the tribunals must take the time limitation into consideration. This was 
clearly expressed by the judges of ITLOS where the cases have mostly been urgent. 
They further said that, if there was more time, the appointment of independent experts 
would have been plausible. There are also time restrictions within the context of the
9Q1WTO . This could result in the panels not exploiting the experts fully, e.g. not 
giving enough time for follow-up questions in the meeting, or cutting down time for
i  • • 2 9 2the cross-examination process .
Fourth, the question arises as to the influence of domestic rules on the 
approach of international tribunals. The tribunals do not seem to be adopting the 
approach of one legal tradition. In contrast, the general approach has been the 
amalgamation of the systems, giving as much scope for the submission of expert 
evidence as possible. However, the proceedings before the ICJ and ITLOS tend to 
resemble the Common Law tradition where, in addition to the written submissions, 
there is also the use of the oral testimony with the cross-examination process. In 
contrast, the WTO proceedings arguably resemble more the Civil Law tradition where 
the panel is in control with limited oral evidence.
6.3 Should there be a common approach on expert evidence?:
Like other chapters, the section will begin to address the question of whether 
there should be a common set of evidential rules by focusing on expert evidence.
291 DSU, 1 9 9 4  a r t i c l e  1 2  a n d  2 0
292 S e e  g e n e r a l l y  f o r  a  c r i t i q u e  o f  t h e  W T O  s y s t e m :  P a u w e l y n ,  ( 2 0 0 2 )  3 6 2 - 3 6 5  , C h r i s t o f o r o u ,  ( 2 0 0 0 )  e s p .  6 3 5 - 6 4 8  , T i m u r a ,  
( 2 0 0 2 ) 7 2 5 - 7 3 1
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However, the details will be left to the overall conclusion where many aspects of 
evidential rules in all three tribunals will be examined.
As noted by judges/panellists, expert evidence is crucial to the outcome of the 
case. Consequently, the way in which they are used could have an effect on the 
outcome of the dispute. Taking into consideration that the tribunals examined could 
potentially have overlapping jurisdictions on similar disputes, if different rules on 
expert evidence are used, a different outcome could result from the same facts. This 
could happen in a case concerning trade and the marine environment, which could 
potentially come before ITLOS and the WTO DSB, two tribunals with different rules 
on expert evidence. This issue will be further explored in the overall conclusion. 
Further, the difference in the rules on experts could lead to forum shopping. Are 
these arguments enough to justify a more consistent approach on expert evidence? In 
addition, there is also the question of whether the dialogue and cooperation between 
the tribunals would increase if the question of the commonality was brought to the 
forefront.
However, because of the different nature of the disputes before the various 
tribunals, there is a case to be argued that different rules are needed to cope with the 
situation in each tribunal.
The overall conclusion will address the tension between the benefits and the 
disadvantages of having a common set of rules. It will further explore the extent to 
which this is a feasible option, and the way in which it could be implemented.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
Section 1: Introduction
As mentioned in the introduction, two recent developments make this thesis 
very timely on the question of the fragmentation of international law: a) the Genocide 
Case, b) the conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law. They are significant to the debate on the fragmentation of 
international law and the relationship of international tribunals. The Genocide Case 
has shown the new willingness of the ICJ to refer to the decisions of other permanent 
tribunals when needed, in this particular case the ICTY and the ICTR to a lesser 
extent. The work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law 
focuses on substantive law but also has bearing on the general debate. Even though 
the report is yet to be adopted by the ILC as a whole, the findings of the report may be 
significant in concluding that “international law is a legal system” and that “its rules 
and principles (i.e. its norms) act in relation to and should be interpreted against the 
background of other rules and principles”1. “International law is not a random 
collection of...norm s”2. This shows that there is a more closely knit system 
emerging. Further, regarding harmonization, “when several norms bear on a single 
issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set 
of compatible obligations”3. This thesis is set within these latest developments.
This chapter addresses the three questions set out in the introduction4. Against 
the background of the proliferation of international tribunals, the main questions of 
the thesis are the following: a) is there an emerging set of common rules on evidence 
that would suggest a community of international tribunals?, b) what are the factors 
influencing the approach of the tribunals on evidential rules?, c) should there be a 
common set of rules on evidence for international tribunals, and if so, how should the 
solution be implemented?
These conclusions take account of the information gathered from the 
interviews. All the views of the judges expressed are presented and included in the 
section where they are relevant.
1 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  C o m m i s s i o n ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  p a r a  1
2 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  C o m m i s s i o n ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  p a r a  1
3 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  C o m m i s s i o n ,  ( 2 0 0 6 )  p a r a  4
4  S e e :  C h a p t e r  1 ,  S e c t i o n  1 . 4 ,  1 0 - 1 2
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Section 2: The existence of a common approach on evidential rules:
The study of the constituent instruments and rules, jurisprudence and the 
interviews have given an insight into whether there is an emerging commonality5 in 
evidential rules of the selected three tribunals:
2.1 Standard of proof
The practice of the selected tribunals has not indicated an emerging 
commonality on the rules on the standard of proof. The ICJ invoked and applied a 
variable standard of proof, including: a) the Common Law standards of beyond 
reasonable doubt in the Corfu Channel Case, b) “fully conclusive” proof in the 
Genocide Case, and c) the balance of probabilities in many cases but notably in the 
Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute Case (El Salvador v. Honduras) Case6. 
It also expressed the standard, inter alia, in terms of whether the evidence was 
“convincing” and “well-founded”. The Court has indicated, through the jurisprudence 
and the judges interviewed, that it has adopted a variable standard of proof, i.e. the 
more serious the nature of the allegation, the higher the standard applied. However, 
the Court has not always been explicit in spelling out the applicable standard to 
different cases, and the jurisprudence has not been consistent enough to suggest a 
clear answer.
ITLOS was equally unclear on the applicable standard of proof but the study 
has been more restricted because of its limited jurisprudence. The standard of proof 
has varied on a case by case basis, and have included the “balance of probabilities” 
and evidence being “well-founded”7. From the interviews, the judges gave a range of 
responses as to the applicable standard. The most significant case in this regard was 
the Saiga (No. 2) Case where Judge Wolfrum expressed concern on the lack of 
certainty on the standard of proof applied. Many of the judges have stated in the 
interviews that the standard can vary according to the seriousness of the allegation in 
the case.
5 S e e :  C h a p t e r  1 ,  S e c t i o n  1 . 4 . 1 ,  1 0
6  S e e :  C h a p t e r  4 ,  S e c t i o n  3 ,  6 9 - 9 4
7 S e e :  C h a p t e r  4 ,  S e c t i o n  4 ,  9 5 - 1 0 5
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Regarding the WTO DSB, even though little is said in its constituent 
instruments on the standard of proof, the jurisprudence has been quite clear. The 
standard applied is a two stage test which requires the applicant to establish a prima 
facie  case of a breach of a WTO obligation, and the respondent has to rebut it. The 
jurisprudence has shown that, if unrebutted, the prima facie  case can be enough to
Q
render a judgment in favour of the applicant . Consequently, the standard imposed on 
the applicant is low, and although debatable, the respondent has a much higher one.
In conclusion, there are differences on the standard of proof as applied by the 
three tribunals. However, there are similarities worth noting between the ICJ and 
ITLOS9. The constituent instruments of the two tribunals are similar because 
ITLOS’s was based on the ICJ’s. The lack of rules on the standard of proof could be 
one of the reasons behind the uncertainty before the two tribunals. Further, the ICJ 
and ITLOS have both adopted the variable standard of proof, even though, regarding 
ITLOS, this has only been learnt from the interviews. In contrast, the WTO DSB has 
adopted its two stage test. Commonality on the standard of proof is yet to develop.
2.2 Amicus curiae briefs
The practice of the three tribunals on amicus curiae briefs has again showed 
that, although there are similarities, their approaches have been different. The 
instruments of the ICJ provide for the submission of briefs from public international 
organizations in contentious cases. There has been limited use of this provision, only 
a few occasions in cases concerning the ICAO10. No NGO submissions have been 
allowed in contentious cases. The Court has been more open in advisory opinions 
where the Statute allows for submissions from States and international organizations. 
States and public international organizations have submitted briefs. The Court 
allowed on one occasion a brief from an NGO11. However, after that case, the Court 
seems to have taken a much more restrictive approach, and only recently opening up 
again. The judges interviewed also confirmed the recent open approach of the Court 
in advisory opinions.
8 S e e :  C h a p t e r  4 .  S e c t i o n  5 ,  1 0 5 - 1 1 8
9 S e e :  C h a p t e r  4 ,  S e c t i o n  6 ,  1 1 8 - 1 2 1
10 S e e :  C h a p t e r  5 ,  S e c t i o n  3 . 3 . 2 . 1 ,  1 3 4 - 1 3 6
11 International Status o f  South-West Africa, I C J ,  1 9 5 0 ,  S e e :  C h a p t e r  5 ,  S e c t i o n  3 . 3 . 2 . 2 ,  1 4 2
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Again, the Statute of ITLOS resemble that of the ICJ and provide for 
intergovernmental organizations to submit briefs in contentious cases. In advisory 
opinions, there are provisions for States and intergovernmental organizations to 
submit briefs. However, partly due to the limited number of cases, there have not 
been any amicus curiae briefs submitted. The interviews of the judges have shown 
that the future of the Tribunal’s approach is still uncertain. Some judges say that the 
Tribunal will be hesitant to take amicus curiae briefs, to concur with the practice of
the ICJ. However, others are of the opinion that the Tribunal would take the
10opportunity to admit briefs .
1 3The question of the amicus curiae has been controversial in the WTO DSB . 
There are no explicit provisions for such briefs but the jurisprudence has shown that, 
starting from the US-Shrimp/Turtle Case, amicus curiae briefs have been admitted at 
both the panel level and the AB level. There were further developments resulting in 
the Additional Procedure for the regulation of the submission of briefs in the EC- 
Asbestos Case, which was very contentious among the Members14. After this case, it 
was clear that many Members thought that accepting amicus curiae briefs was outside 
the mandate of the AB. Consequently, the WTO DSB has been cautious in 
approaching amicus curiae briefs. After the EC-Asbestos Case, even though they are 
admitted, they have never been used and referred to in the Reports.
In sum, even though there are similarities on the approach of tribunals on 
amicus curiae briefs, commonality on this issue has not developed.
2.3 Expert evidence
The approach of the three tribunals on expert evidence share similarities, but 
not to the extent that would suggest an emerging common set of rules. They have all 
adopted a flexible and open approach towards the admission of expert evidence. The 
parties can appoint experts as members of the delegation. These experts can give 
advice to the parties and incorporate their opinion into the written submission or plead 
before the tribunal as members of counsel. Parties can also call experts to give an oral 
testimony. Further, all three tribunals have the power to appoint its own experts if 
necessary.
12 S e e :  C h a p t e r  5 ,  S e c t i o n  4 . 4 ,  1 5 6 - 1 5 8
13 S e e :  C h a p t e r  5 ,  S e c t i o n  5 ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  5 . 3 ,  1 6 0 - 1 7 5
14 S e e :  C h a p t e r  5 ,  S e c t i o n  5 . 3 . 3 . 2 ,  1 6 8
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The provisions of the three tribunals provide for many channels of expert 
evidence, but tribunals and the parties have used them differently.
The expert evidence before the ICJ has primarily been through the use of 
written evidence15. However, there was also some use of oral expert testimony on a 
wide range of issues. Such oral proceedings resemble the Common Law tradition 
with a cross-examination process. The Court’s jurisprudence has confirmed the right 
to call experts. On occasion, the Court has also used its own appointed experts 
according to Article 50 of the Statute.
The use of experts before ITLOS has resembled to a large extent to that before 
the ICJ16. In the Tribunal’s limited jurisprudence, the parties have submitted expert 
evidence via written submissions. In a higher proportion than cases before the ICJ, 
parties have also called experts to give oral testimonies. They were also examined in 
a way resembling the Common Law tradition with the cross-examination process. 
The Tribunal has been flexible in applying the provisions on expert evidence, as 
shown by the introduction of the voir dire which was not explicitly provided for. 
However, ITLOS has been the only tribunal from the three selected that has not 
appointed its own experts17. The judges said that the main reason has been the lack of 
time, and that independent experts could be used in full merits cases before the 
Tribunal in the future.
In contrast, the use of expert evidence has been different before the WTO 
DSB18. Expert evidence on facts is limited to the panel stage. In contrast to the other 
two tribunals, the provisions of the WTO DSB are more detailed on the use of 
experts. There are other specific agreements under the WTO framework in addition 
to the DSU which provide for expert evidence. Some of these set up permanent 
bodies, and their findings can be binding on the panel19. However, they have never 
been used. In practice, the parties include expert evidence as part of the written 
submissions. Party oral expert testimony has a limited role.
The DSU also provides the panel with the power to appoint expert review
90groups or individual experts . Expert review groups have never been used. The 
panels have been willing to appoint its own experts in cases concerning technical non­
15 S e e :  C h a p t e r  6 ,  S e c t i o n  3 ,  1 8 3 - 2 0 2
16 S e e :  C h a p t e r  6 ,  S e c t i o n  4 ,  2 0 5 - 2 2 6
17 A l t h o u g h  i t  s o u g h t  t o  d o  s o  i n  The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases , I T L O S ,  1 9 9 9 .  S e e :  C h a p t e r  6 ,  S e c t i o n  4 . 4 ,  2 2 1 - 2 2 2
18 S e e :  C h a p t e r  6 ,  S e c t i o n  5 ,  2 2 6 - 2 4 3
19 S e e  C h a p t e r  6 ,  S e c t i o n  5 . 3 . 1 . 1 ,  2 2 9
20  S e e  C h a p t e r  6 ,  S e c t i o n  5 . 3 . 1 . 1 ,  2 2 7 - 2 2 9
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trade issues. For example, scientists have been used in cases involving the safety of 
the use of hormones in beef and the IMF has been consulted on issues of the balance 
of payment21. The questions from the panel to the experts and their replies are usually 
written. The parties have the opportunity to put questions to the experts, but the 
jurisprudence has shown that this has been limited and the experts are not scrutinized 
as much compared to the other two tribunals. The details of the questions and the 
answers are included in the final report.
Comparable to the case with amicus curiae briefs, there are some similarities 
which the tribunals share on the question of experts. However, it is not enough to 
suggest that commonality with regard to this aspect of the rules is developing.
2.4 Has the proliferation of international tribunals brought the issue of commonality 
to the forefront?
The overall impression from the practice of the three bodies and from 
interviews is that the judges of all three tribunals are aware of the phenomenon of the 
proliferation of international tribunals. However, it has not brought the issue of 
evidential rules to the forefront. Tribunals have not given priority to this issue. For 
example, in the context of the WTO, Panelist L has stated that, despite the increase of 
the number of international tribunals, the focus of the panel has been on the 
application of the provisions of the DSU.
Despite the low profile of evidential rules for international tribunals, a few 
judges seem to be increasingly conscious of its potential importance. Judge A stated 
that the debate on the issue has been louder in the past few years and the questions 
have become more pertinent. Even though there is greater awareness of the problem, 
he added that the ICJ has not addressed the problem in an organized way. Judge E of 
ITLOS said that he, and the Tribunal, are becoming aware of the increase in the 
number of tribunals, and the potential problems from inconsistent rules on evidence. 
He further noted that this is a problem that could also arise in the domestic context22 
and is not unique to international tribunals. Judge J suggested that once there are 
more cases, evidential rules would be granted more importance from ITLOS.
21 S e e :  C h a p t e r  6 ,  S e c t i o n  5 . 3 . 2 . 4 ,  2 3 6
22  E . g .  P r o b l e m s  a r i s i n g  f r o m  t h e  r u l e s  w h i c h  a r e  s o m e t i m e s  u n c l e a r .
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2.5 Dialogue within each tribunal
The judges of the ICJ and ITLOS on the whole observed that the dialogue 
within the tribunal has been good. The judges of the two tribunals stated that the 
there is opportunity for thorough discussion during the deliberations23. For example, 
amicus curiae briefs have been addressed by ITLOS24. As for the WTO DSB, the 
panelists have said that there is good dialogue within one panel. Any disagreement is 
discussed thoroughly with the chairman taking a leading role within a panel. 
However, there is no dialogue between the different panels, considering themselves as 
separate individual units. Panelist M has noted that, because of their temporary 
nature, there is no collegiate atmosphere between the panels and there is little 
opportunity for a dialogue
What is significant for this thesis is that, despite the dialogue between the 
judges, there is still a lack of clarity in many aspects of evidential rules. In many 
cases, judges of the same tribunal have expressed different views on what the 
appropriate evidential rules should be. For example, the judges of the ICJ and ITLOS 
have stated different standards of proof in the same case before their respective 
tribunal25. Interviews have also shown that there are different views from the judges 
of ITLOS as to the stance of the Tribunal on amicus curiae briefs . The lack of 
agreement of the judges could indicate: a) an emerging set of common rules seem 
unlikely if there is disagreement within a tribunal, b)the judges might not be granting 
much importance to evidential rules, not prioritizing agreement, c) evidential rules 
are technical and hard to agree upon, d) the development of a common set of rules 
could face many challenges.
2.6 Dialogue between the tribunals
23  J u d g e  H  a n d  D  o f  I T L O S  h a v e  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a l  d i a l o g u e  h a s  b e e n  “ e x c e l l e n t ” .
24 A s  s u g g e s t e d  b y  J u d g e  H .
25 S e e  g e n e r a l l y :  C h a p t e r  4 ,  S e c t i o n  4 - 5 ,  9 5 - 1 1 8
26  S e e :  C h a p t e r  4 ,  S e c t i o n  4 . 4 ,  1 0 1 - 1 0 3
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The interviews have shown that formal dialogue between the tribunals has 
been minimal and always informal.27 However, there was a mixture of responses 
regarding informal dialogue between individual judges.
Judges of the ICJ indicated that there is as yet to be formal dialogue with other 
tribunals. However, Judge A noted that there have been visits to other tribunals, e.g. 
the President of the Court visited ITLOS in late 2006. One judge indicated that there
is more informal inter-tribunal dialogue now, on both substantive and technical
2 8issues . These informal dialogues are happening at dinners or private gatherings of 
judges.
The judges of ITLOS have confirmed that there is not much formal dialogue 
between international tribunals. However, many judges have suggested that there is 
informal dialogue between the judges29. Judge D said he is personally willing to meet 
judges of other tribunals but problems might arise from the lack of willingness of the 
ICJ judges. He further noted that the amount of dialogue depends on the personality 
of the judges, and that dialogue could also be carried out between the registrars. 
Judge J stated that a dialogue between international tribunals has started, but has not 
taken off as yet. He added that the dialogue so far concerned general points of 
procedural issues, and the lack of dialogue has partly been a result of politics between 
the tribunals. One judge expressed the view that the informal dialogue between the 
judges is also limited30.
The WTO panelists have confirmed that there is no formal dialogue between 
the tribunals. In contrast to the other two tribunals, the panelists suggested that there 
is also little informal dialogue. Panels consider themselves as bodies with their own 
rules. Further, the temporary nature of panels has resulted in no extended dialogue 
between the panelists and judges of other tribunals. One panelist underlined the role 
of the Secretariat of communicating with other tribunals.
The question of whether the judges think more dialogue is needed will be 
addressed later in the chapter.
2.7 Reference to other tribunal’s jurisprudence
27 S e e :  A p p e n d i x  E ,  q u e s t i o n  3 .
28 J u d g e  C .
29  E . g .  J u d g e  D
30 J u d g e  H
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At interviews carried out prior to the Genocide Case, the views of the judges 
of the ICJ were divided on the reference to other tribunal’s jurisprudence. Judge A 
said that the Court does not generally look at the jurisprudence of other tribunals. He 
made the observation that some judges take the attitude that the ICJ is the “Big 
Brother”, “almost to the point of arrogance”31 on this issue. Judge A further stated 
that some judges think that this is reflected in the budgeting structure of international 
tribunals, i.e. the ICJ gets more money than other tribunals. In one case, during 
deliberations, Judge A wanted to draw attention of the Court to another case before 
another tribunal for comparison. However, one judge had strong opinions that the 
Court should not be referring to a smaller tribunal. Judge A stated that the ICTY is
T9the most likely candidate for references . But Judge B has noted that the nature of 
the cases before the ICTY is quite different to those before the Court. However, 
Judge C has stated that the Court does on occasion look at the jurisprudence of other 
tribunals.
However, what was said in the interviews must be seen in a new light after the 
Genocide Case. This case is significant because, for the first time (to the knowledge 
of the writer), the ICJ has referred to the judgment of another tribunal in determining 
the outcome of its own, although it as referred before to arbitral awards. The ICJ 
referred to the judgment of the ICTY on many issues such as the issue of the intention 
of genocide33 and ethnic cleansing34. The Court also referred to cases of the ICTR, 
but to a lesser extent35. Further, documents used in cases before the ICTY were used
TAby the ICJ . The reference of the ICJ to the jurisprudence of other tribunals could be 
an indication of their intention to begin a dialogue between tribunals. Did the judges 
who support referring to other tribunals win over the judges who were against? 
However, it might have merely been due to the similarities of the nature of the cases. 
Would the Court refer to other tribunals on other types of cases? The answer will no 
doubt be revealed with new judgments of the Court.
Judges of ITLOS have commented that the Tribunal has referred to the 
jurisprudence of other tribunals, especially the ICJ. They try to establish consistency
31 A s  e x p r e s s e d  b y  J u d g e  A .
32 J u d g e  C  a g r e e s .
33 The Genocide Case, I C J ,  2 0 0 7  p a r a  1 8 8
34  The Genocide Case, I C J ,  2 0 0 7  p a r a  1 9 0
35 E . g .  The Genocide Case, I C J ,  2 0 0 7  p a r a  3 0 0
36 E . g .  The Genocide Case, I C J ,  2 0 0 7  p a r a  2 0 6
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3 7of evidential rules of international tribunals, and look to the ICJ . This is done by 
looking at the published cases of the Court38. However, this can be difficult because
3 9of the lack of clarity and consistency of the jurisprudence . Judges add that, in 
addition to the ICJ, the Tribunal also looks to other tribunals but with caution. Judge I 
stated that, other Tribunals such as the WTO would bear less weight. A reason why 
there could be more references to the ICJ is because it shares types of cases with 
ITLOS. Judge J added that, if the Tribunal shares a case with another tribunal, it 
would try to take the same approach unless there is a good reason not to.
Judge G stated that the Tribunal is aware of what is going on in other 
tribunals. However, the Tribunal must be careful in applying the same rules when the 
nature of the disputes is different. For example, the Tribunal has jurisdiction over 
prompt release cases, and time restrictions on prompt release and provisional 
measures cases. Nonetheless, Judge G said some evidential rules could be common to 
many tribunals. Several judges of ITLOS commented that the ICJ has referred to its 
jurisprudence, especially on the recent question of the binding nature of provisional
4 0measures .
Regarding the WTO DSB, the panelists have observed that the panels do not 
look at other tribunals, not even the ICJ. They regard themselves as having their own 
rules, different from other Tribunals. However, Panelist L added that he personally 
does look at the jurisprudence of other tribunals to the extent possible, e.g. the rules of 
the ICJ, ICSID, UNCITRAL. But this is in a more general context. As well as seeing 
the practice of other tribunals, it is also to indicate how evidential rules should not be 
applied.
2.8 Conclusion:
The research has shown that the tribunals do share a level of commonality on 
evidential rules. For example, none of the three tribunals have adopted rules which 
are excessively formalistic41. Several judges have indicated that one of the reasons
37 E x p r e s s e d  b y  J u d g e  E ,  I .
38 J u d g e  1
39  J u d g e  E
40  T h e  i n t e r v i e w s  s h o w  t h a t  t h e  I C J  j u d g e s  d o  n o t  s h a r e  t h i s  v i e w .
41 T h i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  h a s  n o t  c h a n g e d  s i n c e  t h e  e a r l i e r  p e r i o d  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l i t i g a t i o n ,  a s  n o t e d  b y  S a n d i f e r :  S a n d i f e r ,  ( 1 9 7 5 )  
1 8 9 ,  4 5 7 ,  8 .  O n  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  e v i d e n t i a l  r u l e s  t h a t  d o  e x i s t ,  s e e :  S a n d i f e r ,  ( 1 9 7 5 )  1 8 6  a n d  E g b e r t ,  ( 1 9 3 9 )  1 5 5 .  S e e  f u r t h e r :  
S a n d i f e r ,  ( 1 9 7 5 ) 4 2
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behind this is the lack of evidence in international litigation. The tribunals need to 
adopt rules permitting as much evidence to be submitted as possible.
In addition to the flexibility of the tribunals’ approach, the research has shown 
that there has been a level of cross-fertilization on the rules on evidence42 and this has 
been confirmed by many of the judges interviewed43. For example, the approach of 
the ICJ and ITLOS on experts is similar to a large extent, and resembles the Common 
Law tradition.
Despite the similarities that the tribunals share, it is not sufficient to suggest an 
emerging common set of rules on evidence, or an established community of 
international tribunals. Even though there are references made to each other’s 
jurisprudence on evidential rules, this has neither been widely practiced nor 
consistent. The judges have further indicated that the dialogue on evidential rules has 
been minimal, and informal. What further supports the argument on the lack of an 
emerging commonality is the disagreement on evidential rules within each individual 
tribunal. If this is the case, it is difficult to see how there could be said to be an 
emerging common set of rules among different tribunals.
Section 3: The influencing factors on the approach of the tribunals
Chapters Three to Six have shown the variety of factors that influence the 
approach of international tribunals on evidential rules. Concerning the ICJ, a scholar 
has suggested that “the Court seems to have reworked the rules of evidence which it 
does apply with three objects in mind: (1) to bridge the gap left by the non-production 
of evidence, (2) to enable the Court to weigh the evidence submitted, and (3) to allow 
the opposing party to meet the evidence introduced.”44 The factors below are those 
gathered through this research, and some reflect those suggested by Bentham as 
considerations by courts in diverging from the Freedom of Proof45.
3.1 The judges:
42 S c h o l a r s  h a v e  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r i b u n a l s  h a v e  l o o k e d  a t  o n e  a n o t h e r ’ s  j u r i s p r u d e n c e  s i n c e  t h e  e a r l i e r  p e r i o d  o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l i t i g a t i o n .  S e e  f u r t h e r :  S a n d i f e r ,  ( 1 9 7 5 )  4 4 .  S e e  t h e  r e c e n t  s t u d y :  B r o w n ,  ( 2 0 0 4 )
43  E . g .  J u d g e  I
44  A l f o r d ,  ( 1 9 5 8 )  8 1
45  S e e  C h a p t e r  3 ,  S e c t i o n  2 ,  4 1 - 4 7
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There is no doubt that the identity of the judges has an influence on the 
approach of the tribunal on evidential rules46. This has been expressed by the judges 
of all three tribunals.
First, the background of the judges can have an impact. For example, in the 
context of the ICJ, concerning the standard of proof, Judge B has expressed that a 
reason why the Court cannot establish clear rules was due to the disagreement 
between the judges who are roughly grouped into the Civil Law tradition on one hand, 
and the Common Law tradition on the other. Some Civil Law judges do not agree 
with the cross-examination process of the ICJ. Further, Judge B pointed out that the 
judge’s legal training also has an influence, e.g. whether he has been received training 
as a barrister. The judges trained as such, when compared to judges who are “legal 
diplomats”, can more easily spot the issues which would have otherwise gone 
undetected.
In the context of ITLOS, Judge E also confirmed the Civil/Common law 
divide in the approach of the judges. For example, the Common Law judge would 
look into all the facts of the case whereas the Civil Law judge would ask for the 
relevant facts. He also noted that, generally, the international law judge resembles 
more the Common Law judge, being passive in the proceedings. Judge H added that 
a judge could be skeptical about adopting procedures which he is not accustomed to. 
Judge G noted that since there are few evidential rules from the provisions of the 
Tribunal, the background of the judge is important in determining the approach. 
Judge H thought that judges must be open to new procedures and developments. 
Judge J added that the training of the judges can also determine the approach of the 
Tribunal. For example, “legal diplomats”, i.e. those judges who did not practice in 
their own jurisdiction, are generally not too concerned about technical procedural 
rules.
In the context of the WTO, Panelist L stated that the background of the judges 
does matter especially on the question of the interpretation of the DSU. Different 
legal traditions interpret the same WTO provision differently. Each panelist brings 
alternative perspectives into the interpretation of the provisions, which are discussed. 
In contrast, Panelist K noted that when he acted as a panelist, the input from the Civil 
Lawyers and the Common Lawyers were not that different.
46 See further: Sandifer, (1975) 11-12, Witenberg, (1951) 335, and Cheng, (1953b) 335
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Further, and unique to the WTO, there is also a distinction between the 
panelists who are lawyers and those who are not. Panelist L noted that the non­
lawyers are generally not concerned with technicalities such as the rules of evidence. 
They do not really understand the issues. Panelist M underlined the role of the 
chairman in trying to find an accepted solution when the panelists cannot agree.
Further, the number of judges can potentially influence the approach of the 
tribunals. The ICJ has 15 judges, ITLOS has 21, but the WTO only has 3 sitting at 
both the panel level and the appeal level. A large number of judges (e.g. the ICJ and 
ITLOS) could find it more difficult to arrive at a consensus on a particular approach 
on a technical issue such as evidential rules. In the context of the WTO, there are 
only 3 panellists or AB Members sitting at any one time (7 AB Members altogether 
when they confer for consistency according to WTO provisions) which makes 
agreement easier. This distinction could explain why the ICJ and ITLOS have not 
been precise on aspects of evidential rules compared to the WTO. Further, it could 
explain the many dissenting opinions in judgments of the ICJ and ITLOS.
3.2 Limitation of resources:
An important factor influencing the approach of international tribunals is the 
limitation of resources, the first one being time. First, tribunals can be restricted by 
the nature of the case itself, e.g. provisional measures cases and prompt release cases 
which require the tribunal to as expeditious as possible. Second, in full merits cases, 
tribunals will need to find a balance on the admission of evidence to make the 
litigation as efficient as possible.
The judges of ITLOS have expressed that time restriction is particularly 
pertinent for the Tribunal because the majority of its cases have been prompt release 
and provisional measures cases. The Tribunal has to concentrate on certain aspects of 
the case submitted, and does not preoccupy itself with issues that can be left 
undecided. Some judges expressed that tribunal-appointed experts were not used 
because of the time limit. Using tribunal-appointed experts for every case would 
mean long delays: in obtaining the views of the Parties, in issuing an Order, providing 
time for the experts to carry out their enquiry, and giving the Parties time to respond 
to it. The judges suggested that, time permitting, the Tribunal could appoint its own 
experts in the future.
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As well as time restrictions, Judge H of ITLOS noted that tribunals also take 
into account how to conduct the case in the most cost-effective way. Because 
tribunals have to pay for their own appointed experts47, could the lack of financial 
resources explain why they have not been used more often?
The different way in which assistants or clerks are used by the tribunals can 
also have effects on evidential rules, as is apparent from the interviews. For example, 
the limited role of the secretariat of the ICJ and ITLOS has meant that, if needed, the 
judges must seek independent advice. In contrast, the WTO panelists have underlined 
the important role of its Secretariat in supplying expert advice or acting as a point of 
reference where any questions can be referred48.
3.3 The nature of the case:
The effect of the nature of the case on evidential rules is apparent. Regarding 
the ICJ, the wide range of cases that could come before the Court could be a reason 
for its flexible approach on the standard of proof. The variable standard of proof, 
contingent on the seriousness of the allegation in the case, has been expressed by the 
judges of the Court. For example, cases involving acts resembling those of a 
criminal nature would require a higher standard than those cases involving boundary 
limitations49. Further, cases which are very technical in nature could also prompt the 
Court to appoint independent experts, e.g. cartographers50.
Similarly, before ITLOS, the nature of the cases has also affected the 
Tribunal’s approach on evidential rules. For example, as mentioned by the judges, the 
rules applied by the Tribunal have taken into account that most of the Tribunal’s cases 
have either been prompt release or provisional measures cases, e.g. urgency is 
required. Further, could the flexible standard of proof be a reflection of the range of 
cases: prompt release, provisional measures and merits cases?
In the context of the WTO, Panelist M confirmed that the nature of the case 
can determine the approach of the tribunal on evidential rules. For example, external 
experts would not be used in cases only concerning trade but in cases concerning 
technical issues such as health or the environment. Further, the relatively clear
47 E.g. Rules o f Court, 1978 art. 68
4S See: Chapter 6, Section 5.4, 141-143
4 9  See: Chapter 4, Section 3, 69-95
50 See: Chapter 6, Section 3.4.2.4, 195-200
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standard of proof before the WTO DSB could reflect the more consistent nature of the 
cases only involving barriers to trade.
3.4 The conduct of the parties:
Panelist M indicated that the conduct of the parties could have an effect on the 
approach of the tribunal. For example, the amount of evidence put forward by the 
parties, or whether the evidence produced by one party is challenged by another, 
could determine if there is a need to appoint independent experts. The importance of 
the conduct of the parties has also been confirmed by Judge E of ITLOS.
3.5 References to the jurisprudence of other tribunals:
In some circumstances, the jurisprudence of other tribunals can influence a 
tribunal’s approach on evidence. For example, ITLOS looks to the jurisprudence of 
the ICJ and tries to conform unless there is reason not to. This has been addressed in 
detail in a previous section51.
3.6 The nature of international litigation:
The particular characteristics of international litigation can have an influence 
on evidential rules. First, the provisions of the tribunals have been drafted by States, 
resulting in a level of deference to them. This is reflected in rules allowing much 
flexibility.
Further, the scope of inter-State litigation can be wider than domestic disputes 
and the relationship between two States may also depend on the proceedings. “The 
importance of the interests at stake [in international litigation] precludes excessive or 
decisive reliance upon formal and technical rules” . There is concern that the result 
of international litigation should not turn on a point of procedure, but on the facts of 
the case.
51 See: Chapter 7. Section 2A-2.1, 252-257
52 Lauterpacht, (1958) 366
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Another characteristic of international litigation is that evidence is difficult to 
obtain and prepare53, caused by a range of factors including: a) the longer time 
elapsed between the events and the proceedings, b) the greater distance between the 
trial and the place of the events, c) the poor conditions of some written records. As 
noted by scholars, this has meant that parties have had to submit all the evidence 
available54.
In addition, tribunals were created and exist as separate entities. Because there 
are no formal inter-tribunal channels of communication, there has been minimal 
dialogue and only some references between them.
3.7 The extent of deference of tribunals to States
Because of State sovereignty, tribunals can be inclined to grant them deference 
and refrain from imposing rules restricting the freedom of States. This was expressed 
early on in the Lotus Case before the PCU55, and also confirmed in the interviews of 
this research. One judge said that international tribunals have to try to please both 
parties.
Regarding the use of tribunal-appointed experts, judges expressed the view 
that the tribunals must be cautious because they are dealing with sovereign States. 
The tribunals must not be too active in seeking its own information, but allow the 
parties to present what it considers to be relevant information. Further, the tribunals 
rely on States to create work. A restrictive approach could deter them from using the 
forum.
The ICJ and ITLOS arguably have more deference to States than the WTO 
DSB. The rules of the former two grant much flexibility whereas the rules and the 
timetables of the WTO DSB are more precise. This distinction could be a result of 
the context in which they were created. The recent WTO DSB could indicate that the 
nature of international litigation is shifting towards tribunals granting less deference 
to States. States have also been more willing to give their consent to undergo 
compulsory dispute settlement. In the 19th century, international litigation was very
53 See further: Sandifer, (1975) 24-29. In the earlier period of international litigation, tribunals have to cope with the lack of 
evidence, see: Alford, (1958)91
54 Sandifer, (1975) 457, 181-182
55 The Lotus Case, PCU, 1927, para 3
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flexible with very few rules56. Any rules created were for a particular forum. This 
gradually changed with the introduction of the PCIJ with permanent rules. For the 
first time, there was an option for States to be subject to compulsory jurisdiction 
without a special agreement. In recent years, the WTO DSB being a good example, 
tribunals have arguably given less deference to States. There are more tribunals with 
compulsory jurisdiction. The procedural rules have become more detailed and 
arguably more restrictive in order to regulate the disputes more efficiently, e.g. the
cn
time-frame introduced under the WTO system .
3.8 The policy of the tribunals towards commonality
The tribunal’s policy towards the notion of commonality could affect 
evidential rules. The interviews have uncovered that the proliferation of international 
tribunals has not generally been a consideration of the judges in deciding the approach 
on evidential rules58. The proliferation has not brought the issue of the commonality 
of evidential rules to the forefront. However, a number of judges noted that evidential 
rules in the context of the proliferation of tribunals should be addressed in the near 
future.
3.9 Incentive of States to use the tribunals:
The ICJ and ITLOS have arguably adopted flexible rules as incentive for 
States to use them as the forum of choice. Since the basis of the jurisdiction of 
tribunals is different, those without compulsory jurisdiction, e.g. the ICJ and ITLOS, 
could be inclined to grant more deference to States. Tribunals adopting rigid rules of 
procedure could deter States from using them altogether. A tribunal with compulsory 
jurisdiction, e.g. the WTO DSB, need not introduce flexible rules to attract States.
3.10 The existence of the Appellate Body:
56 See: Chapter 2, Section 3, in particular 3.3, 26-32
57 Dispute Settlement Understanding, 1994 Article 20. Lapradelle suggested that, even though States are sovereign, they have 
transferred the power over the dispute to tribunals. Consequently, tribunals can consider what rules are appropriate, see: 
Lapradelle and Politis, (1957) 537-538
58 See: Appendix E
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One reason why procedural rules of the WTO DSB have been consistent and 
clearer than those of the ICJ and ITLOS is no doubt because of the AB. The AB can 
add, revise, or confirm points of law from the Panel report helping to build a clear set 
of rules. For example, the jurisprudence of the ICJ shows inconsistencies in the 
applied standard of proof. If there were to be an appellate body, these points of law 
might have been clarified. The same argument applies for ITLOS.
3.11 Municipal rules on evidence:
Municipal rules on evidence can also influence the rules of international 
tribunals. However, this is not explicit in the provisions. The practice of the tribunals 
equally does not indicate an adoption of a particular legal tradition’s approach on 
evidence. The tribunals seem to be incorporating the approaches of many legal 
traditions allowing for flexibility, and opening as many channels as possible for the 
submission of evidence. Judge F of ITLOS observed that, with 21 judges, the 
Tribunal could have difficulty applying the approach of one tradition.
Interviews with judges have shown that their background can have an 
influence on the approach of the tribunal. Most of them indicated that there is the 
Civil/Common Law divide, meaning that the judges from different legal traditions 
will approach evidential rules differently. For example, this could be in the 
interpretation of existing provisions.
Parties can also introduce the practice from their own tradition into the 
proceedings of international tribunals. A good example was the Corfu Channel Case 
where it has been argued that because the UK was involved in this first case of the 
ICJ, its proceedings started to use Common Law style oral examinations which still 
carry on today59. Further, parties can request the tribunal to allow specific 
procedures, as was done before ITLOS on the voir dire, a procedure originating in the 
Common Law tradition60.
3.12 The context and history of the tribunals:
59 Rosenne, (1995) 156
60  See: Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1, 97-100
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Many of the influencing factors above have arisen because tribunals were 
created within different contexts. For example, the reason why the provisions of 
ITLOS resemble those of the ICJ is no doubt partly because it was created after the 
ICJ, and both tribunals are within the UN framework. In contrast, the WTO is not 
part of the UN framework but created as the replacement for the inefficient GATT. 
Members of the new WTO were keen to ensure that obligations under the agreement 
were met, introducing enforcement mechanisms.
Other influencing factors such as how much references are made between the 
tribunals, and their level of deference to States, are also partly the result of the context 
in which the tribunals were created.
3.13 Preliminary Conclusion
The factors above can influence the approach of international tribunals on 
evidential rules. A range of factors will contribute to the overall result of the 
approach of each tribunal, each one having different predominant influencing factors.
Section 4: Should there be a common approach to evidential rules?
The final section of this chapter will answer this last question by addressing 
the clear tension between the advantages and disadvantages of commonality. It will 
show that the advantages of commonality outweigh the disadvantages:
4.1 The Advantages:
4.1.1 Clarity of rules:
The research has shown that the tribunals’ provisions do not address the issue 
of evidential rules in detail, the DSU of the WTO DSB being the most detailed of the 
three61. Many judges from the interviews have indicated that the most significant 
advantage of a common set of evidential rules is that all the tribunals must pay
61 See: Chapter 4, Section 5.2, 105-106; Chapter 5, Section 5.2, 160-161; Chapter 6, Section 5.3.1, 227
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attention to the debate and can address particular issues, even if an entirely common 
set of rules is not achieved.
Many judges further remarked that, at the moment, because evidential rules 
are not concrete, the parties have to face uncertainty of the proceedings. Filling in 
gaps in the provisions by addressing the question of commonality can provide clarity 
and predictability for the parties. Judge A of the ICJ had concerns on this issue, 
giving the example of the Oil Platforms Case where the parties did not know what 
evidential rules were to be applied62. The situation could improve if a common set of 
rules was established. Existing rules or practice can be set out. For example, hearsay 
evidence is allowed before the ICJ, but not the ICTY. Judge B said that a common set 
of rules would help to “articulate” what the court is doing.
Judge H of ITLOS agreed that adopting a common set of rules would add 
clarity to the current rules. Further, it will make the parties more comfortable with 
litigation. Panelist K of the WTO added that some rules governing certain aspects of 
the WTO do not function well. Trying to achieve commonality would address these 
problems.
4.1.2 Commonality producing consistent approaches to judgments:
The proliferation of international tribunals has meant the overlapping of 
jurisdiction of different tribunals over the same types of dispute . For example, both 
the ICJ and ITLOS have jurisdiction over maritime delimitation. This raises the 
possibility of parties submitting the same disputes or disputes arising from the same 
set of facts to two different tribunals. Although unlikely, it is possible and the 
possibility increases with the number of tribunals and the number of inter-state 
disputes64.
First, the ICJ and the WTO DSB could have overlapping jurisdiction. A good 
example of this would be the Oil Platforms Case65. In this case, the ICJ based its 
jurisdiction on the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights 
between the US and Iran. Iran brought a claim that the US had breached Article X of
62 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003
63  One ITLOS judge expressed the opinion that the overlapping jurisdiction is good because there could be reasons why a 
particular State would not come before a particular tribunal. Reasons could be political or it could concern issues like secrecy.
6 4  Many of the judges o f noted that the overlapping of the jurisdiction of the tribunals is unlikely. However, they cannot deny 
that it will be more likely in the future as there are more cases before the increasing number of tribunals.
65 Oil Platforms Case, ICJ, 2003; See: Chapter 4, Section 3.3.2.3, 84-87
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the Treaty on the freedom of commerce and navigation. What is significant for this 
thesis is that, if Iran had been a member of the WTO, because the dispute concerned 
trade, the dispute could have equally been before the WTO DSB. Another example of 
a potential overlap in jurisdiction between the ICJ and the WTO would be where a 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA), for political reasons, had a dispute settlement clause 
referring disputes to the ICJ. Because an FTA often stipulates the obligations already 
laid down in the WTO Agreement, both tribunals could have jurisdiction over the 
same obligations. For example, a dispute could concern State A, State B, and State C. 
Regarding the same obligations, State A and B could decide to submit the dispute to 
the WTO DSB, and State A and C decide to submit it to the ICJ.
Second, the ICJ and ITLOS can have overlapping jurisdictions. This overlap 
is specifically provided for in UNCLOS where the parties can chose, among other 
fora, whether to use the ICJ or ITLOS as the dispute settlement body of choice. Such 
disputes could be maritime delimitations. There could be a dispute involving a 
common maritime boundary of three States. Again, State A an B could submit a 
dispute on one part of the boundary to the ICJ, and State A and C could submit a 
dispute on another part of the boundary to ITLOS. Being the same boundary, the 
tribunals would have to address the same issues. Further, different disputes could 
share many aspects. For example, there could be two different maritime boundary 
disputes: one involving fisheries and the other pollution. Consequently, these two 
disputes between the same two States on the same boundary could be submitted to 
two different tribunals.
Third, the WTO DSB and ITLOS can also have overlapping jurisdiction. This 
has already happened in the dispute between Chile and EU concerning the fishing of 
swordfish off the coast of the former by the latter. In the context of the WTO, the EU 
requested consultations with Chile on the prohibition of the unloading of swordfish, 
through a Chilean measure, in Chilean ports. The EU argued that this, as a result, 
transit through the ports was impossible for swordfish, and this was inconsistent with 
GATT. Before ITLOS, Chile and the EU requested a Special Chamber to be created 
to address, inter alia , whether: a) the EU has complied with UNCLOS to ensure the 
conservation of swordfish in its activities on the high seas adjacent to the EEZ of 
Chile, b) the Chilean measure, in purporting to apply conservation measures, breached 
UNCLOS. However, neither the WTO DSB nor ITLOS has delivered a judgment on 
the dispute because the parties reached an arrangement out of court. Nonetheless, the
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two cases are still in the docket of the two tribunals should the parties decide to take it 
further.
Once of the consequences of the overlapping jurisdictions of tribunals together 
with different evidential rules is two tribunals reaching two different conclusions on 
the same set of facts. For example, in the second example given where the ICJ and 
ITLOS have overlapping jurisdiction on a maritime delimitation, the standard of proof 
could prove crucial to the case. The standards of proof of the two tribunals have not 
been clearly fixed, so they could consequently be different. If there was a crucial fact 
to be proven, such as whether a rock formation is to be considered as an island or a 
low-tide elevation for the purposes of the delimitation, the standard of proof could be 
decisive. There might be enough evidence to satisfy one standard as applied by one 
tribunal, but not the other.
Another example of how different evidential rules could determine the 
outcome of a case can be taken from the example of the ICJ and the WTO DSB. As 
noted above, these tribunals have different practices regarding the use of experts66. 
The ICJ depends largely on evidence presented by the parties, both written and oral. 
However, in cases involving technical issues, the panels of the WTO have made 
extensive use of their own appointed experts. Party experts tend to present more 
extreme views on issues when compared to the independent experts who generally 
present a more balanced and complete picture. This difference in the evidence 
presented could potentially render difference judgments from the same case.
Establishing one set of common rules on evidence would minimize the chance 
of tribunals reaching different conclusions when the facts of cases are the same and 
the applicable legal rules are the same or similar. This would also reduce the problem 
of how to reconcile two contradicting judgments. Currently, this question has not 
been addressed and would be difficult to answer because there is no hierarchy 
between the tribunals.
However, Judge E argued that common evidential rules would not necessarily 
help the consistency of judgments because the same rules would still be subject to 
different interpretation of the judges who bring in a level of subjectivity. However, 
the writer disagrees with this view. Even if there is subjectivity, having a common set 
of rules would still narrow down the way evidential rules can be applied.
66 See: Chapter 6, 179-247
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Judge G of ITLOS added that even though different tribunals have different 
evidential rules, if the same dispute were before two fora, the tribunals would try to 
reach the same conclusion even if through different reasoning. Nonetheless, Judge G 
sees the problem that could arise from different evidential rules. But, in his opinion, 
the harmonization process will happen by itself with time. As there is more dialogue 
between tribunals, their approaches will merge. The tribunals must be seen as a 
community now and not isolated entities.
However, Judge H noted that problems arising from overlapping jurisdictions 
are not merely the result of different evidential rules, but it could certainly contribute 
to the problem. One of the judges commented that there has always been overlapping 
jurisdictions between international tribunals. However, their recent increase has 
drawn attention to the potential problem. Judge I of ITLOS noted that tribunals must 
take into account that, in many cases which seem to overlap, the different tribunals are 
actually looking at two different aspects of the same case. However, there could also 
be cases where two tribunals are looking at the same aspect of the case.
As a preliminary conclusion, the risk of overlapping jurisdictions of different 
tribunals on the same case is real. Consequently, because of different evidential rules, 
tribunals can reach different conclusions on the same dispute. This problem is 
recognised by many of the judges interviewed. However, some judges noted that 
common rules would still be subject to interpretation of individual judges, or the 
difference in evidential rules is only a factor in creating the problems from 
overlapping jurisdictions.
4.1.3 Problems arising in the future:
As noted above, different judgments from different tribunals on the same 
dispute can lead to potential problems, e.g. reconciling inconsistent judgments. With 
the increasing interaction between States and more international tribunals, this 
problem could worsen in the coming years. The inconsistency could cause problems 
in the jurisprudence in terms of referencing to the old case law. For example, should 
a dispute occur in the future with a similar set of facts to two conflicting judgments 
from two different tribunals, questions would arise as to which judgment could be 
used as precedent. The agents of the two parties in the new case would no doubt refer
Charlie Gamjana-Goonchom
Page 270 of 321
to the case that suited their argument. This potential problem could be minimized by 
adopting a common set of rules on evidence.
4.1.4 Clarity for the parties
A common set of evidential rules can provide clarity for the litigating 
parties . If the parties are unaware of what rules the tribunals will apply, then they 
will face great uncertainty. For example, this could be facing uncertain standards of 
proof, or what experts the tribunal will use. In fact, clarification for the parties has 
been an important reason expressed by judges interviewed for the adoption of 
common evidential rules. Judge H has observed that this could put the parties more at
/TO
ease . Judge A also expressed his concern over the unsatisfactory state of some of 
the evidential rules, leaving the parties unaware of what rules are to be applied by the 
Court. Common evidential rules can facilitate the litigation of the parties by making 
the process less complex. In turn, this could encourage States to use international 
tribunals. Further, commonality could encourage tribunals to fill in gaps in the 
provisions.
4.1.5 Stepping towards an “integrated system” of international tribunals:
The proliferation of international tribunals has raised questions of whether the 
existing fragmented system where tribunals function as separate entities should 
continue, or whether they should operate in a more “integrated system” of tribunals 
where there is more dialogue and the bond between them is more formalized and 
defined. This question is yet to be answered, and up to States and tribunals to 
determine. However, should a more integrated system be desired, then adopting 
commonality in evidential rules would be a step towards this goal.
Further, a common set of evidential rules could reduce forum shopping. In the 
opinion of the writer, this would help achieve a more integrated system because one 
of its important quality is ensuring the consistency of judgments. Similar disputes 
should be subject to the same treatment, ensuring consistency of judgment. Judge E 
of ITLOS has expressed that forum shopping would not be desirable, and that the
67  This is linked to the clarity o f rules which has been addressed in Chapter 7, Section 4.1.1, 265-266
68 See: Appendix E.
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result of the disputes should not turn on technical rules. The writer agrees with this 
view. The substance of the case should be the determining factor before a tribunal, 
and not the procedure through which the dispute is put through69.
4.2 The disadvantages:
4.2.1 Commonality does not take into account the specializations and the nature of the 
tribunals:
Common evidential rules do not take into account the need of tribunals in two 
ways. First, as expressed by the judges interviewed, many of the tribunals were 
created to resolve disputes of specialized subject matter. For example, ITLOS’s 
jurisdiction covers issues arising from UNCLOS, i.e. the law of the sea. The WTO 
DSB deals with disputes under the WTO Agreement regarding trade. Outside the 
scope of this study but illustrative are the criminal courts such as the International 
Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
Their specialization requires different evidential rules. For example, the standard of 
proof in criminal courts is usually higher (beyond reasonable doubt) than in civil 
cases. Further, urgent cases such as prompt release cases (specific to ITLOS) could 
demand rules to facilitate this. In contrast, full merits cases before the ICJ would 
merit from the most extensive evidence. Many of the judges interviewed agreed that, 
if a common set of rules were to be established, then the specialization of the tribunals 
will have to be taken into account70.
Further, some characteristics of international tribunals do not suit common 
evidential rules. For example, the ICJ, with its universal jurisdiction, demands a more 
flexible set of rules than a forum such as the WTO DSB which essentially only deals 
with disputes on barriers to trade. The standard of proof of the ICJ would have to be 
flexible enough to deal with, on one hand: a) cases concerning serious acts of States 
such as the Corfu Channel Case or criminal type cases such as the recent Genocide 
Case, and on the other, B) ordinary civil cases including boundary disputes. Another 
special characteristic of an international tribunal is the appellate system in the WTO 
DSB which could require different rules from a forum like the ICJ which is final.
69 See also: Chapter 7, Section 4.2.3, 272-273
70 See: Appendix E
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4.2.2 The intention of States
An argument against common rules is that it was not the intention of the States 
which created the tribunals. States intended to create the tribunals as separate entities 
and not as part of an integrated system, or with a common set of evidential rules. 
With the current situation where sovereign States make international law, should it 
not be the case that their intention be followed? If initiatives to establish common 
evidential rules were taken, would the judges be acting outside their mandate? Must 
the initiative for common evidential rules be taken by the States who originally 
drafted the Statutes of the tribunals? These are questions to be answered. Judge D 
noted that States did not create tribunals in a hierarchical arrangement with common 
rules. In his opinion, adopting commonality could prove difficult.
4.2.3 Reducing the choice of States
In contrast to the view that international tribunals should function in an 
integrated system, there is also the argument that tribunals should function 
independently. This view encourages tribunals to adopt different rules on evidence to 
increase the choice of States. In other words, forum shopping would be encouraged. 
Advocates of this model add that the consistency of evidential rules is not important. 
States should be encouraged to use third party dispute settlement through choice. 
Every forum applies international law so the State’s choice of tribunal should not
71matter. This was the view of one of the judges from ITLOS . However, when the 
idea was shared with an ICJ judge, he added that this has been argued perhaps 
because there have not been many cases before ITLOS and this would be one way to 
increase their work. Judge A is also of the view that the difference in evidential rules 
should not be the decisive factor in a case.
Judge F of ITLOS who supports commonality of evidential rules argued that, 
if States need choice in international tribunals, evidential rules should not be part of it. 
There are other considerations which can provide such choice.
71 See: Appendix E
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Panelist M of the WTO expressed his opinion that tribunal choice for States is 
a good thing. However, he recognizes the problems arising from overlapping 
jurisdictions, especially in the future. Common evidential rules would reduce the 
chance of problems arising but not eliminate it completely.
4.2.4 Problems of implementation
There can be difficulties in the implementation of achieving common 
evidential rules. For example, tribunals could be overloaded with the extra work. 
There are also other issues that need addressing, such as: a) the best way to achieve 
commonality, b) which entities will play a role in the process, c) which tribunal is to 
take the initiative to start the dialogue, d) what will be the characteristics of the 
dialogue and who will lead it, e) who will finance the processes in achieving 
commonality. These are important pragmatic questions which need to be answered.
Judges also expressed the desirability of commonality but noted the potential
"10problems in the implementation . Judge H noted that the problem could arise from 
the question of who will initiate the process to achieve this commonality. Judge J, 
although in favour of commonality, had concerns on the legal authority of tribunals to 
change their evidential rules. He added that, for the moment, there is no urgent need 
to develop common rules, but more appropriately in ten year’s time. The tribunals 
will learn how to approach this issue through experience, and the judges must keep an 
open mind. In the context of the WTO, although the panelists recognized the benefits 
of common rules, they also pointed out that only the Members have the power to 
change the provisions.
4.2.5 Preliminary Conclusion:
Having seen the advantages and the disadvantages of commonality, the writer 
is of the view that the former outweighs the latter. This is particularly the case 
because the community of tribunals will increase, and most of the problems foreseen 
with the lack of commonality will also increase with it. Adopting commonality now 
could prevent many problems in the future. In light of the ILC’s study on the
72 E.g. Judge B o f the ICJ.
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fragmentation of international law suggesting that international law is now a legal 
system where rules and norms relate to one another, the writer suggests that 
commonality of evidential rules is appropriate. However, the disadvantages of 
commonality, and the methods of implementation need to be addressed73.
4.3 Judges’ views on commonality:
The research has shown that the judges are split on issue of common 
evidential rules. Many judges oppose the idea of commonality. One judge expressed 
the view that commonality would reduce the choice of States in terms of different 
tribunals with rules which could benefit a State’s claim. Another judge stated that 
there is no need to adopt common rules because flexibility should be enough to avoid 
inconsistency of the case law74. Judge I added that, so far, the disadvantages of the 
lack of common rules have not been unmanageable. He also noted the trend of 
tribunals towards specialization. The problems of overlapping jurisdiction would not 
be significant if this trend continues.
Some judges say that the current arrangement on evidential rules does not 
hinder the tribunals from functioning, but there are benefits to adopting a common 
approach to evidential rules75. Judge I added that if a common approach is 
established, the rules must not be too strict.
In contrast, there are also many judges who support commonality of evidential
7  f \rules. Their view is that tribunals should work together in a community . Judge A of 
the ICJ supports this notion and has given an insight that it has been suggested within 
the ICJ that different courts should meet to discuss such issues. However, there was 
disagreement between the judges whether this should be done, so no initiative was 
taken. Judge H noted that the evidential rules of the different tribunals already 
resemble each other to an extent, and thinks that commonality should be established 
as far as it is necessary. He added that there needs to be an exchange of ideas 
between the tribunals. Judge F stated that, if there are overlapping jurisdictions, then 
a common set of rules is highly desirable. In his opinion, international tribunals need 
common evidential rules to the fullest extent possible. Having noted that WTO law is
73 See: Chapter 7, Section 4.3-4.5, 274-313
74  See Appendix E.
75 E.g. Judge H, see further: Appendix E.
76 This view is arguably supported by the ILC’s study on the fragmentation of international law, International Law Commission, 
(2006)
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in a niche of its own, one panelist however went on to say that the problems arising 
from overlapping jurisdictions are real. The WTO also applies general international 
law so there is no reason why it cannot engage in a dialogue on procedural rules.
Although these interviews were carried out after the ILC’s study on the 
fragmentation, they were before the recent Genocide Case77. The case is significant 
because it has brought the attention of tribunals, at least the ICJ, to evidential rules. 
Questions arise as to whether the answers of the judges concerning commonality 
would have been different in light of this new case. Perhaps they would recognize to 
a fuller extent the importance of evidential rules.
4.4 The suggested conclusion:
Having seen the advantages and the disadvantages of a move towards 
commonality of evidential rules, in the opinion of the writer, tribunals should make an 
effort to achieve it. The advantages outweigh the disadvantages.
As underlined by many judges, the clarity of the rules on evidence is 
important, and could make litigation more efficient and cost effective. Commonality 
will also help achieve the advantages mentioned. Further, as the proliferation of 
international tribunals continues, problems arising from overlapping jurisdictions will 
be ever more realistic. The writer is of the view that international law is becoming a 
more integrated system where norms and the relationship between international 
tribunals must be recognized. This view of international law is arguably supported by 
the latest study of the International Law Commission on the fragmentation of 
international law. Having noted the arguments on fragmentation, the study went on to 
conclude: “International law is a legal system. Its rules and principles (i.e. its norms) 
act in relation to and should be interpreted against the background of other rules and 
principles.”78
In adopting commonality, what must be noted is that there are varying degrees 
at which it can be adopted. In other words, it is a question of how much cross­
fertilization of evidential rules there is in between the tribunals. It is a sliding scale 
with absolute commonality at one end and no commonality on the other. In between 
these two extremes, there are different levels of commonality of rules. For example,
77 The Genocide Case, ICJ, 2007. See: Chapter 4, Section 3.3.2.3, 88-89
78 International Law Commission, (2006) para 1. NB: This study has not been adopted by the ILC as a whole. See generally on 
the points addressed by the ILC in: Study Group:Analytical study, (2006) esp. para 1-21.
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the lowest level of cross-fertilization is perhaps for a tribunal to clarify its own rules 
and recognize the rules, including the differences, of other tribunals. A higher level 
of cross-fertilization would be to adopt general guidelines on evidential rules. For 
example, the tribunals could agree on what the applicable rules are for different types
79of cases . An even higher level of cross-fertilization could involve tribunals adopting 
the same approach on specific evidential rules. At the most extreme end would be all 
tribunals applying common evidential rules. The question is where on this scale the 
tribunals would be willing to settle.
As for the suggestion of the writer, the level of commonality cannot ignore the 
disadvantages mentioned. As indicated by judges, the specialization of the tribunals 
must be taken into account. Consequently, the thesis proposes that at least guiding 
principles on evidential rules be adopted.
Guiding principles can be adopted through common rules which take into 
account the nature of the case or the specialization of the tribunals. For example, on 
the standard of proof, a set of common rules could be made to stipulate the standard 
applied to different types of cases, with the criteria for using each one. For example, 
gravest cases, e.g. those of a criminal nature, could use a high standard of proof such 
as proof beyond reasonable doubt. Other cases could use a lower standard such as the 
balance of probabilities, and in some exceptional circumstances, provisions could 
stipulate when the lowest standard of prima facie  evidence would be used. Through
this arrangement, the provisions on the use of the standard of proof would be shared
80by the tribunals but the special needs of each tribunal would also be recognised .
This set of guiding principles could also recognise the nature of the case. 
There could be common rules on the types of expert evidence allowed in different
Q 1
types of case, or under what circumstances . Cases involving technical scientific 
issues could arguably require independent experts more than those where the judges 
can grasp the issues presented by the parties. Further, taking the example of amicus 
curiae briefs, the common rules on evidence could recognise and reflect that 
environmental cases also involve interests of non-states and NGOs.
79 See: Chapter 7, Section 4A-4.5, 275-315
80 However, it must be noted that dividing cases into categories with different standards o f proof will be difficult. There will be 
border-line cases which are difficult to categorize and cases containing many different issues which could require different 
standards o f proof.
81 In cases where tribunals refuse the request o f parties to appoint independent experts, they could be obliged to provide reasons 
giving more clarity in the proceedings.
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Recognizing the specialised nature of international tribunals also means 
realising that some aspects of evidential rules cannot be the same. Adopting guiding 
principles would allow common evidential rules to be limited to the extent that is 
possible. First, there could be cases where two tribunals need to take different 
approaches on a particular aspect of evidential rules82. Further, the provisions of a 
tribunal might not permit the adoption of some evidential rules. For example, there 
has been argument within the context of the WTO DSB whether the AB had the 
authority to adopt rules on the admission of amicus curiae briefs. When tribunals are 
unable to merge towards commonality, this, and its reasons, should be clearly 
enunciated.
The proposal of the thesis of moving towards a commonality is supported by 
many of the judges interviewed. Judge H stated that even though the tribunals 
consider themselves different, they are also similar in the way they function and the 
tasks they have to perform. The tribunals can learn from one another.
The judges also made several other points worth mentioning. First, several of 
the judges have stated that, with the current level of references made between the 
tribunals and the likelihood of this increasing in the future, evidential rules will 
eventually merge and commonality will be established in any case . However, none 
of the judges went into the details as to how this might occur or its time frame. 
Second, Judge E added that the clarity of the rules would be improved if the judges 
were obliged to explain the way they have arrived at their decision. Third, Judge H 
stated that although a common set of rules on evidence would be beneficial, it must 
not be overly complicated as to create new problems for tribunals and States.
In addition, many judges noted that, even though a common set of rules would 
reduce problems that could arise from overlapping jurisdictions, it could be difficult 
to achieve in practice. However, suggestions as to how this could be done will be 
outlined in the following section.
The judges have also indicated that problems arising from the lack of 
commonality of evidential rules could also be resolved through other means. For 
example, as suggested by the arbitral tribunal in the MOX Plant Case, mutual respect 
and a sense of comity between the judicial institutions can be the key in avoiding
82 Because criminal tribunals and civil tribunals are very different, one judge has suggested that it might be easier to adopt a 
common approach to evidential rules among the international criminal tribunals because of their similarities.
83 See: Appendix E
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conflicting decisions from two tribunals on the same dispute . Further, tribunals can
85grant deference to one another through notions such as res judicata and lis pendens .
Regarding the argument that it was the intention of States to create tribunals 
as separate entities, the writer argues that the landscape of international litigation has 
changed must be seen under a new light. On the creation of a tribunal, States often 
did not take into account other tribunals at the time or those to be established in the 
future. They did not foresee the increasing interaction between the tribunals. 
Consequently, in the context of international litigation today, the tribunals should be 
seen as a community. This coincides with the view of over half of the judges 
interviewed.
Concerning the argument that choice should be granted to States through 
different evidential rules, the writer is of the opinion that this should not be the case. 
The writer shares the view with some of the judges that the result of the dispute 
should not turn on a procedural technicality but rather the facts of the case. Further, 
as indicated previously, encouraging different evidential rules in different tribunals 
could lead to inconsistencies in the jurisprudence of international tribunals. In the 
long term, this could cause unpredictability and discourage States from using third 
party litigation.
4.5 Implementation:
Many of the judges have said that there should be an increase in the dialogue 
between tribunals, both formal and informal. This dialogue will no doubt help to 
achieve commonality, and the beginning of the establishment of the guiding principles 
suggested previously. There needs to be a brainstorm between tribunals for the 
absorbing each other’s ideas. Should a tribunal decide to reject the approach of 
another, at least the reason for it will be clear. To achieve this dialogue, there were 
many models proposed by judges.
First, Judge F of ITLOS made references to the arrangement between 
domestic courts. In that context, there is a community of judges from different 
jurisdictions that meet regularly at meetings and conferences. They can exchange
84 The MOX Plant Case, Arbitral Tribunal, 2003 para 27-28
85 See: Reinisch, (2004) esp. 43-50
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ideas about how courts in different jurisdictions have adopted solutions to similar 
problems.
Second, Judge A of the ICJ has made suggestions for a judicial club at the 
Hague. International tribunals there, and even the local Dutch courts, could get 
together for a discussion. The chair of the discussion group could rotate each year. 
However, Judge A is not sure whether the ICJ would be willing to give up the chair of 
such a meeting for a smaller tribunal such as the ICTY.
Third, one judge suggested that, if direct dialogue was proving too 
problematic, then it could go through a neutral third party. The judge gave an 
example as the Institut de Droit International. He noted that there is a role for a 
neutral academic body such as the Project on International Courts and Tribunals 
(University College London) to act as the body where the debate could pass through. 
He added that the International Law Association would perhaps not be suitable 
because it has many people from commercial arbitration. The dialogue should, for the 
moment, concentrate on inter-state fora. In addition, he suggested that there is a 
possibility of NGOs taking part in the debate.
Fourth, several judges stated that the presidents of the tribunals have an 
important role to play. They have to take the initiative and discuss issues. This is to 
avoid the problem of trying to involve too many judges. Judge F welcomes the 
participation of practitioners and academics with hands-on experience of these 
issues86. There were proposals that international tribunals should look to the UN 
model where there are regular meetings of the agencies with the Secretary-General as 
the chairman. In the context of international tribunals, the President of the ICJ can 
perform the role of chairman. However, this process will be slow to start but good for 
international tribunals as a whole. In addition, it could eventually be required 
anyway. Judge D added that this approach is a good idea. However, there are 
political issues which need addressing before it can be done. The participation of the 
ICJ would depend on the personality of its President. In his opinion, the dialogue 
between the tribunals could make some ICJ judges feel threatened. They do not see 
the need for many tribunals performing similar functions.
Fifth, Panelist K of the WTO suggested that the best way to achieve common 
rules would be to draft up a list of “best practices” of the different tribunals on
86 Judge F added that there needs to be more participation from developing countries because the debate on international law at 
the moment is mainly made by the Europeans and the Americans.
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different aspects of evidential rules. The tribunals can refer to this list when they 
come across a particular problem. He also indicated that perhaps the ICJ should take 
an initiative on this, and the rules can then be passed down to smaller tribunals such 
as the WTO DSB.
If dialogue between the tribunals is proving too hard to achieve at this 
moment, Judge A suggested that an in-house debate on these issues would be a good 
starting point.
In addition to what was mentioned above, there are other ways to help achieve 
a level of commonality. First, in the context of the WTO DSB, to achieve a more 
collegiate atmosphere, Panelist M has suggested that the members of the panels 
should be permanent. A permanent body would also work much faster than a 
temporary one. Second, tribunals should be encouraged to refer to each other’s 
practice and decisions when it is appropriate.
However, adopting commonality is not without problems. The judges 
indicated that there could be other difficulties in trying to achieve dialogue between 
the tribunals. Judge C of the ICJ commented that, even though there are certainly 
benefits to adopting a common approach to evidential rules, tribunals might have 
difficulty agreeing. Judge H noted that the importance of this issue is yet to be 
recognised by tribunals. There is no immediate need to address it, and it might take 
too much of their resources. However, he added that, it should be done if it can be 
done. This view was also expressed by WTO Panelists. This difficulty can be 
overcome by promoting the awareness of the tribunals on this issue.
Another problem already briefly touched on is the ability of the tribunals to 
change its evidential rules in an attempt to pursue commonality. There are questions 
whether changing the rules or taking a new approach on evidential rules without the 
consent of States would be ultra vires. This thesis will only raise the questions, and 
the answer is yet to be determined. In some contexts, it has been argued that only 
States have the authority to alter the procedural rules87. However, would tribunals be 
acting ultra vires if only guidelines to the practice were established?
There were several judges of ITLOS who expressed the opinion that, with the 
amount of references that is currently happening today and the tendency for it to
87 See: Chapter 5, Section 5, 160-175
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increase, the evidential rules of the different tribunals will eventually merge in any 
case.
Taking into account the input of all the judges, in the opinion of the writer, the 
best way to achieve a dialogue between the tribunals and a level of commonality on 
evidential rules is through a gradual process and the awareness of the tribunals on 
evidential issues and what the approach of other tribunals are88. First, there has to be 
discussion among the judges within each tribunal. Further, the ICJ should take an 
active role in leading the initiative to address the question of commonality of 
evidential rules. Being the only international tribunal that is a primary organ of the 
United Nations, its role should extend to aiding the development of international law, 
both substantive and procedural. This role of the ICJ has long been suggested by Sir 
Robert Jennings: “[The ICJ] is readily and generally thought of as being well suited to 
the settlement of disputes. But in so doing, it has also a vital role in the development
O Q
and elaboration of general law.” From the suggestion of judges, the most ideal 
situation would be where, based on the practice of the specialised agencies of the UN, 
the presidents of the tribunals meet regularly and the President of the ICJ acting as the 
chairman. However, this arrangement would require a lot of effort from all tribunals 
making this goal difficult to achieve. The more realistic model, and one which would 
not require too much resources, is the judicial club. For example, a club could begin 
with the tribunals based in the Hague, and expanding to other tribunals in Europe, and 
the next step would be to other tribunals in other regions of the world such as the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights or the Court of Justice of the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. The club would act as a forum where judges 
and administrative staff could exchange views.
Once there is a dialogue between the tribunals, any points agreed or addressed 
on commonality can be summarised in a written format of a “Guiding Principles” for 
all the judges of the participating tribunals. They will then have a point of reference 
with regards to the direction of any rules of evidence that they may need to adopt. 
Once the number of participating tribunals increases, or when there is better 
collaboration between the tribunals, then a more formal and detailed Guiding
88 This was also suggested by one of the Judges of ITLOS. One alternative way to see what rules could be suitable for tribunals to 
adopt is to examine what rules are used by States in ad hoc arbitrations because it could indicate their preferred rules. However, 
there is yet to be a fixed or standard set of rules under such circumstances.
89 Statement o f Judge Sir Robert Jennings, President o f the International Court o f Justice, read by the Registrar of the Court to the 
plenary session of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (June 11, 1992), reprinted as The Role o f the 
International Court o f Justice in the Development of International Environment Protection Law, 1 RECIEL 240 (1993)
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Principles could be produced to lay out rules agreed by the different tribunals. This 
document could be revised according to the needs of new participating tribunals later 
joining the dialogue.
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(Indemnity), PCIJ, 1928
The Factory at Chorzow (Claim fo r  
Idemnity) (Germany V. Poland) ( 
Merits), PCIJ Series A No. 17 (1928).
1932 Free Zones o f Upper 
Savoy and the District o f 
Gex, PCIJ, 1932
Free Zones o f Upper Savoy and the 
District o f Gex (France V. Switzerland), 
PCU Series A/B No. 46 (1932).
1932 Interpretation o f the 
convention o f 1919 
concerning employment 
o f women during the 
night, PCIJ, 1932
Interpretation o f the Convention o f  
1919 Concerning Employment o f 
Women During the Night, PCU Series 
A/B No. 50, 365 (1932).
1933 Legal Status o f Eastern 
Greenland, PCIJ, 1933
Legal Status o f Eastern Greenland 
(Denmark V. Norway), PCU Series A/B 
No. 53,49(1933).
1934 The Oscar Chinn Case, 
PCIJ, 1934
The Oscar Chinn Case, PCU Series 
A/B No. 63 (1934).
1935 Consistency o f Certain 
Danzig Legislative 
Decrees with the 
Constitution o f the Free 
City, PCU, 1935
Consistency o f Certain Danzig 
Legislative Decrees With the 
Constitution o f the Free City, PCU 
Series A/B No. 65 (1935).
1937 The Meuse Case, PCU, 
1937
The Diversion o f Water From the 
Meuse (Netherlands V. Belgium), PCU 
Series A/B No. 7 (1937).
1939 Societe Commerciale De 
Belgique Case, PCIJ, 
1939
Societe Commerciale De Belgique 
Case, PCU Series A/B No. 78 (1939).
ICJ:
Y ear A bbreviation Full Reference
1949 The Corfu Channel 
Case, ICJ, 1949
Corfu Channel (United Kingdom V. 
Albania), ICJ Reports 1949, 4 (1949).
1950 Asylum Case, ICJ, 
1950
Asylum (Colombia V. Peru), ICJ Reports 
1950, 276 (1950).
1950 International Status 
o f South-West 
Africa, ICJ, 1950
International Status o f South-West Africa, 
ICJ Reports 1950, 128 (1950).
1951 Fisheries Case, ICJ, 
1951
Fisheries Case (United Kingdom V. 
Norway), ICJ Reports 1951, 116 (1951).
1953 Ambatielos Case, 
ICJ, 1953
Ambatielos Case (Greece V. United 
Kingdom), ICJ Reports 1953, 29 (1953).
1953 The Minquiers and 
Ecrehos Case, ICJ, 
1953
The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France 
V. United Kingdom), ICJ Reports 1953, 47 
(1953).
1954 Effect o f Awards o f  
Compensation Made 
by the United 
Nations
Effect o f Awards o f  Compensation Made 
By the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal, ICJ Reports 1954, 47 (1954).
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Administrative 
Tribunal, ICJ, 1954
1955 Nottebohm Case, 
ICJ, 1955
Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein V. 
Guatemala), ICJ Reports 1955, 4 (1955).
1957 Case o f Certain 
Norwegian Loans, 
ICJ, 1957
Case o f Certain Norwegian Loans (France 
V. Norway), ICJ Reports 1957, 39 (1957).
1959 Belgium V. 
Netherlands, ICJ, 
1959
Case Concerning Sovereignty Over 
Certain Frontier Land (Belgium V. 
Netherlands), ICJ Reports 1959, 209 
(1959).
1959 Interhandel Case, 
ICJ, 1959
Interhandel (Switzerland V. United States), 
ICJ Reports 1959, 6 (1959).
1962 Temple Case, ICJ, 
1962
Temple o f Preah Vihear Case (Cambodia 
V. Thailand), ICJ Reports 1962 (1962).
1962 South West Africa 
Cases (Preliminary 
Objections), ICJ, 
1962
South West Africa Cases, (Ethiopia V. 
South Africa; Liberia V. South Africa) 
(Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports 
1962, 473 (1962).
1964 Barcelona Traction 
Case, ICJ, 1964
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company, Limited (Belgium V. Spain) 
(Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports 
1964, 6 (1964).
1966 South West Africa 
Cases (Merits), ICJ, 
1966
South West Africa Cases, (Ethiopia V. 
South Africa; Liberia V. South Africa) 
(Merits), ICJ Reports 1966, 6 (1966).
1969 North Sea 
Continental Shelf 
Case, ICJ, 1969
North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal 
Republic o f Germany V. Denmark; 
Federal Republic o f Germany V. 
Netherlands), ICJ Reports 1969, 3 (1969).
1970 Barcelona Traction 
Case, ICJ, 1970
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company, Limited (Second Phase), ICJ 
Reports 1970, 3 (1970).
1971 Namibia Case, ICJ, 
1971
Legal Consequences fo r  States o f the 
Continued Presence o f South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) 
Nothwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports 1971 
(1971).
1972 Appeal Relating to 
the Jurisdiction o f 
the Icao Council, 
ICJ, 1972
Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction o f the 
ICAO Council (India V Pakistan), ICJ 
Reports 1972, 43 (1972).
1974 Fisheries 
Jurisdiction, ICJ, 
1974
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom o f 
Great Britain an Northern Ireland V. 
Iceland), ICJ Reports 1974, 3 (1974).
1974 Fisheries 
Jurisdiction Case, 
ICJ, 1974
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal 
Republic o f Germany V. Iceland), ICJ 
Reports 1974, 175 (1974).
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1975 Western Sahara, 
ICJ, 1975
Western Sahara, ICJ Reports 1975, 12 
(1975).
1980 The Tehran 
Hostages Case, ICJ, 
1980
United States Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), ICJ 
Reports 1980, 3 (1980)
1982 Tunisia V. Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, 
ICJ, 1982
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia V. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), ICJ 
Reports 1982, 18 (1982).
1984 Gulf o f Maine Case, 
ICJ, 1984
Delimitation o f the Maritime Boundary in 
the Gulf o f Maine Area (Canada/united 
States o f America), ICJ Reports 1984 
(1984).
1985 Application fo r  
Revision and 
Interpretation o f the 
Judgment o f  
February 24, 1982, 
ICJ, 1985
Application fo r  Revision and 
Interpretation o f the Judgment o f February 
24, 1982 in the Case Concerning the 
Continental Shelf (Tunisia V. Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya), (1985).
1985 Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya V. 
Malta, ICJ, 1985
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya V. Malta), ICJ 
Reports 1985, 13 (1985).
1986 The Nicaragua Case, 
ICJ, 1986
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua V. United 
States o f America), Merits., ICJ Reports 
1986 (1986).
1986 Burkina Faso V. 
Republic o f  Mali, 
ICJ, 1986
Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute 
(Burkina Faso V. Republic o f Mali), ICJ 
Reports 1986, 554 (1986).
1987 Review o f Judgment 
No. 33 Application, 
ICJ, 1987
Application fo r  Review o f Judgment No. 
333 o f United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal, ICJ Reports 1987, 18 (1987).
1988 Applicability o f the 
Obligation to 
Arbitrate under 
Section 21, ICJ, 
1988
Applicability o f the Obligation to Arbitrate 
Under Section 21 o f the United Nations 
Headquarters Agreement o f 26 June 1947, 
ICJ Reports 1988, 12 (1988).
1988 Case Concerning 
Border and 
Transborder Armed 
Actions, ICJ, 1988
Case Concerning Border and Transborder 
Armed Actions (Nicaragua V Honduras), 
ICJ Reports 1988, 69 (1988).
1989 The ELS I  Case, ICJ, 
1989
Elettronica Sicula S.p.a. (ELS1) (United 
States o f America V. Italy), ICJ Reports 
1989, 15(1989).
1989 Aerial Incident o f 3 
July 1988, ICJ, 1989
Aerial Incident o f 3 July 1988 (Islamic 
Republic o f Iran V United States o f  
America), ICJ Reports 1989, 133 (1989).
1990 El Salvador V. 
Honduras, ICJ, 1990
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute (El Salvador V. Honduras), ICJ 
Reports 1990, 92 (1990).
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1991 Case Concerning the 
Arbitral Award o f 31 
July 1989, ICJ, 1991
Case Concerning the Arbitral Award o f 31 
July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau V Senegal), ICJ 
Reports 1991 (1991).
1992 El Salvador V. 
Honduras, ICJ, 1992
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute (El Salvador V. Honduras), ICJ 
Reports 1992, 351 (1992).
1992 Case Concerning 
General Phosphate 
Lands in Nauru, ICJ, 
1992
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru 
V. Australia), ICJ Reports 1992, 240 
(1992).
1993 Genocide Case, ICJ, 
1993
Case Concerning Application o f  
Convention on Prevention and Punishment 
o f Crime o f Genocide (Bosnia,
Herzegovina V. Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro)), ICJ Reports 1993, 325 
(1993).
1993 Greenland and Jan 
Mayen Case, ICJ, 
1993
Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in 
the Area Between Greenland and 
Janmayen (Denmark V Norway), ICJ 
Reports 1993 (1993).
1994 Libya V. Chad, ICJ, 
1994
Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriy V. Chad), ICJ 
Reports 1994 (1994).
1995 Qatar V. Bahrain, 
ICJ, 1995
Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation 
(Qatar V. Bahrain)(jurisdiction and 
Admissibility), ICJ Reports 1995, 6 (1995).
1995 Request fo r  an 
Examination o f 
Situation in 
Accordance with 
Paragraph 63, ICJ, 
1995
Request fo r  an Examination o f Situation in 
Accordance With Paragraph 63 o f Court's 
Judgment o f 20 December 1974 in Nuclear 
Tests (New Zealand V. France) Case, ICJ 
Reports 1995, 288 (1995).
1995 East Timor Case, 
ICJ, 1995
Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal V 
Australia), ICJ Reports 1995, 90 (1995).
1996 Cameroon v. 
Nigeria, ICJ, 1996
Case Concerning Land and Maritime 
Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon V. Nigeria), ICJ Reports 1996, 
13 (1996).
1996 Legality o f the Use 
By a State o f Nuclear 
Weapons in Armed 
Conflict, ICJ, 1996
Legality o f the Use By a State o f Nuclear 
Weapons in Armed Conflict, (1996).
1997 Gabcikovo- 
Nagymaros Project 
Case, ICJ, 1997
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hungary V. 
Slovakia) Case, ICJ Reports 1997, 7 
(1997).
1998 Fisheries 
Jurisdiction, ICJ, 
1998
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain V. Canada) 
Jurisdiction o f the Court, ICJ Reports 
1998, 432(1998).
1998 Lockerbie Case, ICJ, 
1998
Question o f the Interpretation and 
Application o f the 1971 Montreal
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Convention Arising From the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libya Arab 
Jamahiriya V Uk; Libya Arab Jamahiriya 
V USA), ICJ Reports 1998 (1998).
1998 The Breard Case, 
ICJ, 1998
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
(Paraguay V USA), ICJ Reports 1998 
(1998).
1999 Case Concerning 
Kas ikili/Sedudu 
Island, ICJ, 1999
Case Concerning Kasikili/sedudu Island 
(Botswana V Namibia), ICJ Reports 1999 
(1999).
2000 Aerial Incident o f 10 
August 1999, ICJ, 
2000
Aerial Incident o f 10 August 1999 
(Pakistan V India), ICJ Reports 2000, 12 
(2000).
2001 Case Concerning 
Sovereignty Over 
Pulau Ligitan and 
Pulau Sipadan, ICJ, 
2001.
Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau 
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia V. 
Malaysia), ICJ Reports 2001, 575 (2001).
2001 Qatar v Bahrain, 
ICJ, 2001
Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation 
and Territorial Questions Between Qatar 
and Bahrain (Qatar V. Bahrain), ICJ 
Reports 2001, 40 (2001).
2001 LaGrand Case, ICJ, 
2001
Lagrand Case (Germany V United States 
o f America), ICJ Reports 2001, 466 
(2001).
2003 Oil Platforms Case, 
ICJ, 2003
Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic 
Replubic o f Iran V. United States o f 
America), ICJ Reports 2003, 1 (2003).
2004 Wall Case, ICJ, 2004 Legal Consequences o f the Construction o f 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, ICJ Reports 2004, 136 (2004).
2004 Legality o f Use o f  
Force, ICJ, 2004
Legality o f Use o f Force (Serbia and 
Montenegro V. France), ICJ Reports 1999, 
198 (2004).
2005 DRC  v Uganda, ICJ, 
2005
Armed Activities on the Territory o f Congo 
(DRC V. Uganda), ICJ Reports 2005, 1 
(2005).
2006 The Pulp Mills Case, 
ICJ, 2006
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
(Argentina V. Uruguay), (2006).
ITLOS:
Y ear Abbreviation Full Reference
1997 The Saiga Case, 
ITLOS, 1997
The M/v "Saiga” Case (Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines V. Guinea), (1997).
1999 The Saiga Case 
(No. 2), ITLOS, 
1999
The M/v "Saiga" (No. 2) Case (Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines V. Guinea), (1999).
1999 The Southern | The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New
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Bluefin Tuna 
Cases, ITLOS, 
1999
Zealand V. Japan; Australia V. Japan), 
(1999).
2000 The Monte 
Confurco Case, 
ITLOS, 2000
The "Monte Confurco" Case (Seychelles V. 
France), (2000).
2000 The Camouco 
Case, ITLOS, 
2000
The "Camouco" Case (Panama V. France), 
(2000).
2001 The Grand 
Prince Case, 
ITLOS, 2001
The "Grand Prince" Case (Belize V. 
France), (2001).
2001 The MOX Plant 
Case, ITLOS, 
2001
The Mox Plant Case (Ireland V. United 
Kingdom), (2001).
2001 The Chaisiri 
Reefer 2, ITLOS, 
2001
The "Chaisiri Reefer 2" Case (Panama V. 
Yemen), (2001).
2002 The Volga Case, 
ITLOS, 2002
The "Volga" Case (Russian Federation V. 
Australia), (2002).
2003 Straits o f  Johor 
Case, ITLOS, 
2003
Case Concerning Land Reclamation By 
Singapore in and Around the Straits o f Johor 
(Malaysia V. Singapore), (2003).
2004 The Juno Trader 
Case, ITLOS, 
2004
The "Juno Trader" Case (Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines V. Guinea-Bissau), (2004).
WTO DSB:
Y ear A bbreviation Full Reference
1996 Japan - Alcohol 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 1996
Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages Case, 
10/11 WT/DS8/11, 11/8 (1996).
1996 USA - Gasoline 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 1996
USA - Standards fo r  Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline Case, WT/DS2/9 
(1996).
1997 USA - Shirts and 
Blouses Case, 
WTO DSB, 1997
USA - Shirts and Blouses Case, WT/DS33 
(1997).
1997 USA-
Underwear Case, 
WTO DSB, 1997
USA - Restrictions on Imports o f Cotton and 
Man-Made Fibre Underwear Case, 
WT/DS24/R (1997).
1997 Canada - 
Periodicals 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 1997
Canada - Certain Measures Concerning 
Periodicals Case, WT/DS31/R (1997).
1997 EC - Hormones 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 1997
EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones) Case, WT/DS26 
(1997).
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1997 EC-Bananas, 
WTO DSB, 1997
EC - Regime fo r  the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution o f Bananas, WT/DS27 (1997).
1997 Argentina - 
Measures 
Affecting Imports 
o f Foorwear, 
WTO DSB, 1997
Argentina - Measures Affecting Imports o f 
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other 
Items, WT/DS56 (1997).
1997 India-Patent 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 1997
India-Patent Protection fo r  Pharmaceutical 
and Agricultural Chemical Products Case, 
WT/DS50 (1997).
1998 Korea - Taxes on 
Alcoholic 
Beverages Case, 
WTO DSB, 1998
Korea - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 
Case, WT/DS75 (1998).
1998 USA - Certain 
Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 1998
USA - Import Prohibition o f Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products Case, WT/DS58 
(1998).
1998 Australia- 
Salmon, WTO 
DSB, 1998
Australia-Measures Affecting the 
Importation o f Salmon, WT/DS18 (1998).
1999 Japan - 
Agricultural 
Products Case, 
WTO DSB, 1999
Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural 
Products Case, WT/DS76 (1999).
1999 India - 
Quantitative 
Restrictions 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 1999
India - Quantitative Restrictions on Imports 
o f Agricultural Textile and Industrial 
Products Case, WT/DS90 (1999).
1999 Canada-Civilian 
Aircraft, WTO 
DSB, 1999
Canada-Measures Affecting the Export o f 
Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70 (1999).
1999 USA - Lead Bars 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 1999
USA - Imposition o f Countervailing Duties 
on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth 
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the 
United Kingdom Case, WT/DS138 (1999).
1999 Tu rkey-Textiles, 
WTO DSB, 1999
Turkey-Restrictions on Imports o f Textile 
and Clothing Products, WT/DS34 (1999).
2000 USA - Anti- 
Dumping Act 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 2000
USA - Anti-Dumping Act o f 1916 Case, 
WT/DS136 (2000).
2000 Korea - Dairy 
Safeguards Case, 
WTO DSB, 2000
Korea - Dairy Safeguards Case, WT/DS98 
(2000).
2000 USA - Copyright 
Act Case, WTO 
DSB, 2000
United States-Section 110(5) o f the Us 
Copyright Act Case, WT/DS160 (2000).
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2000 Argentina - 
Footwear, WTO 
DSB, 2000
Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports 
o f Footwear, WT/DS121 (2000).
2000 Australia- 
Leather, Article 
21.5, WTO DSB, 
2000
Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers 
and Exporters o f Automotive Leather, Article 
21.5, WT/DS126 (2000).
2000 Australia- 
Salmon, Article 
21.5 Case, WTO 
DSB, 2000
Australia-Measures Affecting Importation o f 
Salmon, Article 21.5 Case, WT/DS18/RW 
(2000).
2000 USA - Wheat
Gluten
Safeguards,
WTO DSB, 2000
USA - Definitive Safeguard Measures on 
Imports o f Wheat Gluten From the European 
Communities, WT/DS166 (2000).
2000 EC-Bed Linen, 
WTO DSB, 2000
EC - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports o f 
Cotton-Type Bed Linen From India, 
WT/DS141 (2000).
2001 Thailand - Anti - 
Dumping Duties 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 2001
Thailand - Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, 
Shapes and Sections o f Iron Or Non-Alloy 
Steel and H-Beams From Poland Case, 
WT/DS122 (2001).
2001 EC - Asbestos 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 2001
European Communities - Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos 
Case, WT/DS135 (2001).
2001 USA - Section 
211, W TO  DSB, 
2001
USA - Section 211 Ominbus Appropriations 
Act o f 1998, WT/DS176 (2001).
2001 India-Autos, 
WTO DSB, 2001
India-Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Sector, WT/DS175 WT/DS146 (2001).
2002 Canada - 
Measures 
Affecting the 
Importation o f 
M ilk and the 
Exportation o f 
Dairy Products 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 2002
Canada - Measures Affecting the 
Importation o f Milk and the Exportation o f 
Dairy Products Case, WT/DS113 (2002).
2002 EC-Sardines 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 2002
EC - Trade Descriptions o f Sardines Case, 
WT/DS231 (2002).
2002 Canada-A i rcraft 
II, WTO DSB, 
2002
Canada-Export Credits and Loan 
Guarantees fo r  Regional Aircraft, 
WT/DS222 (2002).
2003 Japan-Apples, 
WTO DSB, 2003
Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation o f 
Apples, WT/DS245 (2003).
2003 EC - Pipe 
Fittings, WTO 
DSB, 2003
EC - Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable 
Cast Iron Tube Or Pipe Fittings From 
Brazil, WT/DS219 (2003).
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2004 USA - Lumber 
CVDs Final 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 2004
USA - Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination With Respect to Certain 
Softwood Lumber From Canada Case, 
WT/DS257 (2004).
2004 USA - Lumber 
ITC Investigation 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 2004
USA - Investigation o f the International 
Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber 
From Canada Case, WT/DS277 (2004).
2005 USA - Subsidies 
on Upland 
Cotton Case, 
WTO DSB, 2005
USA - Subsidies on Upland Cotton Case, 
WT/DS267 (2005).
2005 USA - Gambling 
and Betting 
Services Case, 
WTO DSB, 2005
USA - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply o f Gambling and Betting Services 
Case, WT/DS285 (2005).
2005 Dominican 
Replubic - 
Cigarettes Case, 
WTO DSB, 2005
Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting 
the Importation and Internal Sale o f 
Cigarettes Case, WT/DS302 (2005).
2005 EC-
Trademarks/GIs, 
W TO  D SB, 2005
EC - Protection o f Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications fo r  Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS290 (2005).
2005 EC-Chicken 
Classification 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 2005
EC - Customs Classification o f Frozen 
Boneless Chicken Cuts Case, WT/DS269 
(2005).
2005 EC - Sugars 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 2005
EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar Case, 
WT/DS265,266,283 (2005).
2006 Mexico-Soft 
Drinks Case, 
WTO DSB, 2006
Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and 
Other Beverages Case, WT/DS308 (2006).
2006 USA - "Zeroing" 
Case, WTO 
DSB, 2006
USA - Laws, Regulations and Methodology 
fo r  Calculating Dumping Margins 
("zeroing”) Case, WT/DS294 (2006).
Iran-US Claims Tribunal:
Y ear Abbreviation Full Reference
1982 Flexi-Van Case, 
Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, 1982
Flexi-Van Leasing, Inc. V. The Islamic 
Replubic o f Iran, Case No. 36, Chamber 
One, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 1 Iran-US 
ClaimsTribunal Reports, 455 (1982).
1982 Case No. 1 (Issue 
II), Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal, 
1982
Case No. 1 (Issue Ii), Decision No. Dec 8- 
Al-F t, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 1 Iran-US 
ClaimsTribunal Report, 144 (1982).
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1984 Time, Inc. v. Iran, 
Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, 1984
Time, Inc. V. Iran, No. 139-166-2, Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal, 7 Iran-US ClaimsTribunal 
Report, 8 (1984).
1984 Bendone-Derossi 
Case, Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal, 
1984
Bendone-Derossi International V. The 
Government o f the Islamic Republic o f Iran, 
Interim Award No. Itm 40-375-1, Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal, 6 Iran-US ClaimsTribunal 
Report, 130 (1984).
1984 Pereira
Associates Case, 
Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, 1984
William L. Pereira Associates, Iran V. 
Islamic Republic o f Iran, Award No. 116-1- 
3, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 5 Iran-US 
ClaimsTribunal Report, 230 (1984).
1984 Schering 
Corporation v. 
The Islamic 
Replubic o f Iran, 
Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, 1984
Schering Corporation V. The Islamic 
Replubic o f Iran, Award No. 122-38-1, Iran- 
US Claims Tribunal, 5 Iran-US 
ClaimsTribunal Report, 374 (1984).
1986 Flour
Corporation 
Case, Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal, 
1986
Flour Corporation V. The Government o f the 
Islamic Republic o f Iran, Interim Award No. 
Itm 62-333-1, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 11 
Iran-US ClaimsTribunal Report, 296 (1986).
1986 Oil Field o f  
Texas Case, Iran- 
US Claims 
Tribunal, 1986
Oil Field o f Texas, Inc. V. Iran, Award No. 
258-43-1, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 12 Iran- 
US ClaimsTribunal Report, 308 (1986).
1987 Sola Tiles Case, 
Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, 1987
Sola Tiles, Inc. V. The Government o f the 
Islamic Replubic o f Iran, Award No. 298- 
317-1, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 14 Iran-US 
ClaimsTribunal Report, 223 (1987).
1988 Lockheed Case, 
Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, 1988
Lockheed Corporation V. The Government o f 
Iran, the Iranian Air Force, EtAl., Award 
No. 367-829-2, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 18 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 292 (1988).
1989 Rockwell Case, 
Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, 1989
Rockwell International Systems, Inc. V. The 
Government o f the Islamic Republic o f Iran, 
Award No. 438-430-1, Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, 23 Iran-US ClaimsTribunal Report, 
150(1989).
Other Cases:
Y ear A bbreviation Full Reference
1827 The Dowman Case, 
Domestic
ClaimsCommission(United 
States), 1827United States
The Dowman Case, Domestic 
ClaimsCommission(United States), Act 
of March 2 Domestic Claims 
Commission (United States), 1827
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(Convention, United States and Great 
Britain, November 13, 1826). National 
Archives of the United States (1827).
1895 The Fur Seal Arbitration 
Case, Arbitral Tribunal, 
1895
The Fur Seal Arbitration Case ( United 
States V Great Britain), Arbitral 
Tribunal, The proceedings (1895).
1900 French Guiana-Brazil 
Boundary Arbitration, 
Arbitral
Tribunal(SwissFederal 
Council), 1900Swiss 
Federal Council
Sentence De Conseil Federal Suisse 
Dans La Question Des Frontieres De 
La Guyane Francais Et Du Bresil, 
Arbitral Tribunal(SwissFederal 
Council), Pasicrisie Internationale : 
Histoire Documentaire des Arbitrages 
Intemationaux (1902) H. La Fontaine, 
570(1900).
1900 Whaling and Sealing 
Claims, Arbitral Tribunal, 
1900
Whaling and Sealing Claims (Russia V 
United States), Arbitral Tribunal, 
Appendix 1,1903 Proceedings and 
Awards [1902] Foreign Rel. U.S. 
(1900).
1903 Venezuela Preferential 
Case, Arbitral Tribunal, 
1903
Venezuela Preferential Case, Arbitral 
Tribunal, J. Scott (1903).
1908 Honduras and Nicaragua 
V. Guatemala and El 
Salvador, CACJ, 1908
Honduras and Nicaragua V. 
Guatemala and El Salvador, CACJ, 
Sentencia de la Corte de Justicia 
Centroamericana en El Juiciao 
Promovido por la Republica de 
Honduras contra law Republicas de el 
Salvador y Guatemala Corte de Justica 
Centroamericana (1908).
1913 Felipe Molina Larios V. 
Honduras, CACJ, 1913
Felipe Molina Larios V. Honduras, 
CACJ, 3 1911-1917 Anales de la Corte 
de Justicia Centroamericana. 7 Vols. 
San Jose : Tipo-grafia de A. Alsina, 58 
(1913).
1926 Parker Case, Mexican- 
USA GeneralClaims 
Commission, 1926
Parker Case, Mexican-USA 
GeneralClaims Commission, 4 RIAA, 
39(1926).
1926 Parker v Mexico, United 
States-
MexicanGeneralClaims 
Commission, 1926
Parker V Mexico, United States- 
MexicanGeneralClaims Commission, 
Docket No. 127 (1926).
1928 War Claims Arbiter, War 
Claims Arbiter, 1928
War Claims Arbiter, War Claims 
Arbiter, Administrative Decision No. II 
Dealing with the Bases of Determining 
Fair Compensation in Patents Claims 
Functioning Under the Settlement of 
War Claims Act of 1928 (1928).
1929 Archuleta Case, United 
States-
Archuleta Case, United States- 
MexicanGeneralClaims Commission,
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MexicanGeneralClaims 
Commission, 1929
September 26 Opinions of 
Commissioners, 1928, to may 17, 1929 
(1929).
1930 Mexican-USA 
GeneralClaims 
Commission, 1930
Lillie S. Kling (USA) V. United 
Mexican States, Mexican-USA 
GeneralClaims Commission, 4 RLAA 
(1930).
1931 Lighthouses Arbitration, 
Arbitral Tribunal, 1931
Lighthouses Arbitration (Affaire Des 
Phares) (France V. Greece), 
Lighthouses Arbitration (Affaire Des 
Phares) (France V. Greece), 
Ordonnances de Procedure et 
Sentences avec Annexes de Tribunal 
D'Arbitrage constitue en vertu de 
Compromis signe a Paris le 15 Juillet 
1931 entre la France et la Grece 
(Affaire des Phares) Protocoles des 
Seance (1931).
1947 Miller v. M inister o f 
Pensions, King's Bench 
Division, 1947
Miller V. Minister o f Pensions, King's 
Bench Division, 2 All E. R., 372 
(1947).
1951 Bater v. Bater, Court of 
Appeal, 1951
Bater V. Bater, Court of Appeal, 
(1951).
1954 Batchelder Claim, Italian- 
United StatesConcilation 
Commission, 1954
Batchelder Claim, Italian-United 
StatesConcilation Commission, 22 
International Law Reports (1954).
1955 X. v. Belgium, Eurpopean 
CommissiononHuman 
Rights, 1955
Re-Application No. 107/55 (X. V. 
Belgium), Eurpopean 
CommissiononHuman Rights, 24 
International Law Reports, 367 (1955).
1955 Hepworth, Queen's Bench, 
1955
Hepworth, Queen's Bench, 2 Queen's 
Bench, 600 (1955).
1955 Morelle Ltd  v Wakeling, 
Queen's Bench, 1955
Morelle Ltd V Wakeling, Queen's 
Bench, 2, 379(1955).
1957 Hornal v. Neuberger 
Products Ltd., Queen's 
Bench, 1957
Hornal V. Neuberger Products Ltd., 
Queen's Bench, 1 Queen's Bench 
(1957).
1978 Irish Case, European 
CourtofHuman Rights, 
1978
Ireland V. United Kingdom, European 
Court of Human Rights, 58 
International Law Reports, 264 (1978).
1981 Louis de Merode, World 
Bank Administrative 
Tribunal, 1981
Louis De Merode,World Bank 
Administrative Tribunal, (1981).
1983 Air Canada v. Secretary o f 
State fo r  Trade, House of 
Lords, 1983
Air Canada V. Secretary o f State fo r  
Trade, House of Lords, 2 A.C., 394 
(1983).
1988 Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 
Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, 1988
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights, 
Protecting Human Rights in the 
Americas T. Buergenthal. R. Norris
1990
1998
Statin
Year
1899
1907
1907
1911
1945
1945
1976
1978
1982
1982
1994
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and D. Shelton, 3rd edition (Kehl- 
Strasbourg-Arlington, 1990), 255 
(1988). ______________
Thailand - Cigarette Case, 
GATT Panel, 1990
Thailand — Restrictions on 
Importation o f and Internal Taxes on 
Cigarettes, GATT Panel, BISD 
37S/200 (1990). ______________
Pinochet Case, House of 
Lords, 1998
R. V Bow Street Metropolitan 
Stipendiary Magistrate Ex P. Pinochet 
Ugarte, House of Lords, 3 Weekly Law 
Reports, 1456 (1998).________________
Abbreviation Full Reference
French "Code de
Procedure
Civile",
French "Code De Procedure Civile"
French "Nouveau 
Code de 
Procedure 
Civile",
French "Nouveau Code De Procedure 
Civile".
The 1899 Hague 
Convention, 1899
Convention fo r  the Pacific Settlement o f 
International Disputes, 1899.__________
The 1907 Hague 
Convention, 1907
Convention fo r  the Pacific Settlement o f 
International Disputes, 1907.__________
Convention fo r  
the Establishment 
o f a Central 
American Court 
o f Justice, 1907
Convention fo r  the Establishment o f a 
Central American Court o f Justice, 1907.
Regulations o f  
the Central 
American Court 
o f Justice, 1911
Regulations o f the Central American Court 
o f Justice, 1911.
ICJ Statute, 1945 Statute o f the International Court o f Justice, 
1945.
UN Charter, 
1945
Charter o f the United Nations, 1945.
UNCITRAL 
Rules, 1976
UNCITRAL Rules, 1976.
Rules o f Court, 
1978
International Court o f Justice Rules o f 
Court, 1978.
UNCLOS, 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law o f 
the Sea, 1982.
Statute o f ITLOS, 
1982
Statute o f the International Tribunal fo r  the 
Law o f the Sea, 1982.___________________
Dispute
Settlement
Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement o f Disputes, 1994.
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Understanding,
1994
1994 DSU, 1994 Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement o f Disputes (Annex 
2 to the WTO Agreement), 1994.
1994 Subsidies and 
Countervailing 
Measures 
Agreement, 1994
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement, 1994.
1994 SPS Agreement, 
1994
The Agreement on the Application o f 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 1994.
1994 TBT Agreement, 
1994
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
1994.
1994 Customs 
Valuation 
Agreement, 1994
Customs Valuation Agreement, 1994.
1994 Textiles
Agreement, 1994
Textiles and Clothing Agreement, 1994.
1996 Rules o f conduct, 
1996
Rules o f Conduct fo r  the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement o f Disputes, 1996.
2001 Rules o f  ITLOS, 
2001
International Tribunal fo r  the Law o f the 
Sea: Rules o f the Tribunal, 2001.
2005 Appellate Body 
Working 
Procedure, 2005
Working Procedures fo r  Appellate Review, 
2005.
Others:
Year Abbreviation Full Reference
1910 Malloy, Treaties, 
Conventions, 
International 
Acts, Protocols 
and Agreements 
Between the 
United States and 
Other Powers, 
1776-1909. Vols 
1 and 2., 1910
Malloy, W. "Treaties, Conventions, 
International Acts, Protocols and 
Agreements Between the United States and 
Other Powers, 1776-1909. Vols 1 and 2.", 
Washington D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1910.
1916 Scott, The Hague 
Court Reports, 
1916
Scott, J. "The Hague Court Reports.", 1916.
1920 Advisory 
Committee of 
Jurists, Proces- 
Verbaux of 
Proceedings of 
the Committee,
Advisory Committee of Jurists. "Proces- 
Verbaux of Proceedings of the Committee.", 
Chapter 3, Procedure, Article 11, 1920.
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1920
1920 Joint
Commission, 
Final Report, 
Joint
Commission, 
United States and 
Panama, App. A, 
Rules of 
Procedure, 
adopted March 
18,1913, 1920
Joint Commission, "Final Report, Joint 
Commission, United States and Panama,
App. A, Rules of Procedure, Adopted March 
18, 1913.", 1920.
1987 Australian Law 
Reform 
Commission, 
Report on 
Evidence, 1987
Australian Law Reform Commission, 
"Report on Evidence.” Volume 39, 1987.
1989 Laurin, Recueil 
Dalloz-Sirey de 
doctrine, de 
jurisprudence, et 
de legislation, 
1989
Laurin, Yves. "Recueil Dalloz-Sirey De 
Doctrine, De Jurisprudence, Et De 
Legislation.", 341-42.1989.
1998 Dispute
Settlement Body, 
Minutes of 
Meeting Held on 
6 November 
1998, 1998
Dispute Settlement Body, "Minutes of 
Meeting Held on 6 November 1998.", 
WT/DSB/M/50, 1998.
2000 Guillaume, 
Speech to the 
Sixth Committee 
of the General 
Assembly of the 
United Nations, 
2000
Guillaume, G. Speech to the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, 27/10/2000
2000 Guillaume, The 
Proliferation of 
International 
Judicial Bodies: 
The Outlook for 
the International 
Legal Order, 
2000
Guillaume, G. "The Proliferation of 
International Judicial Bodies: The Outlook 
for the International Legal Order.", Speech 
by the President of the International Court of 
Justice, to the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, 
2000.
2000 Dispute
Settlement Body, 
Minutes of 
Meeting held on 
7 June 2000, 
2000
Dispute Settlement Body, "Minutes of 
Meeting Held on 7 June 2000.", 
WT/DSB/M/83, 2000.
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2001 General Council, 
Minutes of 
Meeting held on 
22 November 
2000, 2001
General Council, "Minutes of Meeting Held 
on 22 November 2000.", WT/GC/M/60, 
2001
2006 International Law 
Commission, 
(2006)
International Law Commission, Conclusions 
of the work of the Study Group on the 
Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law. 2006
2006 Study Group: 
Analytical study, 
(2006)
Conclusions of the work of the Study Group 
on the Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law; 
Analytical study, prepared by the Study 
Group
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Evidential Rules before International 
Tribunals: Towards Common Principles?
Appendix
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Appendix A: Information regarding the interviews:
Bearing in mind the three main questions of the thesis:
1. Is there an emerging common set of rules from the practice of international 
tribunals?
2. What are the factors affecting the formation of evidential rules?
3. Should there be a common set of evidential rules for international 
tribunals?
Purpose of the interviews:
The interviews were conducted with the background that the majority of the 
information for the thesis coming from the tribunals themselves. In addition to the 
information from the provisions and the cases, interviews paint a more complete 
picture of the tribunal’s view on evidential rules and commonality.
The purpose of the interviews is two fold. First, the interviews supplement the 
information that can be gathered from what is published in the public domain. This is 
particular relevant in answering question one and two. Partly because no comments 
would be directly attributable, the judges were willing to comment and give insights 
to questions that would not have otherwise been available. This included the policy 
of the various tribunals on evidential rules and also what their opinion on the 
fragmentation of international law from the procedural perspective.
Second, the interviews granted the writer the opportunity to obtain the views 
of the judges on the proposal of commonality. This is unique to this thesis. The 
details of the views of the judges on the commonality of evidential rules have not 
been expressed before.
The questions given to the judges are attached as Appendix B.
Methodology:
The information in this interview was gathered through a series of questions. 
The views of the judges have been directly incorporated into the thesis where 
relevant. There has not been a statistical analysis in anyway.
The judges were interviewed on an anonymous basis. This allowed them to 
openly reply in ways that would have not otherwise been possible. The writer 
considered this information to be of higher value than the ability to attribute restricted 
views to particular judges. No recording was made of the interviews apart from the 
first one where the interviewer felt that the judge was not at ease. The information 
was noted by hand thereafter.
Selection of the judges:
The sample of the judges was neither scientifically selected nor random. 
Letters were sent to all judges of the ICJ, ITLOS and the members of the WTO AB. 
A number of letters were sent to WTO Panelists. Interviews were conducted with all 
judges who replied to the letters. The judges interviewed were varied in terms of their 
own legal tradition and the country which they came from.
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Appendix B: Interview questions for the judges:
1. For each of the following aspect of evidential rules: a) standard of proof, b) 
expert evidence, c) amicus curiae, please address the questions of:
a. Does your tribunal have a general policy or approach towards the 
issue?
b. Are the current rules and policy satisfactory?
c. Do you have any comments on the approach adopted by other 
tribunals?
2. Thinking back to the three aspects of evidential rules in question one, what 
factors may have an effect on the approach of your tribunal? How does your 
tribunal decide what approach to adopt on evidential rules?
3. To what extent does your tribunal seek to develop commonality of approach 
with other tribunals to evidential rules? Is there an active dialogue between the 
judges within your tribunal? Is there a dialogue between your tribunal and 
other tribunals?
4. How do the judges on your tribunal influence the way the tribunal adopts a 
particular approach to evidential rules?
5. Has the increase in the number of tribunals brought the issue of a common set 
of evidential rules to the forefront?
6. What do you see as the advantages and disadvantages of a common set of 
evidential rules, if any?
7. Do the advantages outweigh the disadvantages? In other words, in your view 
should there be a common set of rules on certain aspects of evidence?
8. From the perspective of the judge, would a common set of rules on evidence 
be desirable? Why? Why not?
9. Is a common set of rules achievable for international tribunals? What should 
be done? How should it be done?
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Appendix C: Socialist Law and examples of evidential rules from the municipal 
context
1 Socialist Law
1.1 Historical aspects and characteristics of the Socialist Law tradition:
To an extent, pre-1917 Russia and pre-World War II Rumania, Bulgaria, 
Albania and those States called “socialist” States were part of the Civil Law family. 
Up to the Revolution in Russia, and before the end of the Second World War in the 
other mentioned States, there were also movements against the jus commune type of 
procedure, trying to achieve similar goals as the Civil Law tradition. The 1894 
Russian Code of Civil Procedure and the Rumanian Code of 1865 were strongly 
influenced by the French Civil Code90. The Revolution of 1917 had great influence 
on Russian law, which had been under the czarist tradition. The German and the 
Austrian Civil Codes were models for the Hungarian Code of 1911, the Yugoslavian 
Code and the Polish Code.
The way reform took place after the 1917 Revolution was crucial for the 
development of procedural rules of the Socialist States’ judicial system. For example, 
the reform attempted to make the judicial process accessible to all. As a result, many 
technicalities were abolished and there needed to be immediate contact between the 
parties and judges. Replacing judges of the pre-existing regime with lay judges also 
lead procedures to becoming oral because they would not otherwise be able to cope 
with the technical written procedures. Public interest was a priority for these reforms. 
Scholars have suggested that Socialist Law nations have transformed civil procedure 
with collective welfare as its aim, or what Franz Klein called a 
Wohfahrtseinrichtung91. The notion of “public interest and welfare” requires the 
court to take into account factors that a “Western” system would not, or would to a 
lesser extent. For example, State and community interests play an important role in 
civil proceedings in Eastern European countries92. The courts’ and the State 
attorney’s role in initiating civil proceedings are much more apparent in a socialist 
system. They are more “interventionist”.
90 See Caenegem, (1987) s. 70-71; Gsovski, (1948) 856; Ionasco, (1970) 105, 108
91 Klein, (1958) 25, 26, 29 (a lecture given in 1901). See further: Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 13
92 See: Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 15
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Further, Socialist Law has moved away from the old rules on the evaluation 
of evidence, evidence exclusion and witness disqualifications. Instead, the system 
applies the notion of “objective truth”, which means that the burden is upon the judge 
to inquire into the facts of the case. Any restriction on the judge preventing him from 
performing this function is incompatible with the system. There is no distrust in the 
judiciary unlike in the Civil Law tradition. The requirement that the evidence be 
evaluated fully and freely does not only protect the right of the litigants, but also the 
right of the State.
2 Some examples from the courtroom
This section will briefly address selected issues of evidential rules as an 
illustration to give a fuller picture of how they are used in domestic courts.
2.1 Judicial interrogation of witnesses
Regarding this aspect of evidential rules, there is a clear difference in the 
approach of the Common Law tradition, Civil Law tradition and Socialist Law 
tradition. In the Common Law tradition, the attorneys normally carry out the process 
of interrogating the witnesses through examination and cross-examination. The judge 
does not normally exercise his power to question the witnesses. In England, the judge 
may question a witness to clarify a particular point but not to start a new inquiry, 
whereas in the United States, the judge has more power even though not broadly 
exercised. In these countries, the power of the judge is limited because it is argued 
that, by commencing a line of questioning, the judge might be seen to be biased 
towards one party.
In the Civil Law and the Socialist Law traditions, the person who usually 
directs the questioning is the judge. The attorneys may only question the witnesses
QTthrough the judge or after having been given authority to do so . The view on the 
Continent is that the judge is impartial so he is in a better position to ask the
93 E.g., the French Civil Code of Procedure, Art. 213 and 214. For Germany, see: Kaplan, Mehren, and Schaefer, (1958) 1234- 
1235
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questions. Parties can affect the objectivity of the witness through leading questions. 
Prior to the French Revolution, the interrogation by the judge was done in camera94.
However, the distinction between the systems might not be as clear-cut as 
suggested above. In the Civil Law tradition, there are also limitations on the power of 
the judge. For example, the judge can only inquire within the limits of the res in 
judicium deducta (the factual allegations of the parties). Hence, the judge cannot call 
up a witness on his own motion, and has to adhere to the questions submitted by the 
parties. The judge does not ask his own questions. In the Common Law tradition, the 
judge may also have a lot of control over the proceedings and the questioning of the 
witnesses, even without the direct powers to interrogate them.
2.2 Ex-Officio Judicial gathering of evidence:
Various legal traditions differ on this aspect of evidential rules. In some Civil 
Law and Eastern European States, the judge has more power in this regard than his 
counterpart in the Common Law tradition. For example, the judge in France can 
order the gathering of evidence ex ojficio, with minor exceptions. In Socialist States, 
the judge can order any type of evidence to be taken. However, judges in the 
Common Law tradition generally have less power. Even though the American judge 
can call witnesses ex ojficio, this power is hardly used in civil proceedings. The 
English judge may only do so if there are no objections from the parties.
Similar to the issue of the power to interrogate witnesses, the distinctions 
between the different legal traditions are again not very clear-cut. Civil Law judges 
are also subject to limitations and their powers are not used often because the parties 
usually cover most of the issues in the submissions.
2.3 Other differences between legal traditions:
There are also further examples of differences that distinguish the legal 
traditions. The first is judicial notice of foreign law. In the Civil Law jurisdiction, the 
court is generally capable of determining foreign law. In the Common Law 
jurisdiction, foreign law is a question of fact for the parties to prove. This is normally
94 In today’s context, it has been argued that allowing parties to question the witnesses will be effective because they will more 
familiar with the facts.
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the case in England and most other Common Law countries. In the United States, the 
court is gaining more power to determine the question of foreign law95.
The second issue is the judicial control of pre-trial and proceedings. The Civil 
Law tradition’s proceedings are not as concentrated as those in the Common Law 
systems. In the Civil Law tradition, a pre-trial may not even exist. In the Socialist 
Law tradition, the preparation for the trial is in the judge’s control. This is to be 
contrasted with the Common Law tradition where the parties have control over the 
preparation for the trial.
95 See further: Cappelletti and Garth, (1987) 29
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Appendix D: Australia- Measures Affecting the Importation o f Salmon:
This case between Australia and Canada concerned a measure taken by 
Australia to restrict the importation of fresh, chilled and frozen salmon from Canada. 
The restrictive measure was based on the identification by Australia of 24 disease 
agents that could have been present in Canadian salmon, and consequently a threat to 
the health of Australian salmon. The measure adopted by Australia prohibited the 
importation of dead salmon if untreated with heat to eliminate the risk of disease.
Following consultation through the GATT framework, Australia made a risk 
analysis on non-heated salmon. The final report recommended that salmon 
importation should not be permitted at that moment. However, the risk analysis was 
only carried out for one type of salmon, those which were wild and ocean-caught in 
the Pacific Ocean but not for the other types of salmon produced by Canada96.
The panel had to decide whether Australia’s measure was consistent with its 
obligations under the WTO Agreement. Canada argued that the prohibition was 
inconsistent with: a) Articles XI and XIII of the GATT97, b) Article 2, 3, and 5 of the 
SPS Agreement98 and, c) nullifies or impairs benefits under the WTO Agreement.
In the Report, the panel ruled, inter alia, that: a) because Australia did not 
carry out risk assessment on other types of salmon, the measure did not satisfy Article
5.1 of the SPS Agreement99, b) Australia imposed stricter measures for salmon than 
for herring or finfish100.
Again in this case, the panel decided to seek advice from experts101, and 
consulted the parties before hand. The parties did not request the panel to seek the 
advice but also had no objection. A list of experts was sought from the International 
Office for Epizootics. The parties were invited to submit names of experts and given 
the opportunity to comment on each expert. The panel chose experts in three fields: 
fish diseases, the procedures of the International Office for Epizootics, and general 
risk assessment procedures102.
96 There were four other categories of salmon which were differentiated by the way they were raised and caught.
9 7  Article XI concerns the general elimination of quantitative restrictions. Article XIII concerns the Non-discriminatory 
administration of quantitative restrictions.
98 Article 2 concerns the basic rights and obligations, article 3 Harmonization, and article 5 the assessment of risk and 
determination of the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.
9 9  Australia-Salmon, WTO DSB, 1998 Panel Report, para 8.59 and 8.96-99
100 Australia-Salmon, WTO DSB, 1998 Panel Report, para 8.134-141. The panel ruled that this distinction render the measure to 
be “arbitrary and unjustifiable”.
101 Based on article 13(1), (2) o f the DSU, and article 11(2) of the SPS Agreement.
102 Australia-Salmon, WTO DSB, 1998 Panel Report, para 6.3
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Similar to the previous case, the panel prepared questions in consultation with 
the parties and submitted them to the experts individually. The experts were asked to
103provide their responses in writing to the questions that they felt qualified to address . 
The experts were provided with the written submissions of the parties and the written 
version of the oral proceedings. This dispute involved four experts. The questions 
covered a range of issues including Australia’s risk assessment procedures, the 
relevance of the risk assessments of other States, and the details of how the disease 
from Canadian fish could potentially be transferred to Australian fish. A detailed 
summary of the responses of the experts was also found in the Panel Report104.
103 Australia-Salmon, WTO DSB, 1998 Panel Report, para 6.4
104 Australia-Salmon, WTO DSB, 1998 Panel Report, para 6.1-6.157
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Q l : I s  th e r e  a  g e n e ra l po licy  to w a rd s  th e  is su es?  C u r r e n t  
ru le s  s a tis fa c to ry ? ; C o m m e n ts  o n  th e  a p p ro a c h  o f  o th e r  
t r ib u n a ls ?
Q 2 :W h a t fa c to rs  a ffe c t th e  a p p ro a c h  
o f  y o u r  t r ib u n a l? ;  H o w  d o es  y o u r  
t r ib u n a l  d ec id e  w h a t a p p ro a c h  to  
a d o p t?
Q 3 :T h e  e x te n t th e  t r ib u n a l  seeks  
to  d ev e lo p  c o m m o n a lity  w ith  
o th e r  t r ib u n a ls ? ;  I s  th e r e  a  
d ia lo g u e  b e tw e e n  th e  ju d g e s  o r  
t r ib u n a ls ?
Q 4: H o w  d o  th e  ju d g e s  in f lu e n c e  
th e  w ay  in  w h ich  th e  t r ib u n a l  
a d o p ts  a n  a p p ro a c h  to  e v id e n tia l 
ru le s?
J u d g e  A 
( IC J )
SP: - No general policy. Not satisfactory. On occasion, the 
Ct has mentioned standards, e.g. Corfu Channel. Continental 
judges not sure how to deal this issue.
- The most serious act requires a high standard, similar to 
criminal standard. Hard to determine seriousness, only case- 
by-case.
Ex: No general policy. Some cases, oral evidence not that 
useful. Written expert evidence tends to be ok. The use of 
affidavits mentioned in Ct. Opinion: Ct. feels that it is too 
Anglo-Saxon.
AC: Not big issue here. Position is quite closed. Ct. has 
discussed it once or twice.
- The judges play an important role.
Some like to express their opinions, some 
don’t. 1 am in the middle.
- No effort made to bring tribunals 
together so far. Why have we not 
had seminars on this? No dialogue 
so far.
- ICJ don’t look at other courts. 
Feeling: we are the big brother, 
almost a defensive arrogance. 
Some judges think the big brother 
approach is apparent from the big 
budget.
- On occasion, I tried to look at 
other tribunals, but this was 
frowned upon by some judges.
- ICTY is really the only one we 
can look at now.
- The President is key.
- Civil/Common law divide.
- There are some common law judges 
who stick to their common law 
notions.
- Apparent in the style of writing: 
e.g. Congo/Uganda was written by 
common lawyer.
- All judges contribute to the 
judgment.
J u d g e B
(IC J )
SP: I have always advocated for showing a clear standard. 
There was a problem in the Oil Platforms -  standard not 
clear. Majority of the Ct. goes for conviction intime 
approach.
- We avoided setting the standard in Congo v Uganda by just 
stating what has probative value.
- We will need to revisit this issue.
- Opinion: a high standard for a serious case. But not sure for 
other judges.
- Serious cases include: major uses of force, breaches of 
humanitarian law.
- 1 have not succeeded in spelling out a precise standard. The 
approach of Congo v Uganda is probably the way for the 
future.
Ex: Written expert evidence satisfactory. Experts can also be 
called.
AC: Generally opening up, also the case with other tribunals. 
Key is to give chance to non-state actors. AC mainly to do 
with AO. Non-states generally not interested in contentious 
cases. AC will open but must be consistent with the Statute, 
as happened in the Wall Case. Long way off AC for 
contentious cases, but don’t think this matters. AC is about 
representation not presenting information. No need for extra 
legal argument.
- For the judge, experience at the Bar is 
important. Those who have been to the 
Bar can see issues others might not see.
- We do not look at other tribunals 
a great deal. There are some other 
tribunals which are very different.
-Civil/Common law divide.
- Some judges do not like the cross- 
examination process.
J u d g e C  
( IC J )
SP: Issue not arisen in a sharp way. The Ct has not been 
specific. The Ct was careful in Congo v Uganda. There was
- The issue on the law of evidence does 
not appear that often.
- Don’t look at other tribunals 
much, but there is yet to be a huge
- All background of the judges count, 
not just the Civil/Common la divide.
Key:
SP: Standard of Proof Ex: Expert Evidence
AC: Amicus Curiae Briefs BRD: Beyond Reasonable Doubt
PoE: Preponderance of Evidence SBT: Southern Bluefin Tuna 
PM: Provisional Measures AO: Advisory Opinion
BoP: Balance of Probabilities.
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careful thought. The standard shifts with the seriousness of 
the act, a bit like fraud in Common Law. Cannot pinpoint the 
precise standard of the Ct. This is because of the many 
different legal traditions (see Other Comments). Current 
approach has advantages and disadvantages.
Ex: - Ct has power to appoint experts which is sometimes 
done. Normally, parties appoint them, but the evidence 
sometimes not satisfactory often with a direct clash. An 
objective view would be good. Usually up to the parties to 
request independent experts. Generally up to the parties to 
present expert evidence.
AC: - Ct has not really used this. Problems could arise where 
the real parties are not before the Ct, a potential problem 
with the Statute.
- The Ct has generally refused AC. AC sometimes benefit 
the Ct, sometimes not.
amount of practice on this issue. 
Possibility of looking at the ICTY 
and ICTR.
- But we do look sometimes.
- There is some dialogue, on both 
substantive and procedural issues. 
There is borrowing from other 
tribunal’s jurisprudence.
The training at the Bar is also 
important.
J u d g e D  
( I T L O S )
- No general policy on evidential rules. The closest in terms 
of the rules to us is the ICJ. This is probably because the 
tasks we do are very similar. Not surprising that we have 
similar rules, but our rules have been changed slightly, 
tailored for us. We wanted to speed up the process from the 
ICJ.
SP: No general policy on this issue. Some judges have 
expressed views though. I think we apply the Civil 
conviction test.
Ex: Experts are used in a satisfactory way. Voir dire was 
used in the SBT Case. Question arose: can experts be 
counsel and also called up. ITLOS has not used independent 
experts but informally we have. There is no time. With the 
chance, we will call independent experts. Personally, I would 
give more weight to independent experts but party experts 
have not been biased either.
AC: This has been discussed. We follow the approach of the 
ICJ, but generally with caution. There are non-state interests 
in cases here. We note the NGO bias in such submissions. 
Tribunal agree to approach ACs with caution. ITLOS 
probably follow ICJ: no ACs accepted for contentious cases 
but only for AO.
- We try to establish commonality 
with the ICJ.
- In addition to the ICJ, we also 
look at the European Court (non- 
ICJ tribunals are looked at with 
caution).
- Opinion: tribunals look at one 
another. Compulsory nature of PM 
of the ICJ was copied from us.
- We look at other tribunals and 
examine their jurisprudence. But 
we note that we might be dealing 
with different things.
- There is no formal dialogue 
between the tribunals, maybe some 
informal, e.g. President Higgins is 
coming to visit us.
- There is more influence from the 
Civil law tradition than the common 
law tradition.
J u d g e E  
( I T L O S )
- No common policy on rules of evidence, like a “black 
hole”. There is a lack of debate on this issue.
- ITLOS has no general policy.
SP: The standard was not satisfactory in the Saiga Case. 
Generally, we apply the PoE standard. The standard is 
different for the merits and the jurisdiction phase. It is higher 
for the jurisdiction phase: higher than PoE but not quite 
BRD. The word “satisfied” in the provisions for establishing 
jurisdiction is more than PoE.
- Everything has an influence: experience 
of the judge, past practice, behaviour of 
the Agents, behaviour of the States. 
Opinion: however, all these factors 
probably won’t play a role on the 
conscious mind, but at the back of the 
mind.
- The nature of international litigation is 
adversarial. We rely on the evidence of
- There is no general policy.
- There is an active dialogue 
between the judges of this tribunal 
but no dialogue between the 
tribunals.
- Judges here try to adopt a 
common approach on evidence.
- We look at the ICJ. But this is 
sometimes hard because the
- All background of the judge affects 
the way evidential rules of the 
tribunal.
- We always argue points in 
deliberations. There is a very active 
dialogue. If we cannot agree, then we 
use Dissenting Opinions.
- 1 see some distinction of the Civil/ 
Common law divide. The Common
Key:
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Ex: In the SBT case, experts were very influential. There was 
no need for independent experts because the party experts 
had enough expertise. In some cases, such as the Saiga, there 
was expertise within the tribunal.
AC: No opportunity to submit AC so far. If there is an 
opportunity, we will probably admit AC. ACs can bring in a 
lot of subjectivity. Have to ask where the brief is from. There 
will always a hidden agenda, e.g. from NGOs. The judges 
have to weigh up the different perspectives. ACs don’t really 
make a difference to the result.
the parties. It is for the parties to present 
the facts. The tribunal will not generally 
investigate further into the facts.
- Limitation of time. We have to be very 
focused on the issues.
approach of the ICJ is sometimes 
inconsistent and difficult to follow.
lawyer will look into facts that might 
be considered as irrelevant. Civil 
lawyers might more easily see the 
issues.
JudgeF 
(ITLOS)
- There is no common approach on evidence. Generally, the 
rules in international fora are not restrictive and with much 
flexibility.
SP: -Lack of clarity. Some members probably apply the BoP 
test. A limited number apply the BRD test.
- We need rules on SP. Are we just trying to please everyone 
by adopting flexible rules?
- States might fear the uncertainty.
Ex: - They play a crucial role. If the party experts submit 
contradicting evidence, then we must have independent 
experts.
- We have not had any because there is yet to be a merits 
case. Let’s see when there are more merits cases.
AC: Some members are pro, some are not. Generally, I think 
we are pro.
- The benefits of AC depends on the case. ACs are rare even 
in domestic cases but they are very good when used 
correctly.
- Time is big factor, especially in the 
urgent cases.
- We look at the ICJ. If they set 
rules, then we are likely to follow.
- We can’t just use domestic rules.
- There is interaction between the 
judges but only at a personal level.
- International judges should look 
at the domestic level. Domestic 
judges have meetings and 
conference. We should have this.
- Within this tribunal, there is very 
good dialogue. We can discuss 
everything. There is open-ness.
JudgeG  
(ITLOS)
- There are some principles that are applied generally by 
tribunals.
- Issues on evidence usually arise at the oral stage when a lot 
of the evidence is produced.
- Judges have a lot of flexibility.
SP: Depends on the case. Opinion: we don’t apply a specific 
standard as such. Tough to determine in urgent cases.
- Try to avoid municipal concepts because it can be 
misleading. We have to look at specific cases. The parties 
present to us what is needed.
Ex: The use of experts depends on the subject matter.
- If the case is very technical, we sometimes need 
independent experts, but we still don’t know how 
independent they are. But, they tend to give a more 
complete picture.
- Party experts are cross-examined. This is good.
AC: Cautious on this issue. Good when used in domestic 
context, but can be misleading in the international plane.
- No need for friends. Just apply law. Too much influence is
- The background of the judge. There are 
few evidential rules so the judge has to 
bring in a lot. The geographical location 
of where the judge comes from is 
important.
- We apply general principles of 
law that are applied in other 
tribunals.
- We are aware of what is going on 
elsewhere.
- We must be careful when 
applying same rules to different 
matters. Tribunals are different, 
e.g. prompt release cases here.
- The stance of the judge on 
particular issues can influence the 
outcome of the case.
- A lot depends on who is judge at 
the time.
Key:
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not a good thing. I TLOS does not have much time.
- Future: if busy, we cannot admit them. But if we are split 
into chambers on certain issues, they could be used. Hard to 
use them if full court in session, but might be able to in 
specific issues such as the environment.
J u d g e H  
(IT L O S )
SP: Nothing in the rules. Depends on the issues and the case. 
Otherwise, we apply the “well-founded” test, but this exact 
point is a legal determination. SPs are subjective. The judge 
will weigh up the evidence, looking at what is most 
convincing first. He will have to be convinced. There is room 
for improvement on the current rules but not feasible to 
formulate a strict policy. Better to adopt aids.
Ex: Expert evidence comes from both parties. We have not 
used independent experts. It all depends on the case: party 
experts cover most of what is needed in urgent cases. But, 
we have sought informal independent experts because we 
could not understand what the parties were saying. If case 
very technical, we will have to rely on experts. So far, no 
need yet. There has not been discussion on the lack of rules 
but we are not hindered by it.
AC: AC’s purpose is to fill gaps of inadequate information. 
We have discussed this and concluded that they are desirable 
within the constraints of the rules. Opinion: no huge problem 
if we admit them. ACs from NGOs should be ok too. 
Opinion: ACs will be useful. People can submit them and we 
can refuse them if we don’t want them. There is a risk of 
getting too many. The cost-effectiveness of litigation must 
not be undermined. We might also admit briefs from 
individuals. It’s strange if we can ask expert opinion but not 
accept submissions. Seeking experts is just asking people 
you know. What if information with people you don’t know?
- The legal tradition of the individual 
judges.
- Time and money are factors. The 
tribunal tries to keep undue delay and 
cost to a minimum.
- Look at our own practice and that 
of the ICJ, but we are different in 
some ways.
- There is dialogue within the 
Tribunal. We discussed the issue of 
ACs.
- No mechanism for inter-tribunal 
dialogue set up. I have suggested 
for there to be a dialogue.
- There is no informal dialogue 
between the courts either.
- Different judges might be skeptical 
of things which he has not seen in his 
own jurisdiction.
- Judge have deliberations. We 
discuss issues and many drafts of the 
judgment to see whether we can 
come to an agreement.
J u d g e  I 
(IT L O S )
SP: The ICJ and ITLOS have similar cases. There is good 
reason for the existence of a common set of rules. The WTO 
is different in nature. ICTY totally different.
- SP must take into account the area of law also.
- In our urgent cases, we apply a lower standard. The 
standard is not as strict as the domestic context.
Ex: The current arrangement is satisfactory. The 
international judge is powerless when dealing with sovereign 
States. We can’t go far getting evidence. Everything is left to 
be done in the cross-examination process. Judges sometimes 
bow too easily to expert evidence.
- There is also the risk that experts are used informally 
without knowing the extent of the effect they have on the 
tribunal.
- Experts appointed by the court in consultation with the 
parties are very legitimate, but still need to be checked with
- The different backgrounds of the judges 
play a role. We muddle through with the 
different backgrounds.
- Opinion: We all find a middle ground. 
The procedures are not dominated by one 
tradition, but a mix.
- Time limitation, especially in urgent 
cases. We cannot deal with the evidence 
properly in that time.
- We have urgent cases, and not even the 
chance to address them at the merits 
(unlike the ICJ).
- We look at other courts, 
especially the ICJ. We will take the 
same approach as them, unless 
there is good reason not to do so.
- There is no dialogue. We look at 
published cases, and seek 
commonality unless there is good 
reason not to.
- The WTO is quite different from 
us and their jurisprudence might 
not have the same weight.
- If there is a procedure stemming 
from the common law, we leave it to 
the common law judges to deal with 
it.
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cross-examination. However, there is the time limitation. 
AC: We are reluctant. Don’t think they have a place here. 
ACs would be too much interference, but this is the 
conservative view. I think we should open up and welcome 
them. Non-States’ views can be useful on many issues.
JudgeJ 
(ITLOS)
SP: - There are no written rules on this, and no uniform 
doctrine. But there have been some developments such as 
comments by judge Wolfrum is his Opinion.
- Opinion: On the whole, the majority of the tribunal apples a 
standard similar to the common law standard, perhaps BRD 
but this is not explicit.
- The ICJ has not said anything explicit either and they have 
functioned for 60 years.
- Flexibility in SP is better than rigid approach. I admit there 
are some problems with the flexible approach but this can be 
remedied.
Ex: So far, expert evidence has been useful. We have not 
had independent experts as yet but we have used them 
informally.
- Whether we need more independent experts depends on the 
problems that arise. It is not easy to find the right experts.
- There is a cross-examination process for party experts 
which is good.
- It is not certain whether we will use independent experts in 
the future.
AC: - Our provisions do not allow this. The tribunal has 
talked about it but without a conclusion. In the past, the 
attitude of the majority has been cautious. The minority 
support ACs.
- There is the legal hurdle of ACs not being provided for in 
the provisions.
- However, if submitted, judges would likely read ACs. 
Unlikely forjudge to throw things away. Submissions would 
probably have an effect, e.g. subconsciously.
- We look at the ICJ with respect, but not 
exclusively.
- Time limits is important, especially 
because we have had many urgent cases.
- In the Grand Prince Case, some 
evidence was rejected because of the lack 
of time.
- If there are cases that we share, we 
would probably follow the approaches of 
other courts.
- It would be an exception that we take a 
different route.
- The cases are similar, we are likely to 
go along the same path anyway.
- In broad terms, there is a dialogue 
between tribunals.
- A dialogue has started but it tends 
to be more general procedural 
issues, e.g. preliminary objections. 
E.g. the ICJ looked to us on the 
question of PM.
- There is an echo in the 
jurisprudence, e.g. the 
precautionary principle. Opinion: 
there is an implicit dialogue.
- So far, things have been on a 
personal basis.
- We are 21 judges here. It is hard 
to get everyone to talk to one 
another.
- The lack of cooperation between 
tribunals partly stems from the 
politics between the tribunals.
- Civil/Common Law divide is there.
- Remember that many judges are 
legal diplomats. They are not too 
bothered about technical rules, 
because they have minimal 
knowledge of such notions.
P a n e lis t  K
(W T O
D SB )
SP: (Hesitant) The SP applied is prima facie  evidence. The 
claimant has to prove to the panel that it has a prim a facie  
case. The burden then shifts to the defendant. The defendant 
then has a higher standard to rebut this claim.
- But the standard is not that precise as such. It is intuitive for 
us whether they have strong case.
- The SP is perhaps higher for cases involving issues such as 
fraud, because of the seriousness of the act.
Ex: We did not use experts when I was panelist. We thought 
that there was enough expertise within the panel and the 
Secretariat. The Secretariat would have a section on anti­
dumping. The Panel would also have one or two experts on 
anti-dumping. If there is not enough expertise, then there
- No dialogue between the panelists 
and the tribunals on commonality 
of evidential rules. Not sure about 
the AB stage where there could be 
meetings.
- There could be meetings between 
tribunals but we must note that 
tribunals are different.
- No distinction between 
Civil/Common Lawyers.
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would be independent experts appointed, e.g. Beef 
Hormones Case. Independent experts tend to be appointed in 
scientific cases. Party expert evidence: we do look at it but 
the question is how probative are they? We take many 
factors into account, e.g. who wrote the submission and 
whether it was done before or after the dispute, the 
“independence” of the experts.
AC: They were widely accepted but generally ignored unless 
very compelling. Opinion: the open approach is good, 
allowing the panel choice to accept the AC or not. But the 
evidence brought by the parties is of higher relevance and 
quality. NGOs often do not know the real issues. Generally, 
ACs are good thing.
- Opinion: ACs don’t tilt the balance to T* world States.
- Chance that ACs could bring up issues not addressed by 
parties. Current rules on AC ok.
P a n e lis t  L
(WTO
DSB)
SP: - The complainant must establish a prima facie case.
The burden then shifts to defendant who needs to prove his 
case BYD.
- This was very hard for me to gather as a civil lawyer. I had 
to look up this in many books. Only the lawyers were 
concerned about the SP. The issue of SP did not take a lot of 
time. If there were problems, we can always consult the 
Secretariat.
Ex: We apply DSU-Art 13. We are very open to the use of 
experts but none were appointed in the cases that I have been 
involved in.
- The Secretariat was able to help if advice is needed on trade 
issues, but independent help might be needed on scientific 
issues.
- We look at the party submissions but very cautious about 
what we take into account because they tend to present 
extreme views.
- Current rules on experts are satisfactory because it gives us 
many options.
AC: Rules on AC are made up by the AB. Nothing precise 
about this in the DSU. We follow the approach of the AB 
and consider ACs for a possible use in the case.
- Panels have to be careful with ACs because they can be 
biased.
- The rules on AC also seem to be a clash of legal cultures. I 
did not understand it as a civil lawyer.
- There must be a balance between flooding the panels with 
information and making good use of it.
- It is hard not to take something into account once it has 
been read, so I think ACs do influence our judgment.
- For the panels which I was in, we applied the criteria of
- The panel meetings are not court-like 
but rather normal meetings. This makes it 
easier for experts to give evidence. The 
court-like arrangement of the ICJ and 
other courts are very intimidating. More 
is revealed in the informal context.
- The Chair of the Panel is important. He 
is in control of the proceedings.
- 1 keep in mind the notion of “Good 
administration of justice”. This is hard to 
define, but to me, it includes notions such 
as impartiality.
- We take into account whether the 
approach we take will become something 
of a general application later one.
- We don’t really look at other 
tribunals. We don’t look at the rules 
from the ICJ or ITLOS. We already 
have our own rules.
- The WTO is different. We are 
special in our own way.
-Personally, I do look at some rules 
of the ICJ, ICSID, UNCITRAL. I 
look at them in a general context.
- No dialogue between the 
tribunals. The work done is through 
research.
- The Secretariat can play a role in 
the future in the referring between 
tribunals. The Secretariat can 
contact other tribunals.
- The background of the judges 
makes a difference, especially on 
issues of interpretation of the rules of 
the DSU.
Civil/Common Law divide. Different 
lawyers bring in different 
backgrounds. We will discuss 
different views.
- The general background of non­
lawyer panelists also plays a role.
- Non-lawyers don’t deal too well 
with technical issues.
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whether that submission was neutral or commercially 
motivated. We throw away those that were not neutral. We 
seek the real friends of the court. Once we decide this, we all 
read the submissions and talk about it.
- There is the risk of not knowing what is in the submission 
until you read them. But we cannot read everything.
Panelist M
(WTO
DSB)
SP: 1 think we apply the BoP test, but on second though, the 
civil law notion of the conviction of the judge also applies. 
We apply the two stage test as well, but I think, overall, it is 
the conviction test. This is more subjective than the common 
law standard. It is easy for the claimant to establish prima 
fa c ie  evidence.
- SP not spelt out because the DSB is about the settlement 
rather than the adjudication process. We need something 
clearer and formal.
Ex: - On examination of the experts, the international judge 
tends to remain silent. They are generally passive unless 
there are issues concerning impartiality of the experts.
- Expert evidence can play a very important role in a case.
- Evidence presented in reports by the parties was also 
useful. The DSU is also willing to appoint experts. Party 
experts tend to support their argument. I prefer independent 
experts.
AC: 1 never had them sitting as a panelist. ACs are important 
in the context of the WTO. There is much advantage in 
admitting them.
- Must be careful that we don’t admit everything and have to 
take it on a case by case basis. AC submissions would be 
sub-ordinate to parties’ submissions. Their probative value 
would also depend on the NGO.
- The nature of the dispute.
- The conduct of the parties, including 
what evidence is brought forward.
- What we learn from other tribunals.
- Who is chairing the panel.
- No dialogue between the tribunals 
or between the panels. The panels 
exist as separate entities.
- It is difficult to establish a close- 
knit community if there is no 
permanent body. This is not the 
case with WTO Panels
- A permanent body also works 
faster than a temporary one.
- We always try to reach agreement, 
discussing the important issues. If 
there is something we cannot agree 
upon, the chairman will try to reach a 
compromise. Therefore, the 
chairman is key.
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Q 5 : H a s  th e  in c re a s e  in  th e  n u m b e r  o f  
t r ib u n a ls  b ro u g h t  th e  is su e  o f  
c o m m o n a lity  to  th e  fo re f ro n t?
Q 6 : W h a t a r e  th e  a d v a n ta g e s  a n d  
d is a d v a n ta g e s  o f  co m m o n a lity ?
Q 7 : D o  th e  a d v a n ta g e s  o u tw e ig h  th e  
d is a d v a n ta g e s ?  S h o u ld  th e r e  be  
c o m m o n a lity ?
Q 8 : F ro m  th e  p e rs p e c t iv e  o f  th e  ju d g e ,  
w o u ld  co m m o n  ru le s  b e  d e s ira b le ?
J u d g e  A  
( IC J )
- The debate is definitely louder. The 
question is becoming more pertinent.
- There is greater awareness of the problem, 
but the problem has not been addressed in 
an organized way. Ct. started to think more 
about commonality.
- There are certainly advantages.
- E.g., in Oil Platforms, the parties were 
confused by the Ct. There were no set 
rules.
- The existing arrangement is 
unsatisfactory. There are concerns on this 
issue.
- Yes, it is a very good thing. - Yes. A common set of rules can set out 
what is allowed/what is not, e.g. the hearsay 
is allowed for the ICJ but not the ICTY. 
Rules must be set out clearly.
J u d g e B
(IC J )
- We need to work on the evidential rules of 
the Ct.
- The Ct. will perhaps address these issues 
after the Genocide Case. We have seen a 
whole range of issues to be dealt with.
- The overlapping jurisdiction with 
tribunals disagreeing probably won’t 
happen.
- The tribunals do not disagree that much.
- Good but not realistic. - Commonality would be good but not 
realistic to implement.
J u d g e  C  
( IC J )
- We don’t need commonality. We can 
avoid the problems through other means.
- We have always had a de-centralized 
system.
- We don’t need commonality.
- There are benefits to commonality but 
how much can we get people to agree on?
J u d g e D  
(IT L O S )
- We note that tribunals are different. 1 
think we can establish common rules for 
tribunals that are similar, e.g. criminal 
tribunals.
- There should be commonality as far as 
they are necessary.
- There are already rules which are similar. 
Some tribunals follow the approach of 
others.
- We need it to the extent that is necessary. 
There are already some common principles 
that exist.
- 1 think we do need to exchange ideas. The 
problem is a practical one.
J u d g e E  
( IT L O S )
- We are very aware of the increase in the 
number of tribunals.
- There could be potential problems from 
inconsistent rules on evidence. But this is 
not just a PIL problem, also domestic courts 
where rules are often unclear. The standard 
in the domestic context still subject to 
interpretation and imprecision.
- Advantage: We don’t want any forum 
shopping, even if the application of the 
rules is still subjective.
- We must take note of this subjectivity.
- The difference in evidential rules only 
matter under some circumstances.
- More important that the judges explain 
how they arrive at the conclusion. They 
must explain their subjectivity.
- Commonality would not solve the 
problem. The problem arises from the 
subjectivity of the judges. Judges will have 
to find a way to deal with this.
J u d g e F  
(IT L O S )
- If there are overlapping jurisdictions, then 
it is bad to have different rules.
- Judges need more interaction with one 
another. We need it.
- We need same rules as far as possible.
- Evidential rules should be the same. 
Choice should not be made from the 
different evidential rules. States should take 
other factors into account but not the 
evidential rules.
- Evidential rules should be the same for 
different tribunals.
J u d g e G  
(IT L O S )
- There are some rules which stretch across 
many tribunals, but it all depends on the
- Unpredictability from the current 
evidential rules is a problem. We must try
- There are no judicial tactics in 
international law, unlike domestic law. The
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area of the law. to cope with it.
- Different rules leading to different results: 
even with different rules, tribunals would 
still reach the same result, but maybe 
through different reasoning. Opinion: the 
different courts would make sure that the 
results were consistent.
-1 can see the problem with different 
evidential rules.
results should not turn on a point of 
technicality.
- Harmonization will come with time. It 
will be automatic. Since there is a dialogue 
between tribunals, things will gradually 
merge.
- Tribunals are in a community now.
J u d g e H  
( IT L O S )
- Not really. The issue is not at the 
forefront.
- There is no harm is stating the rules 
clearly, but to what extent of a difference 
will this make.
- Advantage: commonality will make 
people more comfortable. It will put parties 
in the comfort zone. This is a good thing.
- There are no disadvantages to 
commonality. Commonality may give 
perspectives of how to regulate the rules.
- Disadvantage of international tribunals is 
the lack of rules, a problem that needs 
addressing.
- Current rules have no fundamental flaws, 
but there are no concrete rules either.
- However, there is no harm in developing 
rules but current rules do not hinder the 
decision making process either.
-1 am not sure whether commonality would 
be feasible. There is not enough recognition 
of the issues as yet.
- If feasible, it is worth a go.
- The tribunals might not see the need to 
develop common rules as yet, but you never 
know. Commonality is a very valid 
academic question. Your study could 
highlight the usefulness of commonality.
-1 have no objection to commonality.
J u d g e  I 
(IT L O S )
- The flexibility of the rules can be an 
advantage or a disadvantage. There are no 
major problems because this is the nature of 
international tribunals. We have not had a 
serious problem with the flexibility. It has 
not been a hindrance.
- To a certain extent, there is a common set 
of rules already. Applying stricter rules 
would not be desirable or feasible. There 
have been no problems with the lack of 
rules so far.
J u d g e J  
(IT L O S )
- It is very rare that tribunals share similar 
cases but this is possible.
- Opinion: No need to establish common 
rules. Flexibility is enough.
- We will try to avoid inconsistency in the 
rules applied. This is important but we will 
have to see with future cases. This is not 
that important yet.
- International tribunals might eventually go 
into a system of comity but this is to be 
seen.
P a n e lis t  K
(W T O
D SB )
- The issue of commonality does not really 
crop up.
- The issue is not at the forefront.
- The increased case-load has pointed 
towards deficiencies within the WTO 
system.
- There are advantages to commonality.
- Disadvantage: tribunals were created for 
different purposes. Would not be feasible to 
have a set of common rules for everything. 
On evidential rules, this does not apply 
because it is very narrow.
- Must note that tribunals are different.
- However, on evidence, a common 
approach could work. There is merit in 
bringing some sort of commonality.
- The notion of evidential rules is narrow 
enough for there to be commonality.
- Commonality would make everything 
simpler.
- If commonality on evidential rules only, 
we should go ahead.
P a n e lis t  L
(W T O
D SB )
- Not really. The panelists follow the rules 
of the DSU.
- Panelists do not adopt their own approach 
as such. We try to stay within the area of 
“interpretation”.
- The WTO is a niche. Many see the AB 
and panels as the judiciary branch of the 
organization and the Members’ meetings as 
the legislative branch.
- 1 see the merits to common rules. The 
problem of overlapping jurisdictions is very 
real.
- The WTO panels apply general 
international law anyway so why can’t it
- Commonality is desirable, mainly for the 
reason of consistency.
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adopt procedural law as well as substantive 
law. We might need to adopt such rules in 
the future anyway.
P a n e lis t  M
(W T O
D SB )
- Not really. There is not yet a community 
of courts.
- There is a problem with overlapping 
jurisdictions of tribunals, i.e. the same 
disputes leading to different results. This 
problem can get complicated. A common 
set of rules would reduce this difficulty but 
it will not eliminate it.
- There is no need for common rules. We 
can borrow from other tribunals.
- Opinion: Good thing that parties can 
chose the forum. Part of the choice can be 
based on the particular governing 
instrument.
- We have to live with different evidential 
mles even though there might be problems. 
The solution is for one tribunal to grant 
deference to another. But then there is the 
hard question of who must give way.
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Q 9 : Is  a  se t o f  co m m o n  ru le s  ac h ie v a b le ?  W h a t  a n d  h o w  s h o u ld  it b e  d o n e ? O th e r  C o m m e n ts
Judge A 
(ICJ)
- We have suggested that courts should meet, but this was not desired by some judges.
- A good model is a judicial club, perhaps starting in the Hague involving, e.g. Dutch 
courts, ICJ and ICTY. The chairman could be on rotation (opinion: not sure whether 
the ICJ would accept this).
- Having inter-tribunal meetings would be good.
- There could be an in-house debate.
- Alternatively, we could feed the debate into a neutral like the Institut de Droit 
International, or PICT. There could be a conference.
- The ILA has too many practitioners. We should concentrate on inter-state people.
- These conferences can include NGOs.
- Q: The relationship between the tribunals is not easy to define. Do we rely on the facts 
established before another tribunal? Can we differ? Any consequences? What can be done?
- Opinion: there will be a greater readiness to call independent experts in the future, e.g. Pulp 
Mills. I am a believer in division of labour.
- 1 am for the opening up for amicus curiae briefs. Some other judges are not. The change in the 
composition of the Ct. can have an impact. With new judges, the approach will open up.
- 1 do not agree that evidential mles should be a choice for States in choosing tribunals. 
(Interviewer: This has been suggested by members of ITLOS) It could be because ITLOS is 
under worked, a reason for this desire in choice. Evidential mles should be the decisive factor.
Judge B 
(ICJ)
- Commonality would be good but it is not quite realistic. It does help to articulate 
what we are doing.
- On experts: By calling someone as an expert, the court could be seen as pre-judging the issues. 
Hard to separate the expert from his published views. The Ct. does not want this. A commission 
of 3-5 people would be more feasible.
- Team expert help on technical issues, taking us through the details. There is no examination of 
team experts but contrary arguments. Team experts tend to be the norm now. Team experts are 
time-saving. The information is of high standard with many honest views. International lawyers 
are not good at cross-examination.
Judge C 
(ICJ)
- There is already some dialogue between judges, but in an informal context such as 
dinners, etc. Opinion: Not sure what formality will achieve. E.g. Judge Higgins just 
went to ITLOS.
- Commonality will emerge. People tend to borrow stuff from one another.
- We have to be aware when our mles are different.
- The work we do is diverse. We have to be careful we recognize this diversity.
- Codifying the evidential mles will be difficult. It is a trial and error process.
- The SP of the Ct: cannot pinpoint. Have to look at the different judgments. Not a mechanical 
process. Q  reluctant to spell out the standard because of the different legal traditions. Civil 
lawyers need to be convinced whereas the Common lawyers use a more mechanical process. For 
the future, the standard depends on the case. If criminal case, we will apply relevant standard, 
almost like the Common Law standard. But, it depends. We would need an essentially criminal 
case. We cannot be precise about the definition of seriousness.
Ex. It can be dangerous for the Ct to start seeking information. Would France and Australia be 
happy if the Court would just seek facts in the Nuclear Test Case?
Judge D 
(ITLOS)
- 1 am prepared to meet with other tribunals. But I think the ICJ is sometimes not 
prepared. The amount of dialogue depends on the personality of the judge, e.g. some 
judges at the ICJ support us and some don’t.
- There could be contact between the registrars.
- Having the ICJ at the top of the hierarchy for this purpose might work but there are 
also political issues to consider. 1 don’t think it is that feasible. States have not created 
tribunals in a hierarchical format. They are for multiplication of tribunals.
-Meetings between tribunals now and then seems like a good idea, if the ICJ would 
come. This depends on the personality of the judges and the ICJ's President.
- At the beginning, members of the Tribunal were not concerned with evidential issues. We did 
not decide on a particular approach.
- The problem with international law is the lack of evidence.
- There is also a lack of time. We don’t even have time to read the evidence. There have been 
criticisms that we cannot assess the evidence properly. These issues will come to the forefront 
with full merits cases.
- We try to avoid the fragmentation of international law as much as possible.
- Opinion: some members of the ICJ feel that they are being threatened (by other tribunals). 
Some judges think there is no need for many tribunals when one will do.
Judge E 
(ITLOS)
- On technical rules, the rules are satisfactory as far as they go. There are not many rules and the 
ones in the provisions do not touch the real issues.
- The ICJ has applied a high standard, e.g. the Corfu Channel Case. The ECHR applies the BRD 
standard. The American Court of HR, the standard is PoE.
- The standard of the ICJ can vary. If there are issues with negative constitution, then apply 
BRD. Anything else, apply PoE. Opinion: This is satisfactory.
- However, most tribunals are not clear on the standard they use.
- Even if we stipulate what the standard is, there are still questions on its exact definitions. This 
is subjective.
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- It will be good if the judge can be under an obligation to explain what they have decided. 
Judges must be aware of the subjectivity.
- There are also other uses for experts, e.g. Strait of Johor, where experts were used for a 
different purpose.
- The common law judge will sit back while the civil law judge will be more inquisitorial.
Judge F 
(ITLOS)
- International judges should look at the domestic level. Domestic judges have 
meetings and conference. We should have this.
- A set of rules should be established to make States comfortable.
- The best way is through the initiation of the Presidents. There can be seminars of 
judges.
- We also need more involvement from developing countries. At the moment, 
everything is focused on Europe.
- There should be meetings of people including professors and practitioners so they 
can exchange hands-on experience.
- The flexibility of mles also brings in some problems. Sometimes, we cannot control what is 
submitted and it is very time consuming.
- We are 21 judges here so it is hard just to follow one domestic approach. Each judge just writes 
his opinion. Note: many judges here are legal diplomats.
- The system here is almost like a jury system. We just sit back, listen and decide. We don’t 
really ask many questions.
- We must note that the international system is different.
- International litigation tries to please both sides. A court is supposed to make a judicial 
decision.
Judge G 
(ITLOS)
- We must be careful when applying same rules to different matters. Tribunals are 
different, e.g. prompt release cases here, time limits are different.
- Generally, evidence problems are municipal problems. On the international plane, the problem 
could arise from the flexibility of the mles but the mles are flexible to cope with the nature of 
international law.
- The mles applied depend on the nature of the case.
Judge H 
(ITLOS)
- International tribunals bring together many legal cultures. Sometimes difficult to 
formulate rules which will suit everyone.
- The judge should keep an open mind, welcoming rules that will help him reach the 
final decision. Judge should not seek new things to be fashionable but should not 
refuse new things because they are not used to them either.
- 1 have suggested for there to be a dialogue. Useful to have one. Presidents can meet 
for an inter-tribunal dialogue.
- Could try to copy UN system where agencies meet on a regular basis with the Sec- 
Gen as the president of the meetings. The ICJ President could art as president. This 
development will be slow but worth it.
- There needs to be a brainstorm between the courts and absorb each other’s ideas. 
Each would be better off. If they reject each other’s approach, then they know why 
they are rejecting it.
- There might be problems of implementation. Who will initiate it?
- We can start by having commonality for one aspect of evidential rules, e.g. ACs. 
There needs to be a dialogue between the tribunals. If there are mles which the parties 
need setting out, would be good to do it.
- The implementation of commonality is possible but could be difficult to achieve.
- Common mles would need to recognize the specialization of tribunals, and hence 
cannot be too complicated.
- Commonality will put parties at ease knowing that they can expect the same thing 
from Court A and Court B. This is good.
- But common mles must not be too complicated as to create new problems. The 
details must be examined carefully.
- No international court has really been explicit and spelled out one set of standards for 
evidential mles.
- We must distinguish between evidence of facts and evidence of law.
- Rules in international courts are often made by scholars and not in the provisions themselves.
- The drafters of the provisions recognized the need for experts. We are not bound by what the 
experts say but their advice often leads' the tribunal to the conclusion.
- The WTO system works well because they have experts assessing party expert evidence, 
meaning the right questions are asked. Useful to have independent experts if the party evidence 
is completely contrary.
- Many tribunals are moving towards letting in ACs. Opinion: the ICJ will accept them in the 
future. We can accept anything because we don’t have to follow them.
- Opinion: the courts consider themselves as different, but there are many things which are the 
same. So many things in common.
- Courts can learn from one another. They must study each other.
- Must note: the regime as it is has nothing missing but it will be useful to have mles available.
- Opinion: the overlap of jurisdiction is a good thing. States might not be willing to go before 
one tribunal for any reason so there should be choice for it to go elsewhere. The choice does not 
have to arise from the choice in procedural mles.
- Opinion: If the evidential mles do not completely oppose one another, then it should be ok, but 
it is nice to have one set of neat mles.
- It is unlikely that two exact same disputes could arise before two tribunals.
- We have always had many courts. There has always been overlapping jurisdictions. Forum 
shopping should not be a problem because for there to be jurisdiction, there needs to be the 
consent of both parties. But this could always happen.
- States should have a choice. More choice means more chance of using 3rd party settlement.
Judge I 
(ITLOS)
- The potential conflicts between thejurispmdence of different tribunals also depend on whether 
they share similar cases, e.g. ITLOS and WTO do not share many cases. Even if cases are 
similar before two tribunals, the aspects of the cases before the two tribunals would probably be
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different anyway. But there could be problems in cases such as those concerning delimitation 
where tribunals would be dealing with similar aspects of a case.
- A lot of the mles that are laid down are just a guidance. There is a degree of fuzziness.
- Opinion: Fomm shopping is a good thing. The more choice, the better. This will encourage 
States to resolve disputes through 3rd party adjudication. The disadvantages are not 
unmanageable. Tribunals do not try to contradict one another. We give respect to the IQ.
- If the trend of the specialization of tribunals continues, then competing jurisdictions would not 
be too much of a problem.
Judge J 
(ITLOS)
- The key is that everybody should be aware of what is going on and keep in touch. It 
is better to be cooperative.
- Opinion: we will eventually try to merge the rules.
- Any proposed changes would have to consider whether there is legal backing.
- Opinion: Question: Is it worthwhile to have something formal? In ten years, 
something might have to be done. We have to learn more and gather experience.
- The question of evidence should be high on the agenda. Once we get more cases, it 
will be on our agenda.
- Fomm shopping is not such a bad thing. Tribunals exist separately. This will be the case unless 
we seek into account other tribunals.
Panelist K
(WTO
DSB)
- It is up to the governments and not the panels to change the mles on evidence.
- We should work out a “best practices” for the purposes of referrals by various 
tribunals.
- It is up to the various governments to take the initiative but we could get a consensus 
on it because it is quite a narrow area.
- The ICJ could take the initiative in leading this and passing the mles down.
- 1 would like to say something related to SP. There is an issue with confidential information that 
the defendant holds. This case was about a dumping measure, but this issue also applies to many 
subsidies cases. The defendant was in a much stronger position because they had info. The WTO 
mles say that the claimant had to prove the standing but the needed information was 
confidential. This made it difficult. It was hard to meet the SP set.
- Perhaps the SP should be reversed in such cases making it easier for the claimant and harder 
for the defendant. This should be the case of area of subsidies.
- Opinion: A lot of the expert evidence of the WTO is written. I want more oral evidence.
- Note: The chairman of the panels is very diplomatic. If the parties don’t know something, they 
can go away and prepare it. There is a relaxed atmosphere. In contrast, the AB is much more 
aggressive.
Panelist L
(WTO
DSB)
- However, a common set of mles would not be achievable in the near future. There is 
no immediate reason for the WTO to adopt the mles of other tribunals. Our mles work 
well in our own world.
- The initiative must come from the members. They are the ones who can change the 
mles.
- We can only do this through a reform of the DSU. To my knowledge, this is not on 
the agenda. There is no motivation or drive or change as yet.
- The panelists are not entitled to have or adopt a policy as such. Rules are already set out and 
can be found in the DSU and the jurisprudence. Panelists just apply the mles as they already 
exist. We are careful not to go beyond what was said by the AB.
- The non-lawyers panelists were not too bothered about technical mles.
- Opinion: The AB is trying to deal with a clash of legal cultures and avoiding this clash. But the 
dominating legal culture is the Anglo-Saxon one.
The current mles are satisfactory as far as they are applied in a consistent manner.
The marriage of the legal cultures is not a bad thing.
Panelist M
(WTO
DSB)
- The WTO needs to shift towards more formality. At the moment, it is like a meeting, 
e.g. the witnesses are not tested as much as they should be.
- When compared to the English system, international law takes a relaxed view towards 
evidential mles. This is mirrored, for example, by the fact that non-lawyers can present the case 
before international courts. The mles are relaxed.
- Opinion: Both oral and written evidence should be presented. There are benefits to both. 
Written evidence can provide more formality but oral evidence can provide spontaneity.
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